Burmese–Siamese War (1759–1760)

Summary of Burmese–Mon–Siamese conflicts (r. 1550–1581) of Burmese Toungoo dynasty is known in Thailand as "Conqueror of Ten Directions" from a popular Thai novel published in 1932. Burmese King Tabinshweti of Toungoo dynasty conquered the Mon Kingdom of Hanthawaddy in Lower Burma in 1539. However, the Mons soon rebelled and had to be reconquered by King Bayinnaung in 1551. In 1555, Bayinnaung conquered the Shan-occupied Ava and Upper Burma, Bayinnaung then went on to lay siege on Ayutthaya, resulting in the surrender of Ayutthaya in 1564. The panicked Lanna King of Chiang Mai requested aid from King Narai of Ayutthaya. Burma conscripted Mon people to fight Chinese invaders, leading to Mon rebellion at Martaban in 1661. in late 1661. Siam retaliated by attacking Tavoy up to Martaban on Tenasserim Coast in 1662. However, Siam did not seek to permanently occupy Lanna and the Mon lands so these Siamese conquests reverted back to Burmese rule. Decline and Fall of Toungoo dynasty In 1704, King Charairongba of Meitei Kangleipak Kingdom married off his sister Chakpa Makhao Ngambi to Burmese king Sanay. However, Sanay reportedly mistreated Chakpa Makhao Ngambi, not making her his chief queen as promised. Charairongba then died with a broken heart in 1709, instructing his son and successor Pamheiba to avenge Burma. Pamheiba, the new king of Kangleipak, under influence of Indian guru Shantidas Goswami, converted his kingdom to Hindu Vaishnavism, renamed his kingdom Manipur and renamed himself with a Persianate name Gharib Niwaz. In 1716, the new Burmese king Taninganway sent his envoys asking for a Manipuri princess to marry. Gharib Niwaz, remembering the grudges of his father, was offended by this request. Gharib Niwaz sent his forces to ambush the Burmese envoys, Indian Brahmins also told Gharib Niwaz that he should bath in the sacred water of Irrawaddy River, which was just opposite of Ava on the Irrawaddy. Gharib Niwaz, however, did not proceed to attack Ava but instead performed sacred bathing ritual in the Irrawaddy river. Maha Damayaza Dipati, the last Burmese king of Toungoo dynasty, reached a truce with Gharib Niwaz in 1740 with the Manipuri king withdrawing. The Mons found cooperation with the Gwe Shans (Shans or Karens who had migrated from Karen Hills to Burma) in their uprising against Burma in 1740. The uprising was led by a Buddhist monk and Minlaung millenarian pretender Smim Htaw Next year, in 1749, Gharib Niwaz marched his army to Ava in order to marry off his niece to the Burmese king. and at Nakhon Si Thammarat in 1700 and 1704–1705, which took great efforts to quell. At the death of Phetracha in 1703, his son Phra Chao Suea succeeded the throne and executed his half-brother and rival claimant Prince Phra Khwan. Siam capitalized this situation by daring the Haijin or Chinese ban on overseas trade by sending rice in tributary junks to trade at Canton in 1722. Emperor Kangxi allowed the import of cheaper Siamese rice into ports of Canton, Amoy and Ningbo, under the guise of tributary submissions, to relieve famines. Siamese court erected stone steles at Catholic seminaries at Ayutthaya and Mergui to enforce this edict. On his deathbed in 1733, King Thaisa gave the throne to his two sons instead of his younger brother Prince Phon, who had been the Wangna and technically heir presumptive, resulting in a civil war in Ayutthaya between the uncle and his nephews. In 1742, Siamese court issued a campaign to round up ten thousands of conscription evaders. (modern Bang Pahan district) for the Mon refugees to settle. Binnya Dala sent emissaries to Ayutthaya in 1748, coming for Smim Htaw and urging Borommakot not to shelter his nemesis. Borommakot, not wanting to send Smim Htaw to his doom, instead sent Smim Htaw off to China Upayaza the Mon commander demanded submission from local Burmese leaders in Upper Burma. Aung Zeiya and his retinue were one of many communities in Upper Burma that stayed defiant to the Mon conquerors. In February 1752, about one month before the eventual fall of Ava, Aung Zeiya declared himself Alaungpaya or Future Buddha Bodhisattava, becoming a Minlaung Historians call the redeployment premature, pointing out that the Siamese threat was never as grave as any counterforce that could rise from Upper Burma, the traditional home of political power in Burma. Alaungpaya resisted and killed Mon officials sent to subjugate him in May 1752. In June, Talaban himself led a Mon army to put down this undaunting Burmese resistance but was too defeated. In late 1753, Alaungpaya assigned his seventeen-year-old son Prince Thado Minsaw (later King Hsinbyushin) to lay siege on Ava. Thado Minsaw finally took Ava in January 1754. Upayaza and Talaban arrived from Hanthawaddy in attempts to reconquer Ava but was repelled. Alaungpaya 'commanded' the British to visit him. Buddha himself visited the Tavoy area in 'legendary' times and the local Nat spirit Durakha gave Buddha a durian fruit. Mason also explained that this was the reason why the Tavoyans spoke a Burmese-related language. Tavoy then came under the rule of Mon Hanthawaddy Kingdom of Lower Burma. The ruler of Tavoy submitted to King Wareru of the Mons. Tavoy city moved to Weidi Tenasserim appeared in a list of Siamese cities composed in 1455, later then incorporated into the Three Seals Law. In 1531, according to Myeik Yazawin or Mergui chronicles, the ruler of Tenasserim founded the new port-town of Marit or Mergui to replace the former port covered with silts. Mergui then emerged as an important trading port on the Tenasserim Coast on Andaman Sea under jurisdiction of Tenasserim. Throughout history, both Burma and Siam had claimed the entire Tenasserim coast (present-day Mon State and Tanintharyi Region in Myanmar) and control had changed hands several times. The Burmese Pagan Dynasty controlled the entire coast until 1287. Throughout 14th and 16th centuries, Siamese kingdoms (first Sukhothai, later Ayutthaya) controlled much of the coast, up to just south of present-day Mawlamyaing. In the mid-16th century, the Burmese under Toungoo kings Tabinshwehti and Bayinnaung tried to regain the coast, first failing in 1548, and finally succeeding in 1564 when they conquered all of Siam for the first time. The Siamese revolted in 1584, and under their king Naresuan regained the lower coast by 1593 and the entire coast by 1594. The Burmese retook the upper coast down to Tavoy in 1615, but failed to recover the rest. . Du Bruant was among many French officials who had escaped from Siamese onslaught at Mergui in 1688. During this period, Mergui on the Andaman Sea was the primary port of Siam through which its trade with India and the West was conducted. In 1688, King Narai allowed the French to station their troops in Mergui. However, the Siamese Revolution happened shortly after. Siamese armies expelled the French from Mergui. De Beauregard fled on ships and sailed into the Tavoy River to seek refuge at Tavoy, which had been under Burmese rule. Unfortunately, De Beauregard and other French men were attacked and arrested by Tavoyan authorities. De Beauregard was condemned to slavery by Burmese authorities, deported to Pegu and died shortly after in slavery. moved to its present location and sent a letter to the British asking for support. With Alaungpaya's conquest of Pegu in 1757, Alaungpaya acquired Martaban. In the Anglo–Burmese Treaty of 1757, it was stated that the British should not help the "King of Tavoy" against Alaungpaya, meaning that, by 1757 and after, Tavoy was still independent and a formidable rival to Alaungpaya himself. Mon Rebellion of 1758 After Alaungpaya had taken Rangoon in mid-1755, he proceeded to attack and lay siege on Syriam where both the British and the French had been residing. British ships in Syriam showed allegiance to Alaungpaya by leaving Syriam to join Alaungpaya at Rangoon. Robert Jackson, captain of the British ship Arcot, was reluctant to take Alaungpaya's side along with his fellow British men. Jackson did not personally visit Alaungpaya but rather sent his delegate John Whitehill on a mission to visit Alaungpaya. Alaungpaya commanded the British to hand over their muskets and weapons to him. Captain Jackson of Arcot ship refused to comply. Then Alaungpaya had to personally leave Rangoon for his northern campaigns in late 1755. The French and the Mons at Syriam took this opportunity to sail their fleet to attack the Burmese at Rangoon. Captain Jackson decided to join the French–Mon side with his ship Arcot to attack the Burmese. Death of Gharib Niwaz marked the downturn of Manipur, which would be plunged into dynastic conflicts. In 1752, Chitsai was overthrown by Bharatsai, another son of Gharib Niwaz. Next year, in 1753, Bharatsai was overthrown and Gaurisiam, son of Shyam Shai and grandson of Gharib Niwaz, was made new King of Manipur. After his victorious conquest of Hanthawaddy in 1757, Alaungpaya embarked on another grand campaign to conquer Manipur in late 1758, declaring to avenge for Gharib Niwaz's treacherous death and to convert Manipur to Theravada Buddhism. Alaungpaya himself led the Burmese forces to enter Manipur through the Aimol Pass, defeating Manipuri prince Bhagyachandra, brother of Gaurisiam, at Pallel. King Gaurisiam of Manipur, along with his Manipuri people, fled into the jungles to escape the invading Burmese. When Alaungpaya entered Imphal the Manipuri capital in November 1758, he found the city to be virtually abandoned and deserted. In late 1758, the Mons in Lower Burma rose in rebellion, seizing control of Rangoon and Pegu. Nemyo Nawrahta, the Burmese governor of Pegu, was defeated and pushed back to Hinthada. Alaungpaya and Burmese conquerors occupied Imphal the Manipuri capital for nine days in November 1758 until when Alaungpaya heard of Mon insurrection in Lower Burma so Alaungpaya decided to abandon his Manipur campaign to return to Burma. Nemyo Nawrahta managed to retake Rangoon and disperse the Mon rebellion in 1759. A group of Mon rebels boarded on a French ship at Syriam and fled to take refuge at the Siamese port of Mergui. When Alaungpaya returned to Shwebo in February 1759, he learnt that the Mon rebellion had been pacified. At the advent of Seven Years' War, George Pigot the British governor of Madras decided to evacuate British forces from Negrais in order to be redeployed to fight the French in India. Most of the British forces left Negrais in April 1759, leaving only a small contingent to guard a British warehouse there. In July 1759, King Alaungpaya of Burma marched his Burmese–Shan armies of 60,000 men from Shwebo down south in pilgrimage to make merits at Shwedagon Temple at Rangoon in Lower Burma. Meanwhile, John Whitehill arrived at Rangoon on his private trade venture. Unknowing that he had been subjected to the grudges of the Burmese king due to the defection of British ship Arcot four years ago, Whitehill traveled to Prome to visit Alaungpaya where Whitehill was arrested, physically beaten and chained. Whitehill had to pay a large sum of money to bail himself out of the wrath of Burmese king. Gregory the Armenian man and Lavine, a French man who had formerly been a subordinate of De Bruno, told Alaungpaya that the British at Negrais had supported the Mon rebels with weapons and ammunitions. Alaungpaya was then determined to extinguish the British from Burma. Alaungpaya made a Portuguese man Antonio the governor of Bassein and entrusted Antonio to lead a Burmese force to visit the British at Negrais. Antonio visited Negrais on 6 October 1759 where he was greeted by Southby the British headman in Negrais. Lavine invited Southby and other Europeans for a dinner. Antonio then shut the doors of dining room and commanded the Burmese soldiers to kill Southby and other Europeans. Ten Europeans and a hundred of Indian sepoys were massacred in this incident. The massacre of the British of Negrais at Burmese hands in October 1759 temporarily ended British presence in Burma and Anglo–Burmese relation was put to halt for four decades until the mission of Michael Symes in 1795. ==Causes of the War==

Chakravartin ideology Alaungpaya had declared himself Future Buddha or Bodhisattava, the savior who would end sufferings of the world and bring forth a new era of happiness. He was also to be the patron, upholder and restorer of Buddhism. During his prolonging siege of Syriam in 1756, Alaungpaya declared that he was assigned a sacred task from Sakra or Thagyamin (syncretization of the Indic deity Indra and the local Burmese Nat spirit, Thagyamin is the head of Nat pantheon) himself to end worldly strives and to create a peaceful world. Alaungpaya declared that the deity Indra had granted him a mighty lance called Arindama ("Spinner of the Wheel") ideology of Universal Conqueror – the concept that had also been revered by neighboring Theravadin polities including Siam. Chakravartin is the worldly alternative to Bodhisattava. Conquest of Ayutthaya might be a part of his long-term plan towards greatness. Alaungpaya's pilgrimage to Rangoon in modern Yangon is the most sacred Buddhist religious site in Myanmar. King Alaungpaya took journey to make dedications at this place in 1759 before learning about Siamese provocations. After his return to Shwebo from Manipur campaign in February 1759, Alaungpaya took off on his pilgrimage trip, along with his queen, his sons and his family, to Rangoon for dedication of Zayat or pavilion to the sacred Shwedagon Pagoda and for other merit-making activities. For some reasons, Alaungpaya amassed a huge army to go south with him to Rangoon. Alaungpaya might contemplate dangers from Mon rebels Alaungpaya learnt that his royal cargo trading ships were seized by the Siamese in Tavoy(his concern proved justified. The Mons put up several rebellions in 1758, 1762, 1774, 1783, 1792, and 1824–1826. Each failed rebellion was followed by more Mon flight to Siam). Alaungpaya demanded that the Siamese stop their support of the Mon rebels, surrender their leaders, and cease intrusions into the upper coast, which he considered Burmese territory. The Siamese king Ekkathat refused Burmese demands, instead prepared for war. While historians generally agree that the Siamese support of the Mon rebels and their cross border raids were some of the causes of war, they do not agree on (other) ulterior motives. Some British colonial era historians of Burmese history (Arthur Phayre, G.E. Harvey) outright downplay the aforementioned reasons as "pretexts", and have suggested that the primary cause of the war was Alaungpaya's desire to restore Bayinnaung's empire (which included Siam). David Wyatt, a historian of Thai history, acknowledges that Alaungpaya could have feared "Ayutthaya's backing for the revival of the Kingdom of Pegu" but adds that Alaungpaya, "apparently a rather crude country fellow with scant experience of statecraft was simply continuing to do what he early demonstrated he could do best: lead armies to warfare". But Burmese historian Htin Aung strongly counters that their analyses greatly understate Alaungpaya's genuine concern for his still nascent and unstable rule in Lower Burma, and that Alaungpaya never invaded Arakan as the Arakanese never showed him any hostility, although Sandoway in southern Arakan had sent him tribute in 1755. Later Western historians provide a somewhat more balanced view. D.G.E. Hall writes that the "chronic raiding" by the Siamese and Mon rebels "alone would have provided an adequate casus belli" although he adds "for a monarch unable to settle down to a peaceable existence". David I. Steinberg, et al., concur that the casus belli grew out of a local rebellion in Tavoy in which the Siamese were thought to be involved. More recently, Helen James states that Alaungpaya likely wanted to capture Siam's trans-peninsula trade, while granting that his "subsidiary motivation" was to stop Siamese attacks and Siamese support for the Mons. ==Burmese preparation==

When King Alaungpaya of Burma decided to conduct his grand campaign to conquer Ayutthaya in late 1759, he was dissuaded by his court astrologers who pointed out that, according to their horoscopic calculations, this campaign would be inauspicious and illnesses might take over the king. Alaungpaya was to lead the invasion personally, and his second son Hsinbyushin was his second-in-command. His first son Naungdawgyi was left to administer the country. Also in his service were his top generals including the likes of Minkhaung Nawrahta who like all Burmese leadership had plenty of military experience. Some in the court urged him to stay behind and allow Hsinbyushin to lead the operation but the king refused. In September 1759, King Alaungpaya at Rangoon initiated his plans for the conquests of Ayutthaya, Chiang Mai and Lamphun. He assigned the vanguard forces; • under Minhla Yaza, who commanded a vanguard force of 1,000 men and would left Rangoon first for Martaban in November 1759. • under Sithu Nawrahta and Thohanbwa the Shan saopha of Yaw, who commanded a vanguard force of 1,000 men, would follow Minhla Raya to leave Rangoon for Martaban. • Alaungpaya himself would march his main royal armies to leave Rangoon for Martaban in early December 1759. During Alaungpaya's stay at Rangoon for his preparation of Burmese armies to invade Siam, he sent a Portuguese man named Antonio under his service to bring Burmese forces to massacre the British at Negrais in October 1759. In December, Alaungpaya sent commands to Daw Zweyaset the Mon governor of Martaban to assemble the Mon forces and to gather food resources for the upcoming invasion of Ayutthaya. The Burmese assembled a fleet of 300 ships to transport a portion of their troops directly to the Tenasserim coast. As Alaungpaya had ended his relations with the British in the aftermath of the Negrais incident, he saw the French as the new source of European firearms. In December 1759, Alaungpaya dispatched a royal letter to Thomas Arthur, comte de Lally the governor of Pondicherry, urging the French to resume trade relations with Burma. However, both Lally and Pondicherry itself were in an intense warfare with the British so they did not respond to the Burmese king's request. ==Burmese conquest of Tenasserim Coast==

Burmese conquest of Tavoy Alaungpaya was late on his schedule to conquer Ayutthaya. Minhla Yaza, Sithu Nawrahta and Thohanbwa of Yaw led the vanguard force of 2,000 to successfully take Tavoy. After being an independent city-state for seven years from 1752, Tavoy easily fell to the Burmese in December 1759 or January 1760. The ruler of Tavoy, given his uncertain allegiance situating between the two powers, was executed. A number of Tavoyan people fled the Burmese conquest to Siamese towns of Mergui and Tenasserim. Alaungpaya was informed of Burmese victory over Tavoy on 4 January. The Burmese army paused for three days for the rest of army to arrive by land and by sea. Alaungpaya also declared Minhla Yaza to be the sole top commander of the vanguard. Siamese preparation On 15 January 1760, Alaungpaya dispatched two messengers to deliver his demands to the Siamese authorities at Tenasserim, demanding the Siamese king to return his sojourned French ship at Mergui and its crew and also to return the Tavoyan war refugees to him. The Siamese were unresponsive at best. Alaungpaya pressed his demands again on 19 January but to no avail. Running out of his patience, Alaungpaya finally decided to invade Siamese territories. Siamese authorities in Tenasserim reported the development to the royal court of Ayutthaya, reporting that "A certain Burmese King named Manglong (possibly from Minlaung) has marched his army of about 30,000 men to successfully conquer Thawai (Tavoy) and now he is going to attack Marit (Mergui)." Ekkathat was panicked. Late Ayutthaya, unlike later early Bangkok, had not yet maintained an intelligence system manned by the Mons and the Karens on the borders. Siamese intelligence system was inaccurate. The Siamese king was falsely informed that the Burmese came in three directions; through the Singkhon Pass, the Three Pagodas Pass and from Chiang Mai. In fact, however, the Burmese only came through the Singkhon Pass. King Ekkathat of Ayutthaya then organized the "first phase" of Siamese defense against the Burmese offensives. He sent 8,000 men to the north, 10,000 men to the Three Pagodas and 14,000 men to Mergui. When it was later became clear that the Burmese only invade through Singkhon, Ekkathat focused his manpower allocation onto that front; • Division of Phraya Yommaraj; As Phraya Yommaraj the Head of Police Bureau had been imprisoned for his rebellion attempt previously in 1758, Ekkathat appointed Phraya Inthrabodi to be the new Phraya Yommaraj. The new Phraya Yommaraj was assigned the command of a force of 3,000 men with Phraya Phetchaburi Rueang the governor of Phetchaburi as his vanguard commander. • Division of Phraya Rattanathibet; Phraya Rattanathibet the Minister of Palace Affairs was assigned to command the force of 2,000 men with Phraya Siharaj Decho and Phraya Ratchawangsan, who was the commander of Krom Asa Cham or Malay mercenary regiment, as his vanguard commanders. Khun Rong Palat Chu, a minor official from Wiset Chaichan, also volunteered to fight the Burmese so he, along with his 400 Phrai commoner followers, was levied into this regiment. Burmese capture of Mergui and Tenasserim After the rest of the Burmese army had arrived, Alaungpaya's army; 5,000 men under the Myedu Prince and 3,000 men under Minkhaung Nawrahta, Alaungpaya's childhood friend, marched and besieged Mergui, with Alaungpaya's main armies closely following behind. Mergui resisted the Burmese for fifteen days. The vastly outnumbered Siamese garrison of 7,000 infantrymen and 300 cavalry was easily overran by the Burmese army. Minhla Yaza the Burmese vanguard commander took Mergui in early February 1760. Siamese town of Tenasserim, which held authorities over Mergui, was within two-day-march distance. These two Siamese towns offered little resistance. In less than two weeks of the war, the Burmese had captured both Mergui and the town of Tenasserim, and controlled the entire Tennaserim coast. Siamese officials from Mergui and Tenasserim simply fled to Inner Siam, going through the Singkhon Pass. == Battle of Singkhon Pass ==

Alaungpaya's declaration of war In February 1760, after winning over the entire Tenasserim coast, Alaungpaya made his mind to continue his offensive campaign in Siam. On 20 February 1760, Alaungpaya, who had been staying at Tavoy, declared his intention to invade Ayutthaya to the Siamese king Ekkathat; Perhaps learning about political conflicts in Ayutthaya, Alaungpaya enacted further ruses to Ekkathat; Battle of Singkhon Pass Ayutthayan armies arrived too late to rescue Mergui and Tenasserim so they took defensive positions; • Phraya Yommaraj and his regiments took position at the Singkhon Pass, which was a narrow valley passageway cutting through the Tenasserim Hills – a major entry point for the incoming Burmese between modern Mawdaung and Theinkun. • Phraya Rattanathibet and his regiments took position at Kuiburi. Upon learning about Burmese invasion, Ekkathat ordered all of the city governors to bring their local forces to defend Ayutthaya. This overly-centralized defense strategy was characteristic of the reign of Ekkathat. Peripheral governors were obliged to abandon their cities to bring their forces to Ayutthaya, leaving their cities and towns defenseless to the mercy of Burmese invaders. Ekkathat also encouraged Siamese people in outlying towns to take refuge in the jungles in order to avoid being captured by the Burmese. checkpoint at Myanmar-Thailand border. King Alaungpaya moved from Tavoy to Tenasserim. The Burmese began their offensives into the Singkhon Pass in early March 1760 and five days later they met the Siamese defending forces. Phraya Yommaraj sent his armies under Phraya Siharaj Decho (Bya Tezaw in Burmese) and Phraya Ratchawangsan (Aukbya Yazawunthan in Burmese) the vanguard commanders to face the Burmese, leading to the Battle of Singkhon Pass in early March 1760. This was the first confrontation between regular troops of Burma and Siam in about a century. Thai chronicles gave the number of 15,000 men for the Siamese army. Burmese chronicles, however, gave an astonishing number of 27,000 Siamese men. The battle result was an absolute victory for the Burmese. Minkhaung Nawrahta, along with his subordinate commander Minhla Yaza, led his Burmese armies of 20,000 Burmese men (number given by Thai sources) to inflict heavy defeat on the Siamese defending armies of Phraya Yommaraj at the Singkhon Pass. The Siamese defeat obliged Phraya Yommaraj to retreat, allowing the Burmese to pass through the Singkhon Pass, entering the Gulf of Siam front. ==Gulf of Siam campaign==

Battle of Wakhao (), who was known for his stand against Burmese vanguard at Wakhao Bay in March 1760, in Wiset Chai Chan After the victory of the Burmese under Minkhaung Nawrahta over the Siamese in the Battle of Singkhon Pass, the Burmese invading forces entered the Gulf of Siam front as the Siamese were retreating. Phraya Rattanathibet, who had been taking position at Kuiburi, sent his small vanguard regiment under Khun Rong Palat Chu to face the Burmese. Khun Rong Palat Chu led his army of 500 Phrai commoner men to wait for the Burmese at the Wakhao beach in modern Tambon ฺBonok, Mueang Prachuap Khiri Khan district. The Burmese invaders arrived at Wakhao in a morning in March 1760, leading to the Battle of Wakhao beach. According to Thai chronicles, Siamese men engaged in hand-to-hand combat with the Burmese. However, the Burmese were numerically superior and the Siamese were defeated by noon of that day. Khun Rong Palat Chu was captured alive by the Burmese, while his subordinates were chased by the Burmese into the sea, many of them were drowned and some managed to return to report to Rattanathibet at Kuiburi. Phraya Rattanathibet, upon learning of this Siamese defeat, realized that Siamese stand against the invading Burmese was hopeless and decided to withdraw and retreat to Ayutthaya, ending the 'first phase' of Siamese defense. Both Phraya Rattanathibet and Phraya Yommaraj reported to King Ekkathat that the Burmese were too powerful to be dealt with at the periphery so the king adopted the defensive strategy by standing grounds at the royal citadel of Ayutthaya, waiting for the Burmese to come. Khun Rong Palat Chu became another Thai national hero in history known for his desperate stand against the Burmese at Wakhao beach in March 1760. Burmese capture of Kuiburi and Phetchaburi With the collapse of Siamese defense, Alaungpaya and his Burmese forces marched towards Ayutthaya virtually unopposed. The Burmese quickly took Kuiburi, Pranburi, Nongchik and Phetchaburi on the coast of Gulf of Siam in rapid succession. Alaungpaya assigned Minhla Yaza to be the leading commander of the vanguard but some other commanders were also enthusiastically pursued war glories, advancing far forward upon seeing the ineptitude of Siamese military. Impetuous advancement of Burmese vanguard would be a major problem. Alaungpaya had to issue many orders restraining the victory-pursuing vanguard officers who went too far in the frontlines, running the risk of being isolated without support from the main royal forces. When Alaungpaya was attacking Kuiburi, some of his vanguard forces had already reached Phetchaburi. Kuiburi fell to the Burmese on 16 March 1760. Alaungpaya ordered his forces to closely follow the retreating enemies in the distance within the range of lance-throwing. Phetchaburi peacefully surrendered to Alaungpaya around 22 March. Three days later, on 25 March, Alaungpaya issued another message to Ekkathat the Siamese king; Alaungpaya's royal message was written in Thai and Burmese languages and placed in casket to be delivered by a young Siamese monk from Phetchaburi to King Ekkathat at Ayutthaya himself. Burmese capture of Ratchaburi Alaungpaya stayed at Phetchaburi for three days and then continued his campaign. Alaungpaya sent Minkhaung Nawrahta as his vanguard to attack Ratchaburi where he met a Siamese forces of 20,000 infantrymen, 1,000 cavalry and 200 elephants, under the command of Phraya Ratchawangsan the commander of Malay mercenary regiment. Initially, the Burmese under Minkhaung Nawrahta suffered heavy losses with many Burmese killed in battle. However, Prince Thiri Damayaza of Myedu, son of Alaungpaya (future king Hsinbyushin) brought the supporting forces to alleviate the situation for the Burmese at Ratchaburi. Reinforced, Minkhaung Nawrahta eventually prevailed over the Siamese under Phraya Ratchawangsan at Ratchaburi. Ratchawangsan himself rode on a horse to retreat from the battlefield. The Burmese captured 2,000 Siamese men, 1,000 guns and 180 small cannons from this battle. The Burmese eventually captured Ratchaburi and quickly proceeded to seize Suphanburi, which was about fifty kilometers to the west of Ayutthaya itself. == Battle of Talan ==

Ascendency of Uthumphon When Alaungpaya and the Burmese armies had reached and occupied Suphanburi to the west of Ayutthaya, the Ayutthayan royal court and populace panicked. Within only a month of March 1760, Alaungpaya conducted rapid offensives into Western Siam from Tenasserim to Suphanburi. Burmese invaders had not come this far since 1586, about two centuries ago, when King Nanda Bayin of Toungoo dynasty also personally led his Burmese armies to invade Ayutthaya. Ayutthayan populace considered Ekkathat to be an incapable king so they beseeched his younger brother Uthumphon the temple king, who had abdicated to become a Buddhist monk at Wat Pradu temple previously in 1758, to leave monkhood to return to government in order to lead defenses against the Burmese. Uthumphon complied to the popular request, leaving monkhood and leaving his temple to return to the royal palace. Publicly, Uthumphon was to cooperate with Ekkathat in the commands but Uthumphon actually seized power in the royal court. Uthumphon pardoned and released his political supporters who had been imprisoned in late 1758 for their failed rebellion attempt to restore Uthumphon to the throne, including Chaophraya Aphairacha the former Samuha Nayok and the former Phraya Yommaraj. Uthumphon organized the 'second phase' of Siamese defense. Uthumphon ordered all of Siamese people and food provisions to be collected and gathered inside of the Ayutthaya citadel, shutting all the city gates. He also ordered gunmen to be ready stationed on the walls and teak logs to obstruct all of Ayutthayan land and water gates to prevent Burmese entry. Uthumphon sent the Siamese forces of 20,000 men (30,000 men according to Burmese chronicles) led by Chaophraya Kalahom Khlongklaeb the Minister of Military, divided into five regiments, each under Chaophraya Kalahom himself (Aukbya Kalahon in Burmese), Phraya Rattanathibet, the former Phraya Yommaraj, Phraya Ratchawangsan and Phraya Siharaj Decho. Chaophraya Kalahom Khlongklaeb led his Siamese troops to station at the Talan River (modern Noi River in modern Phakhai district) to the northwest of Ayutthaya, speculating the Burmese offensives. During these defensive preparations, Uthumphon flexed his political power by arresting Ekkathat's supporters including the unpopular brothers Phraya Ratchamontri Pin and Chamuen Si Sorrarak Chim. Both of the brothers were accused of having affairs with palace ladies – a classic Siamese political accusation and were subjected to fifty lashes of rattan cane flagellation. Phraya Ratchamontri succumbed to his wounds and soon died but his brother Si Sorrarak survived. In late March 1760, in response to the Burmese invasion, Ayutthaya experienced leadership turnover and political rearrangement, in which pro-Ekkathat supporters were purged and pro-Uthumphon officials were restored to power. Battle of Talan In Late March 1760, the Burmese vanguard, under the commands of Prince Thiri Damayaza of Myedu (son of Alaungpaya) and Minkhaung Nawrahta, left Suphanburi and marched towards Ayutthaya. The Burmese arrived at the banks of Talan River, about 25 kilometers to the northwest of Ayutthaya with the sights of Siamese defensive camps on the opposite side of the river, leading to the Battle of Talan. The Myedu Prince was poised to charge the Siamese right away but Minkhaung Nawrahta told the prince that the Siamese were numerically superior and they should wait for the main royal forces of Alaungpaya to arrive. Immediate charge on the Siamese without support from Alaungpaya posed the risk of failure. Alaungpaya himself issued command to the vanguard not to initiate any attacks until arrival of the main royal regiments. to the northwest of Ayutthaya was the site of a Burmese–Siamese battle in March 1760 when Siamese gunmen fired onto the river-crossing Burmese. Prince Myedu, however, was in his urgency in attacking the Siamese on the Talan River. As soon as Myedu heard distant sounds of drums and saw royal standards of Alaungpaya's main forces at a substantial distance, Prince Myedu ordered his vanguard forces to attack the Siamese right away without waiting for Alaungpaya. Prince Myedu divided his forces into three sections; right wing under command of Minkhaung Nawrahta, left wing under Minhla Nawrata and center under Minhla Thiri (who later became Maha Nawrahta). All three Burmese vanguard regiments crossed the Talan River to attack the Siamese on the opposite river bank. The Siamese, however, had the advantage of being on the dry land when the Burmese submerged in the water. Chaophraya Kalahom ordered Siamese gunmen to shell heavily onto the river-crossing Burmese, inflicting heavy damages and death toll upon them. The Burmese were on the verge of defeat but Alaungpaya and his main armies arrived just in time to save the situation. Alaungpaya helped pushed the Burmese vanguard to successfully cross the Talan River. Directly facing the Burmese on land, the Siamese were of no match. The Siamese were utterly defeated, dispersed and obliged to retreat. Burmese chronicles state that the Burmese managed to capture all of five Siamese commanders, with exception for Chaophraya Kalahom whom they had to pursue. Chaophraya Kalahom Khlongklaeb the Siamese commander fled on the horseback but was closely pursued by the Burmese. The pursuing Burmese got to Chaophraya Kalahom near Wat Nonsi temple in modern Bang Pahan district to the northwest of Ayutthaya, where a Burmese lancer threw his lance at Chaophraya Kalahom. Kalahom, the Siamese Minister of Military, was pierced with the Burmese lance and killed immediately in action. Thai chronicles say that other commanders managed to return. It might be that the Siamese commanders were captured by the Burmese and then released. Former Phraya Yommaraj returned with many serious wounds from Burmese lances. Yommaraj recuperated at Ayutthaya and died a week later. For unknown reasons, during the confusion, Phraya Ratchawangsan attacked Phraya Rattanathibet and his regiment. Rattanathibet was convinced that his comrade Ratchawangsan was intended to harm him. Rattanathibet told Uthumphon that Phraya Ratchawangsan had been a traitor and co-conspirator with Phraya Ratchamontri, who had been executed. Phraya Ratchawangsan was then punished with fifty rattan cane blows, also succumbed to his wounds and died a week later. ==Siege of Ayutthaya==

, 1662-63 After the Burmese victory at the Battle of Talan in late March 1760, Alaungpaya proceeded to march his Burmese armies to encamp at Ban Kum, called Naung Outun With permission from King Ekkathat, Luang Aphaiphiphat led Chinese mercenaries of 2,000 men to face the Burmese under Minkhaung Nawrahta at Phosamton. However, Minkhaung Nawrahta, upon seeing the approach of the Chinese–Siamese forces, did not even wait for his enemies to encamp. Minkhaung Nawrahta attacked the incoming Ayutthayan forces right away, defeating and dispersing the Chinese mercenaries under Luang Aphaiphiphat. and the Dutch trade factory of Dutch East India Company at the southern riparian checkpoint. On 11 April, the Burmese proceeded to burn down all Siamese vernecular houses in Ayutthayan outskirts outside of city walls. On 13 April 1760, a group of 2,000 Burmese men surprisingly attacked the southern outskirts of Ayutthaya, massacring the populace taking refuge there. The Burmese indiscriminately killed Ayutthayan people of all ages. Their bodies were piled up, filling the river and city moat so that the water could not be used. Most of Siamese royal ceremonial barges and royal trading galleons were burnt down and destroyed. The Burmese proceeded to attack the Dutch factory. Dutch and Chinese trading ships were destroyed and burnt down. Nicolaas Bang, the Dutch opperhoofd of Ayutthaya, was injured and died from drowning, along with his Siamese wife, while trying to escape the Burmese. Starting on 14 April, the Burmese began bombarding the city itself for the next three days. The Burmese stationed their cannons at Wat Ratchaphli and Wat Kasattrawat temples off the western portion of Ayutthayan wall to fire their cannons into the Ayutthaya citadel, killing a number of people, damaging a number of houses and frightening the populace. Uthumphon the temple king then rode an elephant to patrol the city, enforcing military defenses and cheering up Ayutthayan people. Uthumphon also ordered Siamese cannons at Satkop Fort (northwestern corner of Ayutthaya) and Mahachai fort (northeastern corner of Ayutthaya) to fire at the Burmese to the west in response, causing the Burmese to cease firing and retreat back to their camps Two days later, on 16 April, the Burmese stationed their cannons Wat Na Phramen temple just off the northern wall, firing directly onto Ayutthayan royal palace. Burmese cannon fires struck Suriyat Amarin Palace the royal residence of King Ekkathat, causing the palace spire to collapse. == Burmese retreat ==

Illness of Alaungpaya According to French and Thai sources, Alaungpaya fell ill on 16 April 1760 (second waxing of the sixth month). Thai chronicles tell that, for reasons unknown to the Siamese, the Burmese retreated from their frontlines at northern outskirts of Ayutthaya on 16 April. French missionaries in Ayutthaya recorded that the Burmese hastily retreat from the war front in the night of 16 April, which was the same day when the Burmese were bombarding Ayutthaya from Wat Na Phramen temple to the north, causing damages to the royal palace. It was then assumed that Alaungpaya might be injured from a cannon explosion during the Burmese operations against Ayutthaya on 16 April. However, in fact, Alaungpaya likely did not engage himself in the frontlines but stayed at his main base at Bangban to the northwest of Ayutthaya. He was suffering from either dysentery or scrofula. According to the Siamese sources, he was wounded by the bursting of a shell from a battery whose installation he was personally supervising but the Burmese sources definitely state that he became ill with dysentery. There was no reason for the Burmese chronicles to hide the truth since it is more glorious for a Burmese king to die of wounds received on the battlefield than to die of a common ailment. Moreover, if he had been wounded in the full view of the army, it would have been known to the whole army, creating confusion. As Alaungpaya the Burmese king fell ill, ten days after arrival of the Siamese envoys, he called for a war council to be held at his main camp at Bangban to decide the future course of the war. Alaungpaya said that the Siamese kept holing up in their citadel, not engaging in open battles. Ayutthaya had sent envoys, promising to bring tributes but those had not been realized. Treacherous Siamese wet season was going to arrive soon and the Burmese had to decide what to do next. Prince Thiri Damayaza of Myedu, Alaungpaya's son, told his father that Siam's blank promise to send tributes was only to buy time for the rainy season to arrive. Prince Myedu proposed the general retreat of Burmese forces for the sake of Alaungpaya's health, comforting his father that he could try to conquer Ayutthaya again next dry season. Minkhaung Nawrahta the vanguard commander agreed with Prince Myedu, saying that Ayutthaya was a formidable citadel surrounded with moat and many canals and manned by Portuguese gunners. Ayutthaya city had not been completely destroyed and annihilated before and, therefore, it was full of food provisions, elephants, horses and weapons. Supposedly 'indestructible' Ayutthaya would stand no chance against the might of the Burmese king when he was in full health. Burmese conquest of Ayutthaya was inevitable. But given the indisposition of Alaungpaya, Minkhaung Nawrahta suggested that they should abandon the campaign for once, especially when the court astrologers were against this expedition and try again next year with secured victory. Moreover, Minkhaung Nawrahta pointed out the flaws of this campaign to Alaungpaya; • Schedule: Alaungpaya was too late on his schedule to conquer Ayutthaya. The Burmese left Rangoon in Pyatho (January) and had to go through the lengthy route through Tavoy, Tenasserim, Western Siamese towns, only reaching Ayutthaya in Tagu (April), taking whole three months, leaving with little time of achieve the goal before arrival of the rainy season in Kason (May). In order to conquer Ayutthaya in due time, major Siamese peripheral cities should be taken by Nadaw (December) or Pyatho (January). • Invasion route: Alaungpaya had to take the invasion through Tavoy and Tenasserim through Singkhon Pass, which was a lengthy, non-direct route to Ayutthaya because he had to subjugate the rebellious city-state of Tavoy first. Minkhaung Nawrahta proposed the plan in invade Siam in three directions; from Rahaeng, from Tak and from Tenasserim. Burmese retreat Upon the beseeching of Minkhaung Nawrahta and Prince Myedu, Alaungpaya consented to the general retreat. The Burmese command kept Alaungpaya's serious illness a secret and ordered a general withdrawal, giving the excuse that the king was indisposed. The king selected the friend of his childhood, Minkhaung Nawrahta, for the signal honor of commanding the rearguard. These were the "pick of the army"—500 Manipuri cavalry and 6,000 infantrymen, every man of whom had a musket. After staying in Ayutthayan outskirts for about twenty days, Alaungpaya left his main base at Bangban and began his journey on the next day on 17 April 1760, leaving Minkhaung Nawrahta and his regiment as rearguard against any possible Siamese attacks in Burmese rear. One day after Alaungpaya's departure, Minhla Nawrata, with 3,000 men, followed Alaungpaya in the rear in order to act as the intermediary between Alaungpaya's main army and Minkhaung Nawrahta's rearguard. It was two days before the Siamese realized that the main Burmese army had left. On 20 April, King Uthumphon then ordered Siamese commanders the new Phraya Yommaraj and Phraya Siharaj Decho to bring forces to pursue and attack the Burmese in the rear. Phraya Yommaraj completely surrounded Minkhaung Nawrahta at Ban Kum, Bangban, leading to the Battle of Ban Kum. Minkhaung Nawrahta's subordinates called for the retreat but Minkhaung Nawrahta persisted, saying that they should stand firm in order to protect Alaungpaya's rear. If they retreated, the Siamese would be sure to follow to reach Alaungpaya's main forces. Minkhaung Nawrahta ordered Burmese forces, 1,500 men each, to break Siamese encirclement in the south, west, north and Minkhaung Nawrahta himself going for the east. Breaking Siamese encirclement in four directions simultaneously was successful. Phraya Yommaraj and his Siamese forces were routed and defeated. Minhla Nawrata, who had been following Alaungpaya in the rear, upon hearing gunshot sounds, hurried back to help Minkhaung Nawrahta. However, Minkhaung Nawrahta had already drove off the Siamese pursuers and told his comrade Minhla Nawrata to focus on guarding Alaungpaya's back not to worry about him. Minkhaung Nawrahta stood as rearguard at Bangban for five more days, only leaving when he was sure that the Siamese would not follow, presumably on 25 April. Minkhaung Nawrahta also left four cannons, each with three to four inches of caliber, burying them at Ban Kum. Uthumphon ordered Siamese men to search for what the Burmese had left in their former campsite. The Siamese found the four large Burmese cannons, excavated them and took them back to Ayutthaya. With the Burmese retreat, the eventual fall of Ayutthaya was postponed for seven years. Death of Alaungpaya Prince Myedu had his father the ailing king Alaungpaya placed on a litter to be transported back to Burma. Prince Myedu led the Burmese forces to return to Burma through Tak and Mae Lamao or Mae Sot Pass, which was the shortest way from Ayutthaya to Martaban. Prince Myedu also conquered the Siamese town of Kamphaengphet on the way. When the royal retinue reached Tak, they turned west, going through Myawaddy towards Martaban. Alaungpaya died on Sunday of 11 May 1760 (12th waning of Kason, 1122 ME), midway between Myawaddy and Martaban in modern Kinwya village in Bilin Township, Thaton District in modern Mon state, at the age of 45 and having reigned for eight years. Eventual death of Alaungpaya, however, was kept in utmost secrecy to prevent confusion and upheaval. Only Prince Myedu and the king's closest attendants knew about it. Prince Myedu sent a messenger on horseback to inform his elder brother Prince Thiri Thudamayaza of Tabayin, who had been the Upayaza or heir presumptive and had been administering the royal capital of Shwebo since Alaungpaya's departure in mid-1759, about the death of their father. Alaungpaya's body continued to be placed on the litter on the journey and it was pretended that he was still alive, sending out royal orders everyday. Body of Alaungpaya was then placed on a royal barge to be transported on waters to Pegu and to Rangoon. At Rangoon, public announcement was made on the demise of Alaungpaya. Prince Myedu continued to lead Alaungpaya's retinue on the Irrawaddy river northwards. The whole royal court of Shwebo went out to receive the body of Alaungpaya at Kyaukmyaung pier. Alaungpaya was then conducted to enter the royal city of Shwebo through the Hlaingtha Gate. Alaungpaya was eventually buried at the place of his original village – the Moksobo village – to the southeast of the Shwebo Palace. ==Analysis==

Contrasting Burma and Siam In the eighteenth century, most traditional polities in Continental Southeast Asia had been experiencing political intrigues, declining central authority, political fragmentation, diminishing military supremacy and decline in manpower control, representing the general instability of the region. In mid-to-late eighteenth century to early nineteenth century, these polities experienced destructive cataclysmic changes to give way to more powerful, effective, unified polities with increasing regional military dominance. Burma was the first kingdom to undergo this change, followed by Siam and then Vietnam. In eighteenth century, both Burma and Siam suffered from the decline of manpower and manpower control. all of whom had substantial military experience under their belt. Burmese flawed conscription system of Toungoo dynasty was readily fixed by Alaungpaya's military reforms, enabling effective military conscription and mobilization. Alaungpaya's royal order on proper usage of European muskets, which he had acquired through both trade and coercion, in December 1759 signified his emphasis on effective utilization of firearms. Siam, on the other hand, had not experienced any major external wars since the Burmese–Siamese War of 1661–1662. Ever since the Siamese revolution of 1688 and the establishment of the Ban Phlu Luang dynasty, Ayutthaya had been in the period of internal political conflicts and struggles in 1703, 1733 and 1758 and major regional rebellions in 1689 and 1699–1700. Siamese kings had attempted to curb the rising power of the princes by controlling manpower allocation through the creation of Kroms, manpower regiments, which was more or less successful at preventing princely conflicts. The rise in numbers of Phrai Som or private princely servants in Krom regiments further weakened direct royal government manpower. Succession crises of 1733 and 1758 took great toll on Siamese political cohesion. Siamese court had been badly divided into princely factions since the death of Chaophraya Chamnan Borrirak the Siamese Prime Minister in 1753. Siam, therefore, concentrated its energy internally on dealing with and preventing internal conflicts, leaving no room for military reforms to empower its own defense, let alone recognizing external threats. The incident of execution of Prince Thammathibet, King Borommakot's son and heir, in 1756, sent Ayutthayan royal court into political upheaval that will continue after Borommakot's death in 1758 and only briefly ended in late 1758 at the exile of Prince Kromma Muen Thepphiphit to Sri Lanka. Siamese military, had been mostly in disuse since 1662, deteriorated in the face of the new round of Burmese incursions in 1760. While Burma had already reconstituted itself into a unified militarized power, Siam remained a troubled polity with disused defense. Siam had sent its military forces to Vientaine in 1695, Cambodia in 1717 and 1749 and to Pattani in 1692, 1709 and 1712 but most of these campaigns resulted in peaceful negotiation and surrenders rather than active rigorous warfare. Siamese military force was for display of power to impose political demands rather than for actual battles. Traditional Siamese bureaucracy did not have clear distinction between civil and military duties. Siamese court ministers and administrators were expected to perform both civil and military duties, commanding armies in wartime and administering civil affairs in peace time. During the Burmese invasion of Siam by Alaungpaya in 1760, Chaophraya Phrakhlang the Minister of Trade and Foreign Affairs, Phraya Rattanathibet the Minister of Palace Affairs and Phraya Yommaraj the Head of Police Bureau were sent against battle-hardened Burmese commanders. Only Kalahom minister had direct military duties but the power of Kalahom had been greatly reduced in royal succession crisis incident of 1733. Alaungpaya's strategy When King Alaungpaya fell ill during his campaign in Siam in April 1760, he called for a war council to decide the next move. HIs son Prince Myedu (later King Hsinbyushin) and his childhood friend and vanguard commander Minkhaung Nawrahta convinced the Burmese king to abandon his campaign as the Siamese rainy season was coming that would cripple Burmese standing in Ayutthayan outskrits. Minkhaung Nawrahta pointed out the flaws in Alaungpaya's campaign in Siam as follows, resulting in his eventual failure to conquer Ayutthaya; First, Alaungpaya started his campaign too late, meaning he did not have enough time to push through Siamese peripheral cities and to lay siege on Ayutthaya with enough time to pressure the Siamese capital city into surrender. Alaungpaya had left his royal city of Shwebo in July 1759 but spent the majority of his time dealing with the British at Negrais and making merits at the Shwedagon Pagoda at Rangoon. Perhaps he had not intended to conquer Ayutthaya that year until he learned of Siamese provocations, the Siamese seizure of the ship, in September 1759. Alaungpaya only made official declaration to conquer Ayutthaya and Chiang Mai in September 1759. Alaungpaya and his Burmese forces were scheduled to leave Rangoon on 7 December but was two weeks late and eventually left on 21 December. Alaungpaya had to make his way through the whole Tenasserim Coast, from Tavoy to Mergui, eventually entering the Siamese side of the peninsula on the Gulf of Siam Coast in March 1760. Facing weak Siamese resistance, Alaungpaya and the Burmese quickly made their way to the outskirts of Ayutthaya in late March 1760 to lay siege on the city. This left the Burmese with about one month to pressure Ayutthaya into surrender before the arrival of rainy season in May. Ayutthaya, with strong walls strengthened by French architects in the reign of King Narai and with abundant food and weapon supplies, certainly will not yield in one month. Minkhaung Nawrahta suggested that, in order to conquer Ayutthaya, the Burmese should start the campaign very early in dry season, conquering Siamese peripheral cities by December or January. Second was the invasion route. Usually, Burmese invasion routes into Siam were through the Three Pagodas Pass through Kanchanaburi or Mae Lamao Pass through Tak. If Chiang Mai was under Burmese control, the Burmese would descend from the north also. Alaungpaya, in his campaign, did not only intend to conquer Ayutthaya but also to conquer Tavoy as well. As Siam did not have control over Tavoy, Tavoy had become an independent city-state after the fall of Toungoo dynasty in 1752. Alaungpaya had been declaring Tavoy to be in rebellion against him, not a city under Siamese control and his conquest of Tavoy in December 1759 was the last pinning point of his reunification of Burma. Only when Alaungpaya had successfully conquered Tavoy and was approaching Mergui that Alaungpaya sent messages to Ayutthaya as he was about to enter Siamese territories. Invasion through the whole Tenasserim Coast from Tavoy to Mergui, passing through the Singkhon Pass and then conquering through Western Siamese peripheral towns like Kuiburi, Phetchaburi, Ratchaburi and Suphanburi was not the shortest route, taking Alaungpaya the whole three months from December 1759 to March 1760. Mingkhaung Nawrahta suggests that they should take a shorter, more direct invasion route next time. Hastiness and rashness of Burmese commanders were also concerning. After entering the Gulf of Siam Coast, Burmese commanders, finding Siamese military defense incredibly weak, rushed in competition to seek glory for the inevitable conquests. Alaungpaya had to issue many orders restraining the vanguard commanders to prevent them from advancing too far, risking being attacked or encircled by the Siamese without support from the main royal forces of Alaungpaya. In the Battle of Talan, Prince Myedu, in his urgency and hastiness, did not wait for the main forces of his father Alaungpaya to arrive, ordered his vanguard forces to cross the Talan River to charge at the Siamese right away, resulting in initial Burmese casualties. Only with timely arrival of Alaungpaya to the battlefield that the Burmese were reinforced and able to push through the Siamese. Siamese strategy Ayutthaya has a traditional strategy of passive stand against the invaders and besiegers, relying on the impressively strong walls and natural phenomenon including the arrival of rainy wet season and the inundation of Ayutthayan outskrits to ward off the invaders. In the late sixteenth century, King Naresuan had utilized more active defense strategy by reaching out to deal with the invaders at the frontiers and periphery instead of passively standing in the Ayutthayan citadel. However, those military fervor and sentiments had been long gone after two centuries of absence of serious external threats. Initial Siamese response to the incoming of Alaungpaya's Burmese armies showcases the state of disuse and deterioration of Siamese defense system. The intelligence system was not accurate and virtually did not exist. King Ekkathat was panicked by false information that the Burmese came from three directions; north, west and south. Only later when the Siamese king realized that the Burmese only came through the Singkhon pass that he concentrated his forces on that front. Siamese commanders, who were mostly civilian administrators turned military commanders for the occasion, cowered in the face of the militaristic energy of "battle-hardened" Burmese commanders and fighting forces. Siamese attempt to deal with the invaders at the periphery was not possible due to inexperienced nature of Siamese commanders and personnel, who were not shameful to quickly retreat in the face of advancing Burmese troops. In Thai historiography, the only valiant figure in this war was Khun Rong Palat Chu, a mid-ranking officer who made a desperate stand against the overwhelming Burmese forces at Wakhao beach in modern Prachuap Khiri Khan. Ekkathat ordered that all provincial governors abandon their cities and bring their forces to defend Ayutthaya. This overly-centralized defense strategy was characteristic of this period. City governors, including the governor of Phetchaburi, were obliged to abandon their cities to the mercy of Burmese invaders. Ayutthaya had no intention to preserve its own provincial cities, focusing solely on safeguarding the royal capital city of Ayutthaya. The Burmese then marched through Siamese peripheral cities with less-than-expected resistance all the way to the outskirts of Ayutthaya. The city of Phetchaburi surrendered peacefully to Alaungpaya in March 1760, leaving the city intact and unharmed. With Alaungpaya's conquest of Suphanburi, just kilometers to the west of Ayutthaya, the Ayutthayan court and populace panicked in great consternation as the Burmese had not come this close to Ayutthaya since 1586, about two centuries ago. The Siamese king Ekkathat was sidelined as the royal court and populace asked Uthumphon the temple king and Ekkathat's younger brother, who had been the king once but abdicated in favor of his elder brother in 1758, whom the general populace considered more-capable, to leave monkhood to assume military commands in the face of the renewed Burmese invasion. Uthumphon complied with the popular request and left his temple to assume commands. On the papers, Uthumphon ran jointly with his elder brother Ekkathat in the commands but Uthumphon had to stage a seizure of power in order to assume powers. Siam's divided princely factional politics came into play. Pro-Uthumphon supporters, who had been imprisoned in 1758, were released and resumed their positions, while pro-Ekkathat supporters were punished and imprisoned. It was a tumultuous factional overturn in Siamese bureaucracy. When Ayutthayan commanders went out to fight the Burmese, others were being whipped with rattan cane blows as political punishment. The Siamese commanders, who were captured by the Burmese in the Battle of Talan and then released, blamed each other for the failures to divert their guilts as court politics took over military commands. Chaophraya Phrakhlang the Siamese Prime Minister was even imprisoned for his suspected collaboration with the Burmese. Disuse and deterioration of Siamese defense system, combined with inexperience due to long hiatus from external invasions and factional court politics, rendered Siam unable to defend itself against the Burmese invasion. Eventually, Siamese traditional strategy of passive defense succeeded for the last time as King Alaungpaya and the Burmese were obliged to retreat in April 1760 by the upcoming arrival of rainy season. However, this fortunate success was short-lived, postponing the final fall of Ayutthaya only for seven years. == Subsequent Events ==

Conflicts in Burma On his deathbed, Alaungpaya dictated that Burmese royal succession should be in agnatic seniority Ever since his escape from Pegu in 1756, Talaban the Mon military man had been posing threats to Konbaung regime. In 1762, King Naungdawgyi dispatched Burmese troops of 3,500 men to subjugate Talaban which had been under Chinese suzerainty. This would lead to border disputes between Burma and Qing China – one of many precipitating factors of the Sino-Burmese War. Burmese Invasion of Siam in 1765 The new Burmese king Hsinbyushin inherited his father Alaungpaya's energy and military talent. vassalizing Lao kingdoms of Luang Prabang and Vientiane under Burmese domination. King Hsinbyushin stayed in Manipur for about a month. down south, much earlier than his colleague Maha Nawrahta at Tavoy due to the northern path to Ayutthaya being much longer. Nemyo Thihapate swept through Northern Siamese towns of Sawankhalok, Sukhothai down to Nakhon Sawan and Ang Thong. In October 1765, Maha Nawrahta left Tavoy with his main forces to attack Central Siam, taking Thonburi and Nonthaburi. William Powney, British merchant trading in Ayutthaya, was asked by Ayutthayan court to help repelling the Burmese. Powney, with his small British contingent and Siamese auxiliaries, attacked the Burmese but was defeated Ayutthayan inhabitants back to Burma. Ekkathat, the last king of Ayutthaya, died shortly after. Among the captured were Uthumphon the temple king, royal princes and princesses, Siamese weaponry, Siamese craftsmen and cultural artifacts, all were taken back to Burma. ==Notes==