Irving and Cassell appealed to the
Court of Appeal, where a court constituted of
Lord Denning MR,
Lord Justice Salmon and
Lord Justice Phillimore heard the appeal over two weeks in February 1971. Irving appealed against the amount of both the compensatory and exemplary damages, while Cassell only appealed against the amount of exemplary damages. The appellants argued that on the evidence presented at trial, their conduct did not fall within
Lord Devlin's second category as set out in
Rookes v Barnard, and thus no exemplary damages could be awarded.
Exemplary damages and Rookes v Barnard Exemplary damages, also known as punitive damages, have long been controversial in English law. It was criticised on the ground that it confused civil and criminal justice: the former's purpose is to compensate and to restore, while the latter's purpose was to punish and to deter. Compensatory damages were a form of punishment, but one which was administered through civil justice. Defendants in civil cases were liable to be punished through exemplary damages, without the benefit of the safeguards that exist in criminal courts, such as the heightened burden of proof. In
Rookes v Barnard (1964), Lord Devlin severely limited the circumstances under which exemplary damages could be awarded. He declined to abolish exemplary damages, because there were precedents for awarding them, and because there were at least two statutes which mentioned them by name. According to Devlin, they could be awarded in cases: • of oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional acts by government servants; • where the defendant's conduct had been calculated by him to make a profit for himself which might well exceed the compensation payable to the plaintiff; • where expressly authorised by statute. In subsequent years,
Rookes v Barnard came under criticism from many quarters. Its approach was rejected by the
High Court of Australia, the
Supreme Court of Canada, and the
Supreme Court (later renamed High Court) of New Zealand. The
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council later endorsed the Australian High Court's rejection of
Rookes v Barnard.
Judgment of the Court of Appeal On March 4, 1971, the Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeals. The three judges all concluded that the defendants' conduct fell into Lord Devlin's second category in
Rookes v Barnard, and that therefore the jury was entitled to award exemplary damages. However, the judges also used the opportunity to attack the House of Lords' decision in
Rookes v Barnard. Lord Denning, who gave the main judgment, began by noting that both sides in
Rookes v Barnard accepted that juries could award exemplary damages for libel. Yet when the House came to deliver their speeches, Lord Devlin threw over all that we ever knew about exemplary damages. He knocked down the common law as it had existed for centuries. He laid down a new doctrine about exemplary damages. He said [...] that they could only be awarded in three very limited categories, but in no other category: and all the other lords agreed with him. After noting that various Commonwealth courts have rejected Lord Devlin's approach, Denning said This wholesale condemnation justifies us, I think, in examining this new doctrine for ourselves: and I make so bold as to say that it should not be followed any longer in this country. I say this primarily because the common law of England on this subject was so well settled before 1964 – and on such sound and secure foundations — that it was not open to the House of Lords to overthrow it. It could only be done by the legislature. Denning criticised Devlin's "new doctrine" as "hopelessly illogical and inconsistent.". Of his first category, Denning argued "[o]ther people can be just as oppressive and arbitrary as the servants of the government" and that juries should be able to award exemplary damages for oppressive acts "no matter whether he [the defendant] is a servant of the government or not." Of the second category, Denning said it was not obvious whether a man who committed libel for profit was more worthy of punishment than a man who committed libel whatever it cost him. Denning concluded that "if ever there was a decision of the House of Lords given
per incuriam, this was it". Finally, Denning said that:the difficulties presented by
Rookes v. Barnard are so great that the judges should direct the juries in accordance with the law as it was understood before
Rookes v. Barnard. Salmon and Phillimore LJJ delivered separate judgments agreeing with Lord Denning. == House of Lords ==