Buncefield fire

Explosion and fire buildings. The windscreen and rear window on the vehicle in the foreground are broken. The first and largest explosion occurred at 06:01 UTC on Sunday, 11 December 2005 near container 912. All members of staff from the terminal were accounted for. Tackling the blaze . The emergency services announced a major emergency at 06:08 and a tremendous firefighting effort began. At peak times this effort consisted of 25 fire engines, 20 support vehicles and 180 fire fighters. Plans had been in place to start using foam at midnight on 11 December, but were delayed by last-minute concerns over possible pollution of local rivers and underlying water sources. By midday on 13 December, all but three fires had been extinguished, although the largest tank was still burning. Bronze commandoperations on the groundwas visited by the Bishop of St Albans, the local vicar, and the industrial chaplain supporting the fire crews, to see how they were coping. The small particles in the smoke contained hydrocarbons, which can be an irritant but have a low toxicity and were not expected to cause any long-term harm. To investigate the smoke cloud the Facility for Airborne Atmospheric Measurements, a research aircraft operated jointly by NERC and the Met Office, made two flights on 12 and 13 December. In the first flight the edge of the plume was followed along the south coast of England. Carbon monoxide, nitrogen oxides and ozone concentrations were found to be low with soot particles being the major component in the cloud. The second flight went into the centre of the plume to obtain data to help forecasting and emergency teams. == Reactions and response ==

Evacuations and closures , above the closed M1 motorway on the day of the explosion Hundreds of homes in the Hemel Hempstead area were evacuated, and about 2,000 people had to find alternative accommodation; emergency services asked residents of the smoke-affected areas to close their windows and doors and to stay inside. Police and local authorities advised residents to consult the Hertfordshire Direct website for up-to-date information. Transport disruption The incident occurred close to junction 8 of the M1 motorway. Some long-haul flights to Australia, the Far East, and South Africa had to make an intermediate stop at Stansted Airport or other European airports to refuel, while short-haul operators were asked to fuel their aircraft for the round trip before flying to Heathrow. ASOS lost £5 million of inventory and could not sell during the Christmas shopping season. In all, six buildings were designated for demolition and 30 more required major repairs before they could be reoccupied. As a result of the destruction of the equipment in the Northgate building several websites hosted there were inaccessibleincluding that of the Labour Party. Addenbrooke's Hospital in Cambridge was also affected; its IT system dealing with admissions and discharges had to be replaced for several days by a manual system. It stated that no water from this well entered the public water supply and that a nearby well and pumping station had been closed since the fire as a precaution. The chemical is a known health risk and the UK government had been about to ban its use. Most of the fuel burned outrather than spilling into the soil, so the impact on surrounding land and the water table was limited. == Inquiry ==

, London, about away, 10 hours after the explosion A government inquiry held jointly by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) and the Environment Agency was started, but calls for a full public inquiry were declined. The Board included Tony Newton, Baron Newton of Braintree; Prof Dougal Drysdale, an authority on fire safety; and Dr Peter Baxter, a medical expert. Its aim was to identify the immediate causes of the explosion, rather than consider who was to blame for any deficiencies, so as not to prejudice further legal proceedings. The investigators did not believe that it was caused either by the driver of a fuel tanker, as had been speculated, or by anyone using a mobile phone. It was felt unlikely that the explosion had a widespread effect on air quality at ground level. == Legal action ==

Civil liability A total of 2,700 claims were filed by residents, businesses and insurers. A group of 146 claimants were hoping to bring a class action against Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd. On 17 March 2006 a High Court official, Senior Master Turner, adjourned a hearing on whether to permit the class action until October 2006. The BBC quoted Cheetah Courierswhich suffered a 20% drop in turnover because of the explosions, resulting in losses of around £300,000 to £400,000. The company was located in offices on an industrial estate from the depot. In the main trial, Total UK claimed that the duty supervisor at the time was responsible for the explosion, but refused to admit either civil or criminal liability for the incident. Total appealed the judgement, but the appeal was dismissed in a hearing on 4 March 2010. Criminal liability The site is covered by the COMAH regulations. The Control of Major Accidents and Hazards Regulations are jointly enforced by the competent authority which is formed of the Environment Agency and the Health and Safety Executive. They carried out an investigation during and following the fire. In April 2010, the five companies accused of causing the explosion faced a criminal prosecution brought by the Health and Safety Executive and the Environment Agency. Two defendants, Total UK and British Pipeline Agency Limited, had already pleaded guilty to offences under the Health and Safety at Work Act. The remaining three, Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd, TAV Engineering Ltd and Motherwell Control Systems were found guilty in June 2010. TAV Engineering Ltd and Motherwell Control Systems were found guilty of failing to protect their employees. Hertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd was found guilty of failing to prevent major accidents and limit their effects and then pleaded guilty to causing pollution to enter controlled waters underlying the vicinity around the site, contrary to the Water Resources Act. Sentencing took place in July 2010. == The terminal ==

The Hertfordshire Oil Storage Terminal (HOSLHertfordshire Oil Storage Ltd), generally known as the Buncefield complex, was the fifth largest oil-products storage depot in the UK, with a capacity of about of fuel, although it was not always full. This was about 8% of UK oil storage capacity. The HOSL is a major hub on the UK's oil pipeline network (UKOP) with pipelines to the Lindsey Oil Refinery and Stanlow Refinery and is an important fuel source to the British aviation industry, providing aircraft fuel for local airports including Gatwick, Heathrow and Luton airports. About half of the complex is dedicated to the storage of aviation fuel. The remainder of the complex stores oil, kerosene, petrol and diesel fuel for petrol stations across much of the South-East of England. The terminal is owned by TOTAL UK Limited (60%) and Texaco 40%. The seat of the fire, and the worst damaged section, was "HOSL West", used by Total and Texaco to store a variety of fuels, and the neighbouring British Pipeline Agency area. == Causes ==

The final report of the Major Incident Investigation Board (MIIB) was written in 2008 and released in February 2011. The investigation found that Tank 912 at the Buncefield oil storage depot was being filled with petrol. The tank had a level gauge that employees used to monitor the level manually, and an independent high-level switch which would shut off inflow if the level got above a certain setpoint. On Tank 912, the manual gauge was stuck and the independent shut-off switch was inoperative, meaning that the tank was being "filled blind" with petrol (i.e., being filled without a clear indication of the level). Eventually Tank 912 filled up completely, the petrol overflowed through vents at the top, and formed a vapour cloud near ground level, which ignited and exploded. The fires from the explosion then lasted for five days. The investigation found that the level gauge had stuck at random times after a tank service in August 2005, but it did not concern maintenance contractors or site management. The independent shut-off switch was not fitted with a critical padlock to allow its check lever to work. Secondary containment (meant to trap the petrol in a retaining wall around the tank) failed and allowed petrol to flow out. Tertiary containment (drains and catchment areas to prevent release of spilled chemicals to the environment) also failed, and fuel and firefighting foam entered groundwater supplies. The investigation found secondary and tertiary containment to be inadequately designed and poorly maintained. Wider management failings were found by the investigation to have contributed to the explosion: management safety checks at the site were found to be deficient and not properly followed. Site staff did not have control over the flow rates and timing of two of the three inlet sources, meaning that they did not have enough information to properly manage the storage of incoming fuel. Further, overall throughput had increased, reducing wait times further and shifting the emphasis to process operations instead of process safety. ==Aftermath==

Soon after the incident the Health Protection Agency was stripped of its remit to provide air quality data and it was passed on to the Environment Agency which forms part of the Major Accident Investigation Board. == Remembrance ==

An anniversary service was held in Holy Trinity Church Leverstock Green on Sunday, 10 December 2006, at which the Bishop of St Albans spoke, calling again for a full public inquiry, for assurances that the local hospital would maintain its accident and emergency department, and for the community to continue to build on good and new relationships formed because of the blast. Reconstruction To rebuild the damaged parts of the site, the relevant approval from Dacorum Borough Council would be needed. The BP section of the site is a good way from the explosion and survived with very little damage, but it was inoperative as of 2009. BP is exploring plans for the future use of this part of the site, and has indicated a number of priorities, including the reopening of the fuel pipelines to Heathrow. It is considering using its section to store aviation fuel and as a distribution centre for motor fuel, but at a much-reduced level. The reconstruction of the site has been taking place since March 2013. Commemoration On the roundabout at the entrance to Hemel, the "Phoenix Gateway" sculpture was designed by Jose Zavala to symbolise the recovery of the town from the Buncefield oil depot explosion. == See also ==