Etymology Local
Degar tribesmen call the mountain
Ap Bia, "the mountain of the crouching beast." Official histories of the engagement refer to it as Hill 937 after the elevation displayed on US Army maps, but the US soldiers who fought there dubbed it "Hamburger Hill," suggesting that those who fought on the hill were "ground up like hamburger meat." "Have you ever been inside a hamburger machine? We just got cut to pieces by extremely accurate machine gun fire," recalled a sergeant.
Terrain The battle took place on
Dong Ap Bia (
Ap Bia Mountain, ) in the rugged, jungle-shrouded mountains of
South Vietnam, from the
Laotian border. Rising from the floor of the western
A Sầu Valley, Ap Bia Mountain is a solitary
massif, unconnected to the ridges of the surrounding
Annamite Range. It dominates the northern valley, towering some above sea level. Snaking down from its highest peak are a series of ridges and fingers, one of the largest extending southeast to a height of , another reaching south to a peak. The entire mountain is a rugged wilderness blanketed in double- and triple-canopy jungle, dense thickets of
bamboo, and waist-high
elephant grass.
Order of battle The battle on Hamburger Hill occurred in May 1969, during Operation Apache Snow, the second part of a three-phased campaign intended to destroy PAVN Base Areas in the remote A Sầu Valley. This campaign was a series of operations intended to do damage to the PAVN forces in the A Sầu Valley, which had been an infiltration route into South Vietnam prior to 1966, when the PAVN seized the
Special Forces camp in the valley during the
Battle of A Shau and established a permanent presence. Subsequent US efforts were aimed at damaging enemy forces in the valley rather than attempting to clear or occupy the valley. Lieutenant General
Richard G. Stilwell, commander of
XXIV Corps, amassed the equivalent of two divisions, and substantial artillery and air support, to once again launch a raid into the valley. The PAVN had moved their 6th, 9th, and 29th Regiments into the area to recover from losses sustained during a previous
United States Marine Corps operation (
Operation Dewey Canyon) in February. Assigned to Apache Snow were three airmobile infantry battalions of the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile), commanded by Major General
Melvin Zais. These units of the division's 3rd Brigade (commanded by Colonel Joseph Conmy) were the 3rd Battalion,
187th Infantry (Lt. Col. Weldon Honeycutt); 2d Battalion,
501st Infantry (Lt. Col. Robert German); and the 1st Battalion,
506th Infantry (Lt. Col. John Bowers). Two battalions of the ARVN
1st Infantry Division (the 2/1st and 4/1st) had been temporarily assigned to the 3d Brigade in support. Other major units participating in Apache Snow included the
9th Marine Regiment; and 3d Squadron,
5th Cavalry and the 3rd ARVN Regiment.
Planning Conmy characterized the operation as a
reconnaissance in force. His plan called for the five battalions to "combat assault" into the valley by helicopter on 10 May 1969, and to search their assigned sectors for PAVN troops and supplies. The overall plan of attack called for the Marines and the 3/5th Cavalry to reconnaissance in force toward the Laotian border, while the ARVN units cut the highway through the base of the valley. The 501st and the 506th were to destroy the PAVN in their own operating areas and block escape routes into Laos. If a battalion made heavy contact with the PAVN, Conmy would reinforce it by helicopter with one of the other units. In theory, the 101st could reposition its forces quickly enough to keep the PAVN from massing against any one unit, and a US battalion discovering a PAVN unit would fix it in place until a reinforcing battalion could lift in to cut off its retreat and destroy it. The US and the ARVN units participating in Apache Snow knew, based on existing intelligence information and previous experience in the A Sầu, that the operation was likely to encounter serious resistance from the PAVN. However, they had little other intelligence as to the actual strength and dispositions of PAVN units. The area was extremely remote and difficult to access. Aerial surveillance was difficult, and US battalion commanders had to generate their own tactical intelligence by combat patrols, capturing equipment, installations, documents, and occasionally prisoners of war to provide the raw data from which to draw their assessment of the PAVN order of battle and dispositions. It was this time-consuming and hit-or-miss task force which characterized the main efforts of Honeycutt's 3/187th Infantry during the first four days of the operation. Initially, the operation went routinely for the 101st Airborne Division (Airmobile). Its units experienced only light contact on the first day, but documents captured by 3/187th indicated that the PAVN 29th Regiment, nicknamed the "Pride of
Ho Chi Minh" and a veteran of the 1968
Battle of Hue, was somewhere in the valley. Past experience in many of the larger encounters with PAVN indicated they would resist violently for a short time and then withdraw before the Americans brought overwhelming firepower to bear against them. Prolonged combat, such as at
Dak To and
Ia Drang, had been relatively rare. Honeycutt anticipated his battalion had sufficient capability to carry out a reconnaissance on Hill 937 without further reinforcement, although he did request that the brigade reserve, his own Company B, be released to his control. Honeycutt was a protégé of General
William C. Westmoreland, the former commander of the US forces in Vietnam. He had been assigned command of the 3/187th in January and had by replacement of many of its officers given it a personality to match his own aggressiveness. His stated intention was to locate the PAVN force in his area of responsibility and to engage it before it could escape into Laos. Rather than retreat, the PAVN in the valley determined to stand and to fight in a series of well-prepared concentric bunker positions on Hill 937. ==Battle==