March into Prussia The first stage of the Grunwald campaign was the gathering of all Polish–Lithuanian troops at
Czerwińsk, a designated meeting point about from the Prussian border, where the joint army crossed the
Vistula over a
pontoon bridge. This maneuver, which required precision and intense coordination among multi-ethnic forces, was accomplished in about a week, from 24 to 30 June. Polish soldiers from
Greater Poland gathered in
Poznań, and those from
Lesser Poland, in
Wolbórz. On 24 June 1410, Władysław II Jagiełło and Czech mercenaries arrived in Wolbórz. Three days later, the Polish army was already at the meeting place. The Lithuanian army marched out from
Vilnius on 3 June and joined the Ruthenian regiments in
Hrodna. They arrived in Czerwińsk on the same day the Poles crossed the river. After the crossing, Masovian troops under
Siemowit IV and
Janusz I joined the Polish–Lithuanian army. The massive force began its march north towards Marienburg (
Malbork), capital of Prussia, on 3 July. The Prussian border was crossed on 9 July. The river crossing remained secret until Hungarian envoys, who were attempting to negotiate a peace, informed the Grand Master. As soon as Ulrich von Jungingen grasped the Polish–Lithuanian intentions, he left 3,000 men at Schwetz (
Świecie) under
Heinrich von Plauen and marched the main force to organize a line of defense on the Drewenz River (
Drwęca) near Kauernik (
Kurzętnik). The river crossing was fortified with
stockades. On 11 July 1410, after meeting with his eight-member
war council, Władysław II Jagiełło decided against crossing the river at such a strong, defensible position. The army would instead bypass the river crossing by turning east, towards its sources, where no other major rivers separated his army from Marienburg. The march continued east towards Soldau (
Działdowo), although no attempt was made to capture the town. The Teutonic army followed the Drewenz River north, crossed it near Löbau (
Lubawa) and then moved east in parallel with the Polish–Lithuanian army. According to the Order's propaganda, the latter ravaged the village of Gilgenburg (
Dąbrówno). Later, in the self-serving testimonies of the survivors before the Pope, the order claimed that Von Jungingen was so enraged by the alleged atrocities that he swore to defeat the invaders in battle.
Battle preparations as a gift to King
Władysław II Jagiełło (painting by
Wojciech Kossak). In the early morning of 15 July 1410, both armies met in an area covering approximately between the villages of Grünfelde (
Grunwald), Tannenberg (
Stębark) and Ludwigsdorf (
Łodwigowo). The armies formed opposing lines along a northeast–southwest axis. The Polish–Lithuanian army was positioned in front and east of Ludwigsdorf and Tannenberg. Polish heavy cavalry formed the left flank, Lithuanian light cavalry the right flank and various mercenary troops made up the center. Their men were organized in three lines of wedge-shaped formations about 20 men deep. The Teutonic forces concentrated their elite heavy cavalry, commanded by Grand Marshal
Frederic von Wallenrode, against the Lithuanians. The order, which was the first to organize their army for the battle, hoped to provoke the Poles or Lithuanians into attacking first. Their troops, wearing heavy armor, had to stand in the scorching sun for several hours waiting for an attack. One chronicle suggested that they had dug pits that an attacking army would fall into. They also attempted to use
field artillery, but a light rain dampened their powder and only two cannon shots were fired. As Władysław II Jagiełło delayed, the Grand Master sent messengers with two swords to "assist Władysław II Jagiełło and Vytautas in battle". The swords were meant as an insult and a provocation. Known as the "
Grunwald Swords", they became one of the national symbols of Poland.
Battle begins: Lithuanian attack and retreat maneuver File:Battle of Grunwald map 2 English.jpg|Retreat of Lithuanian light cavalry (battle location and initial army positions according to an 1836 map by
Johannes Voigt and contradicted by archaeological excavations in 2014–2017). File:Battle of Grunwald map 3 English.jpg|Right-flank Polish–Lithuanian assault File:Battle of Grunwald map 4 English.jpg|Polish heavy-cavalry breakthrough Vytautas, supported by the Polish banners, started an assault on the left flank of the Teutonic forces. After more than an hour of heavy fighting, the Lithuanian light cavalry began a full retreat.
Jan Długosz described this development as a complete annihilation of the entire Lithuanian army. According to Długosz, the Order assumed that victory was theirs, broke their formation for a disorganized pursuit of the retreating Lithuanians, and gathered much loot before returning to the battlefield to face the Polish troops. He made no mention of the Lithuanians, who later returned to the battlefield. Thus, Długosz portrayed the battle as a single-handed Polish victory. This view contradicted
Cronica conflictus and has been challenged by modern historians. Starting with an article by
Vaclaw Lastowski in 1909, they proposed that the retreat had been a planned maneuver borrowed from the
Golden Horde. A
feigned retreat had been used in the
Battle of the Vorskla River (1399), when the Lithuanian army had been dealt a crushing defeat and Vytautas himself had barely escaped alive. This theory gained wider acceptance after the discovery and publication, in 1963 by Swedish historian , of a German letter. Written a few years after the battle, it cautioned the new Grand Master to look out for feigned retreats of the kind that had been used in the Great Battle. Stephen Turnbull asserts that the Lithuanian tactical retreat did not quite fit the formula of a feigned retreat; such a retreat was usually staged by one or two units (as opposed to almost an entire army) and was swiftly followed by a counterattack (whereas the Lithuanians had returned late in the battle).
Battle continues: Polish–Teutonic fight fights a Teutonic knight (detail from a painting by
Wojciech Kossak) While the Lithuanians were retreating, heavy fighting broke out between Polish and Teutonic forces. Commanded by Grand Komtur , the Teutonic forces concentrated on the Polish right flank. Six of von Walenrode's banners did not pursue the retreating Lithuanians, instead joining the attack on the right flank. A particularly valuable target was the royal banner of
Kraków. It seemed that the order was gaining the upper hand, and at one point the royal
standard-bearer,
Marcin of Wrocimowice, lost the Kraków banner. However, it was soon recaptured and fighting continued. Władysław II Jagiełło deployed his reserves — the second line of his army. Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen then personally led 16 banners, almost a third of the original Teutonic strength, to the right Polish flank, and Władysław II Jagiełło deployed his last reserves, the third line of his army. The melee reached the Polish command and one knight, identified as Lupold or Diepold of Kökeritz, charged directly against King Władysław II Jagiełło. Władysław's secretary,
Zbigniew Oleśnicki, saved the king's life, gaining royal favor and becoming one of the most influential people in Poland.
Battle ends: Teutonic Order defeated ,
The Slav Epic At that time, the reorganised Lithuanians returned to the battle, attacking von Jungingen from the rear. The Teutonic forces were by then becoming outnumbered by the mass of Polish knights and advancing Lithuanian cavalry. As von Jungingen attempted to break through the Lithuanian lines, he was killed. According to
Cronica conflictus, Dobiesław of Oleśnica thrust a lance through the Grand Master's neck, while Długosz presented
Mszczuj of Skrzynno as the killer. Surrounded and leaderless, the Teutonic Order began to retreat. Part of the routed units retreated towards their camp. This move backfired when the
camp followers turned against their masters and joined the manhunt. The knights attempted to build a
wagon fort: the camp was surrounded by wagons serving as an improvised fortification. However, the defense was soon broken and the camp was ravaged. According to
Cronica conflictus, more knights died there than on the battlefield. The battle lasted for about ten hours. The Teutonic Order attributed the defeat to treason on the part of
Nicholas von Renys (Mikołaj of Ryńsk), commander of the Culm (
Chełmno) banner, and he was beheaded without a trial. He was the founder and leader of the
Lizard Union, a group of knights sympathetic to Poland. According to the order, von Renys lowered his banner, which was taken as a signal of surrender and led to the panicked retreat. The legend that the order was "stabbed in the back" was echoed in the post-
World War I stab-in-the-back myth and preoccupied
German historiography of the battle until 1945. == Aftermath ==