French offensive Though the Anglo-Spanish armies triumphed over King
Joseph Bonaparte's army at the
Battle of Talavera on 27 and 28 July 1809, the butcher's bill was steep. The British counted 5,365 casualties, including 3,915 wounded while
Gregorio García de la Cuesta's Spanish army lost only 400 to 500 men killed and wounded. The battle's losers suffered more; a total of 7,268 Frenchmen were casualties. On the morning of 29 July, General
Robert Craufurd's
Light Infantry Brigade and a battery of
Royal Horse Artillery arrived in the British camp after an epic forced march. Even so, General Wellesley's army was in no shape to exploit its victory. The soldiers were on one-third rations due to the collapse of the supply system and the medical officers were unable to care for the thousands of wounded men. With few wagons and carts, Wellesley was unable to bring supplies forward from his base at
Plasencia or evacuate his wounded. The British commander received intelligence that a French force was moving down from the north, but he assumed that there were only about 15,000 French troops. As it happened, the threat was much worse than Wellesley imagined. On 12 June 1809, Emperor
Napoleon ordered Marshal Soult to take command of the
II Corps, V Corps, and
VI Corps and move against the British army. It took some time to assemble this host but on 27 July, Marshal Mortier's 16,916-man V Corps and 1,853 dragoons set out from
Salamanca toward the south. On the 29th, Soult's own II Corps received a convoy of artillery to replace the guns lost in the
1809 Portugal Campaign. Thus equipped, the 18,740-strong II Corps marched south on the 30th. Marshal
Michel Ney and the 12,500-man VI Corps followed on 31 July, after dropping off a brigade of 3,200 men. Napoleon insisted that Soult keep his corps closed up to avoid
defeat in detail. At most, about 10,000 French Imperial soldiers under
General of Division François Étienne de Kellermann were left behind to defend
León. Soult was aware that the Spanish and Portuguese could bring 20,000 men against Kellermann. But he accepted the risk because he understood that Wellesley's British army was the main objective. The Allied strategy had called for General
Francisco Javier Venegas and the Spanish
Army of La Mancha to prevent the French
IV Corps under General of Division
Horace François Bastien Sébastiani from reinforcing Joseph's army at Talavera. In this, Venegas was completely unsuccessful, but another opportunity opened up. With Sébastiani gone from his front, the way to
Madrid was almost undefended. Though his own army was too crippled to move at the moment, Wellesley hoped that pressure from Venegas' offensive would compel the French to retreat. The
Army of La Mancha pressed forward to
Toledo and
Aranjuez on 29 July, but then it unaccountably halted in place until 5 August. Dropping off Marshal
Claude Perrin Victor's 18,000-man
I Corps to watch Wellesley and Cuesta, Joseph pulled back to a position at
Illescas where he could move to block either Venegas or Wellesley if necessary. Receiving news that 10,000 Portuguese under General
Robert Wilson had reached a position behind his northern flank at
Escalona, Victor retreated toward Madrid. In fact Wilson only had 4,000 Portuguese and Spanish troops and was soon forced to withdraw from his isolated position. On 1 August, Wellesley got news that the French were driving a small Spanish force under Marquis Del Reino from its position at the Puerto de Baños, a mountain pass to the north. Though Wellesley still believed that the French force was not large, he could not ignore the threat to his supply line to Portugal. In fact, Plasencia was captured by the French on the 1st. That day, Cuesta detached his 5,000-man 5th Division under
Major General Bassecourt to investigate. After a heated debate with Cuesta, Wellesley agreed to move west while the Spanish general defended Talavera against Victor. On 3 August Wellesley marched west from
Talavera to
Oropesa with 18,000 British troops. He believed that he and Bassecourt were facing less than 15,000 Frenchmen and hoped to clear them away from his supply lines. Instead, the British commander was unwittingly marching into the jaws of Soult's 50,000-man host.
Scramble to safety By this time, Mortier's and Wellesley's cavalry were already bickering near
Navalmoral only about west of Oropesa. On 3 August, the French horsemen captured a Spanish courier carrying a message from Wellesley to General
William Erksine at
Lisbon in which Soult's forces were estimated at only 12,000 men. Soult saw that Wellesley was marching right into his hands. Luckily for the Allies, Spanish guerillas caught a French agent near
Ávila and delivered his message to Cuesta on the 3rd. It was a note from Soult to Joseph, informing the king that he was advancing with over 30,000 soldiers. Cuesta quickly passed along the message to Wellesley. Alerted to imminent danger, the British commander instantly ordered a retreat across the bridge at Arzobispo. For his part, Cuesta immediately led his army in retreat from Talavera to Oropesa, abandoning the British hospitals. With only about 40 wagons and carts available, 1,500 badly wounded men were left behind. The remainder were told to make their way as best they could. Eventually, 2,000 hobbled into the British lines. Another 500 either died en route or were captured by the French. The ones who were made prisoner by the French were well cared for. Cuesta could have crossed the Tagus at Talavera and retreated on the south bank. However, the roads on that side pass through the
Sierra de Guadalupe and were so bad that the Spanish army would have had to abandon its artillery and wagon train. Instead, Cuesta took the risk of marching on the north bank, where the French were known to be at large. By the evening of 4 August, Wellesley's army was safe on the south bank of the Tagus at Arzobispo. But Cuesta stubbornly refused to retreat. When Mortier's vanguard appeared before him, the Spanish general lashed out at it and drove it back. Believing that he was facing both Cuesta and Wellesley, Mortier became cautious and called for assistance from Soult. During the entire day of the 5th, Cuesta foolishly offered battle with the bridge of Arzobispo at his back, yet Mortier held back. By 6 August when both Soult and Mortier were massed for battle, they found their quarry had withdrawn across the Tagus. As it happened, this was the only opportunity that the French had for inflicting great damage on the Spanish army. As historian
Charles Oman wrote, "Soult's best chance was gone before he was even aware of it." Worried about his supply line to Portugal, Wellesley ordered Craufurd to march west with his own brigade and General
Rufane Donkin's brigade to cover the
Almaraz crossing. On 6 August, the last day of the march, the troops marched 15 hours on a meal of boiled wheat and dried peas without salt or meat. One participant later recalled that the straggling was the worst he ever saw in the entire war. Craufurd reached Almaraz with 4,000 British troops and joined 1,500 Spaniards under Del Reino. Ney's French troops arrived on the north bank the next day. After retreating from the Puerto de Baños, Del Reino crossed to the south bank of the Tagus at Almaraz and dismantled the pontoon bridge on the 2nd. After a difficult march over bad roads, two divisions of Wellesley's army reached
Deleitosa on 7 August, within supporting distance of Almaraz. Another British division was holding
Mesas de Ibor. That day, the head of Cuesta's column was approaching Mesas de Ibor where there was an immensely strong defensive position. The rest of the Spanish army struggled slowly over the hills. To cover the movement, the Spanish divisions of Bassecourt and
Lieutenant General Alburquerque formed a
rear guard at the Arzobispo bridge. Meanwhile, Victor's I Corps occupied Talavera on the 6th, but it remained to the east of the theater of action. ==Battle==