The formation and mobilization of the 41st Infantry Division, Philippine Army Integration into the USAFFE Up until December 1941, the United States had carefully maintained its neutrality, even as Japanese forces continued to
wage war on the Chinese mainland and as
Adolf Hitler's
U-Boats menaced merchant shipping in the
Atlantic Ocean. While America avoided being in a state of open conflict with any state, it did support the war efforts of the
United Kingdom,
Soviet Union, and
China against the
Axis powers by sending weapons, supplies and materials under the
Lend-Lease program. However, heightened tensions across the globe, deteriorating negotiations with Japan and the failure of all diplomatic efforts to halt Japanese aggression in the Far East, made it clear that it would only be a matter of time before the United States' involvement would entail more than just sending material aid to its allies. Japanese occupation of naval and air bases in
Formosa and southern
Indochina in July 1941, and the increasingly precarious situation and location of the Philippines (being in between Japan and the resource-rich
Dutch East Indies), only added to the certainty that US interests in the Philippine Islands and the rest of the Pacific were directly under threat. As early as 1906, American pre-war military planning – the reality of having to fight a two-front war – "
Europe First" strategy, wherein it was deemed that (the need to defeat
Nazi Germany first, while fighting a holding action against Japan in the Pacific), there was increased optimism among American military leaders regarding the feasibility of defending the Philippines against a Japanese invasion. Materials were also sent to the Philippines in an effort to protect American interests in the Islands and in the Far East. On July 27, 1941, the USAFFE (United States Army Forces in the Far East) was created, leading to the integration of the Philippine Army into the USAFFE. During this transition, Lim stepped down as Deputy Chief of Staff to assume command of the 41st Infantry Division. By September 1, 1941, the mobilization of the Philippine Army was in full swing, marking a significant step in its preparations. In August 1941, as the threat of war loomed closer, President Manuel Quezon issued an order to place the Philippine Army and Philippine Constabulary under the command of the United States Armed Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). Even with the problems that plagued the Philippine Army, Vicente realized that the more imminent threat was the fact that there wasn't much time to mobilize a strong defense force for the country. Vicente knew that if the Japanese invaded, he could serve his country better by relinquishing his position as Deputy Chief of Staff (the second highest position in the Army) and assume a field command. He was eventually put in command of the 41st Infantry Division (PA). Recruits came from his home province of Laguna, as well as Rizal, Cavite, Quezon, and Marinduque. Almost all the men were awfully green and untested in combat. The main cantonment area of the 41st Division was set up along the
Tagaytay ridge (today, the 41st Division, PA, USAFFE Shrine in Tagaytay marks the general location of the division's camp).
Organization of the chain of command Consistent with his long-held belief that the strength of any military unit lies with the men that lead it, General Lim put a lot of thought into how the officers of the 41st Division were organized. He made it a point to get to know his men—their strengths, weaknesses, tendencies and personalities—and organized them, "according to the best principles of command" The 41st Division's area of responsibility was the coastline of
Nasugbu, Batangas. There, General Lim's division dug in. Well-designed and organized defenses were set up by the division. However, the men eventually had to abandon the sector, as all units were ultimately ordered to begin withdrawal to Bataan. At the very least, some of the nervous troops of the 41st were assured that their weapons worked, as turtles occasionally triggered improvised warning devices in the dark, causing troops along the line to fire at what they thought to be infiltrating Japanese.
The withdrawal to Bataan Despite the ten-hour window between the time news was received about the attack on Pearl Harbor and the first Japanese attacks on the Philippines, American and Filipino forces were still generally caught by surprise. Within hours, many airfields and naval stations were destroyed by Japanese air attacks. Many valuable American aircraft had been caught on the ground, and the bulk of those that survived the initial Japanese raids were sent south to Mindanao, en route to Australia. The US and Philippine Army units meant to contain hostile Japanese landings at the beaches were eventually overwhelmed by the initial Japanese onslaught. It soon became apparent that a withdrawal to Bataan (as called for in War Plan Orange 3) was the best remaining option for Filipino and American forces, and from there, deny the use of Manila Bay by the Japanese. On December 24, 1941, USAFFE headquarters notified all unit commanders that "WPO-3 is in effect". With this, the withdrawal to the Bataan Peninsula began. Like all other units, General Lim's 41st Division was given the order to move out of their positions along the Batangas coast and move out to Bataan that Christmas Eve. Almost all the USAFFE units which made a withdrawal from the beaches had to make a fighting retreat. General Lim's division however, in the course of its withdrawal from the Batangas coast to Bataan (through Manila), was fortunate not to have come in contact with any hostile forces. Thus, the Division entered Bataan intact.
Acquisition of supplies With the hurried withdrawal of the USAFFE to Bataan, the defenders had to deal with the unfortunate reality that much of their vital supplies simply could not be brought into the peninsula in time. Thus, historical accounts that discuss the Battle of Bataan invariably touch on the meager rations that all the Filipino and American defenders relied on during the course of the gallant stand. Fortunately for the men of the 41st Division, their situation was slightly more favorable, at least during the initial phase of the battle. A paper written by Col. Juanito R. Rimando in 1978 described Brigadier General Vicente Lim as a commander who was "very particular about the Division's status on supplies and food". Ensuring that his men were well provided for started with choosing (in General Lim's own words) "the best
Quartermaster" available. The Division Quartermaster chosen by General Lim before the war began was Juan O. Chioco, assisted by an equally able Executive Officer, Ernesto D. Rufino. Taking a cue from their Commanding General, both Chioco and Rufino secured supplies on their own initiative, even if it meant not being totally dependent on the Division's "normal sources of supply". On December 28, 1941, there were rumors that the USAFFE had opened its depot in
Angeles City and Army units were free to get all the supplies that they needed and could carry. Promptly, Chioco ordered Rufino to take 22 trucks to gather much-needed supplies. Rufino returned with the trucks the next day, hauling large quantities of food, clothing, supplies and other equipment. The supplies were stored at the
Balanga Sugar Central. A few days after, an American inspector from higher headquarters arrived at the 41st Division's quartermaster headquarters and was surprised with the large quantity of supplies the Division had. Apparently appalled by what he discovered, the inspector "accused Captain Chioco of hoarding while other units lacked these. He threatened to file court-martial charges against Chioco". The American officer took the matter to General Lim. The officer expected General Lim to side with him, but instead the General "bawled him out like hell and said ... that he's got no business interfering with the affairs of the Division, much more so on ... the way the supplies under question were procured." Rimando writes, "The American inspector left a more subdued individual". The relatively better supply situation of the 41st Division is corroborated in memoirs written by other 41st Division veterans such as Captain Jose M. Zuño. On December 29, 1941, Zuño wrote, "BGen Vicente Lim, 41st Div Commanding Gen distributed bacon and
Lucky Strikes cigarettes as Christmas presents, to the officers and men of the division." There can be little doubt that all these played an essential role in making the 41st Infantry Division one of the most effective fighting units during the Battle of Bataan.
The defense at Abucay "Lim is the hero of Bataan", states the
Philippine Army Bulletin of April 1947, "General Lim's 41st Division made possible the Battle of Abucay, which I believe is the most decisive battle of Bataan. , . At Abucay the Japs for the first time met real opposition. . . Contact at Abucay was about 8 January 1942. The Japs, employing massed artillery followed closely by aggressive infantry action hit the 41st Division. For the next 18 days the Japanese tried to break the 41st Division line and failed. Abucay was abandoned on 25 January when Jap breakthroughs in Moron and Natib made Abucay untenable. . . After Abucay the Japs started to withdraw from Bataan, and resumed their attack in April, thus allowing MacArthur forty precious days for the preparation of Australia as an operational base. If any one factor can be said to have contributed mostly to make Bataan possible, that can be Abucay. And If any one unit can be said to have made Abucay possible that is General Lim's 41st Division. Absolute knowledge that they were to hold at all cost gave those members of the Regiment, who were fighting for their homeland, an additional incentive. The Filipino soldier did not have to be motivated to fight. They were the only Philippine Army unit to have been awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for helping the 57th Infantry Regiment of the Philippine Scouts. 696 casualties from the intense fighting along the Abucay front for the 41st Infantry Regiment out of 1821. The fight for Trail 2 remains one of the finest moments in Philippine Army history.
Lull in the fighting and the proposal to counterattack By February 1942, the Japanese had already overshot their original estimate of being able to secure the Philippines within 50 days. The commander of Japanese forces, General Homma, ordered the suspension of offensive operations, in order to regroup and reorganize. As a result, there was a lull in the fighting on Bataan until the middle part of March 1942. General Vicente Lim understood that unless a Japanese soldier was either dead or totally disabled, he was not going to stop attacking. Thus, during the lull, he made a proposal to the high command for a counterattack by USAFFE forces towards
San Fernando, Pampanga. General Lim hoped that a counterattack north, would not only regain ground and their previous defensive positions, but would also give the USAFFE a chance to acquire much needed food stocks. He also believed it would provide a much-needed morale boost to the Filipino and American troops. Unfortunately, no counterattack materialized. It will never be known how much success such a counterattack would have actually yielded (and how much it would have really changed the long term course of events), but the admissions of Japanese Generals Homma and
Takaji Wachi after the war suggest that there was indeed a great chance of success. So "demoralized and badly mangled" were the invading Japanese, that of its 16th Division and 65th Brigade, only two battalions could be classified 'effective' at the time
"To inspire and to lead" The effectiveness of the 41st Division as a fighting unit was as much due to the capability of its leadership, as it was about the bravery and tenacity of its fighting men. Brigadier General Vicente Lim's competence and his ability to get the most out of his men, contributed to making the 41st Division one of the most decorated units in the Battle of Bataan. An excerpt from the memorial article written by his classmates at West Point, best describes the way General Lim led men in battle: "General Lim knew his military science. General Lim had an uncanny faculty of predicting events. General Lim was an excellent judge of men. Although he had gained the reputation in peace time of being rough and outspoken, in war he was father to his men. He was accessible, and gave his counsel when this was sought. He made his subordinates fight by making them feel that upon their personal efforts depended the outcome of the battle." While much praise was showered on General Vicente Lim for his leadership and the performance of his Division, it was his earnest desire to make sure credit was given where it was due. In his last known letter from Bataan, General Lim wrote to his wife: "With all this talk I sincerely give the credit to my officers and enlisted men. They are the ones who did it all. Mine is only to inspire and to lead them. When history is written I will give them all the credit. Their satisfaction is mine to share."
The fall of Bataan After almost four months of fighting the Japanese, the elements, hunger and disease, and with their fates already sealed by the decision made by Allied leaders to defeat Hitler's Germany first, the beleaguered defenders of Bataan were simply in no condition and position to effectively resist the enemy's final push to defeat them. The final Japanese offensive for Bataan began on Good Friday, April 3, 1942. The main attack was directed at the center of the main line of resistance, the sector covered by General Lim's 41st Division. The attack was preceded by an intense and sustained aerial and artillery bombardment. The intensity of the bombardment and the use of incendiaries effectively depleted the Division's ability to hold the line. By April 7, 1942, General Lim had assessed that the fight was over. One of Lim's last official acts was to issue a commendation to his division, "Your courageous and tenacious defense of your line for the last five days against tremendous odds and continuous bombing and shelling by the enemy merits my highest praise and commendation. I am proud to lead such a group of men." Lim used his time at the PGH to get back to health. Friends sent him food and other forms of help, and thus was comparatively well provided for. Lim sustained himself at the hospital by using proceeds from the sale of shares he owned in the Mangco Dry Dock. He continued to fight the Japanese using these same funds, personally financing various guerrilla activities in the provinces. Directing all of these operations from the PGH, Lim had his operatives give regular weekly reports about Japanese troop movements, disposition, and military installations. Such information, like those provided by many other brave Filipino guerrillas, greatly contributed to the success of American and Filipino military operations to liberate the Philippines in the latter part of 1944 to 1945. General Lim's involvement in the underground and guerrilla operations inevitably made him a target of the Japanese Military Police. ==Capture and death==