(left) at the War Office in 1940 His appointment on 3 September 1939 as
Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) came as something of a surprise to Ironside; he had been led to believe he would be appointed as the Commander-in-Chief of the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF), and indeed had already despatched his Assistant to Aldershot to begin preparing his headquarters. The reorganisation was politically driven; Hore-Belisha had fallen out heavily with Lord Gort during 1939, and the outbreak of war provided an excellent pretext for Gort to leave Whitehall. This left the post of CIGS vacant, and after heavy lobbying by Churchill, Ironside was chosen over Sir
John Dill, then the General Officer Commanding,
Aldershot Command. On 4 September, Ironside told the Cabinet that Poland could resist for six months and suggested a future support operation via
Romania. However, he violently opposed the French plan of opening a front in the Balkans. At the
Anglo-French Supreme War Council of 22 September, the British chiefs of staff backed the Romanian conception of a neutral Balkan bloc. In the first half of September, Hore-Belisha notified Ironside of
MI5 concerns over his connections. As CIGS, Ironside adopted a policy of rapidly building up a strong force in France, aiming to put some twenty divisions in the field. However, this force would be broadly defensive, acting to support the
French Army, and he aimed to influence the course of the war by forming a second strong force in the Middle East, which would be able to operate in peripheral operations in the Balkans. He strongly supported the development of a close-support air force, preferably under Army command, but at the same time argued that when a German offensive began in the West, the
Royal Air Force (RAF) should throw its main strength into strategic bombing of the
Ruhr rather than attacking the forward units.
Norway Ironside's enthusiasm for "peripheral" operations led him in November 1939 to plans for
Allied intervention in Scandinavia, initially to help Norway against the
Soviet Union. He accepted the risk of an Anglo-Soviet war and opposed the build-up of the
British Expeditionary Force in France. By December, in place of Churchill's
limited approach of simply mining Norwegian waters to stop Swedish
iron ore shipments to Germany, he argued for
landing a strong force in northern Norway and physically occupying the Swedish orefields. If successful, this would allow the resupply of Finland – then
fighting the Soviet Union, and aligned loosely with the Allied forces – as well as interdicting Germany's ore supply, and could potentially force Germany to commit troops on a new and geographically unfavourable front. Both Ironside and Churchill supported the plan enthusiastically, but it met with opposition from many other officers, including from Gort – who saw his forces in France being depleted of resources – and from
Cyrill Newall, the
Chief of the Air Staff. Planning continued through the winter of 1939–1940. Ironside welcomed the agreement reached at the
Anglo-French Supreme War Council conference of 5 February 1940 to land two British divisions and additional forces supplied by France, including the
Polish Independent Highland Brigade and the
French Foreign Legion, at
Narvik and
Trondheim by mid-March with the aim of securing the Swedish mines of
Gällivare and
Kiruna. He regarded the plan as favouring British expertise in the north and as an opportunity to seize initiative in the war. During February 1940, he also considered
air attacks on the Soviet refineries in
Baku. As he warned Marshal
Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim in February, however, only a fraction of the Scandinavian expeditionary force was going to reach Finland. The plan for the landings relied on Finnish pleas for military assistance to justify the "semi-peaceable" invasion of neutral Scandinavia, but Norway and Sweden refused the Allied and Finnish requests for the passage of troops in late February. After
Lord Halifax was notified of the Finnish–Soviet peace negotiations on 1 March, Ironside offered Mannerheim 57,000 British troops, even though they were not ready to sail, hoping to buy time to conduct the operation. On 12 March, however, the
Moscow Peace Treaty was concluded, and the expedition had to be abandoned. A few days prior to the German invasion of Norway in April 1940 as part of
Operation Weserübung, Ironside was embarrassed by the publication of an interview intended to influence the United States, in which he dared Nazi Germany to attack Norway. The
Norwegian campaign of April–June 1940 saw significant British forces committed to action for the first time in the Second World War. Flaws in the command system quickly began to show.
War Cabinet meetings dragged on at great length to little effect, as did meetings of the Chiefs of Staff, both to Ironside's great frustration. He also found it hard to cope with Churchill's mood swings and insistence on micromanagement of the campaign, and a gulf began to grow between the two. Ironside's main contribution to resolving the Norwegian campaign was to insist on a withdrawal when the situation worsened, and he pushed through the evacuation of the unbeaten
British force in central Norway at the end of April despite ministerial ambivalence (Churchill had wanted to assign guerrilla tasks to the troops) and without consulting the French.
Battle of France Ironside himself was sent to France in May 1940 to liaise with the BEF and the French in an attempt to halt the German advance. He was not well-qualified for this task, having a deep dislike and distrust for the French, whom he considered "absolutely unscrupulous in everything". At a conference in
Lens he clashed with the French generals
Gaston-Henri Billotte and
Georges Maurice Jean Blanchard, whom he considered defeatists. He wrote: "I lost my temper and shook Billotte by the button of his tunic. The man is completely defeated." Although Billotte was supposed to be co-ordinating the British, French and Belgian armies' operations in Belgium, Ironside took over the job himself, ordering Gort and Blanchard to launch a counter-attack against the Germans at
Arras. This attack achieved some local success, but the German onslaught proved unstoppable. The French Commander-in-Chief, General
Maxime Weygand, so resented Ironside's actions that he said he would "like to box Ironside's ears." Ironside, despairing of the French Army's unwillingness to fight, accepted Gort's view that evacuation of the BEF was the only answer.
Home Defence In his diary on the afternoon of 25 May, Ironside wrote that "I am now concentrating upon the Home Defence ... [The Cabinet] want(s) a change to some man well-known in England. They are considering my appointment". That night, he spoke to Churchill, offering to take up the new post, and – again from his diary: His appointment as
Commander-in-Chief, Home Forces was announced to the public on 27 May, succeeding General Sir
Walter Kirke. At the same time Ironside was succeeded as CIGS by his deputy, Sir John Dill. In his new command, Ironside commanded a force which amounted – on paper – to fifteen Territorial Infantry divisions, a single armoured division, fifty-seven home-defence battalions, and the
Local Defence Volunteers (later the Home Guard). However, all of these were deficient in training and organisation, as the operational units had already been sent to France. They were also lacking in equipment; the force as a whole had almost no modern artillery or anti-tank guns, and the armoured division had just a small number of light tanks. or "Ironside" was based on a civilian motor car chassis. The deficiencies with equipment led to an overall lack of mobility, which coupled with the limited training of the units meant that very few were capable of organised offensive counter-attacks against an invading force. As a result, the only way they could practically be used would be to commit them to static defence; Ironside planned to steadily pull units away from the coast and into a central mobile reserve, but this was not possible until they were trained and equipped for the role. He threw himself into the details of the strategy, laying out plans for the static defence of village strongpoints by the Home Guard, patrols of
"Ironsides" armoured cars to strengthen the divisions, and light artillery
mounted on trucks as improvised
tank destroyers. He agreed to release two divisions for the
Second BEF in early June, but was dubious about Churchill's decision to bring home troops from the Middle East and India; even after the
fall of France and the potential collapse of the defences in Britain, he still held to his pre-war position that "[it] is essential to hold the East firmly, whatever happens here". By mid-June, he had begun to collect a scanty mobile reserve – the
8th Royal Tank Regiment, with infantry tanks, and six regiments of armoured cars beginning to form – and the
pillboxes and coastal defences were being prepared, though he emphasised to the local commanders that the latter "are only meant as delaying lines, and are meant to give the mobile columns a chance of coming up to the threatened points." The fall of France led to a brief interlude where the Cabinet debated sending Ironside on a diplomatic mission to meet
Charles Noguès, the French commander in North Africa and a personal acquaintance of Ironside's, but decided to retain him in Britain and send Lord Gort instead. On 25 June, he was called to the
War Cabinet to brief them on the plans for Home Defence; his system of
defence in depth provided for: • A
defensive "crust" along the coast, able to fight off small raids, give immediate warning of attack, and delay any landings. • Home Guard roadblocks at crossroads, valleys, and other choke points, to stop German armoured columns penetrating inland. • Static fortified
stop lines sealing the Midlands and London off from the coast, and dividing the coastal area into defensible sectors • A central corps-sized reserve to deal with a major breakthrough • Local mobile columns to deal with local attacks and parachute landings The plan was "on the whole" approved by the Cabinet, and by the Chiefs of Staff later in the week. He was clear in his diaries that he saw the static focus as an undesirable option – "[the] eternal preaching of the defensive and taking cover behind anti-tank articles has been the curse of our tactics" – but that it was the only practical way to make use of untrained and badly-equipped forces. However, criticism of the "Ironside plan" was soon manifest. On 26 June (only a day after the plan's approval) at a meeting of the Vice-Chiefs of Staff, Air Marshal
Richard Peirse pointed out that many of the RAF's main operational airfields would be overrun by an invader before they reached Ironside's principal stop line, the "GHQ Line". The conclusion of the meeting was that the plan was "completely unsound". Although Ironside managed to placate the Chiefs of Staff, discontent amongst his subordinates was growing; one divisional commander wrote "We have become
pill-box mad". There was widespread concern that troops were spending their time constructing defences rather than on the training which they desperately needed. Another critic was Major-General
Bernard Montgomery, who later wrote that he found himself "in complete disagreement with the general approach to the defence of Britain and refused to apply it." When Churchill visited Montgomery's
3rd Infantry Division on 2 July, he described to the prime minister how his division, which was fully equipped except for transport, could be made into a mobile formation by the requisitioning of municipal buses, able to strike at the enemy beachheads rather than strung out along the coast as ordered. Finally, on 17 July, Churchill had a long drive with Lieutenant-General Sir
Alan Brooke, the commander of
Southern Command, whose views on creating mobile reserves held close to possible landing sites were in accordance with his own. In addition, Ironside had been a friend and mentor of J.F.C. Fuller from his time at the Staff College in the 1920s, and was a strong supporter of his arguments for modernisation of the Army into a mobile force. Following his retirement from the Army in 1933, Fuller became associated with the
British Union of Fascists, and was a strong opponent of war with Germany. After Ironside was appointed CIGS in 1939, he asked for Fuller to be re-appointed to a staff role, citing the role of German mechanised forces in the defeat of Poland, but this was vetoed by the Prime Minister
Neville Chamberlain on political grounds. Fuller appears to have seen Ironside as sympathetic to his beliefs, and in late 1939, he told fellow fascist
Barry Domvile that "Ironside is with us". Ironside's name was later mentioned by
John Beckett, who in 1940 was involved in planning a fascist coup, though there is no indication Ironside himself was aware of this. This friendship with Fuller may nonetheless have become a liability towards the end of his career; one historian reports that "whispers" were circulating about his association with a known fascist as early as May 1940. On 19 July, Ironside was summoned to the War Office and informed that he was to be replaced by Brooke as C-in-C Home Forces, effective immediately. The formal reason was that the Cabinet wished to have someone with recent combat experience in command, and Ironside accepted the dismissal gracefully – "I was quite prepared to be released. I had done my best ... I can't complain. Cabinets have to make decisions in times of stress. I don't suppose that Winston liked doing it, for he is always loyal to his friends." On his arrival at Home Forces HQ, Brooke was astonished that Ironside had not stayed to apprise him of the situation; neither had he left him any notes except for a brief memo to say that he had arranged for Brooke to use his staff car. ==Retirement and writing==