For several centuries,
Central Europe was split into a few large- or medium-sized states and
hundreds of tiny entities, which while ostensibly being within the
Holy Roman Empire ruled by the
Holy Roman Emperor, operated in a largely independent fashion. When an existing Emperor died, seven secular and ecclesiastical
prince-electors, each of whom ruled at least one of the states, would elect a new Emperor. Over time the Empire became smaller and by 1789 came to consist of primarily German peoples (aside from Bohemia, Moravia, the southern Netherlands and Slovenia). Aside from five years (1740–1745), the
Habsburg family, whose domain was
Austria, controlled the Emperorship from 1440 to 1806, although it became increasingly ceremonial only as Austria found itself at war at certain times with other states within the Empire, such as
Prussia, which in fact defeated Austria during the
War of Austrian Succession to seize the province of
Silesia in 1742. While Austria was traditionally considered the leader of the German states,
Prussia became increasingly powerful and by the late 18th century was ranked as one of the
great powers of Europe.
Francis II's abolition of the office of Holy Roman Emperor in 1806 also deprived him of his imperial authority over most of German-speaking Europe, though little true authority remained by that time; he did, however, retain firm control of an extensive multi-ethnic empire (most of it outside the previous boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire). After 1815, the
German states were once again reorganized into a loose confederation: the
German Confederation, under Austrian leadership. Prussia had been contesting Austria's supremacy in Germany since at least 1850, when a war between the two powers had nearly erupted over Berlin's leadership of the
Erfurt Union, though at that time Prussia had
backed down.
Nationalism n and
Austrian troop movements and maneuvers during the Battle of Königgrätz At the time of the war, there was no strong national consciousness in Germany. Michael Hughes notes that in regards to Germany, "nationalism was a minority movement, deeply divided and with only a marginal impact on German political life". German newspapers were almost exclusively concerned with local affairs or their respective state governments, and the individual German states cultivated loyalty towards themselves. While rivalry with France was an important element of German nationalist myth-making, many Germans cooperated with France during the Napoleonic Era, and those who resisted France did not do so out of nationalist sentiment. According to
John Breuilly, any sense of a common German identity "was weakly developed and confined to particular groups" and "there was very little demand, certainly at popular level, for unification". The liberal-nationalist concept of a united Germany had also become unpopular following the fall of the
Frankfurt Parliament in 1849. One of the strongest social forces in Germany at the time was religion, which provided Germans with common confessional values and identities that transcended national boundaries. This led to a strong confessional rivalry between the southern Catholic and northern Protestant states. Breuilly remarks that the confessional rivalry was so strong that "a Hamburg Lutheran had more in common with a Swedish Lutheran than with an Austrian Catholic". The minor nations of Germany valued their independence and believed that their ability to remain sovereign depended on Austro-Prussian dualism, with neither side allowed to become too powerful. Confessional division also played an important role in German dualism, and there was a strong pressure in Catholic states to support Austria. In the absence of nationalist sentiment, a united German state could only be created through external force.
Bismarck's plot There are many interpretations of
Otto von Bismarck's behaviour before the Austrian-Prussian war. Bismarck himself maintained that he orchestrated the conflict in order to bring about the North German Confederation, the
Franco-Prussian War and the eventual unification of Germany. On 22 February 1866,
Count Károlyi, Austrian ambassador in
Berlin, sent a dispatch to the Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Count Alexander Mensdorff-Pouilly. He explained to him that Prussian public opinion had become extremely sensitive about the Duchies issue and that he had no doubt that "this artificial exaggeration of the danger by public opinion formed an essential part of the calculations and actions of Count Bismarck [who considered] the annexation of the Duchies ... a matter of life and death for his political existence [and wished] to make it appear such for Prussia too." Possible evidence can be found in Bismarck's orchestration of the Austrian alliance during the
Second Schleswig War against Denmark, which can be seen as his diplomatic "masterstroke". Taylor also believes that the alliance was a "test for Austria rather than a trap" and that the goal was not war with Austria, contradicting what Bismarck later gave in his memoirs as his main reason for establishing the alliance. It was in the Prussian interest to gain an alliance with Austria to defeat Denmark and settle the
issue of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. The alliance can be regarded as an aid to Prussian expansion, rather than a provocation of war against Austria. Many historians believe that Bismarck was simply a Prussian
expansionist, rather than a German nationalist, who sought the unification of Germany. It was at the
Gastein Convention that the Austrian alliance was set up to lure Austria into war. Italy gave a good chance to Bismarck as it wanted to annex the remainder of
Emperor Francis Joseph's
Kingdom of Lombardy-Venetia. The timing of the
Italo-Prussian Alliance of 8 April 1866 was perfect, because all other European powers were either bound by relations that forbade them from entering the conflict opposed to Berlin, or had domestic problems that had priority. Obvious reasons why none of the great powers of Europe was about to intervene are listed below:
Russia: Saint Petersburg was unlikely to enter on the side of Vienna, due to ill will over Francis Joseph's support for the Anglo-French alliance during the
Crimean War despite the
house of Romanov's aid to him against the
Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–1849. Moreover, Prussia had stood by Russia during the
January Uprising in Poland, signing the
Alvensleben Convention of February 1863 with the Empire, whereas Austria had not.
France: Paris was also unlikely to enter on the side of Austria, because Bismarck had visited Emperor
Napoleon III in
Biarritz and they allegedly discussed whether or not France would intervene in a potential Austro-Prussian war. The details of the negotiation are unknown but many historians think Bismarck was guaranteed French neutrality in the event of a war.
Britain: London focused on its own affairs in
splendid isolation and had no stake economically or politically in a war between the Central European powers, thus, was not going to intervene. This meant that Austria would be fighting both Italy and Prussia, without any non-German allies of its own. Bismarck was aware of an available numerical superiority but still "he was not prepared to advise it immediately even though he gave a favourable account of the international situation".
Military factors ) commemorates some of the heaviest fighting during the Battle of Königgrätz. Bismarck may well have been encouraged to go to war by the advantages of the Prussian army against the Austrian Empire. Taylor wrote that Bismarck was reluctant to pursue war as it "deprived him of control and left the decisions to the generals whose ability he distrusted". (The two most important personalities within the Prussian army were the War Minister
Albrecht Graf von Roon and Chief of the General Staff
Helmuth Graf von Moltke). Taylor suggested that Bismarck was hoping to force Austrian leaders into concessions in Germany, rather than provoke war. The truth may be more complicated than simply that Bismarck, who famously said that "politics is the art of the possible", initially sought war with Austria or was initially against the idea of going to war with Austria.
Rival military systems In 1862, von Roon had implemented several army reforms that ensured that all Prussian citizens were liable to conscription. Before this date, the size of the army had been fixed by earlier laws that had not taken population growth into account, making conscription inequitable and unpopular for this reason. While some Prussian men remained in the army or the reserves until they were forty years old, about one man in three (or even more in some regions where the population had expanded greatly as a result of industrialisation) was assigned minimal service in the , the home guard. Introducing universal conscription for three years increased the size of the active duty army and provided Prussia with a reserve army equal in size to that which Moltke deployed against Austria. Had France under Napoleon III attempted to intervene against the Prussians, they could have faced him with equal or superior numbers of troops. Prussian conscript service was one of continuous training and drill, in contrast to the Austrian army where some commanders routinely dismissed infantry conscripts to their homes on permanent leave soon after their induction into the army, retaining only a cadre of long-term soldiers for formal parades and routine duties. Austrian conscripts had to be trained almost from scratch when they were recalled to their units on the outbreak of war. The Prussian army was thus better trained and disciplined than their enemy's one, particularly in the infantry. While the Habsburg Empire's cavalry and artillery were as well trained as their Prussian counterparts, with Austria possessing two elite divisions of heavy cavalry, weapons and tactics had advanced since the
Napoleonic Wars and cavalry charges had been rendered obsolete.
Speed of mobilization is cheered on by his troops. The Prussian army was locally based, organized in (military districts, lit.: circles), each containing a Korps headquarters and its component units. Most reservists lived close to their regimental depots and could be swiftly mobilized. Austrian policy was to ensure that units were stationed far from home to prevent them from taking part in separatist revolts. Conscripts on leave or reservists recalled to their units during mobilization faced a journey that might take weeks before they could report to their units, making the Austrian mobilization much slower than that of the Prussian Army.
Speed of concentration The railway system of Prussia was more extensively developed than that within Austria. Railways made it possible to supply larger numbers of troops than hitherto and allowed the rapid movement of troops within friendly territory. The more efficient Prussian rail network allowed the Prussian army to concentrate more rapidly than their enemy. Moltke, reviewing his plans to Roon stated, "We have the inestimable advantage of being able to carry our Field Army of 285,000 men over five railway lines and of virtually concentrating them in twenty-five days. ... Austria has only one railway line and it will take her forty-five days to assemble 200,000 men." Moltke had also said earlier, "Nothing could be more welcome to us than to have now the war that we must have." The Austrian army under
Ludwig von Benedek in
Bohemia (the present-day
Czech Republic) might previously have been expected to enjoy the advantage of the "central position", by being able to concentrate on successive attacking armies strung out along the frontier, but the quicker Prussian concentration nullified this advantage. By the time the Austrians were fully assembled, they would be unable to concentrate against one Prussian army without having the other two instantly attack their flank and rear, threatening their lines of communication.
Armaments and tactics Prussian infantry were equipped with the
Dreyse needle gun, a bolt-action rifle which could be fired faster than the
muzzle-loading Lorenz rifles of the Austrian army. In the
Franco-Austrian War of 1859, French troops took advantage of poorly trained enemies who did not readjust their gunsights as they got closerthus firing too high at close range. By rapidly closing the range, French troops came to close quarters with an advantage over the enemy's infantry. After the war, the Austrians adopted the same methods, which they termed the ("shock tactics"). Although they had some warnings of the Prussian weapon, they ignored these and retained . The Austrians were equipped with breech-loading rifled cannon, which was superior to the Prussian muzzle loading smooth bore cannon. Their artillery used a unique rifling system invented by
Wilhelm Lenk von Wolfsberg called the Lenk system. The Prussians, however, by this point had replaced up to 60% of their smooth bore artillery with the technologically superior
C64 (field gun), which had been in production since 1859. However, due to tactical reluctance on the part of Prussian high command to utilise relatively unfamiliar technology, and doctrinal stagnation in the Artillery Corps, the modern
Krupp guns were either sent to reserve units or used in tandem and to the same effect as their smooth bore counterparts, something that massively throttled their effectiveness in the war, and many of the guns that saw combat were the old smooth bore muzzle loaders. The Austrians too, while having standardised the Lenk system of rifling in their cannon, did not use their artillery to full effect. They specifically targeted the Prussian artillery with their own batteries, limiting their impact on the battlefield in regards to Prussian infantry. One notable exception is the use of Austrian artillery to good effect against infantry at
Battle of Königgrätz. The generals of the Prussian army realized that, in order to stay ahead of their Austrian and later French enemies, they needed to explore new military tactics. They sent officers to travel across the Atlantic Ocean to go and observe the American Civil War. These officers met with high ranking commanders and recorded both Union and Confederate tactics. They wrote about troop movements, artillery positioning, and new methods of attack that worked well for the Americans. These officers then travelled back to Prussia and briefed their generals about these observations. Some officers, such as
Justus Scheibert, published their adventures in America for the public to enjoy.
Economic factors In 1866, the Prussian economy was rapidly growing, partly as a result of the German customs union, the , which gave Prussia an advantage in the war. Prussia could equip its armies with
breech-loading rifles and later with new
Krupp breech-loading
artillery but the Austrian economy was suffering from the effects of the
Hungarian Revolution of 1848 and the
Second Italian War of Independence, so the state was heavily in debt. Historian
Christopher Clark wrote that there is little to suggest that Prussia had an overwhelming economic and industrial advantage over Austria and wrote that a larger portion of the Prussian population was engaged in agriculture than in the Austrian population and that Austrian industry could produce the most sophisticated weapons in the war (rifled artillery). The Austro-Prussian War ended quickly and was fought mainly with existing weapons and munitions, which reduced the influence of economic and industrial power relative to politics and military culture. == Alliances ==