Avian influenza

Because of the impact of avian influenza on economically important chicken farms, a classification system was devised in 1981 which divided avian virus strains as either highly pathogenic (and therefore potentially requiring vigorous control measures) or low pathogenic. The test for this is based solely on the effect on chickens – a virus strain is highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) if 75% or more of chickens die after being deliberately infected with it. The alternative classification is low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI). This classification system has since been modified to take into account the structure of the virus' haemagglutinin protein. Other species of birds, especially water birds, can become infected with HPAI virus without experiencing severe symptoms and can spread the infection over large distances; the exact symptoms depend on the species of bird and the strain of virus. Since 2006, the World Organization for Animal Health requires all LPAI H5 and H7 detections to be reported because of their potential to mutate into highly pathogenic strains. == Virology ==

(TEM) of the reconstructed 1918 pandemic influenza virus. The bottom structure represents membrane debris from the cells used to amplify the virus. Avian influenza is caused by the influenza A virus which principally affects birds but can also infect humans and other mammals. Influenza A is an RNA virus with a genome comprising a negative-sense, RNA segmented genome that encodes 11 viral genes. The virus particle (also called the virion) is 80–120 nanometers in diameter and elliptical or filamentous in shape. There is evidence that the virus can survive for long periods in freshwater after being excreted in feces by its avian host, and can withstand prolonged freezing. There are two proteins on the surface of the viral envelope; hemagglutinin and neuraminidase. Hemagglutinin (H) is an antigenic glycoprotein which binds to sialic acid receptors on the surface of the host cell, thereby mediating the entry of the virus into the host cell. Neuraminidase (N) is an antigenic glycosylated enzyme which facilitates the release of progeny viruses from infected cells. There are 18 known types of hemagglutinin, of which H1 thru H16 have been found in birds, and 11 types of neuraminidase. Further variations exist within the subtypes and can lead to very significant differences in the virus's ability to infect and cause disease. Influenza virus nomenclature To unambiguously describe a specific isolate of virus, researchers use the internationally accepted Influenza virus nomenclature, which describes, among other things, the species of animal from which the virus was isolated, and the place and year of collection. As an example, A/chicken/Nakorn-Patom/Thailand/CU-K2/04(H5N1): • A stands for the genus of influenza (A, B or C) • chicken is the animal species the isolate was found in (note: human isolates lack this component term and are thus identified as human isolates by default) • Nakorn-Patom/Thailand is the place this specific virus was isolated • CU-K2 is the laboratory reference number that identifies it from other influenza viruses isolated at the same place and year • 04 represents the year of isolation 2004 • H5 stands for the fifth of several known types of the protein hemagglutinin • N1 stands for the first of several known types of the protein neuraminidase. Other examples include: A/duck/Hong Kong/308/78(H5N3), A/avian/NY/01(H5N2), A/chicken/Mexico/31381-3/94(H5N2), and A/shoveler/Egypt/03(H5N2). Genetic characterization Analysis of the virus' genome enables researchers to determine the order of its nucleotides. Comparison of the genome of a virus with that of a different virus can reveal differences between the two viruses. Genetic variations are important because they can change amino acids that make up the influenza virus’ proteins, resulting in structural changes to the proteins, and thereby altering properties of the virus. Some of these properties include the ability to evade immunity and the ability to cause severe disease. There are a number of factors that generally prevent avian influenza viruses from causing epidemics in humans or other mammals. • The viral HA protein of avian influenza binds to alpha-2,3 sialic acid receptors, which are present in the respiratory tract and intestines of avian species, while human influenza HA binds to alpha-2,6 sialic acid receptors, which are present in the human upper respiratory tract. • The myxovirus resistance protein (Mx1) is an important antiviral restriction factor that inhibits the replication of avian influenza viruses in particular. Human-adapted strains of IAV display reduced sensitivity to human Mx1 compared with avian strains. Influenza viruses are constantly changing as small genetic mutations accumulate, a process known as antigenic drift. Over time, mutation may lead to a change in antigenic properties such that host antibodies (acquired through vaccination or prior infection) do not provide effective protection, causing a fresh outbreak of disease. The segmented genome of influenza viruses facilitates genetic reassortment. This can occur if a host is infected simultaneously with two different strains of influenza virus; then it is possible for the viruses to interchange genetic material as they reproduce in the host cells. Thus, an avian influenza virus can acquire characteristics, such as the ability to infect humans, from a different virus strain. The presence of both alpha 2,3 and alpha 2,6 sialic acid receptors in pig tissues allows for co-infection by avian influenza and human influenza viruses. This susceptibility makes pigs a potential "melting pot" for the reassortment of influenza A viruses. == Epidemiology ==

History Avian influenza (historically known as fowl plague) is caused by bird-adapted strains of the influenza type A virus. in New York City advising against handling birds Birds – Influenza A viruses of various subtypes have a large reservoir in wild waterbirds of the orders Anseriformes (for example, ducks, geese, and swans) and Charadriiformes (for example, gulls, terns, and waders) which can infect the respiratory and gastrointestinal tract without affecting the health of the host. They can then be carried by the bird over large distances, especially during annual migration. Infected birds can shed avian influenza A viruses in their saliva, nasal secretions, and feces; susceptible birds become infected when they have contact with the virus as it is shed by infected birds. The virus can survive for long periods in water and at low temperatures, and can be spread from one farm to another on farm equipment. Domesticated birds (chickens, turkeys, ducks, etc.) may become infected with avian influenza A viruses through direct contact with infected waterfowl or other infected poultry, or through contact with contaminated feces or surfaces. In 2024, the clade 2.3.4.4b H5N1 was documented causing high mortality in migratory shorebirds, particularly in sanderlings (Calidris alba) along the Atlantic coast of the United States. Affected birds exhibited severe brain and pancreatic damage, highlighting the vulnerability of some shorebird species to HPAI during migration stopovers. Avian influenza outbreaks in domesticated birds are of concern for several reasons. There is potential for low pathogenic avian influenza viruses (LPAI) to evolve into strains which are high pathogenic to poultry (HPAI), and subsequent potential for significant illness and death among poultry during outbreaks. Because of this, international regulations state that any detection of H5 or H7 subtypes (regardless of their pathogenicity) must be notified to the appropriate authority. It is also possible that avian influenza viruses could be transmitted to humans and other animals which have been exposed to infected birds, causing infection with unpredictable but sometimes fatal consequences. When an HPAI infection is detected in poultry, it is normal to cull infected animals and those nearby in an effort to rapidly contain, control and eradicate the disease. This is done together with movement restrictions, improved hygiene and biosecurity, and enhanced surveillance. All subtypes of avian Influenza A have potential to cross the species barrier, with H5N1 considered the biggest threat. In order to avoid infection, the general public are advised to avoid contact with sick birds or potentially contaminated material such as carcasses or feces. People working with birds, such as conservationists or poultry workers, are advised to wear appropriate personal protection equipment. Other animals – a wide range of other animals have been affected by avian flu, generally due to eating birds which had been infected. There have been instances where transmission of the disease between mammals, including seals and cows, may have occurred. Pandemic potential Influenza viruses have a relatively high mutation rate that is characteristic of RNA viruses. The segmentation of the influenza A virus genome facilitates genetic recombination by segment reassortment in hosts who become infected with two different strains of influenza viruses at the same time. With reassortment between strains, an avian strain which does not affect humans may acquire characteristics from a different strain which enable it to infect and pass between humans – a zoonotic event. It is possible (though not certain) that pigs may act as an intermediate host for reassortment. , there is concern about the H5N1 subtype of avian influenza which is circulating in wild bird populations worldwide. Surveillance The Global Influenza Surveillance and Response System (GISRS) is a global network of laboratories that monitor the spread of influenza with the aim to provide the World Health Organization with influenza control information and to inform vaccine development. Several millions of specimens are tested by the GISRS network annually through a network of laboratories in 127 countries. As well as human viruses, GISRS monitors avian, swine, and other potentially zoonotic influenza viruses. Vaccines Poultry – it is possible to vaccinate poultry against specific strains of HPAI influenza. Vaccination should be combined with other control measures such as infection monitoring, early detection and biosecurity. A vaccine against the H7N9 subtype, which has also infected humans, has undergone a limited amount of testing. In the event of an outbreak, the "candidate" vaccine would be rapidly tested for safety as well as efficacy against the zoonotic strain, and then authorised and distributed to vaccine manufacturers. Zoonotic influenza vaccine Seqirus is authorized for use in the European Union. It is an H5N8 vaccine that is intended to provide acquired immunity against H5 subtype influenza A viruses. ==Domestic animals==

Several domestic species have been infected with and shown symptoms of H5N1 viral infection, including cats, dogs, ferrets, pigs, chickens and turkeys. Poultry Commercially important poultry species, including chickens, turkeys, and ducks, can be seriously affected by avian flu. An outbreak of a highly pathogenic strain (HPAI) on a poultry farm can lead to devastating consequences, including mortality rates approaching 100%, consequent economic losses, and potential risks to both animal and human health. When a highly pathogenic strain (HPAI) is detected on a farm, the immediate response involves strict biosecurity measures and, in most cases, slaughter of the affected flock to prevent further spread. A general lack of genetic diversity in commercial poultry, which are often maintained in crowded conditions, makes them particularly vulnerable to avian flu. Dairy cows During April 2024, avian influenza was first detected in dairy cows in several US states and subsequently spread more widely through the year. Influenza A(H5N1) was found to be present at high levels in the mammary glands and in the milk of affected cows. It was shown that the virus can persist on milking equipment, which provides a probable transmission route for cow-to-cow and cow-to-human spread. A number of humans who had been in contact with cows tested positive for the virus, with mild symptoms. According to CDC, 7% of 115 dairy workers had evidence of recent infection in a study from Michigan and Colorado from June to August 2024 – half of them asymptomatic. This is higher than estimates from prior transmission studies in poultry. All dairy workers had worked in cleaning the milk parlor and none had used personal protective equipment. In February 2025, a second type of avian flu, named D1.1, was confirmed in cattle in Nevada, besides the B3.13 circulating in cattle since late 2023, which has infected more than 950 herds in 16 states. This new strain had been present in poultry and "more than a dozen people exposed to poultry" causing mild symptoms but was also found in a dairy worker in Churchill County, Nevada. Cats == Global aspects ==

Global measures In 2005, the formation of the International Partnership on Avian and Pandemic Influenza was announced in order to elevate the importance of avian flu, coordinate efforts, and improve disease reporting and surveillance in order to better respond to future pandemics. New networks of laboratories have emerged to detect and respond to avian flu, such as the Crisis Management Center for Animal Health, the Global Avian Influenza Network for Surveillance, OFFLU, and the Global Early Warning System for major animal diseases. After the 2003 outbreak, WHO member states have also recognized the need for more transparent and equitable sharing of vaccines and other benefits from these networks. Cooperative measures created in response to HPAI have served as a basis for programs related to other emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases. Impact on national policies HPAI control has also been used for political ends. In Indonesia, negotiations with global response networks were used to recentralize power and funding to the Ministry of Health. In Vietnam, policymakers, with the support of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), used HPAI control to accelerate the industrialization of livestock production for export by proposing to increase the portion of large-scale commercial farms and reducing the number of poultry keepers from 8 to 2 million by 2010. Traditional Asian practices Backyard poultry production was viewed as "traditional Asian" agricultural practices that contrasted with modern commercial poultry production and seen as a threat to biosecurity. Backyard production appeared to hold greater risk than commercial production due to lack of biosecurity and close contact with humans, though HPAI spread in intensively raised flocks was greater due to high density rearing and genetic homogeneity. Asian culture itself was blamed as the reason why certain interventions, such as those that only looked at place-based interventions, would fail without looking for multifaceted solutions. As egg production diminished, prices surged, placing a financial burden on consumers and businesses reliant on eggs for food production. When egg prices increase, this low-cost source of animal proteins become less available to low-income consumers, making them the hardest hit. In February 2025, to combat avian influenza, the USDA created a five-pronged strategy to combat highly pathogenic avian influenza and lower egg prices. This included strengthening biosecurity measures, expediting relief for farmers to accelerate repopulation, reducing regulatory burdens to expand supply and lower prices, investing $100 million in avian flu research and vaccine development, and exploring temporary import-export adjustments to stabilize supply. Through this, the New York wholesale egg prices that peaked at $8.53 per dozen steadily declined to $4.08 from 26 February, to 19 March 2025. , New York in February 2025, caused by the 2020–2025 H5N1 outbreak Approximately 20% of the protein consumed in developing countries come from poultry. As poultry serves as a source of food security and liquid assets, the most vulnerable populations were poor, small scale farmers. The loss of birds due to HPAI and culling in Vietnam led to an average loss of 2.3 months of production and US$69–108 for households where many have an income of $2 a day or less. The loss of food security for vulnerable households can be seen in the stunting of children under five in Egypt. Women are another population at risk as in most regions of the world, small flocks are tended to by women. Widespread culling also resulted in the decreased enrollment of girls in school in Turkey. == See also ==