Italian capture of Kassala Amedeo, Duke of Aosta the
Viceroy and
Governor-General of
Italian East Africa ( [AOI], commander in chief of (Italian East African Armed Forces Command) and (General of the Air Force) ordered an Italian attack on Kassala,
Anglo-Egyptian Sudan to begin on 4 July 1940 after Italy had declared war on Britain and France on 10 June. Three columns of Italian and colonial forces comprising about launched the assault, supported by the and some
cavalry squadrons acting as vanguards. Kassala was defended by fewer than of the
Sudan Defence Force (SDF, Major-General
William Platt the [Leader of the Army], known as the ) and local police, who remained under cover during a twelve-hour bombardment by the
Regia Aeronautica, then knocked out six Italian tanks and inflicted considerable casualties on the attackers. At Italian cavalry entered Kassala and the defenders withdrew to Butana Bridge, having lost one man killed, three wounded and 26 missing, some of whom rejoined their units. Italian casualties were 43 men killed and 114 wounded. At Kassala, the 12th Colonial Brigade built anti-tank defences, machine-gun posts and strongpoints. During the Italian attack at Kassala, General
Pietro Gazzera, the Governor of Galla-Sidamo captured the Sudan fort of
Gallabat with a battalion of Italian colonial troops and (irregulars with Italian officers). Gallabat was placed under the command of Colonel Castagnola and fortified. Karora was occupied unopposed and on 7 July, another colonial battalion and supported by artillery and aircraft, attacked
Kurmuk and overcame sixty Sudanese police after a short engagement. The Italian attacks had gained a valuable entry point to Sudan at Kassala and by capturing Gallabat made it harder for the British to support the indigenous Ethiopian resistance fighters, the
Arbegnoch (Patriots), in Gojjam. The loss of Kurmuk prompted some of the locals to resort to banditry; local Sudanese opinion was impressed by the Italian successes but the population of Kassala continued to support the British and supplied valuable information during the occupation. The SDF continued to operate close to Kassala and on 5 July, a company of the 2nd Battalion,
Royal Warwickshire Regiment arrived at Gedaref; the British discovered that exaggerated rumours of the arrival had reached the Italians. Platt decided to bluff the Italians into believing that there were far greater forces on the Sudan border; an Italian map captured on 25 July showed that around 20,000 British and Sudanese troops were believed to be in Kassala province.
Italian plans After the conquest of British Somaliland, the Italians in the AOI adopted a more defensive posture. In late 1940, Italian forces had suffered defeats in the
Mediterranean, the
Western Desert, the
Battle of Britain and in the
Greco-Italian War. General
Ugo Cavallero, the new Italian Chief of the General
Staff in Rome, adopted a new strategy in East Africa. In December 1940, Cavallero ordered the Italian forces in East Africa to concentrate on the defence of the AOI by withdrawing to better defensive positions. On 31 December, Frusci ordered a retirement from the area north of Kassala along the track east of Sabdaret with outposts at Serobatib and Adaret, with a mobile force at Sabdaret as a reserve. Earlier in the month, Frusci had received orders from Rome to cancel plans to invade Sudan, withdraw from Kassala and Metemma in the lowlands along the Sudan–Eritrea border and hold the more easily defended mountain passes on the Kassala–
Agordat and Metemma–Gondar roads. Frusci was reluctant to withdraw from the lowlands, because it would be a propaganda defeat after he had announced that the British were about to attack and would be defeated. Kassala was also an important railway junction; holding it prevented the British from using the railway to carry supplies from Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast to the base at Gedaref.
British plans In November 1940, Gazelle Force operated from the
Gash river delta against Italian advanced posts around Kassala on the Ethiopian plateau, where hill ranges from bound wide valleys and the rainfall makes the area malarial from July to October. After a British reverse at Gallabat in November, Wavell held a review of the situation in Cairo from 1 to 2 December. With Compass imminent in Egypt, the British forces in East Africa were to provide help to the Patriots in Ethiopia and continue to pressure the Italians at Gallabat. Kassala was to be recaptured early in January 1941, to prevent an Italian advance deeper into Sudan and the
4th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General
Noel Beresford-Peirse) was to be transferred from Egypt to Sudan from the end of December. With the success of Compass, East Africa was made second in importance after Egypt, a strategy in which victory over the Italian forces in Ethiopia was to be achieved by April 1941. The transfer of the 4th Indian Division took until early January 1941. Platt intended to begin the offensive on the northern front on 8 February, with a pincer attack on Kassala, by the 4th Indian Infantry Division and
5th Indian Infantry Division (Major-General
Lewis Heath), less a brigade each. News of the Italian disaster in Egypt, the harassment by Gazelle Force and the activities of Mission 101 in Ethiopia, led to the Italians withdrawing their northern flank to Keru and Wachai and then on 18 January to retreat hurriedly from Kassala, Tessenei and the triangle of Keru, Biscia and Aicota. Wavell ordered Platt to begin the March offensive early on 9 February and to begin on 19 January, when it seemed that Italian morale was crumbling. Wireless decrypts greatly aided British preparations and the decision to attack ahead of schedule. The Italian withdrawal led Wavell to order a pursuit and the troops arriving at Port Sudan (Briggs Force) to attack at Karora and advance parallel to the coast, to meet the forces coming from the west.
Ultra The Italians in the AOI had replaced their ciphers by November 1940 but by the end of the month, the
Government Code and Cypher School (GC&CS) in England and the Cipher Bureau Middle East (CBME) in Cairo had broken the
Regio Esercito and
Regia Aeronautica replacement codes. Sufficient low-grade ciphers had also been broken to reveal the Italian order of battle and the supply situation by the time that the British offensive began on 19 January 1941. Italian dependence on wireless communication, using frequencies on which it was easy for the British to eavesdrop, led to a flood of information from the daily report from the Viceroy, to the operational plans of the
Regia Aeronautica and
Regia Esercito. On occasion, British commanders had messages before the recipients and it was reported later by the Deputy Director Military Intelligence in Cairo, that ==Prelude==