Lexington Although often styled a battle, the Lexington engagement was only a minor brush or
skirmish. As the Regulars' advance guard under Pitcairn entered Lexington at sunrise on April 19, 1775, about 80 Lexington militiamen emerged from
Buckman Tavern and stood in ranks on
Lexington Common watching them. Between 40 and 100 spectators watched from the side of the road. The militiamen were part of Lexington's
"training band", a local militia organization method dating back to the
Puritans, and not a
minuteman company. The militia leader, Captain
John Parker, a veteran of the
French and Indian War, had
tuberculosis and his raspy voice could be difficult to hear. After waiting most of the night with no sign of British troops (and wondering if Revere's warning was accurate), at about 4:15 a.m., Parker got confirmation.
Thaddeus Bowman, the last scout sent out earlier by Parker, rode up and told Parker that Regulars were coming in force and were nearby. Parker positioned his company in
parade-ground formation, on Lexington Common in plain sight (not behind walls), but not blocking the road to Concord. The militiamen made a show of determination, but no effort to prevent the Regulars' march. Parker was aware that his company was outmatched and did not intend to sacrifice his men for no purpose. He knew that most of the colonists' powder and military supplies at Concord had been hidden and no war had yet been declared. He also knew the British had gone on such expeditions before, found nothing, and marched back to Boston. Many years later, Isaiah Thomas, one of the militiamen, recalled Parker's words as those now engraved in stone at the battle site: "Stand your ground; don't fire unless fired upon, but if they mean to have a war, let it begin here." According to Parker's sworn deposition after the battle, he concluded after consulting others that the militia gathered on the Common should not engage with the Regulars. When the Regulars approached, he ordered the militia to disperse and not fire. He testified that when the British appeared, they immediately rushed the militia and fired without provocation, killing eight of his men. British Marine Lieutenant Jesse Adair, leading the advance guard, decided to protect the British
column's flank by first turning right and then leading the companies onto the Common itself, in a confused effort to surround and disarm the militia. Major Pitcairn then arrived from the rear of the advance force. Pitcairn led his three companies to the left and halted. The remaining companies under Colonel Smith were further down the road. Although Pitcairn probably ordered the Regulars to advance on the militiamen, at least one account states that the officer in the lead was
Lieutenant William Sutherland, who ordered the Patriots to disperse and "lay down your arms, you damned rebels!" Another Patriot account stated that three British officers led the charge with the foremost giving an order to fire. Amid the confusion caused by considerable yelling, some Patriots did not hear Parker's raspy command to leave the field and left slowly as the British charged. None threw down their arms.
First shot: Conflicting accounts from 1775. Doolittle visited the battle sites and interviewed soldiers and witnesses. Contains controversial elements, possibly inaccuracies. Fire from the militia may have occurred but is not depicted. British and Patriot soldiers' accounts from Lexington, and analyses by later historians, differ on who fired the first shot and whether any definite conclusion can be made. Modern historian David Hackett Fischer wrote that both British commander Pitcairn and Patriot commander Parker, ordered their men to hold their fire but a shot was fired from an unknown person. Some witnesses (on each side) claimed that someone on the other side fired first; however, many more witnesses claimed to not know which side fired the first shot. Some men on both sides stated that the initial shot did not come from the men immediately facing each other at the Common. Fischer has proposed the possibility of multiple near-simultaneous shots. Fischer wrote that while a few militiamen thought the regulars were only firing powder but not
ball, when they realized the Regulars were firing ball, few if any of the militiamen managed to load weapons and return fire. The others ran for their lives. Historian Mark Urban wrote that British soldiers cheered and ran at the militiamen who lowered their weapons instead of moving in at an orderly walk to disarm them. According to Urban, one or two villagers opened fire and then, without orders from Pitcairn, one formed British company levelled its weapons and let fly a crashing
volley. Some British troops stated that the first shot was fired by an American onlooker from behind a hedge or around the corner of a tavern. Lieutenant John Barker of the 4th Regiment of Foot, claimed that when his regiment came upon his estimate of 200 to 300 militiamen (rather than the 80) formed in the middle of town, his regiment advanced without intending to attack the militia
formation. He wrote that the militia fired two shots at the regiment. Then the regiment rushed upon the militia, fired and put them to flight. In a subsequent deposition taken later that year, 34 militiamen testified that at about 5:00 a.m. on April 19, after hearing their drum beat, they went to the parade ground and spotted large numbers of regulars marching toward them. They claimed that some men of their militia company were still coming to the parade ground when the militia began to disperse and that the regulars fired on them while their backs were turned. In their testimony, the militiamen stated that a number of their company were instantly killed and wounded, but that nobody in the militia company opened fire before they were fired on and that the regulars kept up their fire until all militiamen had fled the scene. Pitcairn's companies got beyond their officers' control in part because they were unaware of the purpose of the day's mission. They began firing in different directions and preparing to enter private homes. Colonel Smith, who was arriving with the remaining Regulars, heard musket fire and rode forward to see the action. He found a drummer and ordered him to beat assembly. The grenadiers arrived on the scene soon thereafter. Order was restored among the British soldiers and the column reformed and marched toward Concord.
Concord from 1775, depicting the British entering Concord Upon receiving the alarm, militiamen of Concord and Lincoln mustered in Concord. They were told about shots fired at Lexington. Initially, they were unsure whether to wait for reinforcements and to stay to defend the town or to move east and engage the British from superior terrain. A column of militia did march toward Lexington to meet the British, traveling about until they approached a column of Regulars. As the Regulars numbered about 700 and the militia only numbered about 250, the militiamen turned around and marched back to Concord, about ahead of the Regulars. The militia proceeded to a ridge overlooking the town and their officers discussed their next move. They decided to be cautious. Patriot
Colonel James Barrett led the men from the center of town across the
Old North Bridge to a hill about a mile north, where they watched British movements and activities in the town center. This step allowed the militia's ranks to grow as minuteman companies arrived from towns to the west before they engaged the British.
Search for militia supplies Colonel Smith divided troops arriving at Concord to carry out Gage's orders to search for supplies. The 10th Regiment's company of grenadiers under Captain Mundy Pole secured the South Bridge, while about 100 men from seven companies of light infantry under Captain Parsons secured the North Bridge. The militiamen could see the British at North Bridge across cleared fields. Captain Parsons took four companies from the 5th, 23rd, 38th, and 52nd Regiments up the road beyond the North Bridge to search
Barrett's Farm, where intelligence indicated supplies could be found. Two companies from the 4th and 10th Regiments were stationed to guard their return route, and one company from the 43rd remained to guard the bridge itself. These companies, under relatively inexperienced commander Captain Walter Laurie were significantly outnumbered by the 400-plus militiamen. The concerned Captain Laurie sent a messenger to Smith requesting reinforcements. Using detailed information from Loyalist spies, grenadier companies searched the small town for military supplies. When they arrived at Ephraim Jones's tavern, by the jail on the South Bridge road, they found the door barred shut, and Jones refused them entry. According to Loyalists reports, Pitcairn knew cannon had been buried on the Jones property. Jones was ordered at gunpoint to show where the guns were buried. These were three massive pieces that fired 24-pound shot. The guns were much too heavy to use defensively, but quite effective against fortifications. The grenadiers smashed the
trunnions of these guns so they could not be mounted. They also burned
gun carriages found at the village meetinghouse. When the fire spread to the meetinghouse itself, local resident Martha Moulton persuaded the soldiers to help in a
bucket brigade to save the building. The British threw most of the barrels of confiscated flour into a local millpond, rather than smashing them. They also threw 550 pounds of musket balls into the millpond. Only the damage done to the cannon was significant. All of the shot and much of the flour was recovered. The flour on the edges of the barrels had effectively caulked the barrels and preserved the remaining flour. General Gage had explicitly instructed Colonel Smith that "you will take care that the soldiers do not plunder the inhabitants, or hurt private property". Thus, the Regulars were generally scrupulous in their treatment of the civilians during the search, including paying for food and drink. The locals used this excessive politeness to advantage. They were able to misdirect British searches from several smaller caches of militia supplies. Barrett's Farm had been an arsenal weeks before, but few weapons remained on April 19. According to family legend, these were quickly buried in furrows to look like a planted crop. The British troops found no supplies of consequence there.
North Bridge Colonel Barrett's troops saw smoke rising from the village square as the British burned cannon carriages. Seeing only a few light infantry companies directly below, Barrett ordered his men to march toward town from their vantage point on
Punkatasset Hill to a lower, closer flat hilltop about from the Old North Bridge. As the militia advanced, the two British companies from the 4th and 10th Regiments which held the position near the road retreated to the bridge, yielding the hill to Barrett's men. Five full companies of minutemen and five more of militiamen from
Acton, Concord, Bedford and Lincoln occupied the hill. At least 400 Patriots confronted Captain Laurie's light infantry companies, totaling 90–95 men. Barrett ordered his men to form one long line two abreast on the highway leading down to the bridge. Then, while overlooking North Bridge from the top of the hill, Barrett,
Lt. Col. John Robinson of
Westford and the other captains discussed advancing on the bridge. Barrett asked Captain
Isaac Davis, who commanded a company of minutemen from Acton, if his company would be willing to lead the advance. Davis responded, "I'm not afraid to go, and I haven't a man that's afraid to go." from 1775, depicting the engagement at the North Bridge Barrett ordered the men to load their weapons but not to fire unless fired upon. Then he ordered them to advance. Laurie ordered the British companies guarding the bridge to retreat across it. One officer then tried to pull up the loose planks of the bridge, but militia Major Buttrick yelled at the Regulars to stop. The minutemen and militia advanced on the bridge in column formation, two by two, led by Major Buttrick and Lt. Col. Robinson. They kept to the road because it was surrounded by the Spring floodwaters of the
Concord River. Not having been reinforced, Laurie ordered the British to form positions for "street firing" in a column running perpendicular to the river behind the bridge. This formation was useful for sending a large volume of fire into a narrow alley between buildings, but not for firing on an open path from behind a bridge. Confusion reigned as Regulars retreating over the bridge also tried to form up in the street-firing position. Lieutenant Sutherland, who was in the rear of the formation, saw Laurie's mistake and ordered flankers to be sent out. But as he was from a company different from the men under his command, only three soldiers obeyed him. The others tried their best to follow the orders of the superior officer. A shot rang out. According to Captain Laurie's later report, the shot was likely a warning shot fired by a panicked, exhausted British soldier from the 43rd. Two other Regulars then fired shots that splashed into the river. Next the narrow group up front, possibly thinking an order to fire had been given, fired a ragged volley before Laurie could stop the firing. Two Acton Minutemen at the head of the line marching to the bridge, were killed instantly. Four more were wounded. Major Buttrick then yelled to the militia, "Fire, for God's sake, fellow soldiers, fire!" At this point the lines were separated by the Concord River and the bridge but were only apart. The few front rows of colonists, bound by the road and blocked from forming a line of fire, managed to fire over each other's heads and shoulders at the Regulars massed across the bridge. Four of the eight British officers and sergeants, who were leading from the front of their troops, were wounded by the Patriot volley. At least three privates from the 4th were killed or mortally wounded, and nine more were wounded. The British at the bridge were both outnumbered and outmaneuvered. Lacking effective leadership and terrified at the superior numbers of the enemy, with their spirit broken, and likely not having experienced combat before, the British abandoned their wounded. They fled to the safety of grenadier companies coming from the town center. This move isolated Captain Parsons and the companies searching for arms at Barrett's Farm. Colonel Smith heard the exchange of fire from his position in the town moments after he received the request for reinforcements from Laurie. He quickly assembled two companies of grenadiers to lead toward the North Bridge himself. These troops soon met the shattered men of the three light infantry companies running towards them. Smith now worried about the safety of the four companies at Barrett's farm since their route to town was now unprotected. Smith then saw the minutemen in the distance behind a wall. He moved forward with only his officers to take a closer look. One of the minutemen behind that wall observed: "If we had fired, I believe we could have killed almost every officer there was in the front, but we had no orders to fire and there wasn't a gun fired." As the detachment of Regulars sent to Barrett's farm marched back from their fruitless search, they passed through the mostly-deserted battlefield and saw dead and wounded comrades on the bridge. One of the dead looked to them as if he had been scalped, angering and shocking the British soldiers. They crossed the bridge and returned to the town by 11:30 a.m. The colonists watched and kept defensive positions without attacking. The Regulars continued to search for and destroy the few military supplies found in the town, ate lunch, reassembled for marching, and left Concord after noon. This delay in departure gave colonial militiamen from outlying towns more time to reach the road back to Boston first.
Return march Concord to Lexington map showing the retreat from Concord and Percy's rescue As the British marched east from Concord, Colonel Smith sent flankers to follow a ridge and protect his forces from the roughly 1,000 colonials now in the field. This ridge ended near
Meriam's Corner, a crossroads about one mile (2 km) outside Concord. There the main road came to a bridge across Elm Brook, a tributary of the
Shawsheen River. The British needed to pull the flankers back into the main column and close ranks to a mere three soldiers abreast to cross the bridge. Colonial militia companies arriving from the north and east converged here, clearly outnumbering the Regulars. As the last British soldiers marched over the narrow bridge, their rear guard wheeled and fired a volley at the colonial militiamen. The militia had been firing irregularly and ineffectively from a distance but had closed to within musket range. The colonists returned fire with deadly effect. Two Regulars were killed and perhaps six wounded, without colonials taking casualties. Smith sent out his flanking troops again after crossing the small bridge. On
Brooks Hill (also known as Hardy's Hill) about past Meriam's Corner, nearly 500 militiamen had assembled to the south of the road, awaiting an opportunity to fire down upon the British column. Smith's leading forces charged up the hill to drive them off, but the colonists did not withdraw, inflicting significant casualties on the attackers. Smith withdrew his men from Brooks Hill, and the column continued on to another small bridge into Lincoln. There, at Brooks Tavern, more militia companies intensified the attack from north of the road. . It is by
Henry Hudson Kitson and stands at the town green of
Lexington, Massachusetts. The Regulars soon reached a point in the road, now referred to as the "
Bloody Angle", where the road rises and curves sharply to the left through a lightly wooded area. Here, the militia company from
Woburn positioned themselves on the southeast side of the bend in the road in a rocky, lightly wooded field. Additional militia flowing parallel to the road from the engagement at Meriam's Corner positioned themselves on the northwest side of the road, catching the British in a crossfire. Other militia companies on the road closed from behind to attack. Some further along, more militiamen took a position at another sharp curve, this time to the right. Again the British were caught in a crossfire from both sides of the road. While passing along these two sharp curves, the British lost thirty soldiers killed or wounded. Four colonial militiamen were also killed, including three officers. The British soldiers escaped by breaking into a trot, a pace that the colonials could not maintain through the woods and swampy terrain. Colonial forces on the road itself behind the British were too densely packed and disorganized to mount more than a harassing attack from behind. As militia forces from other towns arrived, the colonial forces increased to about 2,000 men. Beyond the curves, the road straightened to the east, with cleared fields and orchards along the sides. Colonel Smith sent out flankers, who succeeded in trapping some militiamen from behind and inflicting casualties. British casualties also mounted from these engagements and from persistent long-range fire. The exhausted British now were running out of ammunition. When the British neared the boundary between Lincoln and Lexington, Captain John Parker's Lexington militiamen, including some bandaged from their earlier encounter, ambushed them from a hill overlooking the road. Colonel Smith was wounded in the thigh and knocked from his horse. Major Pitcairn assumed effective command of the British column and sent light infantry companies up the hill to clear out the militia. The British light infantry cleared two more hills as the column continued east—"The Bluff" and "Fiske Hill"— while taking more casualties from ambushes set by fresh militia companies. Here, Major Pitcairn's horse bolted in fright from a militia musket volley, throwing Pitcairn to the ground and injuring his arm. Both principal British commanders were now injured or unhorsed. Their men were tired, thirsty and with little more ammunition. A few surrendered or were captured. Some now broke formation and ran forward toward Lexington. A British officer wrote that officers got to the front, presented bayonets and told men they would die if they advanced. At this, the men formed up under heavy fire. Only one British officer remained uninjured among the three companies at the head of the British column as it approached Lexington. He understood the column's perilous situation, with few men having ammunition and the men so fatigued that flankers could not be kept out. He then heard cheering further ahead. A full British brigade, about 1,000 men with artillery, under the command of Earl Percy, had arrived. The time was about 2:30 p.m. The original British column had been on the march since 2:00 a.m. In their later accounts, British officers and soldiers noted their frustration about colonial militiamen firing at them from behind trees and stone walls, rather than confronting them in large, linear formations as in European warfare. Despite this description being fostered in myth, from the beginning at the North Bridge and throughout the British retreat, the colonial militias repeatedly operated as coordinated companies, even when dispersed to take advantage of cover. Reflecting on the British experience that day, Earl Percy understood the significance of the American tactics when he wrote that the "Rebels" had attacked in a very scatter and irregular manner but with perseverance and resolution. He wrote that they should not look at them as an irregular mob because they knew what they were doing as they had been employed as Rangers against the Indians and Canadians. He noted that the country was covered with woods and hills and was very advantageous to their method of fighting.
Percy's rescue from 1775, showing Percy's rescue in Lexington General Gage had anticipated that Colonel Smith's expedition might require reinforcement, so Gage drafted orders for reinforcing units to assemble in Boston at 4 a.m. But in his obsession for secrecy, Gage had sent only one copy of the orders to the adjutant of the 1st Brigade, whose servant left the envelope on a table. Also at about 4 a.m., Smith's column was within three miles of Lexington. Smith now realized that all element of surprise was lost as the alarm was spreading through the countryside. So he sent a rider back to Boston with a request for reinforcements. At about 5 a.m., the rider reached Boston. The 1st Brigade: the line infantry companies of the 4th, 23rd, and 47th Regiments, a battalion of Royal Marines, two 6-pounder guns from 4th Battalion,
Royal Artillery and battalion companies from 7 regular companies, under the command of Brigadier General Hugh Percy was ordered to assemble. Percy took the land route across Boston Neck and over the Great Bridge, which some quick-thinking colonists had stripped of its planking to delay the British. His men then came upon an absent-minded tutor at
Harvard College and asked him which road would take them to Lexington. The Harvard man, apparently oblivious to the reality of what was happening around him, showed him the proper road without thinking. Percy's troops arrived in Lexington, about 2:00 p.m., they heard distant gunfire. They set up the cannons and deployed lines of Regulars on high ground with commanding views of the town. Smith's men approached like a fleeing mob with colonial militia in close formation in pursuit. Percy ordered his artillery to open fire at extreme range, dispersing the colonial militiamen. Smith's men collapsed with exhaustion when they reached Percy's lines. Against the advice of his Master of Ordnance, Percy left Boston without spare ammunition for his men or for the two artillery pieces. Percy thought extra wagons would slow the march. Percy's men had only 36 rounds. Each artillery piece had only a few rounds carried in side-boxes. After Percy left the city, Gage directed two ammunition wagons guarded by one officer and thirteen men to follow. This convoy was intercepted by a small party of older, veteran militiamen still on the "alarm list", but who could not join their militia companies because they were more than 60 years old. These men ambushed the convoy and demanded the surrender of the wagons. The British ignored them and drove their horses on. The old men opened fire, shot the lead horses, killed two sergeants, and wounded the officer. The British survivors ran. Six of them threw their weapons into a pond before they surrendered.
Lexington to Menotomy Percy assumed control of the combined forces of about 1,700 men and let them rest, eat, drink, and have their wounds tended at field headquarters (
Munroe Tavern) before resuming the march. The British set out from Lexington at about 3:30 p.m., in a formation emphasizing defense along the sides and rear of the column. Earlier in the day, Massachusetts Brigadier General William Heath traveled to
Watertown to discuss tactics with Joseph Warren, who had left Boston that morning, and other members of the
Massachusetts Committee of Safety. Heath, along with Warren, arrived at Lexington and reacted to Percy's artillery and flankers by ordering the militiamen to avoid close formations that would attract cannon fire. Instead, they surrounded Percy's marching square with a moving ring of skirmishers at a distance to inflict maximum casualties at minimum risk. A few mounted militiamen would dismount on the road, fire muskets at the approaching Regulars, then remount and gallop ahead to repeat the tactic. Although the effective combat range of British and colonial muskets was about , unmounted militiamen would often fire from long range, hoping to hit British soldiers on the road without taking fire. Colonial infantrymen also attacked the British column's flankers. When the column moved out of range, the infantrymen would move around and forward to re-engage the column later. Heath sent messengers to arriving militia units, directing them to places along the road to engage the Regulars. Heath and Warren themselves led skirmishers in small actions during the battle. Fischer noted that effective leadership overall probably made the greatest contribution to Patriot tactical success. were killed in or beside the
Jason Russell House itself. During this fighting, Percy and Smith lost control of their men. Many junior officers in flank parties had difficulty stopping their exhausted, enraged men from killing everyone they found inside buildings. A few Regulars committed atrocities such as killing two drunk men at Coopers Tavern to repay for the supposed scalping at the North Bridge and for their own casualties from an often unseen enemy. Although colonists later exaggerated many accounts of British ransacking and burning for propaganda value (and to get financial compensation from the colonial government), taverns along the road definitely were ransacked and liquor stolen by the troops. Houses also were plundered by British soldiers. Some soldiers who stayed too long were killed by concealed minutemen. Far more blood was shed in Menotomy and Cambridge than elsewhere. The colonists lost 25 men killed and nine wounded at those places, and the British lost 40 killed and 80 wounded, with the 47th Foot and Royal Marines suffering the most casualties. About half the day's fatalities for each side were suffered at Menotomy and Cambridge.
Menotomy to Charlestown The British troops crossed the Menotomy River (today known as
Alewife Brook) into Cambridge, and the fight grew more intense. Fresh militia arrived in close array instead of in a scattered formation, and Percy used his two artillery pieces and flankers at a crossroads called
Watson's Corner to inflict heavy damage on them. Earlier in the day, Heath had ordered the Great Bridge to be dismantled. Percy's brigade was about to approach the broken-down bridge and a riverbank filled with militia when Percy directed his troops down a narrow track (now Beech Street, near present-day
Porter Square) and onto the road to Charlestown. The militia (now numbering about 4,000) were unprepared for this movement, and the circle of fire was broken. An American force moved to occupy Prospect Hill (in modern-day
Somerville), which dominated the road, but Percy moved his cannon to the front and dispersed them with his last rounds of ammunition. == Aftermath ==