As the US Eighth Army stopped its advance on the afternoon of November 25, 1950, the PVA 13th Army commenced the Second Phase Campaign. A massive frontal attack was launched against the entire UN line from Yongsan-dong to
Yongdong-ni. To the west, the ROK 1st Infantry Division of US I Corps was attacked by the PVA 66th Corps at Yongsan-dong. In the center, strong probing actions by the PVA 39th and 40th Corps were carried out against US IX Corps at Ipsok and Kujang-dong. In the east, the PVA 38th and 42nd Corps broke through ROK II Corps' line at
Tokchon and
Yongdong-ni. The Home-by-Christmas Offensive was completely stalled on the morning of November 26.
Actions at Tokchon and Yongdong-ni In the aftermath of the
Battle of Onjong, the Chinese recognized ROK II Corps as the most vulnerable unit of the Eighth Army. At the same time, the ROK
8th Infantry Division on the II Corps' right flank advanced north from Yongdong-ni, but their advance was halted by the PVA 38th and 42nd Corps' stubborn resistance. The continuous fighting for the next two days failed to create any gains for the ROK. During the advances, the PVA defenses managed to create a wedge in the center of the ROK 7th Infantry Division, forcing the division to commit most of its reserves on the front line. Meanwhile, the ROK
6th Infantry Division in the II Corps' rear could only offer its 2nd Infantry Regiment as the Corps' reserve due to the earlier losses at Onjong. As the ROK were preparing their defensive positions on the dusk of November 25, the two PVA corps were mobilizing for a decisive counterattack against the Eighth Army's right flank. Given the importance of this assault,
Han Xianchu, one of Peng's deputies, personally commanded the 38th and 42nd Corps for the rest of the battle. The PVA 38th Corps landed the first blow against ROK II Corps at 17:00 on November 25. Aided by total surprise, the PVA 113th Division, 38th Corps first shattered the ROK 7th Infantry Division's Reconnaissance Company on the division's right flank, creating a gap between the ROK 7th and 8th Infantry Division. When the ROK 7th Infantry Division's center and right were in complete chaos, the PVA 112th and the 113th Division, 38th Corps slipped past the UN lines and advanced towards Tokchon. Under heavy pressures from the PVA 114th Division, the ROK 5th and 8th Infantry Regiment tried to fall back to Tokchon, but PVA ambushes in the rear scattered the unsuspecting ROK troops. and the ROK 3rd Infantry Regiment on the ROK 7th Infantry Division's left flank drifted westward and joined the US
2nd Infantry Division. the 124th and the 126th Division tried to infiltrate the ROK 8th Infantry Division's rear by marching through the hills east of Yongdong-ni. At 13:00 on November 25, the ROK 16th Infantry Regiment to the ROK 8th Infantry Division's rear spotted the two PVA divisions at Maengsan, south of Yongdong-ni. But before the order could be carried out, the PVA struck first after learning their trap had been discovered. Meanwhile, following the bonfires made by the Koreans for the cold weather, the PVA 124th Division overran a battalion from the ROK 16th Infantry Regiment and attacked the ROK 8th Infantry Division's command post at Maengsan. With the entire division dispersed, the ROK 8th Infantry Division headquarters and the ROK 16th Infantry Regiment broke out of Maengsan on November 27 and retreated from the battlefield. During the chaos of the battle, Major General
Yu Jae-hung of ROK II Corps did not receive news from the front line until midnight of November 25 — five hours after the Chinese had entered the ROK rear. Responding to the crisis, Yu committed the ROK 2nd Infantry Regiment, 6th Infantry Division to block the PVA divisions. With most of the ROK II Corps' units destroyed by November 27, the UN right flank had fallen to the PVA. Although UN aerial reconnaissance observed on November 27 that the PVA forces on the UN right flank were moving rapidly into the Eighth Army's rear, Walker still ordered the rest of the Eighth Army to continue the offensive north. Convinced that the collapse of ROK II Corps was merely a small counterattack by the PVA, By that time, however, US I and IX Corps had already suffered heavy losses from the Chinese counteroffensive at Kujang-dong, Ipsok and Yongsan-dong.
Actions at Kujang-dong On the left of the ROK 7th Infantry Division of ROK II Corps, the US 2nd Infantry Division of IX Corps was placed in the path of a major PVA supply line. During the Home-by-Christmas Offensive, US
9th Infantry Regiment led the division's advance northward along the Ch'ongch'on River, while the US
38th Infantry Regiment was placed on the division's right flank. The offensive started with little resistance, although the 9th Infantry Regiment was stalled by PVA defenses at Hill 219, north of Kujang-dong on November 25. When the aerial reconnaissance detected an increase in PVA activities, the 38th Infantry Regiment's A Company was sent on a patrol into Chinese territory. The 120th Division would then fight its way across the Ch'ongch'on River and tie down the bulk of the US 2nd Infantry Division. The surprise encounter between the two sides soon left the 9th Infantry Regiment with only three rifle companies combat effective. Unaware that the 1st Battalion of the US 23rd Infantry Regiment had pulled up behind the US 61st Field Artillery Battalion, four
Sharp Sword Companies from the PVA 359th Regiment, 120th Division proceeded to cross the river and attacked the US artillery positions. The surviving PVA troops drifted eastward and occupied a hill named Chinaman's Hat, While the PVA 120th Division commenced its attack on the US 2nd Infantry Division's center, the PVA 119th Division was also trying to drive a wedge between Kujang-dong and Tokchon. Adding to the confusion, Chinese
reconnaissance teams lured the US forces into exposing their positions, and the resulting PVA counter-fire caused the loss of the G Company on the 38th Infantry Regiment's center. The PVA had also penetrated the 38th Infantry Regiment's left flank, blocking the regiment's retreat route in the process. By the morning of November 26, PVA troops were observed all around the 38th Infantry Regiment. The PVA promptly withdrew as the morning came on November 26, and a counterattack by the 38th Infantry Regiment later reopened the road to the rear. Under orders from Major General
Laurence B. Keiser, commander of the US 2nd Infantry Division, Colonel Peploe immediately took command of the ROK 3rd Infantry Regiment while trying to refuse his right flank. The PVA renewed their attacks on the night of November 26. A counterattack from Chinaman's Hat soon captured the 23rd Infantry Regiment's command post. On the 23rd Infantry Regiment's left, the 9th Infantry Regiment's G Company was also overrun by the attacking PVA forces, forcing Colonel Charles C. Sloane Jr. to withdraw the remnants of his regiment across the river. To the US 2nd Infantry Division's right, Commander Wen Yuchen of PVA 40th Corps ordered the 119th Division to destroy the 38th Infantry Regiment in order to protect the PVA breakthrough on the UN right flank. The ferocious fighting soon forced the 38th Infantry Regiment to fight its way back to Kujang-dong in order to rejoin the division. Although Walker did not cancel the Home-by-Christmas Offensive on November 27, Keiser ordered his division to withdraw to Kujang-dong. Full scale retreat of the Division started on the night of November 27, with the PVA attacking everywhere. As the division's convoy tried to move south, they were met with machine gun and mortar fire from numerous PVA roadblocks in the rear. PVA bazooka teams had also knocked out several vehicles while others were trying to swarm the tanks and to lob grenades into their hatches. With some losses, the US 2nd Infantry Division broke through the PVA 118th Division's blockade and arrived at Kunu-ri on the night of November 28.
Actions at Ipsok For the Home-by-Christmas Offensive, US
25th Infantry Division of IX Corps advanced on the left of the US 2nd Infantry Division along the Kuryong River, one of the northern tributaries of the Ch'ongch'on River. On November 24, the 25th Infantry Division started its offensive at the city of Yongbyon, south of Ipsok. To lead the offensive, five companies of infantry, armor and artillery were drawn from the 25th Infantry Division to form a special task force named
Task Force Dolvin. With
Task Force Dolvin leading the offensive on the eastern bank of the Kuryong River, the US
24th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division was placed on the division's right to maintain contact with the 2nd Division, The
27th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division was located in the division's rear as a reserve. Because of the earlier UN defeat at the
Battle of Unsan, the US 25th Infantry Division expected to encounter heavy PVA resistance during its advance. Aside from harassing fire, the US 25th Infantry Division did not encounter strong resistance along the way. Ipsok was captured by
Task Force Dolvin on November 24, and several American POWs from the Unsan battle were also recovered at the town. PVA resistance started to stiffen. During the hill battles on the afternoon of November 25, the
Eighth Army Ranger Company of
Task Force Dolvin suffered heavy losses against the Chinese defenses, and the task force stopped its advance at dusk. But the PVA still conducted a series of probing actions against the American positions on the night of November 25. The PVA patrols soon destroyed the rest of the Ranger Company, while numerous PVA reconnaissance teams disguised as US forces infiltrated
Task Force Dolvin's positions. On the right of
Task Force Dolvin, the mountainous terrains scattered US 24th Infantry Regiment while blocking most of its radio transmissions. Upon learning of the destruction of the Ranger Company, Major General
William B. Kean of the US 25th Infantry Division sent the 2nd Battalion of the 27th Infantry Regiment to reinforce
Task Force Dolvin. He also sent the assistant division commander Brigadier General Vennard Wilson to command of the task force, renaming the task force
Task Force Wilson. After the successful attack against the Eighth Army's right flank, the PVA High Command gave the go ahead for the 39th Corps to attack the US 25th Infantry Division on November 26. The crushing attack soon left the task force decimated and reeling. The PVA 347th Regiment of the 115th Division first met the C Company on the task force's center, On the right flank, the 115th Division attacked the task force's B Company. As the entire task force's line collapsing, the E Company sleeping at the task force's rear was pushed to the front line. the company was reduced to just one platoon after the battle. PVA forces in the rear had also attacked the task force's artillery at Ipsok, preventing fire support during the night. In the aftermath of the night battle, the task force found itself surrounded, and the PVA troops were chanting in all directions against the US forces. When Wilson tried to evacuate the wounded, PVA roadblocks ambushed the medical convoy just south of the 2nd Battalion's perimeter. With only the 2nd Battalion of
Task Force Wilson remaining combat effective on the morning of November 27, Wilson ordered the task force to withdraw to Ipsok. the 2nd Battalion broke through PVA 348th Regiment's roadblock and reached Ipsok on the afternoon. On November 28, Walker shifted US I Corps eastward by attaching the US 25th Infantry Division to US I Corps, while ordering the 25th Infantry Division to withdraw to the Ch'ongch'on River. With the US 35th Infantry Regiment rejoining the 25th Infantry Division after the battle at Yongsan-dong, the 25th Infantry Division withdrew south and
Task Force Wilson was dissolved by Kean on November 28. As part of the Home-by-Christmas Offensive, the Division was to advance north and to capture the town of Taechon while the US 35th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division was advancing north from Yongsan-dong on the Korean right flank. At the same time, the US
24th Infantry Division of US I Corps would advance towards Chongju on the ROK 1st Infantry Division's left flank. On the night of November 24, the defending PVA 66th Corps counterattacked the ROK forces with infantry and cavalry charges, Upon noticing their flank was buckling, the US 24th Infantry Division and the US 35th Infantry Regiment started the retreat southward to the Ch'ongch'on River. At 1 p.m. on November 27, Peng ordered the PVA 66th Corps to destroy the ROK 1st Infantry Division before they could retreat to the Ch'ongch'on River. On the evening of November 27, the PVA 66th Corps launched a massive attack against the ROK 1st Infantry Division, the US
5th Regimental Combat Team of the 24th Infantry Division and the US 35th Infantry Regiment. After midnight, the PVA attacks broke through the ROK lines and captured Yongsan-dong, resulting in the loss of the ROK 11th, 15th and US 35th Infantry Regiment's command posts. The ROK 11th and 15th Infantry Regiment were soon scattered while the retreating US 35th Infantry Regiment was blocked at Yongsan-dong with PVA forces attacking from behind. Under heavy pressure, the US 35th Infantry Regiment fought its way through the town and rejoined the US 25th Division on the afternoon of November 28.
Actions at Kunu-ri Kunu-ri is a crossroad village on the northern bank of the Kaechon River, one of Ch'ongch'on River's southern tributaries. The importance of Kunu-ri was also noted by the Chinese, and on November 27, Peng instructed the PVA 38th Corps to cut the US IX Corps retreat route. On the night of November 27, the Turks took up defensive position at Wawon to the east of Kunu-ri. They were soon met with the PVA 342nd Regiment, 114th Division.
The ensuing battle between the Chinese regiment and the brigade's advance battalion continued for much of the November 28, resulting in 400 Turkish casualties. As dusk came on November 28, the Turkish Brigade tried to retreat west to Sinim-ri to set up stronger defensive positions, but the PVA 342nd Regiment caught up with the brigade and attacked its rear, completely surrounding the brigade. With communications cut between the brigade and the Turkish headquarters, The trapped Turks broke out of the PVA encirclement on the morning of November 29 and the brigade was attached to the US 2nd Infantry Division. Although the Turkish Brigade was crippled by the PVA, its delaying action allowed the US 2nd Infantry Division to secure Kunu-ri on the night of November 28. With the US 23rd Infantry Regiment setting up defensive positions to the north of Kunu-ri on the morning of November 29, the US 38th Infantry Regiment tried to occupy the hills to the northeast of Kunu-ri. But the American soon found the PVA 112th Division had already occupied the hills. The 38th Infantry Regiment was then forced to occupy a lower position at away from the Chinese. Both historian Clay Blair and Colonel Paul Freeman believed that the Turkish Brigade was "overrated, poorly led green troops" who "broke and bugged out", and blamed them for not protecting on the right flank of the US Eighth Army. However historian Bevin Alexander noted that given the Turkish Brigade was the only UN force present between Wawon and Kunu-ri, the Chinese inability to capture Kunu-ri before the US 2nd Infantry Division meant the Turks had fulfilled their original mission and covered the withdrawal of the US IX Corps. , part of the 2nd Infantry Division, fighting a rear-guard action at Kuni-ri|alt=A group of eight or nine men, some standing some sitting, most taking cover behind a bulldozer and with rifles in firing position, in a barren landscape with both water and mountains in the distance On the afternoon of November 28, MacArthur started to recognize that a crisis was growing in Korea. With the start of the
Battle of Chosin Reservoir on November 27, MacArthur gathered his field commanders, including Walker, for a conference in
Tokyo. During the conference, MacArthur learned about the situation on the Eighth Army's right flank and judged that the Eighth Army was in great danger. He instructed Walker to withdraw from the battle before the Chinese could surround the Eighth Army. After the conference at November 29, Walker ordered all Eighth Army units to retreat to a new line around Sunchon, south of Kunu-ri. but the US 2nd Infantry Division was forced to stay at Kunu-ri in order to hold off the Chinese forces on the Eighth Army's right flank. By the time the 2nd Infantry Division tried to withdraw on the night of November 29, the two PVA divisions attacked the US 38th Infantry Regiment. The PVA 112th Division first struck the 38th Infantry Regiment on the left flank, but the American defenses held firm, Upon noticing this development, Brigadier General
Tahsin Yazıcı of the Turkish Brigade ordered a withdrawal, and the Americans had to retreat by infiltrating the PVA lines. At 04:00 on November 30, the 38th Infantry Regiment crossed the Kaechon River under the cover of the 23rd Infantry Regiment and Kunu-ri was under PVA control.
The Gauntlet In the aftermath of ROK II Corps' collapse on November 27, Peng immediately ordered the PVA 38th Corps to cut the road between Kunu-ri and Sunchon in the US IX Corps rear, while the PVA 42nd Corps would surround the entire Eighth Army by rushing south through Pukchang-ni and capture Sunchon. With the new orders on November 28, the US
5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division left Kunu-ri to rejoin the division to the northeast of Sunchon. Lacking reinforcements, the ROK 6th Infantry Division was quickly routed by the PVA 42nd Corps on the night of November 28. PVA forces then attacked the 7th Cavalry Regiment under the cover of the fleeing Korean soldiers and refugees pouring into the American front. Under Gay's order, the 7th Cavalry Regiment withdrew southwest to the town of Sinchang-ni on the morning of November 29, and the PVA resumed the drive southward. A fierce battle between the PVA 125th Division and the 7th Cavalry Regiment broke out during the night of November 29, but by the morning of November 30 the PVA 42nd Corps' advance was halted. The PVA 38th Corps, on the other hand, was marching towards the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road virtually unopposed. An hour and half later, the advance platoon from the 5th Cavalry Regiment was ambushed and destroyed. With its advance blocked, the 5th Cavalry Regiment tried to dislodge the PVA garrison, but it was forced to turn back by the afternoon. The 113th Division then occupied the valley containing the Kunu-ri—Sunchon road at that night and blocked the retreat route of the US 2nd Infantry Division. One of the first victims of the new PVA roadblock was a convoy from the Turkish Brigade, and it was ambushed on the night of November 28. A
military police patrol was sent to investigate, but most of its members were killed by the morning. With the battle still raging at Kunu-ri, the news of the PVA roadblock reached the US 2nd Infantry Division on November 29. and the roadblock grew to in depth. The 2nd Infantry Division, however, did not know the strength of the roadblock on the night of November 29. On the early morning of November 30, Keiser made the decision to withdraw through the valley. On the morning of November 30, the 9th Infantry Regiment led the withdrawal by attacking the roadblock. Four tanks were first sent down the road and the PVA held their fire. Encouraged by this development, Colonel Sloane ordered the 9th Infantry Regiment to press forward, but PVA machine gun and mortar fire immediately stopped the advance at 9 a.m. With no contacts between the American commands and the British units, the Middlesex Regiment advanced to the south end of the valley without attacking the roadblock. Believing that the roadblock was short and the British were attacking up the road, Keiser ordered the 2nd Infantry Division to run through the blockade at 10:00. As the 2nd Infantry Division entered the valley, later known as the "
Gauntlet", The length of the roadblock caught the 2nd Infantry Division by surprise, and the road was soon filled with wrecked vehicles and wounded and dead soldiers. Those who tried to take cover in the ditches were promptly left behind by the convoy rushing south, and unit cohesion instantly evaporated. and the immobilized artillery pieces forced the rest of the division to abandon all vehicles and to retreat by hiking through the hills. In one of the last acts of the battle, the 23rd Infantry Regiment fired off its stock of 3,206 artillery shells within 20 minutes, The last stragglers from the US 2nd Infantry Division finally arrived at Sunchon on December 1, and by December 2 the Eighth Army had completely lost contact with the Chinese. ==Aftermath==