Pre-program Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
chairman Mao Zedong referred to nuclear weapons as a
paper tiger which, although they would not determine the outcome of a war, could still be used by great powers to
scare and coerce. Four days after the
atomic bombing of Nagasaki, Mao first argued against overstating the military significance of nuclear weapons, writing "
Why didn't Japan surrender when the two atom bombs were dropped on her and why did she surrender as soon as
the Soviet Union sent troops?". In 1946 comments to American journalist
Anne Louise Strong, he stated, "The atom bomb is a paper tiger which the US
reactionaries use to scare people. It looks terrible, but in fact it isn't. Of course, the atom bomb is a
weapon of mass slaughter, but the outcome of a war is decided by the people, not one or two new types of weapon." During the
Korean War, the US prepared contingency plans to use nuclear weapons against China, but feared doing so would result in Soviet attacks on
US-occupied Japan. Even prior to
China's entry into the war, mobilized forces in
northeast China that would become the
People's Volunteer Army (PVA) were deeply demoralized by potential US nuclear attacks, with political commissar Du Ping reporting psychological debiliation in 10% of troops. The May 1953 US
Upshot–Knothole Grable nuclear test of a functional
nuclear artillery system is sometimes considered a contributing factor to the July
Korean Armistice Agreement, to which China's
People's Volunteer Army was a signatory. After 1952, the
Eisenhower administration pursued the
New Look policy through which nuclear weapons would be viewed as a "virtually conventional" force. Some scholars write that the Eisenhower administration's threats during the
First Taiwan Strait Crisis to use nuclear weapons against military targets in
Fujian province prompted Mao to begin China's nuclear program. Mao favored China's development of nuclear weapons because "In today's world, if we don't want to be bullied by others, we should have atomic weapons by all means." However, during the
Second Taiwan Strait Crisis, the US
Central Intelligence Agency and
Departments of Defense and
State all concluded that US nuclear attacks on
Fujian province, opposite the
Republic of China-controlled
Kinmen and
Matsu Islands, risked Soviet nuclear attacks on US bases, the Navy's
Seventh Fleet, and possibly general war with the Soviet Union.
Gerard C. Smith, Assistant Secretary of State to
John Foster Dulles, warned him that the US would likely have to choose between defeat or large-scale
Strategic Air Command attacks on China that risked general war with the Soviet Union.
Early program and Soviet assistance imaged by a US
KH-7 Gambit satellite in 1966.|left From the inception, China's central government gave the nuclear program the highest priority in materials, finances, and manpower. In November 1956, China established the Third Ministry of Machine Building (which was in February 1958 renamed the
Second Ministry of Machine Building) to oversee its nuclear program. In October 1957, concluded the "", which allowed for nuclear-weapons technology transfer, including a model of a Soviet atomic bomb and two
R-2 theatre ballistic missiles. Scholar
Jeffrey Lewis noted in China's 1958 nuclear program guidelines its explicit rejection of
tactical nuclear weapons and view of nuclear weapons as primarily political tools influencing the decision towards a small strategic arsenal. In 1958, the National Defense Science and Technology Commission (NDSTC) was established with
Nie Rongzhen as its director to oversee the Second Ministry of Machine Building, the Lop Nur Nuclear Weapon Test Base, and the Fifth Academy of the Defense Ministry (which focused on missile programs). and in July 1960, all Soviet assistance with the Chinese nuclear program was abruptly terminated and all Soviet technicians were withdrawn from the program. As the Soviets backed out, Chinese officials realized that they had to develop hydrogen bomb technology without any Soviet assistance and would need to begin the work immediately, without waiting for successful results from a fission bomb. In 1962, President
Liu Shaoqi announced the creation of the Central Special Committee (also referred to as The Fifteen-Member Special Commission) to coordinate the departments with the overlapping authority related to nuclear weapons. In 1964 as China prepared for its first nuclear weapon test, Chinese leadership received intelligence which increased its concerns that the United States would commit a
surgical strike on its nuclear program. On 20 March 1965, Zhou Enlai explained China's testing philosophy as: "We oppose nuclear blackmail and nuclear threats, and we do not advocate hundreds of nuclear tests. Therefore, our nuclear tests must take place based on the needs of the military, science, and technology. All tests must be conducted as 'one test to achieve multiple results.'" In late 1965, Chinese physicists developed a
Teller-Ulam design equivalent for
thermonuclear weapons. On 9 May 1966, China carried out the
596L nuclear test, of a
layer cake design, a type of
boosted fission weapon. China's first multi-stage thermonuclear weapon test, "
629", occurred with a tower shot on 28 December 1966, at a demonstration
yield of 120 kt. This was the test announced by the ''
People's Daily'' and interpreted internationally as China's first hydrogen bomb test. The test was planned for 1 October 1967, but was moved after project leader
Peng Huanwu speculated France may test a hydrogen bomb before then. The mentality of outpacing France's program influenced the assembly of the 639 device amid the fervor of the
Cultural Revolution. It subsequently focused on weapon miniaturization, for missile warheads, and for delivery by fighter instead of bomber. The Sino-Soviet split prompted China to view the Soviet Union, instead of the United States, as its biggest threat and accordingly to focus on developing its nuclear capabilities to counter the Soviet Union. This threat of attack lead to the development of the
Kuangbiao-1 tactical nuclear bomb, which could be delivered against invading Soviet tank columns by
Nanchang Q-5 ground-attack fighters instead of
Xi'an H-6 bombers. Before the treaty was signed, Premier Zhou Enlai requested a report from the Second Ministry of Machine Building and relevant experts to address the implications. The experts asserted that the three countries participating in the ban had already conducted enough atmospheric tests such that the ban would have little impact on their nuclear programs. , the
JL-1, during its first successful sea test, 1982. In July 1970, a
JL-1 submarine-launched ballistic missile mockup underwent water-drop tests from a crane on the
Nanjing Yangtze River Bridge. On 7 October 1982, the JL-1 was first tested at sea, launched from a
Golf-class submarine, and experienced an attitude control failure, self-destructing. On 12 October 1982, the JL-1 was successfully test-launched from a submarine. The
Chinese submarine Changzheng 6, designed as the country's first
ballistic missile submarine and deployed to
Jianggezhuang Naval Base, is not believed to have conducted any patrols with nuclear weapons on board, but conducted its first successful test-launch of a JL-1 on 27 September 1988. From 1983 to 1988, the
Changzheng 6 conducted a "five-year storage test" of JL-1 warheads and missiles, after which the weapon was approved and the first warhead batch ordered. The Chinese government only officially stated that it had ended atmospheric testing in 1986. It was publicly announced by
Zhao Qizheng in 1999. In 1992, a
two-point implosion aspherical primary was first tested. China was accused using
espionage, most notably in the
Cox Report, throughout the 1980s and early 1990s to acquire the US
W88 nuclear warhead design as well as
guided ballistic missile technology. Details of US intelligence on Chinese nuclear weapons were released in the press surrounding the Cox Report and abortive trial of
Wen Ho Lee. On 8 June 1996, China announced that it would conduct one more test to ensure the safety of its nuclear weapons and then cease testing. According to Chinese nuclear scientists, the date was chosen the memorialize the tenth anniversary of
Deng Jiaxian's death. During the Cold War, China relied on concealment of its nuclear forces as the primary mechanism for their survivability. Despite claims by some, there appears to be no evidence to suggest that the new generation of
People's Liberation Army Navy ballistic-missile submarines came under PLARF control.
2020s Between 2020 and 2021, China began construction of three large intercontinental ballistic
missile silo fields near
Yumen City in
Gansu,
Hami in
Xinjiang, and
Ordos City in
Inner Mongolia. By 2025 these were assessed to total 320 silos for
solid-propellant missiles and 30 silos for liquid-fuel
DF-5 missiles. On 25 September 2024, China's People's Liberation Army Rocket Force test launched a
Dong Feng-31 intercontinental ballistic missile. The missile was launched from
Hainan island over 11,700 km to just west of
French Polynesia, reaching an estimated apogee of 1,200 km. It was the first test of an ICBM into the Pacific for China in over 40 years, typically testing ICBMs at very high apogees within its own borders. China alerted the US, UK, France, Australia and New Zealand ahead of the test, and was criticized by Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Fiji, and Kiribati. In November 2024, China conducted its first joint patrol with its nuclear-capable
Xi'an H-6N bomber and a Russian
Tupolev Tu-95MS over the
Sea of Japan. China had previously conducted eight joint flights of its Xi'an H-6K non-nuclear-capable strategic bombers with Russian Tu-95s. In December 2024, the US Department of Defense assessed that China had 600 nuclear warheads and would have 1,000 by 2030. In December 2025, the U.S. Department of Defense's
China Military Power Report stated that China's nuclear stockpile "remained in the low 600s through 2024, reflecting a slower rate of production when compared to previous years." The report also said China had loaded more than 100
DF-31 ICBMs with solid propellant in silos near its border with Mongolia. In April 2026,
CNN reported, citing satellite imagery and analysis, that China has been conducting a massive overhaul of its nuclear weapons infrastructure at sites in the
Zitong County region, Sichuan Province (e.g., Sites 906 and 931), as part of a broader modernization effort.
US allegations of covert resumed testing In 2020, the
United States Department of State alleged that excavation and "explosive containment chambers" at Lop Nur could allow China to return to low-yield nuclear testing, violating the zero-yield standard of the CTBT. China denied the accusations. In December 2023, satellite
open-source intelligence showed evidence of drilling shafts in Lop Nur where nuclear weapons testing could resume. In January 2025, analysts detected newly excavated soil in the northern rim of the Lop Nur complex, believed to be from horizontal tunnels used for lower-yield nuclear weapons tests. Prior to his meeting with
CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping on 30 October 2025, President Trump, in a social media post, "instructed the
Department of War [sic]" to resume testing nuclear weapons "on an equal basis." On 31 October, in an interview with
60 Minutes, Trump claimed Russia, China, Pakistan, and North Korea were carrying out covert nuclear tests. On November 3,
Secretary of Energy Chris Wright stated that nuclear testing would not resume, and subcritical testing would continue. On 6 February 2026, the
Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, Thomas G. DiNanno, expanded US allegations that China had conducted covert underground tests, stating that one such test occurred on 22 June 2020. DiNanno stated that China had prepared for tests with nuclear yields of "hundreds of tons" using a "decoupling" technique, carrying out nuclear explosions in existing underground cavities to reduce their
seismic signature. The same day, Robert Floyd, the Executive Secretary of the
Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization, issued a statement that its International Monitoring System, which is capable of detecting tests above approximately 500 tonnes yield, did not detect any signs of a nuclear explosion on 22 June 2020. On 17 February 2026, the
Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, Christopher Yeaw, stated that the June 2020 event was a "singular explosion" that took place at Lop Nur and was inconsistent with an earthquake or mining blast. US intelligence sources reportedly believe the resumed testing is for the development of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons. In March 2026,
Brandon Williams, head of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, stated that China had covertly resumed "testing in the hundreds of tons of yield." == Size ==