Australian drive on Finschhafen After the landing, the Australians began establishing a beachhead several kilometres deep, during which significant actions were fought around Siki Cove and Katika. Late in the day, a large Japanese air raid struck the Allied fleet off shore, but this was eventually defeated by a strong US fighter umbrella that was forewarned by Allied picket ships. The following day, 23 September, the 20th Brigade's drive on Finschhafen began, with two battalions commencing the advance south – the
2/13th and
2/15th supported by the 2/12th Field Regiment as well as engineers from the 2/3rd Field Company – while the
2/17th was split up, with two companies advancing as part of the brigade's reserve, while another remained to secure the beachhead from a Japanese attack and push it further to the north, and the fourth pushed towards Sattelberg. The
2/3rd Pioneer Battalion remained in the beachhead, working to improve roads, while the 2/8th Field Ambulance set up a main dressing station, which would receive casualties as they were evacuated rearwards from the advanced dressing station that was following the battalions advancing south. In addition to having to split their forces, the Australians also suffered from supply difficulties during the advance. The terrain over the southerly approaches was quite difficult being primarily dense jungle with numerous water crossings and rugged features. To traverse the ground, the Australians had only limited vehicles, with each infantry battalion possessing four jeeps with trailers for resupply, while the engineers and artillery had several trucks and tractors. The local population, which might have been employed to carry stores, had abandoned the Japanese due to Allied propaganda and their services were also unavailable to the Allies at the initial stages of the campaign. As a result, a large amount of stores had to be carried by combat soldiers, who were diverted to the task. Nevertheless, the Australian advance succeeded in capturing the Heldsbach plantation and the nearby airfield. It continued until the Australians came up against strong resistance around the Bumi River. There a force of around 300 Japanese sailors and marines from the 85th Naval Garrison, reinforced by elements of the 238th Infantry Regiment, established themselves in a blocking position. Although they were under orders to conform to the overall Japanese plan of delaying the Australians and then withdrawing towards Sattelberg to carry out a containment operation, the commander of the naval troops resolved to hold the position, and they subsequently held up the Australian advance on 26 September, until they were overcome through an attack on their flanks by the 2/15th Infantry Battalion. In response to concerns about the large number of Japanese forces in the area, which had proven to be in larger numbers than Allied intelligence had estimated, Windeyer requested reinforcements. These were initially refused as US naval commanders baulked at the idea of transporting another brigade to Finschhafen due to the risks involved and potential naval losses that might be incurred. In addition, the Allied higher headquarters under General
Douglas MacArthur was operating under the mistaken belief that the Japanese defending the area were only very small in number, when in actuality the two forces were roughly equal in size, with the Allied strength after the landing being around 5,300. After much discussion amongst Australian and US commands on 29/30 September the
2/43rd Infantry Battalion arrived to relieve the 2/17th. The South Australians from the 2/43rd were subsequently tasked with defending the beachhead and the surrounding areas including the Heldsbach area, and were ordered to prepare for further actions around Sisi and Sattelberg. Heavy rain fell around this time, and the Australian brigade commander was compelled to use combat troops to carry stores forward from the landing zone to the forward areas as motor transport was unable to transit the primitive track system. Due to concerns about their western flank, the 2/17th extended the Australian perimeter towards Jivevaneng, establishing a company there, but it subsequently came under attack on the Sattelberg Road and west of Katika on 25 and 26 September from the Japanese 80th Infantry Regiment, which was trying to break through to the Heldsbach Plantation on the coast. Over the course of several days, the company from the 2/17th around Jivevaneng held off six Japanese attacks until relieved by the 2/43rd Infantry Battalion on 30 September. Meanwhile, concerned about their rear, due to the presence of a large number of Japanese troops around Sattelberg, the Australians pushed cautiously to Kakakog, which saw heavy fighting at the end of the month, resulting in around 100 Japanese casualties as the Australians called in artillery fire and air attacks to soften up the Japanese defences prior to an attack by the 2/13th Infantry Battalion, supported by Vickers machine guns from the 2/15th. From the south, the 22nd Infantry Battalion advanced north against limited opposition. On 1 October, they crossed the Mape River adjacent to Langemak Bay, while the forward troops from the 20th Infantry Brigade, overwhelmed a Japanese force around Kakakog, supported by artillery and air power, killing between 80 and 100 defenders. Following this, the Japanese began withdrawing from Finschhafen and the next day, the 20th Infantry Brigade reached their objective, entering Finschhafen in the afternoon after overcoming limited resistance. The two forces married up the following day as troops from the 2/17th contacted the 22nd. This ended the first phase of the battle. During operations to capture Finschhafen, the Australians lost 73 killed, 285 wounded. Sickness also resulted in a further 391 evacuations. Japanese casualties were reported as "heavy", but Allied intelligence assessed that a large number of Japanese forces remained at large and had withdrawn west away from the coast in preparation for further fighting. In the same time, US forces from the
532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment lost eight killed and about 42 wounded, mainly during the landing operations around Scarlet Beach.
Japanese counterattack Following the capture of Finschhafen, the main part of the Australian 20th Infantry Brigade returned to Scarlet Beach, due to intelligence that the Japanese were about to attack. The 2/13th and 22nd Infantry Battalions were left around Finschhafen, while the 2/15th and 2/17th Infantry Battalions were re-orientated to defend the approaches to Scarlet Beach. Around Jivevaneng, east of Sattelberg, the 2/43rd had taken up a blocking position and in the early days of October fought a Japanese attack by a battalion from the 80th Infantry Regiment along the coast road to a halt. In an effort to shore up their western flank, the Australian 2/17th Infantry Battalion pressed towards Kumawa, which was met with a fierce response from the Japanese on 5 October when their line of communication from the west was threatened. The battalion continued to fight around Jivevaneng, and on 10 October they secured a piece of high ground called the "Knoll" by the Australians, who subsequently defeated 12 attacks to take it back. around Scarlet Beach, October 1943 |alt=Troops manning a Vickers machine gun on a ridge overlooking a creek amidst a jungle setting On 10/11 October, as it became apparent to the Allies that Japanese were preparing for a major assault, Wootten and his headquarters landed at Finschhafen, along with the remainder of Brigadier
Bernard Evans' 24th Infantry Brigade. That day, the bulk of the Japanese 20th Division, under
Shigeru Katagiri, arrived in the area, as the size of the Japanese force facing the Australians increased to 12,000; nevertheless, Katagiri decided to hold off on launching his counterattack until stores and ammunition could be stockpiled in sufficient quantities. Meanwhile, the Australian 24th Infantry Brigade was subsequently given responsibility for defence-in-depth around the Heldsbach Plantation and Arndt Point, while the 20th Infantry Brigade defended around the Sattelberg Road and the Mape River, with the 22nd Infantry Battalion on their southern flank around Dreger Harbour. As troops from the 20th Infantry Brigade attempted to push towards Sattelberg, the 24th began patrol actions towards Bonga; during one of these patrols, the Allies gained a significant intelligence boon when they discovered a Japanese briefcase containing an operational order detailing plans for a coming counterattack; in addition, the Allies intercepted several Japanese radio transmissions, and deduced their intentions based upon reports of troop and ship movements. This allowed the Australians to switch to a defensive strategy instead of continuing to push on towards Sattelberg. The main Japanese counterattack began on 16 October, signalled by a large bonfire on Sattelberg. The attack was conceptualised as a three-pronged action, involving a diversionary attack by elements of the 79th Infantry Regiment to the north from Bonga, a company-level attack on Scarlet Beach from the sea by elements of the 79th with the Sugino Craft Raiding Unit, and a drive from Sattelberg by the remainder of the 79th and 80th Infantry Regiments orientated upon two lines of advance: one towards Scarlet Beach, conforming with the Song River, and the other striking towards Heldsbach advancing astride the Sattelberg Road. If successful, it was intended that following a regrouping, the two infantry regiments would then clear Finschhafen and Langemak Bay, but Japanese plans went awry from the beginning. The northern diversion was easily overcome, and failed to confuse the Australians into committing their reserves, while the central drive was launched too early – in fact the day before the assault was scheduled to begin – consequently undermining Japanese attempts to achieve sufficient weight of forces to overcome the defenders. The seaborne landing also suffered a significant setback when more than half of the seven landing craft were destroyed by
PT-128 and
PT-194 on the night of 8/9 October while on their way to the landing beach. They subsequently suffered heavy casualties during the assault around the beach, with US and Australian troops there mounting a stubborn defence. The beach was guarded by a
Bofors 40 mm gun of the 10th Light Anti-Aircraft Battery,
2-pounder anti-tank guns and machine guns of the 2/28th, and two
37 mm guns and two
.50-calibre machine guns manned by the US 532nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment. One of the .50 calibre machine guns, manned by Private
Nathan van Noy, assisted by Corporal Stephen Popa, engaged a group of Japanese led by a bugler and two men with
flame-throwers. A Japanese hand grenade landed in their weapon pit, shattering one of van Noy's legs and wounding Popa, but they continued to fire. Another Japanese grenade silenced them. Van Noy was subsequently awarded the
Medal of Honor. The Australians managed to hold key terrain around Jivevaneng and Katika from where the Allies employed their direct and indirect fire support to inflict heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the Japanese achieved a degree of tactical success, albeit briefly. On 18 October, a party of Japanese broke through to Siki Cove, where Australian anti-aircraft gunners and artillerymen were forced to fire over "open sights" and fight back with small arms, after coming under fire from troops that had gotten under the guns. That night, the Japanese cut the 2/17th Infantry Battalion's supply route, establishing a road block astride the Jivevaneng–Sattelberg road, and cutting off the Australians defending Jivevaneng. The 2/17th and a number of other Australian units, such as most of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion, as well as part of the 2/28th, became isolated behind Japanese lines. In order to keep them supplied, emergency air drops of ammunition were flown in by pilots of
No. 4 Squadron RAAF. Presented with the ambiguity of the situation, the commander of the 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion withdrew one of his outposts, while Brigadier Bernard Evans, commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade, also contracted his position around the beachhead, and in doing so subsequently granted the Japanese the prime position of Katika. The Australian divisional commander, Wootten, was enraged by the decision and subsequently lambasted his commander via radio. In response, the 2/13th Infantry Battalion detached two companies from rear area security and sent them north, while the
2/28th Infantry Battalion launched a counterattack against the Japanese around Katika, which – supported by artillery – successfully regained the position. Nevertheless, largely the fighting went in favour of the Allies, and finally the Japanese assault ground to a halt. Despite forcing a contraction of the Australian forces defending the beachhead, on 21 October the Japanese withdrew from Siki Cove, although the fighting around Katika continued for four more days as the Japanese attempted to retake it. Fierce resistance from the 2/28th halted them and eventually the attack was called off on 24 October, with the Japanese having suffered heavily due to tactical deficiencies, poor co-ordination and operational security, and a lack of artillery. Meanwhile, the Allied response was hampered by poor working relationships at some of the highest levels between Australian and US commanders – particularly between
I Corps commander Lieutenant General
Edmund Herring and the VII Amphibious Force commander Rear Admiral
Daniel E. Barbey – the lack of a unified command structure, over cautiousness amongst naval staff, and a poor appreciation of overall Japanese strength and intentions by the highest level of the Allied command who failed to send reinforcements until it was almost too late. Casualties during the attack amounted to at least 679 Japanese killed with another 821 estimated as wounded, while the Australians lost 49 killed and 179 wounded. ==Aftermath==