Pre-1914 Before the emergence of
liberalism in Europe,
mercantilism dominated global trade from the 16th to 18th century. In this era, wealth was equated with power and military capability, and as such, any economic gain that another country experienced was seen as a loss for one’s own country. This view discouraged trade that would be mutually beneficial, believing that in some cases short-term economic sacrifices (e.g. limiting trade) were necessary for long-term security and prosperity. Mercantilist nations aimed to promote
trade surpluses, prioritizing
exports and discouraging imports through the use of tariffs, colonial restrictions on trade with other nations, and other policies that limited foreign trade. According to Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O’Rourke, "during the mercantilist era price gaps were as likely to be due to trade monopolies, pirates, and wars as to transport costs and tariffs, which are more easily quantifiable." One mercantilist-era non-tariff barrier to trade, the
Navigation Acts, lasted from 1651 to 1849, restricting foreign ships from engaging in trade with any part of the
British Empire–including colonies–and prohibiting imports from any non-British territory in Asia, Africa, and America. In the 19th century, informed by
Adam Smith’s theory of
absolute advantage and
David Ricardo’s theory of
comparative advantage, supporters of free trade in Britain and Western Europe began to advocate against tariffs, duties, and other trade barriers.
Interwar Period Though economic growth did continue in the years marked by
World War I and
II, a rise in transportation costs, tariffs, and protectionism meant that world trade slowed significantly. From 1913 to 1937 trade per capita had only grown at an average of 3% per decade compared to a rate of 34% from 1881 to 1913. While the relative weight of these factors is somewhat disputed, many scholars point specifically to tariffs to explain this trend, with one study attributing 41% of the fall in world trade to increased trade barriers. The trade barrier rules and tariff concessions that had been drafted before the establishment of the ITO remained in the form of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After the formation of the ITO failed, GATT was “transformed from a temporary agreement into a normative institutional framework in which governments pursued
multilateral regulation and discussed trade policy.” These regulations–both on tariff and non-tariff barriers–were not without exemptions, however. Developing countries received
special and differential treatment (SDT) through exemptions to the
most-favored-nation principle (MFN) when it came to exports to wealthy market exports in order to help them compete; governments have the ability to raise tariffs short-term if a certain industry is struggling; measures that protect the environment, public health, or moral standards are also permitted as exceptions to reciprocity and liberalization. The WTO adopted a number of new agreements, including
TRIPS,
SPS, and
TBT, streamlined the dispute process, and imposed legally binding compliance obligations. Tariffs declined in use as the influence of the
World Trade Organization grew, but this shrinkage was accompanied by the rise of
non-tariff barriers. In the United States, both of
Trump’s presidential terms have been marked by protectionist policies: the
trade war with China in his
first term and the dramatic
increase in tariffs across the board in his second. ==Impacts==