It is common to draw a distinction in the treatment of authors and other interested parties between common law jurisdictions and civil law systems. Both copyright and authors' rights arose in the eighteenth century to address similar problems: the inequality in relations between authors and publishers (and between publishers themselves) if
intellectual property is not recognized and protected, and the need to provide an income for authors other than
patronage. Both systems provide for a
monopoly right granted to the author for a limited term which can be transferred to another person, which was initially the right to copy or otherwise reproduce the work (hence "copyright") but has since been expanded to take account of technological developments. It is an essential feature of authors' rights and of many copyright laws that the object which is protected must arise from the creativity of the author rather than from
their simple effort or investment (see
Feist v. Rural in the
United States): both
French and
German copyright laws protect "works of the mind" (''oeuvres de l'esprit
and persönliche geistige Schöpfungen'', respectively). This has led civil law systems to adopt a strong link between the rights (at least initially) and the person of the author: the initial ownership rights by a
corporation are severely restricted or even impossible (as in
Germany). Common law jurisdictions are more willing to accept corporate ownership of copyright, as in the U. S.
work for hire principle. Although the following comparison is simplistic and dependent on the exact laws of individual countries, it is difficult to see an effective (economic) difference in the two situations: • Common law: employer owns the copyright in work created by employees • Civil law: employer enjoys an exclusive licence to the economic rights in work created by employees Civil law systems have also been forceful in protecting the moral rights of authors, arguing that their creativity deserves protection as an integral part of their personality. The protection of the personality in common law jurisdiction has for long been separate from the law of copyright, embodied in such
torts as
defamation (also
passing off and
malicious falsehood). Moral rights were not, therefore, explicitly mentioned in
UK copyright law until 1988, over a century after the United Kingdom signed the Berne Convention. The difference runs both ways: UK and Irish copyright laws protect the privacy of the subject of certain photographs and films as a moral right under copyright law, while civil law systems treat this as a separate
portrait right. The different protections of
industrial design rights cut across the divide between the two systems of law. == Use in European Union law ==