Ultimatum and demolition (16-20 January) To carry the aforementioned ultimatum to the defenders, Sakaguchi tasked Capt.
Gerard Reinderhoff, former chief of staff to the Tarakan garrison commander, Lt.-Col. Simon de Waal and Capt. Anton Colijn, manager of the
BPM oil company on Tarakan, KNIL reservist and son to the former Dutch prime minister
Hendrikus Colijn. On the morning of 16 January, they steamed to Balikpapan aboard the captured BPM motor schooner
Parsifal with an Indonesian captain and three Japanese interpreters others mentioned three Japanese interpreters and two Indonesian police officers). Two
Dornier Do 24 seaplanes of
MLD's GVT.4 Squadron sighted
Parsifal, flying a Japanese flag on 19 January. Differing sources indicate that Colijn and Reinderhoff either overpowered or deceived their captors — some accounts claim the Japanese were drunk — and managed to lock them inside a cabin. Colijn then immediately tore down the Japanese ensign, while Reinderhoff waved a Dutch flag. As the seas were too rough for a landing, the Dorniers flew off and returned the next day. The Dorniers returned and landed the following morning, picked up Colijn and Reinderhoff and flew them to Balikpapan, where they delivered the ultimatum directly to van den Hoogenband. van den Hoogenband wasted no time and immediately gave the order for the demolition team to began destroying all the wells, refineries and port facilities in Balikpapan. The destruction had actually already begun ahead on 18 January. In the Louise oilfields located north of Balikpapan, Dutch demolition teams dismantled the well tubing, cut off to a depth of 15 meter, which were then dropped down the holes together with pump plungers and accessory rods. To complete the work, materials such as bolts, nuts, and heavy drilling bits was thrown after them. Finally, a tin containing four pieces of TNT was thrown in to destroy the casing strings. Within a few days "all motors, pumps, dynamos and turbines were blown up." At Balikpapan proper, stills and steam boilers were first wrecked, which took about a day and a half; about thirty hours of “heavy stoking” were required to collapse the shells of the stills, after which the teams destroyed the boilers for five to eight hours. The destruction of the installations then continued throughout the region and at the port itself. First, the teams set fire to the wharves by encircling the channels with burning oil from ignited gasoline drums. They then blew up the factories; the paraffin-wax factory, the packed lubricating-oil drum store, the saltwater pumping station were all dynamited. A newly constructed tin plant in the Pandansari factory was also burned down. The destruction efforts ended with the obliteration of laboratories, tank farms, and the power station, with chains of explosions shattering windows throughout the town. By nightfall on 20 January, the blaze from the destructions could be seen over 100 km away.
Evacuation (20-23 January) From mid-January 1942, BPM personnel and civilians still left behind began to be airlifted out of Balikpapan. After the fall of Tarakan, three
Lockheed Lodestars from the
ML-KNIL and a
DC-2 from the
KNILM were stationed at Surabaya to carry out resupply and evacuation flights. Hundreds of evacuees were flown to
Surabaya from Manggar Airfield, as well as Oelin Airfield near Banjarmasin. From January 20, however, evacuations from the city were only possible by flying boats. To avoid reprisals, BPM and KNIL engineers who carried out the demolition, as well as Colijn and Reinderhoff, were also evacuated. On the night of 20 January, the two officers, along with 25 other evacuees left for Java. At the same time, BPM sent out a
Grumman Goose to evacuate their company officials and employees, the last one done on 23 January. On that night, MLD also began their evacuation runs, starting with the two Dorniers of GVT.4 Squadron that made back and forth trips between Balikpapan and Surabaya. They evacuated the city port's naval commander and his personnel, as well as demolition teams who had destroyed the Samboja drilling site. On the next run on 22 January, two additional Dorniers joined the convoy, but only two made the landing on Wain River and evacuated 58 BPM members of the demolition team and the remaining MLD ground personnel. Despite the bad weather and fuel concerns, the planes managed to land in Surabaya. Of the two other Dorniers, one had to return because of the bad weather, while the other one crashed and exploded while trying to land on Sungai Wain, killing four of the five flight crew. Throughout the evacuation, blazing fires from the town helped to guide the planes in, as they were visible a full hour's flight time away. The rest of the demolition team, 87 Europeans and 10 Indonesians from BPM and other companies, aided by 140 Indonesian porters, marched to Banjarmasin. When Japanese troops cut off the route, the porters ran off and the team decided to split into smaller groups that would try to reach Samarinda II at their own pace. The largest of the group eventually reached the airfield at the end of February and were evacuated to Java and another group reached the airfield on 8 March, when the Netherlands capitulated. From the rest of the small groups, several reached Banjarmasin using
perahus (boat), two groups reached Java after capitulation and one reached Lombok. Yet there were also those who were captured and killed by Japanese troops. In all, out of the 87 Europeans, 41 survived.
Fleet interception (21-23 January) At 17:00 on the 21 January, the Japanese invasion fleet of one light cruiser, ten destroyers, four minesweepers, three submarine chasers, three patrol boats and sixteen transport ships left Tarakan for Balikpapan. A MLD Dornier spotted the fleet that same day, but heavy clouds with strong winds and prolonged rain prevented the plane from shadowing the fleet. On the next day, U.S. Navy submarines
S-40,
Pickerel,
Porpoise,
Saury,
Spearfish and
Sturgeon were ordered to intercept the fleet. Later, they were joined by Dutch submarines
K-XIV and
K-XVIII.
Sturgeon fired several torpedoes on the convoy and reported sinking three ships. However, postwar records failed to confirm any damages to the convoy. On 23 January, an American
PBY Catalina seaplane from Patrol Wing 10 spotted the fleet at 12:20 and shadowed it for an hour. From 16:25, as many as three waves of Dutch
Martin B-10 bombers (19 in total) escorted by up to 12
Brewster Buffalo attacked the fleet. The first and second wave scored no hits, and many were forced to return due to bad weather. On the third wave, the Dutch planes narrowly struck the
Kawakaze, lightly damaged the transport ship
Tatsugami Maru, and sank the transport ship
Nana Maru, for the cost of a Martin bomber shot down. Despite these attacks, at 22:30 the Japanese began their landing on Balikpapan as Col. Kanauji's Raid Unit disembarked and made their way through the bay to land behind van den Hoogenband's defense lines. Later at 01:40 on 24 January, Gen. Sakaguchi's Airfield Seizure Unit and Assault Unit embarked on their landing craft and also began making their way to the beaches.
Land engagement (23-25 January) Around midnight, reports reached van den Hoogenband of craft movements in Balikpapan Bay, heading towards the Klandasan position. Dense smoke from the burning facilities made it difficult for Dutch searchlights to observe the water front ahead of them, enabling Kanauji's Raid Unit to sail unhindered into Wain River behind the Dutch lines. A Dutch patrol soon reported this movement to van den Hoogenband, who ordered 2nd Company to secure the Dutch 120 mm guns and sent out
overvalwagen armored cars to patrol and report for any enemy troop activities in their inland retreat route. At 03:30 on the 24th, the Raid Unit entered mouth of the Wain River, where they were greeted by two Indonesian police officers who guided them inland. At daybreak, 2nd Company reported that they managed to prevent Kanauji from reaching Balikpapan and threatening their retreat route. Yet at 06:30, van den Hoogenband received reports of Japanese troops advancing east towards their defensive lines, and by 07:00, Japanese troops were nearing the Klandasan position. With little reserve at his disposal, van den Hoogenband was left to choose on whether he should reinforce the Klandasan position, or attempt a break out through the Raid Unit and retreat inland. As there was little merit in defending a ruined city, van den Hoogenband chose to do the latter. He informed the General Headquarters in Bandung of his decision and ordered his troops to destroy the guns, searchlights and radio station and bolster the rear defenses for the breakout. Kanauji's forces eventually landed at 17:30 that day. On the 25th, the Raid Unit split up, with one element advancing to seize the pumping station, another advancing toward Balikpapan, and the rest of the main force moving up on the road between Batu Ampar and Balikpapan. At 14:40, when the main force advanced into Batu Ampar, they defeated a Dutch force (unknown, either 2nd Company or parts of van den Hoogenband's column) and taking them prisoner, effectively cutting off any line of retreat inland. After nightfall, the Raid Unit managed to link up with the Assault Unit when they entered the city, and with it, Balikpapan was in Japanese hands.
Naval engagement (24 January) '', with Commander Paul H. Talbot on board, led the night attack on the Japanese transports on Balikpapan. As Japanese forces embarked onto their landing craft and made their way to Balikpapan, Dutch submarine
HNLMS K-XVIII, under
Lieutenant Commander Carel A.J. van Well Groeneveld made contact with the Balikpapan invasion convoy. At 00:35, van Well Groenveld fired three torpedoes on what he reported to be a “1,400 ton destroyer," which was actually the cruiser
Naka. After all the torpedoes missed
Naka, the submarine fired another torpedo that hit and sank the transport ship
Tsuruga Maru between 00:40 and 00:45, taking one crewmember and 39 troops of the Sakaguchi Detachment down with it. As
Naka and the 4th Destroyer Flotilla left the convoy to hunt for
K-XVIII, they opened the path for the American 59th Destroyer Division to attack the now unguarded transport convoy. Admiral
Thomas Hart, commander of the U.S. Navy's
Asiatic Fleet, assembled a strike force (Task Force (TF) 5) that sailed from Koepang (Kupang) Bay,
Timor on 20 January. Commanded by Admiral
William Glassford and
Paul Talbot, it consisted of the cruisers
Boise and
Marblehead and the destroyers
John D. Ford,
Pope,
Parrott,
Paul Jones,
Pillsbury, and
Bulmer. Glassford served as the overall commander, while Talbot led the destroyers. At that time,
Marblehead had only one working turbine, which limited its speed to 15 knots. On 21 January,
Boise struck an uncharted reef off Kelapa Island in
Sape Strait that caused a 120-ft long gash in the ship's port keel. Along with
Marblehead, the two cruisers were forced to retire to
Waworada Bay under the escort of
Bulmer and
Pillsbury. From there,
Boise and
Pillsbury headed back to
Tjilatjap (Cilacap), while
Marblehead and
Bulmer steamed towards Surabaya. The remaining four destroyers under Commander Talbot went on towards Balikpapan. To maintain the element of surprise, Talbot ordered his destroyers to use their torpedoes as their primary attack weapon for that night and only fire their guns when these were expended. Guided by the burning wreck of
Nana Maru and Balikpapan's blazing fires, TF 5 entered the
Makassar Strait just after midnight on 24 January. At 02:35, they ran straight into the path of the cruiser
Naka and four destroyers. One of the destroyers signaled a challenge, to no reply from Talbot's ships. Assuming that they were friendly ships, the Japanese destroyers passed TF 5 without raising any alarm. Ten minutes later, Talbot spotted the Japanese transport fleet, silhouetted by fire from the burning oilfields before them and guarded by three patrol boats, four minesweepers, and four submarine chasers. At 02:57,
W-15 spotted the destroyers, but assumed that it was
Naka.
Parrott, followed by
John D. Ford and
Paul Jones, fired a total of seven torpedoes at the minesweeper, but all missed due to poor angle. As they reached the northern end of the transport fleet,
Parrott fired three torpedoes at 03:00, hitting
Sumanoura Maru and caused a tremendous explosion that sank the ship, as it was carrying depth charges and mines at the time. Soon afterwards,
W-15 alerted Admiral Nishimura that the transport fleet were under attack. Despite the alarm, he refused to believe that enemy ships could penetrate the anchorage and assumed that the attack must be coming from
K-XVIII. In the midst of the newly created confusion,
Pope,
Parrott and
Paul Jones fired a total of 10 torpedoes at 03:06, one of which hit the
Tatsugami Maru. Compounded by damage from the Dutch air raid the previous day, the munition-loaded ship exploded and sank 30 minutes later. Talbot then turned TF 5 southward at 03:14, aiming to attack the southern end of the fleet. Five minutes later,
Pope and
Parrott fired five torpedoes at what they assumed was a destroyer, but was actually the patrol boat
P-37. The former World War I destroyer received three torpedo hits that badly damaged the vessel and killed 35 of its crew.
John D. Ford and
Paul Jones followed on with an attack on the
Kuretake Maru, but it managed to evade the first two torpedoes. A second torpedo from Paul Jones then hit amidships and the transport ship soon sank.
Pope,
Parrott, and
Paul Jones now signaled Talbot that they'd used all their torpedoes, and he authorized them to use their 4-inch guns on the transports. At this time, however, TF 5's formation began to break up.
John D. Ford went on a northwesterly course at 03:35, followed shortly by
Pope.
John D. Ford then fired its last two torpedoes on the wreck of
Tsuruga Maru, before attacking
Kumagawa Maru and
Asahisan Maru concurrently. Shells from its 4-inch guns and .50 caliber machine guns riddled both ships, killing 6 crewmembers in
Kumagawa Maru and 50 in
Asahisan Maru. As it did so, however, a shell hit
John D. Ford's aft at 03:47, wounding four of her crew. Avoiding running aground in shoal waters, the commander of the destroyer, Lt. Cmdr. Jacob D. Cooper, made a port turn and doubled back to catch up with the rest of TF 5, who were already steaming away from Balikpapan Bay.
John D. Ford only managed to catch up with the rest of TF 5 at 06:42, upon which Talbot ordered a signal flag hoisted on the destroyer: WELL DONE. By then, Admiral Nishimura and the 4th Flotilla was still on a wild-goose chase after
K-XVIII nearly six to seven kilometers away (three to four miles). It was not until 05:20 when he finally ordered the 9th Destroyer Division to cut off TF 5's escape route. However, because none of them had knowledge of where the American ships were, Nishimura eventually ordered the destroyers of the 9th to resume their previous task. As his flagship
Naka sailed into the anchorage to ascertain the condition of the transports, it was separated from the 9th Division and rejoined the transport echelons alone.
Retreat into Samarinda II (24 January - 6 February) Upon reaching Batu Ampar, van den Hoogenband realized that Japanese troops had occupied defensive points leading into the pumping station. His forces now had to retreat through the evacuation camps, upon which several hundred women and children, mostly families of the Indonesian soldiers, joined his column. On 25 January, they received report that the Wain River pumping station was already under Japanese control. Considering that his troops were too fatigued by now, van den Hoogenband refrained from attacking the pumping station and persuaded the women and children to return to Balikpapan, as there's better chance there to obtain food. Part of them went back to the evacuation camp, while others remained in the
kampungs (villages) around Wain River. The remainder of 500 soldiers continued the retreat north. Throughout the retreat, Dutch troops encountered difficulties in replenishing their equipment and obtain food, as most of the food depots had been taken over by Japanese forces. It was not until they reached the road between Mentawir and Semoi that they managed to find rice stores in a labor camp. On 3 February, the column reached the Boeat (Buat)
kampung, where they obtain more provisions, as well as additional intelligence. Local officials informed van den Hoogenband that Japanese troops had
occupied Samarinda city that same day, but the Samarinda II airfield was still under Dutch control. At approximately 08:00, three Japanese Navy
Zeros operating out of Tarakan conducted a strafing run over Samarinda II airfield. A KNILM DC-3 with three BPM evacuees onboard was straddled but managed to crash land in the jungle. A group of
Dayak people and a missionary later saved them, though one of the BPM evacuee died of his injury beforehand. Dutch AA fire from the airfield shot down a Zero that crashed intact, thus enabling Dutch forces to obtain intel on the fighter's strengths and weaknesses. Between 09:00 and 09:50, eight B-17 Flying Fortresses of the U.S.
7th and
19th Bomb Group that had departed from
Malang attacked the ships at anchor. The B-17s shot down two Zeros who intercepted the formation, for a cost of three bombers slightly damaged and no hits scored. When the attack wave landed at 15:30, six Zeros and a
Babs caught them in a second raid. Three Zeros strafed and destroyed three Martin B-10s. Three Buffalos of 1-VLG-V attempted to dislodge the fighters, but the Zeros shot down two of them. One Zero was eventually badly damaged by AA fire and ditched in the sea.
25 January On the next day, the attack started with the deployment of nine Martin B-10s of the 1-VLG-I Squadron. Once again, bad weather scattered the formation. When the bombers reached Balikpapan at 08:00, they were immediately engaged by four Zeros. In a 25-minute aerial battle, the Zeros shot down one Martin and damaged three other, while losing one to the bomber's defensive fire. The remaining bombers then were moved to Oelin Airfield in Banjarmasin. The Dutch also send 6 Buffalos of 2-VLG-V Squadron for armed reconnaissance around Balikpapan. The flight yielded no results as the heavy smoke layers and dense rain obscure the pilot's visions. As soon as the Buffalos returned around 09:30, 27
Mitsubishi G4M 'Betty' bombers bombarded Samarinda II from a height of , making them impervious to Dutch AA defenses. Three Buffalos took off and attempted to intercept them, but did not damage or shoot down any bombers. The raid rendered Samarinda II's runways partially unusable and damaged two Buffalos. Later, at 15:30, four Zeros and a Babs strafed the airfield and destroyed a Martin and a Buffalo. The Americans followed up on this attack by sending eight B-17s of the 7th and 19th Bomb Group at 11:00. Bad weather forced four of them to turn back to Malang along the way, with three of the four eventually making emergency landings on the beach of
Madura Island due to lack of fuel. Meeting the same fate as the Dutch planes before them, the remaining Flying Fortresses were promptly intercepted by Japanese Zeros. The B-17 defenses managed to shoot down two of them, but one of the four B-17 was so badly damaged that it had to made an emergency landing at Oelin. By the end of the day, the attacks failed to generate any damages or losses to the Japanese fleet. At around the same time, six Zeros and a Babs from Tarakan raided the fleet of Martin B-10s at Oelin that were still assigned to continue the attacks on Balikpapan. Dutch attempts to shoot down the raiders with their
Lewis Guns and medium machine guns failed, and all six Martins of the 3-VLG-III Squadron were destroyed. In addition, three other Martins of the 1-VLG-I Squadron were also heavily damaged. Because of this loss, the ABDAIR can solely depend on the Americans and their heavy bombers to continue the mission.
29 January Two days later, five Flying Fortresses made another run on the Japanese fleet. One of the bombers returned while en route, while the remaining four were attacked by 13 Zeros for 30 minutes over Balikpapan. One B-17 crashed on the return flight due to its damage. The Americans believed that they managed to shoot down six Zeros, but Japanese records indicated that only one was shot down, while another one was damaged on landing at Manggar Airfield.
30 January The day after, the 19th Bomb Group conducted two separate raids, both of which did not inflict any damage as well. The first raid during the day by three B-17 did not succeed, as all three bombers had to turn back en route due to bad weather and engine failure. Later that night, two
LB-30 bombers attacked the fleet individually, about an hour apart, to no avail. This night attack was the last Allied attempt to stem the Japanese fleet advance in the context of the battle of Balikpapan. == Aftermath ==