At 8:00 am on 10 February, General Ruggero Santini's I Corps and General Ettore Bastico 's III Corps began their encirclement of the Amba Aradam massif under a pouring thunderstorm. Ras Mulughieta's army did not appear until February 12, when on the left of the Italian line it severely engaged the Blackshirts of the
"3 Gennaio" division under General Traditi, striking the Italians with violent melee attacks supported by machine guns and 47 mm guns in the Taga Taga area. On the right, the Ethiopians also attacked the III Corps with extreme force and determination, seriously engaging General Bertini's "
Sila" division on the Dansà-Bet Quinàt slopes with the aim of pushing it back beyond the
May Gabat. Throughout the day the Ethiopians contested with the men of the "Sila" the possession of the Dansà, the first step towards the Amba Aradam, but the Italian machine guns effectively repelled the repeated enemy assaults, so much so that at the end of the day Badoglio was able to declare that the Ethiopian attacks "although conducted with extreme determination, did not demonstrate the presence of a single concept, nor a profitable command action. Furthermore, they were carried out with relatively small forces, undoubtedly much inferior to those that Ras Mulughieta could have had at his disposal" . In fact, in addition to not being able to have access to technological means useful for communicating with the other commanders, Mulughieta, barricaded in a cave almost at the top of the Amba Aradam, was the victim of the exhausting hammering action that the Italian artillery carried out against the massif; During the whole battle the Italian guns fired 22,908 rounds into the area, including many 105 mm shells loaded with arsine, while the aircraft dropped 3,960 quintals of bombs, almost a third of all the explosives dropped during the conflict Between February 13 and 14, the Italians firmly established themselves in their established positions and began preparing for the final assault, while the Abyssinian forces were almost unable to mount any offensive counteraction. The lack of adequate means for modern warfare was felt among the Ethiopian ranks: "They fight with black-powder rifles and a few machine guns; wretches," noted journalist Cesco Tonelli, who added: "Our entire offensive apparatus is now revealed; it's powerful. If it surprises us [...] imagine the Abyssinians, on whom all that metal is raining down." While Badoglio's forces were clearly superior, on the Ethiopian side the emperor was informed of the Italian offensive only on the 11th and, from his headquarters, was unable even to coordinate his four armies in the north; the only dispatch he managed to get to its destination was directed to Ras Kassa, in which he was ordered to move as quickly as possible and with all his forces to the right flank of the Italian deployment, so as to cut off the forces under the command of Bastico: but the order reached its destination only on the evening of 15 February when Mulughieta had already ordered the retreat. By the morning of 15 February, under cover of darkness and dense cloud, the Italians completed the encirclement of Amba Aradam. When daylight came and the clouds lifted, the Ethiopians attacked down the western slopes of Amba Aradam towards Addi Kolo, but the Italian artillery and air power blunted the Ethiopian assault. By darkness, the battle was practically over.
Ras Mulugeta guessed that the Italians would take Amba Aradam by first attacking "The Priest's Hat", but in fact The Italians attacked and secured the lightly held Ethiopian positions on "The Herringbone" which made defence of the "Priest's Hat" untenable. For political reasons, the
1st CC.NN. Division "23 Marzo" was given the honour of hoisting the Italian flag atop Amba Aradam. The Ethiopians had managed to create a break in the Italian line around Addi Kolo. Through this break, the army of
Ras Mulugeta made its escape as it fell back towards
Amba Alagi and
Sekota. Mulugeta planned to reassemble his forces around Amba Alagi. == Aftermath ==