27 April On 26 April, a "Mixed Brigade" was established to occupy the Velestino position. It was formed around the 3rd Brigade (
7th and
8th Infantry Regiments) commanded by Colonel
Konstantinos Smolenskis, with the addition of the
6th Evzone Battalion, a
mountain artillery battalion, an engineer company from the 2nd Engineer Battalion, and a cavalry company. Two days later, a
field artillery battery from the 2nd Artillery Regiment was added to it. Due to shortage of rail carriages, most of this force moved from Farsala to Velestino on foot. Only the Evzone Battalion, an engineer company, and an infantry company of the 7th Regiment's III Battalion (III/7) were sent by rail, arriving at Velestino at 11:00 on 27 April. There they established a defensive position around the
Velestino railway station, and deployed a company to cover the eaves of the forest to the east, near the fork of railway line from Larissa to Volos and Farsala. The artillery and cavalry arrived next, around 15:00, with the rest of the troops following behind on foot. Only towards the end of the day were trains found to carry the 8th Regiment's III Battalion (III/8), an infantry company, and Colonel Smolenskis himself to the area. On the Ottoman side, the commander-in-chief,
Edhem Pasha, dispatched a mixed force to capture Volos, as the Ottomans had received information that the latter city was held by only 200 men. The force, under Suleiman Pasha, was composed of the 13th and 14th Cavalry Regiments plus three companies of the 6th Imperial Horse Guards Regiment (12 companies in total), a
horse artillery battery, and the 3rd Bursa Regiment of the
5th Infantry Division. Setting out from Larissa at 10:00 on 27 April, they moved via Gherli (modern
Armenio) and its cavalry vanguard reached the area of Velestino at 17:30 on 27 April, when they crossed the bridge of
Rizomylos. The Greek forces at Velestino, themselves having arrived hours before, only became aware of the Ottoman approach at 17:00. Immediately the 6th Evzone Battalion, along with the other units on site, deployed its forces: two companies moved to the direction of the Ottoman advance, two others moved to occupy the height of Velestino and Ovrias Gala, and another company covered the artillery, which took position around the railway station. The two cavalry squadrons were ordered to launch a spoiling attack against the Ottoman advance. At 17:30, as the Ottomans were crossing the Rizomylos bridge and their leading cavalry company was approaching Velestino, the Evzones opened fire. Unaware of the size of the opposing forces, Suleiman Pasha decided to break through in force, and sent three cavalry companies to capture the railway station. Faced with stiff resistance, Suleiman Pasha now employed his own artillery about one kilometre north of the Rizomylos bridge, and deployed his entire division: three companies were to continue the attack on the railway station, while the other seven were to advance towards Volos. Each of the two groups was divided into three echelons, the first in open order and the second and third in close-order formation. The firefight continued until 18:30, when the Greek forces launched a counterattack in the direction of the Rizomylos bridge. With their backs to the Rizomylos stream, Suleiman Pasha's forces were in danger of being cut off if the bridge were captured. Mistakenly estimating the Greek forces at much larger than they actually were, the Ottoman commander ordered a retreat, first to Gherli and then, along with the Bursa Regiment, to
Kileler. Despite the Ottoman withdrawal, rumours spread in the Greek rear that the heights around Velestino had been captured, and that the Greek forces were about to be encircled. This led to cases of panic, sporadic wild shots and desertions. The entire artillery battalion withdrew to Volos, followed by two cavalry platoons, and a few Evzones and infantrymen. The 2nd Company of the 2nd Cavalry Regiment took flight towards
Almyros, spreading panic; the field hospitals also fled to Volos, while the peasant carters hired to carry supplies for the troops simply abandoned their carts and fled. When Smolenskis arrived at the nearby village of
Aerino after nightfall, the local railway station staff informed him of the rumours that Velestino had been captured by the Ottomans. He nevertheless pushed on foot towards Velestino with the bulk of his brigade, which had begun arriving; but being unaware of the terrain, and due to the late hour, after making contact with the units of the 8th Regiment, both he and his men spent the night on the heights to the southwest of Velestino. On the next morning, Smolenskis busied himself with deploying his troops in a defensive position, and trying to restore discipline and morale. His requests to the Greek headquarters to be allowed to shoot deserters on the spot were denied, but his arrival did calm nerves and restore order in the Greek units.
28 April The Ottoman commander-in-chief Edhem Pasha dispatched one of the 5th Division's brigade commanders, Naim Pasha, to take over command of the operation, and sent another infantry regiment and a mountain artillery battery as well. Arriving at Kileler around noon on the 28th, Naim Pasha sent two cavalry companies towards Velestino on reconnaissance at 13:30, while half an hour later his main force, comprising his entire infantry brigade and Suleiman Pasha's cavalry division, followed suit, encamping at Gherli. Apart from reconnaissance activity and torching the village of Rizomylos, the Ottoman forces remained quiet that day. The cavalry detachments returned in the evening, reporting that the pass was held by a few Greek battalions and artillery. In the meantime, however, Edhem Pasha had become worried at the inactivity of Naim Pasha, and in the early hours of the 29th sent one of his staff officers, Cavalry Colonel
Mahmud Muhtar, to examine the situation on the ground and take any necessary measures.
29 April After his arrival at Gherli around noon on 29 April, Mahmud Muhtar urged Naim Pasha and Suleiman Pasha to attack before the Greeks had had enough time to establish strong fortifications; he also pointed out that the rest of the Ottoman army was at the very same time preparing to advance on Farsala, and that the Greek forces opposing them were not as strong as they thought.The energetic Mahmud Muhtar would prove to be the driving force of the Ottoman efforts to break through the Velestino position, but the Ottomans remained hampered by the lack of unified command: Naim Pasha, who outranked Mahmud Muhtar, disregarded his advice and proved himself a dilatory and hesitant commander. The Ottoman commanders worked out a plan of attack in two columns. Suleiman Pasha was put in charge of the right (western) column, although Colonel Mahmud Muhtar, who joined the column ostensibly as the commander-in-chief's liaison, was its
de facto commander. It comprised the Bursa,
Orhaneli, and
Bilecik infantry battalions, a horse artillery battery, and 7 cavalry companies (three from the 6th Guards Regiment and the 13th Cavalry Regiment), and was intended to operate as a diversion, while the main attack would be led by Naim Pasha on the left (eastern) flank along the road to Volos, against the Greek centre and right. Naim Pasha's column comprised the
Adapazarı,
Elmalı,
Çakırca, and
Tuzca battalions and two companies from the
Mihaliç battalion, the 14th Cavalry Regiment, and a field artillery battery. On the Greek side, the forces under Smolenskis' command on 29 April numbered 6 infantry companies on the feet of Malouka Hill, to the west of Velestino, with an artillery battery on the Panagia height. A battalion occupied the low ground before the pass itself, between the Velestino railway station and the height of Ovrias Gala to the northeast, near Rizomylos. The 6th Evzone Battalion held the Ovrias Gala height itself. Another infantry battalion, with an artillery battery, was placed at the Pilaf Tepe height. Two battalions (minus a company sent to Volos) remained at Velestino as a reserve. The Greek troops had dug trenches and field works before their positions. The Ottomans began their march at 14:00, and were detected by the Greek scouts an hour later, as the Ottoman vanguard detachments approached the village of Koniari (modern
Chloi) in front of the Greek left. At around 16:00, Suleiman Pasha's troops occupied the heights around Koniari, and started firing on the Greek positions. After about half an hour, Mahmud Muhtar had gauged the Greek strength, which he estimated at 3–4 battalions with a few mountain artillery pieces, and, given the numerical superiority of the Ottoman forces, decided to launch an all-out attack. However, before giving this order, he had to coordinate with Naim Pasha's column, and set out to meet with him at Rizomylos, only to find that the latter's column had moved slowly and not yet reached its planned positions. Only at around 17:00 did the leading elements of Naim Pasha's column arrive at Rizomylos, with the main body following half an hour behind. Naim Pasha launched an attack against the Greek positions at Ovrias Gala at 18:00, but was repulsed, and nightfall halted any further operations. According to
Colmar von der Goltz, Mahmud Muhtar suggested a night attack against the Greek left at 03:00, but again this did not take place because the additional battalion promised by Naim Pasha for this operation failed to arrive on time. With the shift of troops and focus to their right, the Ottomans effectively reversed their original plan and made their main effort against the Greek left. On the Greek side, Colonel Smolenskis asked Crown Prince Constantine for urgent reinforcements, and in the same night received by rail the 4/2 field artillery battery, which took up position near the railway station, and the
4th Evzone Battalion, which took up positions at Ayvali (modern
Rigaion) to cover Smolenskis' left flank. As a result, by the next morning, the heights of Malouka Hill on the Greek left were defended by the equivalent of two full battalions (III/7 Battalion minus two companies, IV/8 Battalion, two companies of 8th Regiment) and two mountain batteries (12 guns), while the positions on the low ground between the railway station and the Ovrias Gala height also strengthened to six companies (II/7 Battalion and two companies from 8th Regiment), leaving 7 companies of 8th Regiment as a reserve. On the right, Ovrias Gala was held by six companies: the 6th Evzone Battalion, minus a company detached to cover the village of Kapourna (modern
Glafyra), along with a company from III/7 Battalion. The engineer company was placed on the Latomi heights east of the Velestino railway station, while the last company of III/7 Battalion had been detached to maintain order in Volos.
30 April The Ottoman attack began at dawn (5:00) on the 30th, with Naim Pasha's column attacking the Ovrias Gala and Pilaf Tepe heights, with support from a battery at Rizomylos. The attacking Ottoman forces, however, were repulsed both at Ovrias Gala and in front of Velestino. The Greeks were aided by the recently arrived field battery, which took position near the railway station at 9:00. At Ovrias Gala, the commander of the Greek II/7 Battalion, Major Kopsidas, launched a counterattack with two companies against the Ottoman reserves, throwing them into panic and dispersing them, until an Ottoman battalion and cavalry company came to their rescue, and attacked the Greeks' left. Eventually, the Greek column withdrew back to its trenches before the railway station around noon. The Ottomans then launched an attack on the Megavouni height with a battalion, but the attack was repulsed by 17:00. Likewise, in the centre, the repeated attempts of the Adapazarı battalion and the two companies from the Mihaliç battalion to evict the Greek defenders from the forest north of Velestino, failed. At 11:30 a Greek company attempted to launch a counterattack but was likewise repulsed. On the Ottoman right, Mahmud Muhtar left the Bursa battalion with the horse artillery battery to pin down the Greek left, while personally leading six infantry companies from the Orhaneli and Bilecik battalions on a wide outflanking manoeuvre around Mount Karadagh to the rear of the Greek left's positions. Two infantry companies of the Bilecik battalion and seven cavalry companies were kept as a reserve to exploit any success. By noon, Mahmud Muhtar's manoeuvring element still had not made sufficient progress, hampered by the hard terrain, and thwarted by the reaction of the III/7 Battalion commander, Major Nikolaos Demestichas, who progressively sent out companies to extend the Greek left flank to the west and occupy crucial heights before the Turks arrived. At the same time, on the Ottoman left, Naim Pasha grew increasingly anxious about the situation of his forces, which were engaged already for seven hours without success, and pleaded with his fellow commanders to apply more pressure on their own front. The bad situation on Naim Pasha's front was exacerbated by the inept disposition of his forces: contrary to the advice of Mahmud Muhtar, he had strung out his entire force on an wide front, without keeping any reserves. As a result, Mahmud Muhtar and Suleiman Pasha decided to launch a frontal attack against the Greek left at Karadagh with the infantry they had held in reserve, and the seven cavalry companies, 300 men under Ibrahim Bey, were instructed to stand by to intervene at the "suitable moment". at Velestino": the failed Ottoman cavalry charge of 30 April, drawn by
John Charlton The Ottoman infantry quickly captured the first Greek line, while the Greeks withdrew to their second, main defensive position. Ibrahim Bey had sent an officer to the front line to determine the "suitable moment" and give the signal for the cavalry to attack; the officer did so at that point, when it was clearly premature, as the line of the Greek infantry had not yet been broken. Consequently, at 13:00 the Ottoman cavalry began to move into position to attack: a first echelon of two companies under Colonel Mahmud Muhtar were tasked with penetrating the Greek positions at the western slopes of Panagia height; Ibrahim Bey led a second echelon of three companies to the left and rear of the first, to assist it in its breakthrough; and a third echelon of two companies followed to the right and rear as a reserve force. While Mahmud Muhtar's first echelon successfully reached the slopes of Panagia and turned south as planned, the second echelon missed the turn and continued advancing to the east. When Ibrahim Bey realized this, it was too late: if he tried to turn south, his men would suffer heavy casualties to the entrenched Greeks on its flank. Thus he ordered his bugler to signal the retreat north. The third echelon followed suit, returning to the positions it had started from. This left Mahmud Muhtar's first echelon, already charging against the Greek trenches west of Panagia, alone and without any support. The Ottoman attack reached the Greek trenches, with some of the cavalrymen fighting with their sabres or dismounting to shoot at the defending Greeks; in the end, the Ottomans were forced to retreat by the heavy fire of the well-entrenched infantry. At about the same time, at 13:30, the Bursa battalion attacked the second Greek line on Karadagh, defended by IV/7 Battalion. By 15:00, the Ottoman troops found themselves separated from their comrades in the six outflanking companies by a single trench still held by the Greeks. The Greeks, with good artillery support, managed to force the Ottomans to withdraw, leaving two artillery pieces behind. In the meantime, the six outflanking companies launched five successive attempts to break through or outflank the Greek positions, without success. At 16:30, the Greek III/7 Battalion's 2nd company launched a fierce counterattack which forced them back, leaving 40 dead. With the Greek positions intact, at 16:30 Naim Pasha and Mahmud Muhtar ordered their forces to retreat towards Gherli. By 18:00, with the Ottoman withdrawal in full effect, fire ceased. Although the day had been a success for the Greeks, the Greek commanders, committed to the doctrine of passive defence, completely failed to exploit their success by launching a pursuit against the strung-out Ottoman forces, even though they disposed of twice as much infantry (7,000 men) as the Ottomans. The counterattack launched by Major Kopsidas, if properly supported, might have destroyed the eastern Ottoman column, but the opportunity was allowed to be lost. The casualties of the two sides during the First Battle of Velestino were 138 killed and 254 wounded for the Ottomans, and 28 killed and 142 wounded for the Greeks. ==Second Battle of Velestino, 5–6 May==