The endemic ill feeling between
France and
Great Britain during the 18th century turned into open warfare in 1754 and 1755. In 1756 what became known as the
Seven Years' War broke out across Europe, pitting France,
Austria and
Russia against Britain and
Prussia. France supported Austria and Russia in a land campaign against Prussia, and launched what it saw as its main effort in a maritime and colonial offensive against Britain. By the beginning of 1759 neither alliance had the advantage, in either the land or sea campaigns, and both were having serious problems financing the war. In 1759 more than 60 per cent of French revenue went to service its debt, causing numerous shortages. The French Navy in particular was overstretched and suffered from the lack of a coherent doctrine, exacerbated by the inexperience verging on incompetence of the
secretary of state for the navy,
Nicolas René Berryer, a former chief of police. Meanwhile, Britain's war effort up to early 1757 had been a failure, with setbacks in Europe, North America, India and at sea. From June it came under the control of the assertive new
secretary of state for the southern department (foreign minister),
William Pitt, who imposed a coordinated strategy. It consisted of a naval and colonial effort to expel the French from North America and ruin their maritime trade, while dispersing their efforts between fighting Prussia in Europe and attempting to defend the wide range of French overseas possessions. By early 1759 this was beginning to bear fruit. In response to the British successes, the ministers of the French king,
Louis XV, planned a direct invasion of Britain, which, if successful, would have decided the war in their favour. An army of 17,000 was collected at Vannes, in the south east of
Brittany, and nearly 100 transports were assembled near
Quiberon Bay. In its final form the French plan required these transports to be escorted by the
French navy. However, at the best of times the French struggled to crew their full fleet with experienced mariners; landsmen could be used, but even a small deficiency in ship handling translated into a marked handicap in combat. Three years into the war, thousands of French seamen were held as prisoners by the British; many more were engaged in speculative, and occasionally lucrative,
privateering careers; and the unhealthy conditions, onerous onboard discipline and poor wages, paid late, were a strong disincentive to service. The transports also required at least a
cadre of skilled men. The French possessed 73
ships of the line, the largest warships of the time: 30 serving abroad and 43 in home waters. The latter were split between the Atlantic port of
Brest (22 ships) and the Mediterranean port of
Toulon, with a small number at two ports on the
Bay of Biscay:
Lorient and
Rochefort. In total these ships required an aggregate
complement of about 25,000 men; they were more than 9,000 short of this. The British had 40 ships of the line in home waters, and a further 15 in their Mediterranean Fleet, which was based in
Gibraltar.
Prelude In May 1759
Edward Boscawen took command of the British fleet in the Mediterranean. As well as 15 ships of the line he also had 12
frigatessmaller and faster than ships of the line and primarily intended for raiding, reconnaissance and messaging. He was tasked with harassing the French, protecting British merchant shipping, and ensuring the safety of the British outpost and naval base at Gibraltar. By late July the ships of the British fleet were low on supplies and in urgent need of maintenance after their prolonged period at sea, during which some ships had been damaged by enemy action. The fleet retired to Gibraltar, arriving on 4August. There they began the difficult process of scraping the bottoms of the ships free of
barnacles and seaweed, repairing and replacing their
rigging and replacing
spars. While this refurbishment was under way, fresh orders arrived, alerting Boscawen to the likelihood that the French Mediterranean Fleet would attempt to join up with their Atlantic Fleet, probably at Brest, and instructing him to prevent it. He ordered the first two of his frigates to be ready for sea to patrol to the east, where the Mediterranean narrowed to the bottleneck of the
Strait of Gibraltar, to give warning if the French were to attempt to break out. Earlier in the year, an aspect of the British strategy had played out in the
West Indies. In February, 4,000 British soldiers landed on the French West Indian possession of
Guadeloupe. This island's immense sugar production was supposed to exceed that of all the British
Leeward Islands combined. After great difficulties in preparing them for sea, nine French ships of the line, under
Maximin de Bompart, were despatched to
relieve the island. They arrived the day after the French governor surrendered to the British on 1May. News of this disaster was passed back to Paris, where after deliberation it was decided to reinforce Bompart's force with the Mediterranean Fleet. Orders to sail reached its commander, Admiral
Jean-François de La Clue-Sabran, at the end of July, and it left Toulon on 5August. It consisted of twelve ships of the line and three frigates. La Clue intended to pass the Strait of Gibraltar by night, in order to keep the British in ignorance of his absence from the Mediterranean. He anticipated this might scatter his fleet, and he had ordered his ships to rendezvous off the Spanish port of
Cádiz. During the late evening of 17 August the French passed through the strait, but were observed shortly afterwards by the British frigate . The French were aware they had been spotted, and realising by now that the British fleet was in Gibraltar, anticipated a prompt pursuit. The approach of the
Gibraltar, firing her guns to indicate that the enemy had been sighted, took the British by surprise. There was a scramble to get under way. Most captains and many crew were ashore; some, including Boscawen, were dining several miles away. Most ships sailed without their captains, some under the command of junior officers. Their seniors followed on as best they couldthe flagship, , sailed with three captains and the admiral on boardand sorted themselves out as circumstances allowed. Many officers and men were left ashore. Several ships were barely seaworthy. The process of fitting, or "bending", sails to the
masts of the large warships of the time was a complicated one, and most British ships were forced to do this as they got under way, in the dark, undermanned and with few officers. Some were also fitting spars or even
stepping in their topmasts. Ships were cluttered with material for their refits and with unstowed stores.
HMS Prince had so many casks on one of her gun decks as to be unable to operate that deck's guns; the crew of threw large amounts of loose material overboard. Despite these difficulties, by 11:00 pm, within three hours of
Gibraltar appearing, eight British ships of the line had
warped out of the harbour and were heading for the Atlantic. Several ships were left behind, under
Vice-Admiral Thomas Brodrick, with orders to sail as soon as they could be made fit for sea. Ships sailing at night usually displayed lanterns from their
sterns and masts, so as to avoid collisions and to allow groups of ships to maintain contact. Wishing to be as inconspicuous as possible, the French ships probably did not follow this practice. The French ships had all been issued with sealed orders, which they were to open on passing the Strait of Gibraltar; these instructed them that the fleet was to rendezvous at
Cádiz. Knowing they had been observed by the British, La Clue changed his plan. Instead of heading for Cádiz, where he feared he could be easily blockaded by the British, he decided to sail more westerly, to clear
Cape St. Vincent and head into the North Atlantic. However, the French navy did not have an effective system of night signalling. So at about midnight La Clue had his flagship, , light her stern lantern, turn to port (left, or westward) and reduce her speed. Normally, such actions would be accompanied by firing a cannon to draw attention. The naval historian
Sam Willis suggests it is possible that La Cluewho had been ordered to avoid battle at all costsknowing the entire fleet was relatively close and not wishing to advertise his manoeuvre to the British, omitted to do this. ==Battle==