as a Peruvian general during the Ayacucho campaign The defeat of Canterac forced La Serna to bring
Jerónimo Valdés in from
Potosí on a
forced march with his troops. The royalist generals debated their plans. In spite of the signs of support from within the besieged
Cusco, the viceroy rejected a direct assault because of his army's lack of training, having been enlarged by the massive return of peasants a few weeks earlier. Instead, he intended to cut Sucre's
rearguard through march and
countermarch maneuvers, which led to the encounter in Ayacucho along the Andean range. The royalists planned a quick strike which they made on 3 December in the
Battle of Corpahuaico or Matará, where they cost the liberator army more than 500 casualties and much of its ammunition and artillery, vs their own losses of only 30 men. However, Sucre and his adjutant managed to keep his troops organized and prevented the viceroy from exploiting this success. Although he had suffered great losses of men and materiel, Sucre kept the
United Army in an orderly retreat, and always situated it in secure positions that were difficult to access, such as
quinoa fields. In his memoirs,
In the Service of the Republic of Peru, General
Guillermo Miller explained the point of view of the independentists. Besides Bolívar and Sucre, the United Army drew on a large body of experienced soldiers; for example, the rifles battalion of the army of Colombia was composed of European troops, mostly British volunteers. This unit was substantially damaged at
Battle of Corpahuaico. Among its ranks were veterans of the
Peninsular War, the
American War of Independence, and the
Spanish–American Wars, and individuals such as the Anglo-German major , a veteran of the 1812
Battle of Borodino against
Napoleón Bonaparte in Russia. A number of
British and Irish volunteer officers fought with Bolívar's forces in Ayacucho, including general
William Miller. But the bulk of the foreign troops, who had taken part in most of the campaign, remained at the rear in reserve during this battle. The royalists had exhausted their resources in a marching war without achieving a decisive victory against the liberator army. Because of the extremely harsh conditions in the Andes, both armies felt the effects of disease and desertion. The royalist commanders positioned themselves in the heights of
Kunturkunka, a good defensive position but one they couldn't hold for long, given that they had food supplies for less than five days. This would mean certain defeat upon the arrival of the expected Colombian reinforcements. The royalist army had to make a desperate decision: the Battle of Ayacucho was about to begin.
Battle disposition Debate exists regarding the number of troops on each side, but both armies initially had similar forces (8,500 independents vs. 9,310 royalists), however these numbers dropped over the next weeks until the day of the battle, when there were perhaps 5,780 independentists vs. 6,906 royalists.
United Liberation Army •
Commander: Marshal
Antonio José de Sucre •
Chief of High Command – General
Agustín Gamarra •
Cavalry – General
William Miller •
First Division – General
José María Córdoba (2,300 men) •
Second Division – General
José de La Mar (1,580 men) •
Reserve – General
Jacinto Lara (1,700 men) Before the battle began, de Sucre addressed his troops assembled in the field: Marshal Sucre does not mention in this part the mounted grenadiers of Río de la Plata. General Miller in his
Memoirs of General Miller: in the service of the republic of Peru described the composition of the armies under Sucre: Miller's assertion that the Junín Hussars were in his division contradicts what Sucre said in the part.
Royalist Army of Perú •
Commander: Viceroy José de la Serna •
Chief of the High Command – Lieutenant General
José de Canterac •
Cavalry Commander – Brigadier
Valentín Ferraz •
Vanguard Division – General
Jerónimo Valdés (2,006 men) •
First Division – General (2,000 men) •
Second Division – General Alejandro González Villalobos (1,700 men) •
Reserve Division – General
José Carratalá (1,200 men)
Battle The plan, devised by Canterac, envisaged that the vanguard division would flank the enemy force, crossing the river Pampas to secure the units to the left of Sucre. Meanwhile, the rest of the royalist army would descend frontally from the
Condorcunca hill, abandoning its defensive position on the high ground and charging against the main body of the enemy, which they expected to be disorganized. The 'Gerona' and 'Ferdinand VII' battalions served as reserves, deployed in a second line to be sent in wherever they were required. Sucre immediately realized the risky nature of the royalists' maneuver, which became clear as the royalists found themselves moving onto an exposed slope, unable to protect their movements.
José María Córdova's division, supported by Miller's cavalry, strafed the disorganized bulk of royalist troops, incapable of forming into battle-lines and descending in waves from the mountain. As the attack started, Independentist general Córdova uttered his famous words "
Division, armas a discreción, de frente, paso de vencedores" (
Division, arms at ease; at the pace of victors, forward!). shows General José María Córdova leading the 2nd Colombian division into their assault. Colonel , who commanded the first royalist regiment, had to protect the artillery, which was pulled by mules. He moved forward carelessly into the plain, where his unit was exposed and badly mauled. He himself was killed during the attack by Córdova's division, whose effective fire on the royalist formations pushed back the scattered fighters of Villalobos’ Second Division. Seeing the misfortune suffered by his left flank, royalist general Monet, without waiting for his cavalry to form in the plain, crossed the ravine and led his First division against Córdova, managing to form two of his battalions into battle order but, suddenly attacked by the independents' division, he was surrounded before the rest of his troops could also form into battle order; during these events Monet was wounded and three of his commanders killed; the scattered divisions of the royalists dragged with them the masses of militia. The royalist cavalry under
Valentín Ferraz y Barrau charged upon the enemy squadrons that pursued Monet's broken left but the confusion and the crossfire from the infantry, caused heavy casualties to Ferraz's horsemen, whose survivors were forced to hastily leave the battlefield. At the other end of the line, the Independentist Second Division of
José de La Mar plus the Third Division of
Jacinto Lara altogether stopped the assault made by the veterans of Valdés’ vanguard, who had launched themselves to take an isolated building occupied by some independentist companies. Although defeated at first, the independentists were soon reinforced and went back to the attack, eventually helped by the victorious Córdova's division. Seeing the confusion in the royalist lines, Viceroy La Serna and the other commanders tried to regain control of the battle and reorganize the scattered and fleeing men. General Canterac himself led the reserve division across the plain; however, the 'Gerona' battalions were not the same veterans who fought in the battles of
Torata and Moquegua. In Olañeta's rebellion these divisions lost almost all their veterans and even their former commander, Cayetano Ameller, and this unit, composed of raw recruits, quickly scattered before it met the enemy. The 'Ferdinand VII' battalion followed, after a feeble resistance. By one o'clock the viceroy had been wounded and made prisoner, along with many of his officers. Even though Valdés’ division was still fighting to the right of his front, the battle was a victory for independentists. Independentist casualties, according to Sucre, were 370 killed and 609 wounded, and the royalists lost about 1800 dead and 700 wounded. With the remnants of his division, Valdés managed to retreat to the hill held by his rearguard, where he joined 200 cavalrymen who had gathered around general Canterac and some scattered soldiers from royalist divisions, whose fleeing and demoralized men shot and killed their own officers, who were trying to regroup them). The now heavily reduced force had no hope of defeating the independentist army. With the main body of the royal army destroyed and the viceroy himself in the hands of his enemies, royalist leaders surrendered.
Capitulation of Ayacucho ). With Viceroy de la Serna seriously injured, the agreement between the two sides was negotiated by royalist commander Canterac and general Sucre. Canterac wrote: The principal terms of the agreement were: • The royalist army under command of viceroy La Serna agreed to end hostilities. • Remaining royalist soldiers were to remain in the Callao fortresses. • The Peruvian republic should pay the debt to the countries that gave military contributions to the independence movement. In Lima, Bolívar summoned the
Congress of Panama, on 7 December, to unite the new independent countries. The project was ratified by
Gran Colombia only. Four years later, due to the personal ambitions of many of its generals and the absence of a united vision that foresaw South America as a single nation, Gran Colombia would end up splitting into the countries that exist today in South America, frustrating Bolívar's dream of union.
Conspiracy theories about the Battle of Ayacucho Spanish historian Juan Carlos Losada calls the surrender of the royalists the "Ayacucho betrayal". He says that the result of the battle had already been agreed between opposing commanders, arguing that Juan Antonio Monet was responsible for the agreement: "the main characters kept a deep pact of silence and, therefore, we can only speculate, although with little risk of being wrong" (Page 254). He argues that a capitulation without battle would have been undoubtedly judged as treason, but defeat allowed the losing commanders to retain their honour. The theory assumes that liberal-minded commanders in the royalist army preferred an independentist victory to the triumph of an absolutist authoritarian Spain. In the conspiracy-minded atmosphere of the time, several commanders were accused of belonging to the Freemasons, as were independentist leaders, and certainly did not sympathise with king Ferdinand VII's ideas, considering him a tyrannical absolutist monarch. Spanish commander Andrés García Camba says in his memoirs that returning Spanish officers, latter known as "
ayacuchos", were unjustly accused of betrayal upon their arrival to Spain, being told by one general, in an accusatory manner, "sirs, in this case we suffered a Masonic defeat"; the veterans replied - "it was lost, my general, in the way battles are lost". ==Aftermath==