U.S. President
Dwight D. Eisenhower began his first term by initiating a defense policy that sought to significantly reduce spending. Gardner was asked to lead a committee and implement an economy program to reduce missile development activities. Its final report recommended that promising missile projects should be continued. The Atlas, under development since 1951, was America's best hope, however its development had been constrained by the Air Force due to the belief that missiles required too great an investment in systems that seemed "impossible.' "Impatient, Gardner requested a scientific review of all Air Force missile programs in April 1953. The impetus came from two directions. First, he was concerned over the growing Soviet threat and, in August 1953, they exploded a hydrogen bomb. The other trend was the development of lighter nuclear weapons. The "impossible" ICBM was now much more possible. In October 1953 Gardner established a second committee — the
Teapot Committee — to review the Air Force's strategic missiles — the
Snark,
Navaho, and Atlas. He directed the committee to find ways to accelerate the development of the Atlas. The committee issued its report on 10 February 1954. Its thrust called for a "radical reorganization of the ...[Atlas] project considerably transcending the Convair framework" Gardner developed a five-year plan to accelerate the Atlas which would yield a "preliminary capability" by June 1958. In early 1955 most of the Eisenhower administration assumed that America had a strong lead over the Soviet Union in strategic technology and felt no particular urgency for the ICBM programs. The
Killian Report indicated that America was becoming vulnerable and that the ICBM should be given the "highest priority." While an Air Force priority, he believed that ICBMs must also be a national priority. He indicated that the U. S. could have a rudimentary ICBM by mid-1958 if the program was conducted on a crash basis. Eisenhower requested a briefing and, on 28 July 1955, Gardner, von Neumann, and Schriever made a presentation to the President and the
National Security Council. As a result, the National Security Council recommended the ICBM be designated a "research program of the highest priority" which the President approved on 13 September 1955. Gardner had achieved his goal. In January 1955 the Scientific Advisory Committee urged the Air Force to develop a tactical ballistic missile. All three services developed plans and the interservice rivalry led to a compromise with the Air Force building the
Thor and the Army and Navy in charge of the
Jupiter. Gardner viewed this approach as dangerous since the
IRBM could drain resources from the ICBM and threaten its early delivery. His fears were realized when President Eisenhower assigned the ICBM and the IRBM "joint" highest national priority. The ICBM program no longer had a unique status. Trevor Gardner felt betrayed and resigned his position in protest on 10 February 1956. == Return to public life ==