painting of a tribute giraffe, which was thought to be a
Qilin by court officials, from Bengal
Legitimacy The "tribute system" is often associated with a "Confucian world order", under which neighboring states complied and participated in the "tribute system" to secure guarantees of peace, investiture, and trading opportunities. One member acknowledged another's position as superior, and the superior would bestow investiture upon them in the form of a crown, official seal, and formal robes, to confirm them as king. The practice of investing non-Chinese neighbors had been practiced since ancient times as a concrete expression of the loose reign policy. The early Ming dynasty actively sought out diplomatic relations with other states within the framework of a tributary relationship to boaster its claims to authority and superiority. In these diplomatic visits, Ming envoys would urge these states to send tributary missions to the Ming capital, asserting the Ming emperor's position as Son of Heaven above all other rulers. The rulers of
Joseon, in particular, sought to legitimize their rule through reference to Chinese symbolic authority. After the defeat of the
Yuan dynasty in 1368,
King Gongmin of Goryeo terminated tributary relations with the Yuan and sent tribute to the Ming. However, Goryeo also sent military forces to the Ming border region of
Liaodong in 1370. After Gongmin was assassinated in 1374, his successor
King U of Goryeo was dominated by a pro-Yuan court that re-established tributary relations with
Northern Yuan while also sending tribute to the Ming in 1384. In 1388, Goryeo sent an army under deputy commander Yi Seong-gye to attack the Ming due to Ming demands to turn over their northeastern territory, but YI refused to carry out the invasion and instead turned back the army to remove King U from power. In 1392, Yi Seong-gye, also known as
Taejo of Joseon, officially founded the state of Joseon, cut off relations with the Mongols and sent tributary envoys to the Ming founder
Emperor Hongwu for recognition. Despite Yi's willingness to become a tributary of the Ming, the Hongwu Emperor did not trust Joseon and forbade Joseon envoys from entering Ming territory by 1397. The militarist faction in Joseon planned to attack the Ming in 1398 with support from the king but their leader,
Chŏng Tojŏn, was killed by one of the king's sons,
Yi Pangwŏn, who later succeeded his father and became king of Joseon. He then used Neo-Confucian doctrines to solidify his rule over Joseon. Yi Seong-gye was the only king of Joseon who requested but did not receive investiture from the Ming emperor. There is no evidence that Koreans during the Ming era ever questioned the practice of sending tribute to and requesting investiture from the Ming emperor upon the enthronement of a new king. Receiving investiture from the Ming emperor was taken for granted as a source of political legitimacy for the Joseon king who was vulnerable to attacks from their subjects should he not receive recognition. Due to the Confucian outlook of contemporary Korean elites, the Ming emperor was identified as the "Son of Heaven" who embodied Confucian moral authority. In the aftermath of the
Imjin War,
Seonjo of Joseon in particular sought symbolic authority from the Ming emperor due to the lack of his own political authority at home. Generals and irregular armies had formed outside of government control during the war and many had personally witnessed Seonjo fleeing from the capital upon the outbreak of the war. He downplayed the accomplishments of his own generals while attributing victory to Ming intervention. Out of fear of rebellion against his own rule, Seonjo doubled down on seeking authority from the Ming through a narrative in which he was central to the Ming's decision to send military aid against the Japanese. However most Koreans at the time understood that the Ming intervention came about from geopolitical concerns that the Japanese would have posed a threat to Ming territory if Joseon had lost the war. On the opposite side of the tributary relationship spectrum was
Japan, whose leaders could hurt their own legitimacy by identifying with Chinese authority. With the exception of
Ashikaga Yoshimitsu from 1401-1408, no other modern Japanese ruler accepted official tributary status with China. As the first ruler of unified Japan during the
Muromachi period, he may have sought to enhance his own status within Japan by accepting a title from the Ming to solidify his ascendance over the Japanese emperor. None of his successors adopted the same tributary relationship with China. In these politically tricky situations, sometimes a false king was set up to receive investiture for the purposes of tribute trade.
Autonomy In practice, the tribute system only became formalized during the early years of the
Ming dynasty. Actors within the "tribute system" were virtually autonomous and carried out their own agendas despite sending tribute; as was the case with Japan, Korea, Ryukyu, and Vietnam. Chinese influence on tributary states was almost always non-interventionist in nature and tributary states "normally could expect no military assistance from Chinese armies should they be invaded".
Tribute The "tribute" entailed a foreign court sending envoys and exotic products to the Chinese emperor. Once foreign envoys reached the Chinese capital, they participated in a series of Confucian ceremonies including the "kowtow". Before meeting the emperor, Chinese officials and foreign envoys gathered to practice a rehearsal ceremony. On the day of the assembly, Chinese officials and foreign envoys moved to their rehearsed positions before the emperor. An official from the
Ministry of Rites led the foreign envoys to perform five bows and three sets of kneeling and bows. Afterwards, the foreign envoys would kneel before the emperor while the emperor instructed the Ministry of Rites official to provide them with drinks and meals. The emperor then gave the envoys gifts in return and permitted them to trade in China. Before departing, the envoys would perform another three sets of kneeling and bows. Presenting tribute involved theatrical subordination but usually not political subordination. The political sacrifice of participating actors was simply "symbolic obeisance". Nor were states that sent tribute forced to mimic Chinese institutions, for example in cases such as the Inner Asians, who basically ignored the trappings of Chinese government. Instead they manipulated Chinese tribute practices for their own financial benefit. The gifts doled out by the Ming emperor and the trade permits granted were of greater value than the tribute itself, so tribute states sent as many tribute missions as they could. In 1372, the
Hongwu Emperor restricted tribute missions from Joseon and six other countries to just one every three years. The
Ryukyu Kingdom was not included in this list, and sent 57 tribute missions from 1372 to 1398, an average of two tribute missions per year. Since geographical density and proximity was not an issue, regions with multiple kings such as the
Sultanate of Sulu benefited immensely from this exchange. After 1435, the Ming dynasty urged foreign delegations to leave and stopped offering transport assistance for visiting missions. The size of delegations was restricted from hundreds of people to less than a dozen and the frequency of tributary missions was also reduced. The practice of giving gifts of greater value than the tribute itself was not practiced by the
Mongol-led
Yuan dynasty court with
Goryeo. Gifts conferred by the Yuan were worth a fraction of the tribute offered by Goryeo.
Joseon paid the
Qing dynasty multiple times per year and were coerced to receive hundreds of diplomatic missions, in turn granting the Qing great influence in their internal affairs, in comparison to
Siam who would only send gold and silver to the Qing when requested by the court as a gift rather than a forced payment, often once every decade.
Culture Participation in a tributary relationship with a Chinese dynasty could be predicated on cultural or civilizational motivations rather than material and monetary benefits. The Korean kingdom of
Joseon did not treat the
Manchu-led
Qing dynasty, which invaded Joseon and forced it to become a tributary in 1636, in the same way as the
Han-led Ming dynasty. Joseon had continued to support the Ming in their wars against the Qing despite incurring military retaliation from the latter. The Manchus were viewed as barbarians by the Korean court, which, regarding itself as the new "Confucian ideological center" in place of the Ming, continued to use the Ming calendar and
era names in defiance of the Qing, despite sending tribute missions. According to historian Ji-Young Lee, Joseon compliance with the Ming tributary system was not merely acceptance of hegemonic practices by the most powerful state, but specifically entrenched in a Confucian worldview that was not shared with the Qing rulers, who the Koreans saw as barbarians. Lee argues that if Korean compliance with Ming hegemony was merely predicated on material interests and fear of Chinese aggression, there would have been greater acceptance of the rising Qing dynasty in the early 17th century. Instead, Joseon envoys refused to attend the Qing emperor's coronation in February 1636, resulting in their beating and imprisonment. When Na Tŏk-hyŏn was ordered by the Manchus to deliver a letter calling the Manchu ruler emperor to the Joseon king, he threw away the letter and chose not to deliver it. Subsequently, Joseon suffered two invasions by the Qing, after which it was forced to become a Qing tributary. Despite this, Joseon officials and intellectuals saw the Manchus' claim on the position of "Son of Heaven" as an attack on socially accepted norms. Joseon envoys to the Qing complained that the Manchus were no different from pigs and dogs, that the Qing emperor's head was shaven unlike previous Sons of Heaven and that the emperor forced them to meet a Tibetan priest, which the envoys described as a barbaric act that the Ming would never have subjected them to. In contrast, Joseon envoys to the Ming emperor seem to have displayed genuine fondness for the ruler. In their personal writings, Ha Gok described himself being overjoyed at seeing the emperor at a close distance, and Hong Ik-han stated that no one dared speak out of turn or make a mistake out of fear and respect. They felt disappointed when they were placed outside the Meridian Gate for the winter solstice ceremony. According to the Joseon historian
Choe Bu, Joseon and the Ming were "one family". Joseon eventually accepted Qing hegemony by sending tribute and accepting a title, but the Qing enjoyed less authority than the Ming. During the Ming dynasty, Joseon kings occasionally sent more than the necessary amount of tribute missions to "show appreciation, offer congratulations to newly enthroned emperors, pay respects to recently deceased members of the imperial family, or make special requests". These missions were voluntary and had benefits for the king's domestic political situation. Joseon kings would even turn to deceased Ming emperors and pay memorial service to them in front of a domestic audience for additional legitimacy. In contrast, Joseon missions to the Qing were kept to a minimum due to the lack of any domestic political benefit. Meanwhile Japan avoided direct contact with Qing China and instead manipulated embassies from neighboring Joseon and
Ryukyu to make it falsely appear as though they came to pay tribute. Another instance of shared cultural affiliation and attraction is Vietnam. Although tributary missions to China have been depicted in modern Vietnamese nationalist history as a cynical practice to appease China, "there is little proof of a consistent or extreme Vietnamese hatred for Chinese culture" throughout history. Instead, Vietnamese elites were generally favorable towards Chinese culture and political norms. A study of poems composed by Vietnamese envoys to China did not find any hostility held towards China but rather that they genuinely felt proud of being part of Sinic civilization. Vietnamese elites prior to French colonization were thoroughly entrenched in Chinese culture. Most Vietnamese elites up to the 19th century do not seem to have written in anything other than
Classical Chinese and even criticized attempts to nativise the Chinese script to represent the
Vietnamese language. Knowledge of specific Chinese texts was considered to be the equivalent of historical literacy. As late as the 20th century, important Vietnamese literature such as
Ho Chi Minh's poem
Vọng Nguyệt, which recites the entire history of Vietnam, was written in Classical Chinese. Vietnamese envoys to China were heavily invested in their tradition of classical studies shared with their Chinese counterparts and sought to create a parallel Sino-Vietnamese bureaucracy in Vietnam. They were the primary advocates of adopting the Chinese administrative model and constantly petitioned Vietnamese emperors to implement practices they had seen at the Chinese court. Most of them were enthusiastic about visiting China and used such occasions as opportunities for sight seeing or personal exploration, sometimes to the detriment of their other tasks. In 1832, the Vietnamese emperor
Minh Mạng criticized Vietnamese envoys for not bothering to describe the conditions of the people in places they had visited, and merely jotted down rough outlines of the distance between places and their names. In 1848, the Vietnamese envoy Nguyễn Siêu spent his trip to and from
Beijing searching for places where the
Song dynasty Neo-Confucian scholars
Cheng Hao and
Cheng Yi had lectured at. In 1841, a Vietnamese envoy to the Qing court, Lý Văn Phức, found his hosts' application of the word
yi (barbarian) to his lodgings, which was named "Vietnamese Barbarians' Hostel", to be objectionable. He ordered the sign be taken down, then wrote an essay in Classical Chinese emphasizing the Confucian nature of Vietnam's elite class and presented it to the
Daoguang Emperor, suggesting that the Vietnamese were no more barbarian than the Manchus were. After returning to Vietnam, envoys were required to write essays on the deficiencies they had witnessed in China, possibly as a form of psychological cleansing after their trip. In 1840, one of the envoys recounted how the Qing emperor spoke different languages depending on who they were conversing with. If the person was Chinese, they spoke in Chinese, and if the person was Manchu, they spoke in Manchu. The Vietnamese emperor Minh Mạng criticized this behavior on the basis that such discrepancies would cause fear and suspicion among his officials. Earlier in 1835, Minh Mạng had proclaimed that his capital was now the new "Central Domain" and that he was the true successor of the ancient
Zhou dynasty, who once ruled the
Nine Provinces of ancient China. To legitimize his rule, he constructed nine bronze urns to represent the Nine Provinces and to signify his association with Zhou sovereignty. According to Lydia He Liu, the Vietnamese, Koreans, and Japanese all placed themselves at the center of the Confucian world order and treated the Qing as its periphery.
Rituals The Chinese tributary system required a set of rituals from the tributary states whenever they sought relations with China as a way of regulating diplomatic relations. The main rituals generally included: • The sending of missions by tributary states to China • The tributary envoys'
kowtowing before the Chinese emperor as "a symbolic recognition of their inferiority" and "acknowledgment of their status of a
vassal state" • The presentation of tribute and receipt of the emperor's "vassals' gifts" • The
investiture of the tributary state's ruler as the legitimate king of his land After the completion of the rituals, the tributary states engaged in their desired business, such as trade. == History ==