Against the Ottoman Seventh Army The main advance by infantry from the XX Corps, began during the night of 8 March, by the 53rd (Welsh) Division with the
1st Light Horse Brigade (probably operating dismounted in the rough terrain — see map opposite), the
74th (Yeomanry) Division and the 10th (Irish) Division. On the right flank the
181st Brigade,
60th (2/2nd London) Division, which took part on the first day only, was to secure the line of the Wadi el Auja in and just above the Jordan Valley and guard it and the open right flank of the 53rd (Welsh) Division against an attack. The 60th (2/2nd London) Division pushed Ottoman units back from high ground on the north bank of the Wadi Auja, well beyond the valuable water supply in the river. Meanwhile, infantry from the 53rd, 74th and 10th Divisions advanced north up both sides of the Jerusalem to Nablus road from
Kefr Malik to
Nebi Saleh cutting off all tracks and roads leading to the lower Jordan Valley. Infantry from the 74th (Yeomanry) Division's attack was made astride the Jerusalem to Nablus road; the
231st Brigade on the right moving towards
Mezra ash Sherqiye north north west of Tell 'Asur. But the difficult night advance was further complicated by the terrain and Ottoman machine guns and despite reinforcements being brought forward, the infantry were held up later in the day by the cavernous gorge of the Wadi el Jib. Operating in two groups; the 10th (Irish) Division's right attacked
Atara and
Ajul and the left attacked from
Deir es Sudan to
Nabi Salih. After a late start due to fog rapid advances were made and during the following night the advance continued on most of the front. The bridge over the Wadi el Jib was found to be intact and the top of the cliff was won just before dawn. Daylight found them on the lower slopes of the hills while Ottoman machine gun defenders made determined stands. During these operations the infantry advanced up and down precipitous cliffs and through deep gorges with every Ottoman machine gun carefully placed in strong defensive positions. These had to be located by careful reconnaissance on foot as the country was very rough and due to the low cloud and mist aerial reconnaissance could not be used. Artillery was also severely hampered by the rough terrain making it virtually impossible to produce effective artillery fire support. The XXI Corps moved its right forward from the Wadi Deir Ballut to Ras el Ain and secured a commanding position near Abu Tellul and Musallabeh which overlooks the Jordan Valley and the Beisan to Jericho road. One section followed close behind the infantry leaving the rest of the battery in action and as soon as the leading section was able to open fire the four other guns moved forward to join it.
Deir el Ballut was taken about at 14:00 on 10 March and by 11:00 on 11 March all the ground to the south of the Wadi had been evacuated by the Ottoman forces leaving behind 112 soldiers who were taken prisoner and about 40 dead at a cost to the two infantry divisions of 104 casualties. == Aftermath ==