Aircraft After the war ended, Schriever returned to the United States on 24 September 1945. In January 1946, he joined the
United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) headquarters at
the Pentagon as chief of the Scientific Liaison Branch in the office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Materiel. He worked closely with the USAAF Scientific Advisory Board, which was headed by
Theodore von Kármán. He was serving there when the
United States Air Force (USAF) became independent from the Army in July 1947. In July 1949, Schriever entered the
National War College. He became known for complaining that there was "too much polishing of doorknobs instead of putting new technology to work." On graduating the following year, he expected to receive a field command, perhaps Vice Commander of the Air Proving Grounds at
Eglin Air Force Base in
Florida, but instead returned to the Pentagon as Deputy Assistant for Evaluation under the newly created Deputy Chief of Staff for Development. His office, which performed or contracted for analytical work, was renamed the Development Planning Office in January 1951. He became an advocate of increased research and development, and instituted a
systems engineering approach to the introduction of new technology. He instituted a system of Development Planning Objectives (DPOs) that attempted to match promising new technologies with major Air Force missions rather than merely attempting to improve existing capabilities. To formulate his DPOs, Schriever turned to the Scientific Advisory Board,
RAND Corporation and outside consultants from industry and academia for help. (left) and
Simon Ramo (right) Schriever clashed repeatedly with General
Curtis LeMay of the
Strategic Air Command (SAC). One disagreement was over the
Aircraft Nuclear Propulsion project. LeMay wanted a supersonic bomber, but the scientists and engineers kept telling Schriever that only a subsonic one was possible. At LeMay's insistence, the project continued until it was cancelled by President
John F. Kennedy in 1961. When Schriever proposed extending the life of the USAF's
Boeing B-47 Stratojets by strengthening the wings and cutting back on production of the new
Boeing B-52 Stratofortress, thereby saving billions of dollars, LeMay flew into a rage. Schriever backed down, and later admitted that LeMay was right; over the years the B-52 proved to be the better investment. When Schriever forecast that the
Soviet Union might develop
surface-to-air missiles that could shoot down high-flying bombers and that in the future bombers might have to attack at low level to fly under the radar, LeMay stormed out of Schriever's briefing in disgust. Another walkout occurred in a disagreement over modes of
aerial refueling; LeMay supported the adoption of the
flying boom method, which was best-suited to bombers, while Schriever supported the
probe-and-drogue method, which was more suitable for fighters. LeMay got his way and the USAF standardized on the flying boom. Inevitably, they disagreed over the specification of a successor to the B-52. LeMay wanted a larger bomber that could carry a heavier bomb load to a higher altitude with longer range and supersonic speed. Schriever thought that the increase in altitude and speed would not save it from surface-to-air missiles. A compromise resulted in the development of the
Convair B-58 Hustler, a supersonic high-altitude medium bomber that satisfied neither. Schriever was promoted to brigadier general on 23 June 1953. LeMay tried to have him sent to South Korea to command the logistics units of the Fifth Air Force. Lieutenant General
Earle E. Partridge, the former head of the
Air Research and Development Command (ARDC) and now the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and Lieutenant General
Donald L. Putt, Partridge's successor at ARDC, intervened, taking the matter up with the new
Air Force Chief of Staff,
General Nathan Twining, and his
Vice Chief of Staff, General
Thomas D. White, and the orders were cancelled.
Missiles In March 1953, Schriever attended a meeting of the Scientific Advisory Board at
Maxwell Air Force Base in
Alabama. The United States had only recently conducted
Ivy Mike, its first
hydrogen bomb test, on 1 November 1952. The Ivy Mike device had weighed , but at the meeting two of the board members,
John von Neumann and
Edward Teller, predicted that by 1960 a hydrogen bomb could be built that weighed just but with the explosive power of . The strategic implications of this were obvious to Schriever: an
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) could be built to deliver hydrogen bombs. The low weight meant that the missile would not have to be impractically large, and the reasonably high yield meant that it did not need to be impractically accurate. ,
Thomas S. Power,
Trevor Gardner,
John von Neumann, Harold Norton,
Guyford Stever and
Clark Millikan The USAF had an ICBM project initially known as Project
MX-1593 running since January 1951. It became Project Atlas in August 1951. Atlas was expected to weigh , and deliver a nuclear warhead within of the target. If the warhead weight could be cut to , the weight of the launch vehicle could be halved. On his own initiative, Schriever went to see von Neumann at the
Institute for Advanced Study on 8 May 1953. Von Neumann explained the process by which smaller and lighter hydrogen bombs of lesser yield would be developed in the future, and Schriever left the meeting convinced. Schriever found an ally in the incoming
Eisenhower administration in
Trevor Gardner, the
Secretary of the Air Force's special assistant for research and development. In October 1953 Gardner created the
Teapot Committee to review the USAF's strategic missile projects. In its report, which it rendered on 10 February 1954, it recommended a crash program that would produce a deployable ICBM in six to eight years. On 14 May 1954, White gave Project Atlas the highest Air Force development priority, and directed the new ARDC commander, Lieutenant General
Thomas S. Power, to accelerate the Project Atlas "to the maximum extent that technology would allow". To steer the project, Gardner created a special Scientific Advisory Committee chaired by von Neumann in April 1954. Its nine members included seven who had served on the Teapot Committee. On 1 July 1954, Power created a special agency, the
Western Development Division (WDD), to manage the ICBM development effort. It was initially located in the recently vacated buildings of the St. John Chrysostom School in
Inglewood, California, in order to be close to
Convair, the prime contractor for Project Atlas. Officers posted there were instructed to wear civilian clothes to disguise the nature of the organization. White initially intended for the WDD to be headed by his special assistant for research and development, Major General
James McCormack, but McCormack suffered from health problems, so Schriever succeeded him as White's special assistant and assumed command of the WDD on 2 August 1954. The normal model for management of Air Forces projects was for them to be managed by the airframe manufacturer, with USAF oversight. This was favored by high-ranking Air Force officers and was the model that Schriever initially proposed. It had worked well on aircraft development projects as recently as the B-47 and B-52, but not so well on recent missile projects like
Navaho and
Snark, which had suffered from long delays and high-cost overruns. The Scientific Advisory Committee did not agree; it felt that the Atlas project was of such a highly scientific and technical nature that a project more like the
Manhattan Project was required and that the aircraft industry, with its inflexible work practices, could not attract the required expertise. After consulting with
Leslie Groves and
Robert Oppenheimer, Schriever came back to the Scientific Advisory Committee with a radical proposal: WDD would manage the project directly, with
Ramo-Wooldridge responsible for systems integration; Convair's role would be restricted to manufacturing the fuel tank and body of the missile. The Scientific Advisory Committee was happy with this proposal, except for
Franklin R. Collbohm, the president of RAND. Not so Power, who felt that he was being made responsible for an expensive, high-profile and risky project that would be run by Schriever on the West Coast, where supervision would be difficult. But Power could see that the proposal had high-level support, and was more interested in what was done than how it was done. Schriever's aide, Major
Bryce Poe II, was able to convince him to accept the organizational arrangements. Schriever made a point of keeping Power informed with weekly progress reports and frequently travelled to
Baltimore to meet with him. When the opportunity arose, he played golf with him. Schriever eventually won Power over, and he recommended Schriever for promotion. Schriever also had to deal with opposition from the president of Convair,
Joseph T. McNarney, and his vice president,
Thomas George Lanphier Jr. General Bernard A. Schriever with
Commanders-in-chief of The Strategic Air Command General
Thomas S. Power during senate hearing at
The Capitol Hill. On 13 September 1955, President
Dwight Eisenhower gave the ICBM program the highest national priority, and Schriever was promoted to major general in December. In 1966, Schriever was the 1966 recipient of the General William E. Mitchell Memorial Award for his “outstanding contributions to the aerospace science and military posture of the United States.” ==Later years==