New owners In the two decades before the outbreak of the First World War, British investors were seeking opportunities outside the United Kingdom. The purchase of the Great Cobar was one of several large investments in Australia that involved acquiring existing assets to improve or expand them. Such investments, in New South Wales, included
British Australian Oil Company,
Commonwealth Oil Corporation,
Dapto Smelting Works,
Mount Boppy Gold Mine, and the
Prince of Wales Mine. A few, such as the
Sons of Gwalia mine in Western Australia, were long-lived, fabulous earners, and others like the Mount Boppy were highly remunerative. However, some eventually were financially unsuccessful, some were also heavily over-capitalised, and some were ill-conceived from the outset; all three would be the case for the new company, Great Cobar Limited. 150,000 new £5 shares and £750,000 in 6%
debentures were authorised, being new share capital and debenture debt in a capital structure totalling £1,500,000; not all of this amount was issued at the time. The assets acquired included the refinery at Lithgow, the coal mine and coke works at Rix's Creek (near
Singleton), the Chesney Mine (south of Cobar, at
Wrightville), the Peak Gold mine (south of Wrightville), and the Conqueror Gold Mine (a small mine, due east of the Peak and south-east from Cobar), but not the
Nymagee Copper Mine, which later would be bought by different English investors. Preparing to float the new company, Great Cobar Limited, its promoters issued a
prospectus document forecasting profitable operations. The no-risk profit made by the new company's promoters, at the time of the float, was also of concern. That the mine had already been producing for some thirty years, by 1906, should have raised some concerns about its remaining economic life; that was especially so, if production was dramatically increased. A report accompanying the prospectus noted ore reserves of 1,530,506 tons, which would yield a profit of £1,215,002 (at a copper price of £60/ton). He was the son of renowned sculptor,
Thomas Woolner, Woolner and Company had "
incurred heavy losses through the default of clients, falling markets and the stagnation of business due to the South African war". By the end of 1904, the firm was insolvent but continued to trade illegally. By promoting a company, called Bohemian Mining Corporation Limited, Woolner and Company returned to solvency. A director of Bohemian Mining Corporation—ultimately an unsuccessful investment for its shareholders—was Andrew Haes, later the Chairman of Great Cobar.
and Andrew Haes. Haes, later the chairman of Great Cobar Limited, had advanced the costs for arranging the float to the apparently cash strapped Woolner. Andrew Haes, it was later revealed, had been a director of some failed or unprofitable listed companies. Woolner and his partner Sumner-Jones were declared in default and ‘
hammered’, meaning they could no longer trade on the
London Stock Exchange. Bankrupt and publicly humiliated, Woolner attempted to re-establish his career in America, spending some of his time there. His personal bankruptcy was discharged in 1910. Later, Woolner was accused of exerting undue influence on the 1912 and 1913 wills of Elizabeth Josephine Forster. She was a wealthy nonagenarian and patron of artists, whose property was worth more than £500,000. Forster's relatives took the matter to the Admiralty, Divorce and Probate Division of the
High Court in London. They alleged that the will was not duly executed, that Elizabeth Foster was not of sound mind, and that she had not understood the will. They argued that her property had to be protected by the
Commissioners in Lunacy. The case was settled in March 1917. One report, in 1884, referred to him as "
probably the greatest authority upon haematite iron-ore mining and geological conditions of haematite". He resigned, as manager of Postlethwaite's
Moor Row Mine, and set up a consulting practice in London, in 1896. His first involvement with Great Cobar was in 1903, when he provided a report on its operations for its then owners, the Great Cobar Mining Syndicate. The other principal of Kendall and Barnett, W. J. Barnett, was a director of Great Cobar Limited, right to its end.
North Cobar mine On a somewhat similar trajectory to becoming controlled by English capital was an adjacent mine site, to Great Cobar's immediate north, the North Cobar mine. First operated by the North Cobar Copper Mining Company Limited—a company founded in 1873, and associated with Joseph Becker and
Russell Barton— that company had prospected on its land, without any real success. The mining rights and machinery were sold for £12,500, in mid 1905, and the old company was put into voluntary liquidation, in January 1906. The Great Cobar Syndicate, owners of the Great Cobar mine, had not moved to take over its neighbour, and a local report described the North Cobar's prospects as poor. A new English company, Great Cobar North Copper-mining Company, Limited was floated in mid 1906. The new company provided capital funding, and a mine development program began. In 1911, it was still engaged in prospecting the North Cobar lease. Its main shaft was, by then, 1,500 feet deep. However, the expected continuation of the Great Cobar ore body was believed to lie further down, at 1,700 to 2,000 feet. In 1913, the company sought to raise more capital, and was working to sink the shaft to 1,700 feet. It seems that the North Cobar mine did not produce a significant amount of ore, but from 1913, it was used to ventilate workings of Great Cobar mine. The mine was still being worked in mid 1916, and there were reportedly plans for a concentrator plant, and to send its concentrate to Port Kembla. At the beginning of 1922, the company was "cleaning up its assets", reportedly having spent "hundreds of thousands of pounds", but with little to show for it but the deepest shaft on the Cobar field, at over 2,000 feet. the Electrolytic Smelting and Refining operation at
Port Kembla, the short-lived
Dapto Smelting Works, and the
Cockle Creek Smelter. At least one observer later saw the decision to smelt at the Great Cobar mine site as a fatal mistake. Great Cobar Limited also inherited the electrolytic refinery at Lithgow, which refined copper matte and, later, blister copper from the Cobar smelter until 1911.
Expansion and mechanisation Having to pay interest on the debentures, at the very least, the new company needed to both increase production and control costs; the path to profitability lay in a large expansion of capacity and intensive
mechanisation. The mine and smelter capacity would need to be doubled. Kendall was already familiar with the Great Cobar, having provided a report on its operations, for its former owners, in 1903, and his firm provided a favourable report for the prospectus when Great Cobar Limited was floated. Kendall and Bellinger made a tour of the operations in March 1909. Blakemore contended that Kendall's design had been faulty, apparently overlooking his own role from 1906 to 1908 and his far more extensive experience in smelting. He remained in the district as a consultant to other ventures. Blakemore would later work for the rival
C.S.A. mine, something that would have consequences for the Great Cobar, a decade into the future. Removing Blakemore did not end the problems. Around midnight on 11 June 1909, Cobar residents were awakened by a series of explosions that caused extensive damage to the No. 2 furnace. Fortunately, the No. 1 furnace was ready to reenter service by then. This was not the first such explosion; an earlier one had been reported in March 1909. It was noted that while Bellinger had reportedly stated that the new plant was "
modern and quite satisfactory", he was already making modifications to the plant. The managing director, John Kendall, like Blakemore, ultimately seems to have been held responsible for the poor performance of the new plant and ceased to be connected with Great Cobar after June 1909. The new managing director was George Earle Baker, who had been one of the promoters of the float of Great Cobar Limited in 1906.
Herman Bellinger Herman Carl Bellinger (1867–1941) was born in Germany. In 1873, he emigrated to
Nevada, United States, where his father worked as a mining engineer. From the mid-1880s, Bellinger was working in the copper industry, with
Fritz Augustus Heinze. From 1897, he was associated with the
Trail Smelter, near the
Canada–United States border in
British Columbia. In 1906, he was working in
Crofton on
Vancouver Island, where there was a copper smelter. After the
panic of 1907, copper prices fell, and the smelter, owned by the Britannia Mining & Smelting Company, closed in January 1908, likely making Bellinger available to work at the Great Cobar. Bellinger took over as General Manager in February 1909. From January 1913 to May 1913, Bellinger was on leave in England and America; during that time, he arranged a new employment agreement with the board. During his visit to England, he reported to an extraordinary meeting of the company, held on 31 March 1913, but his report did not impress observers. After his time at Cobar, beginning in 1916, he worked for the
Chile Exploration Company. He had involvement in mining in Utah, Europe, and Africa. He was awarded the
William Lawrence Saunders Gold Medal by the
Society of Mining Engineers in 1941 for innovations in mining methods. The translucent blue-green mineral, Bellingerite, Cu3(IO3)6·2H2O, is named after him. at nearby
Dapville. Like the Chesney mine, it lay adjacent to the Peak branch line, allowing its ore to be railed to the Great Cobar smelters. Processing the Chesney ore had been one of the problems facing Bellinger, and he believed that the new separation plant would resolve it. The Great Cobar's electrolytic refinery at Lithgow operated until 1911.
Equipment and operations Main shaft and winder The new main shaft had a rectangular cross-section, 15 feet by 8 feet, divided into three compartments; two carried cages and the other contained pipes, cables and a ladderway. There were levels spaced every 100 feet, from which the mine was worked. In 1910, the main shaft was down to 1,033 feet. In June 1912, the mine was working down to the 13th level, and the main shaft was at 1,419 feet down. By the time the mine first closed in 1914, the main shaft was 1,500 feet deep, providing access to 14 levels. The
winding engine for the main shaft was steam-powered, It was speed controlled by a high-speed governor, connected to the engine shaft by a chain-drive. There were two winder drums, four feet wide and ten inches in diameter, onto which two layers of the steel rope were wound. The drum being operated was connected to the engine shaft via a steam-operated clutch. Braking was applied by a heavy weight acting on a brake drum, released by a foot control. The brake was applied automatically if the steam supply or the winding engine driver was lost. The levers and controls were arranged so that a single winding engine driver could operate them without leaving his usual position.
Crushers, crusher ore conveyor, and crusher bins Ore from the mine was crushed using two 'Heclon'
gyratory crushers, made by the Hadfield Steel Company. and so able to be sent to the smelter in the appropriate proportions. File:Ore conveyor, Great Cobar Copper Mine - Cobar, NSW, 1912 (Collection of the Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW).jpg|Inclined ore conveyor gantry and bedding bins (1912). Both were added as enhancements to the 1906 design in 1910–1911. File:Interior view, ore conveyor belt, Great Cobar Copper Mine - Cobar, NSW, June 1912 (Collection of Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW).jpg|Interior view of the ore conveyor above the six bedding bins. The movable chute on the conveyor is visible at the far end. (1912)
Furnace ore feed From chutes below the bedding bins to the feeding floor level of the water-jacket furnaces, side-tip charging skips were hauled by rope over an inclined tramway, onto one of the two charging floors of the furnace building. The skips were then tipped manually, with the ore falling through an openable side hatch directly into the furnace. File:Tramways to furnace, Great Cobar Copper Mine, June 1912 (Collection of Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW).jpg|Rope-hauled inclined tramway to furnaces (1912). There were two such inclines, with a charging floor on both sides of the furnaces. File:Feeding floor, Great Cobar Copper Mine smelters. Side tipping trucks - Cobar, NSW, June 1912 (Collection of Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW).jpg|Charging floor at furnaces, with a side-tip charging skip being tipped (1912) File:Great Cobar Mine, feeding floor of furnaces and side-tip truck (Plate XXXI, Report on Cobar Copper and Gold Field, E.C. Andrews, 1911).jpg|Another view of a charging floor and a charging skip being tipped. Note rope haulage (c.1911).
Smelting plant The steel smelter building was 250 feet long and 85 feet high. Electrically powered overhead travelling gantry cranes carried the ladles of molten copper matte to the converters, in which the matte was converted to blister copper. The converters were located along the western side of the smelter building. There were originally two convertors, Also on the western side was one much smaller water-jacket furnace, mainly used for remelting copper. By 1909, the mine tank had a capacity of at least 70-million gallons, however, in the semi-arid climate, it was rarely full. Electric pumps moved about 40,000 gallons of saline groundwater per day from the mine into saline lakes, where it was lost to evaporation. In times of drought, in desperation, this saline water was sometimes used for cooling the water jacket furnaces, despite the resulting corrosion. The boilers used chain-grate
mechanical stokers, with coal fed via chutes from overhead hoppers.
Electrical power Electricity was generated using three 300 kW
Siemens alternators, each powered by a directly coupled
Browett-Lindley vertical
triple-expansion steam engine. The engine driving the converters was a cross-compound steam engine. The
Roots Connorsville positive-displacement blowers for the water-jacket furnaces, Relining of convertor vessels took place in a dedicated area inside the furnace building. File:Machine shop, Great Cobar Copper mine - Cobar, NSW, 1912 (Collection of Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW).jpg|Machine shop (1912) File:Great Cobar Mine, relining converer vessels (Plate XXXV, Report on Cobar Copper and Gold Field, E.C. Andrews, 1911).jpg|Relining Converter vessels (c.1911)
Operational difficulties Mining operations In 1912,
net profit for the year was £168,617—buoyed by a rise in the copper price from £58 per ton in December 1911 to £79 12s in June 1912—but this profit was not high enough to allow a
dividend. Conscious that even this level of profitability was precarious—dependent as it was upon the copper price—above all, the company pushed for higher rates of production, neglecting mine development for short-term high rates of ore extraction. Although the surface plant was heavily mechanised, the underground mine was not. Rock drills were powered by compressed air, and blasting was used, but otherwise, underground mining was an entirely manual process, carried out by a large and expensive workforce. Mine skips (or "trucks") with approximately one-ton capacity were first filled at the ore face before being pushed to the "plat" over rails. The skips were then manually pushed into or hauled out of cages that were raised and lowered by the main shaft winder. At the lower levels, this task was done by the "platman" and his assistants, while at the surface, the corresponding task was done by "bracemen". A cage accommodated two skips at a time, and typically between 1,150 and 1,500 skips of ore were raised per 24-hour period. To maintain that level of production, a similar number of empty skips had to be returned, during the same 24-hour period, to locations within the mine where ore was being extracted. The mine itself became a bottleneck in the vast enterprise, unable to deliver enough ore to the surface to meet the smelting furnaces' demands. In 1910–11, miners raised a total of 298,050 tons of ore, while another 6,243 tons came from the old dump at the Cobar Gold Mine; from this ore the company recovered 6,248 tons of copper, 22,048
oz of gold, and 109,421 oz of silver, with a total value of £372,046. Total production had exceeded 100,000 tons of copper, by March 1913. From 1871 up to and including 1911, the mine at Cobar—including Chesney mine from 1904 and Cobar Gold mine from 1910)—mined 2,866,643 tons of ore and from it had produced 91,384.75 tons of copper, equating an average recovery rate of 3.19%. Needless to say, this two-pass smelting approach came at a cost. Nonetheless, it became the means by which the problem was overcome, and was possibly one reason that a fourth water-jacket furnace had been added.
Smelting losses A problem was that too much copper was being lost during smelting; the recovery rate was 1.94% copper per ton of ore, meaning around a quarter of the copper in the ore (assaying 2.6%) was lost during processing, mainly in the slag. The effect was exasperated by the two-pass smelting approach with copper being lost on each pass through the water-jacket furnaces. Converter slag was also recycled. was needed for backfilling, to raise the floor level of underground
stopes, as miners extracted the ore, and to stabilize worked-out areas. There was a separate mullock shaft, down which mullock was dropped to the 300-foot level, from where it was distributed, as fill to raise the floor level of stopes as these were mined out. Coal ash from the steam boilers is used to supplement the mullock. File:Great Cobar Mine, new slag dump (Plate XXXVII, Report on Cobar Copper and Gold Field, E.C. Andrews, 1911).jpg|New slag dump c.1911, with electric 'motor' and slag ladle wagon. File:Great Cobar - Tipping molten slag (Australian Town and Country Journal, 19 Jul 1911, p24 ).jpg|Tipping molten slag (1911) File:Berc 20 ton slag ladle and car, Great Cobar Copper Mine - Cobar, NSW, June 1912 (Collection of Mitchell Library, State Library of NSW).jpg|Slag ladle wagon (1912). The tipping mechanism was electrically operated but could also be manually operated.
Types of ore and flux consumption A pressing problem for the company was the type of ore that was being mined. Both 'basic' and 'siliceous' (or acidic) copper ore occurred at Cobar. Both types needed to be blended for smelting; otherwise, fluxes were required to effectively remove impurities, particularly iron, from the copper matte produced in the water-jacketed furnaces. As time progressed and mining went deeper, the ore from the Great Cobar became increasingly siliceous and higher in iron. The increasingly siliceous ore production at Great Cobar also meant that the ore from the Chesney Mine and Cobar Gold Mine was no longer suitable as a smelting flux; in fact, it added to the problem of too much siliceous ore. Instead, the Great Cobar smelters needed to bring in more limestone as a flux. In early 1914, the company was planning to open a quarry at
Molong, capable of mining the 100 tons of limestone per day needed by its smelters. A possible solution was to stop smelting at Great Cobar. One of the smaller mines in the region, the Queen Bee Mine, at
Illewong, eventually stopped its mine site smelting operations altogether, and instead produced
copper concentrate, which was shipped to the large E.R.& S copper smelter and electrolytic refinery, at
Port Kembla, which had opened in 1908. However, the Great Cobar company had invested in a huge smelter at its remote mine site, and writing off such a large investment was always a very unlikely outcome. A flotation plant of a size needed to treat all of Cobar's ore would be immense. Moreover, by late 1913, it was apparent that the Great Cobar's own flotation plant, with a capacity of 50,000 tons per annum, was not meeting expectations. retaining only the coal mine and coke works. From then on, Great Cobar sent the blister copper that it smelted at Cobar to America for refining.
External factors Great Cobar was critically dependent on the
Cobar railway line to maintain operations. Smelting had ceased for two months during late 1911 because a coal miners' strike had left the railways unable to carry coke and other materials to the Great Cobar. Remoteness from larger centres and the coast also brought difficulty in retaining a large and relatively skilled workforce. According to Blakemore, in 1907, Cobar workers were well paid, with higher pay rates than elsewhere in New South Wales. All workers were on a six-day working week of eight-hour shifts in 1907. Mining labor average wages were 11 shillings a day, but many were earning up to 22s a day, and men working in the new main shaft averaged 30s a day. Furnace labourers got from 8s to 9s a day, and ordinary labourers got 8s a day. Blakemore had wanted to cover the seventh day by a new gang of workers, but unions were able instead to obtain additional overtime shifts at a rate of time-and-a-quarter, in a ruling by the
Arbitration Court, and by threatening the company with strike action. There were three major
trade unions representing various workers. The
Amalgamated Miners' Association represented the underground workers, the Smelters Union represented the smelter workers, and the Engine Drivers and Firemen's Association mainly represented the remaining surface workers associated with the mine winder, powerhouse, boilers, steam engines, and industrial railway. On occasion, the unions acted jointly as the Combined Unions. A constant source of dispute was wage rates. Wages for different classes of employees were determined in different ways. Some were paid a wage per shift. Others, for example, those filling mine skips (or 'trucks') were paid by the 'truck' (around one ton of ore), and smelter operators had pay rates on a sliding scale based on the copper price. By 1912, the Company employed a total of 2,200 people, with 960 working in the mine and smelter, and its wages and salary bill was £23,000 per fortnight. During his time as manager, Bellinger attempted to resolve some of the long-standing issues with the workers and was seen as conciliatory and open to negotiation. Another source of dissent between the company and its unionised workforce was the ever-present risk of work-related death or injury, and the union's practice of stopping all underground work for three shifts when a miner died from a work-related event. Additionally, the surface works and smelters at the Great Cobar mine had many hazards, ranging from working at height to molten metal and slag. Serious accidents were commonly fatal. In January 1908, while sinking the new main shaft, John Pascoe was struck in the head by a full bucket that had fallen from a height of around 125 feet, dying soon afterwards. In June 1908, James Cassidy, a 'platman' (a person who puts skips into and out of the winder cage, at an underground level), was killed by an unknown object that fell down the shaft. William Jackson was killed in a rockfall in November 1908. In late October 1909, a labourer, Ambrose Fox, died of burns to his head and body caused by an explosion of hot metal at a water-jacket furnace. 1910 was a particularly bad year; six died. In January 1910, James Craddock died from internal injuries after falling from an 18-foot-high scaffold. In May 1910, William Evans died from internal injuries he received while pulling down a structure. In September 1910, Edward Atkins died after falling, unseen by other miners, into an ore pass (a vertical or near-vertical opening made to provide more convenient material handling by gravity and to reduce haulage distances). In October 1910, two men died; a surface worker, Gerdhardt Weichmann, was killed, apparently, in an unexplained fall from a platform, and a miner, Walter Bender, died from injuries after a rockfall. In November 1910, Thomas Wells, stepped out of the wrong side of a cage, at the 9th level, into an open shaft compartment, falling to his death; the cage was required to have a bar preventing access to the other compartment of the shaft, but it was not in place. It had been the practice of the underground miners to stop work for three shifts following a fatality. The sad events of 1910 caused significant disruption to smelter operations. In November 1910, Henry Bellinger, on behalf of the company, offered the workers an incentive to continue working in the future, except for two hours to attend the funeral. In return, if a levy of half a
crown (or 2
shillings and 6 pence) were contributed to the widow from each miner's wage, the company would also contribute pound-for-pound. It was expected that an amount of around £275 could be given for the welfare of the widow and family of the dead miner. The union countered by offering to donate half a shift's pay if the company contributed pound-for-pound. It was to take until March 1913 for the company and the Combined Unions to agree. All mine workers contributed 2 shillings, and the company contributed 1 shilling, to a jointly administered Miners' Accident Relief Fund; mining work was to continue, but workers had 2 hours off, at their own expense, to attend the funeral. 1911 was another bad year, with five fatalities. In February 1911, Charles Stokes died in a hospital after he was severely burned in an explosion of hot slag. Also in February 1911, John Jolly died of
peritonitis after being crushed against a wall by a crane. Frank Welsh died in April 1911, succumbing to the injuries he received when a rock knocked him into an ore pass, and he was buried, except for his head and hands. In August 1911, a miner, Oliver Rafferty, was working on a boring machine, when he overbalanced and fell backwards onto a pile of rocks, hitting his head, and then rolling 25 feet down an ore pass; he died on the way to the hospital. In December 1911, Thomas Attwater, a shunter, fell between the electric locomotive that he was climbing into and a slag pot, after a handrail broke, and then was run over; he died at the hospital. In December 1912, Henry Love died after a blast in an ore pass in which he was working. 1913 was yet another bad year, with six workers' deaths resulting from work accidents. In April 1913, Walter McEvoy died after seven hours in hospital, after a blasting accident had ripped open his abdomen. In June 1913, a Romanian miner, Giames Piter, was killed in a fall of earth. In July 1913, a pump driver, Arthur Sara, attempting to cross a railway line, caught his foot and was run over and killed by an electric locomotive. In August 1915, Stanley Hutchings was caught between two trucks, was badly injured, and died two days later. In November 1913, Simon Burrs was boodling (moving material by shovel) when the heap, upon which he was standing, collapsed; he fell headfirst, and was completely buried, dying of
asphyxia while he was being freed. In December 1913, Walter Wardle, a shift boss at the furnaces, fell backwards off a ladder and died. Also in December 1913, a labourer named Edwards, was badly injured when a bale arm—a type of spreader bar used when cranes lifted pots (or ladles) of hot metal—fell on him while he was working near the convertors, and died while in
shock caused by his injuries. In January 1914, an assistant manager, Albert Luff, was killed by a rockfall while he was inspecting a stope. Accidents, if not fatal, could result in a life-changing disability. Maurice O'Donnell lost his right hand and a part of his arm when a blasting charge detonated prematurely in February 1911. In November 1911, Thomas Jobson, an engine driver in the surface workings, caught his left hand in a conveyor belt, and his arm needed to be amputated at the elbow. A Russian employee, John Atnor, was trying to remove a broken wooden handle from a hammer head in November 1913, using
dynamite. His shattered forearm was amputated below the elbow. There were also some remarkable survivals and near misses. While the new plant was under construction, on 25 January 1908, a spectacular explosion destroyed the mine's 30-year-old explosives magazine, which stood well away from the mine itself. The total weight of blasting explosives held in the magazine at the time was 2,285
lbs, slightly over a
ton. It was first noticed that the magazine was on fire, then a small explosion occurred, lifting off the roof, followed 15 minutes later by an enormous explosion. Fortunately, there had been time for police to warn most residents of the adjacent villages of
Dapville and Wrightville of the impending danger, and to prevent anyone using the road between Cobar and Wrightville. There were no serious injuries and, aside from the magazine's destruction, very little property damage. In January 1910, a shift boss at the Great Cobar concentrators named Delaney had left his work to rescue a goat from a dog when he fell into an unprotected mine shaft. He fell around 110 feet, but when rescued, was found to be not seriously injured by the fall. Later that year, in March, a cage, fully laden with ore, fell down the shaft after a link broke, but there were no injuries.
Elusive profits and financial difficulties The prospectus issued at the time of the float, in May 1906, had stated that the then existing plant—producing 4,000 tons of copper annually—was capable of earning a 15% dividend on the newly issued Great Cobar share capital. Reportedly, within three months of paying the dividend, the company's balance sheet was in the red, by £24,000. It would be the company's first and last dividend to its shareholders. By August 1909, a newspaper report subtitled "
Parlous Position of Mine and Finances" reported that, after paying the debenture holders, the company had incurred a net loss of £500. It pointed out that this was in fact an artificially low amount, because in company's accounts, "
No provision has been made out of profits, for depreciation, preliminary expenses, underwriting commission, and discount on debentures", and by making a loss there was no contribution to a sinking fund—intended to be £100,000 per annum drawn from profits—for the eventual redemption of the crippling debentures. Around March 1909, settlement was granted on the last £200,000 of its authorised debentures, and the proceeds were used to pay down the company's bank overdraft. Of course, that further increased the debenture interest payments. The company had expended as much as £500,000 on the new plant at Cobar by mid 1912, well in excess of the original budget of £160,000. From these costs alone, it was apparent that the original budget was woefully inadequate; barely £62,000 was left for transport to the site, foundations, equipment installation, local equipment purchases, buildings, chimneys, and sinking the new shaft. There were additional costs for items not in the original scope, introduced by Bellinger's plant modifications of 1909–1911; expansion of smelter capacity by one third (fourth furnace and converter) and the corresponding proportionate increases in scope for the overhead cranes, powerhouse, water system, and industrial railway; Wages and salaries for the large workforce were an unavoidable cost; in 1912, they amounted to £23,000 per fortnight, or nearly £600,000 per annum. A decrease in the price of copper to a range of £65 to £70 during 1913 led to further financial difficulties and a drop in share price to 17s 6d, in mid-December 1913, Upon his return to London, Pellew-Harvey gave a report highly critical of Bellinger's management of Great Cobar. The company held its annual general meeting in London on 17 December 1913. The meeting decided to place the management of the Great Cobar operations in the hands of Bewick, Moreing, and Co., a firm of consulting
mining engineers and mine managers. It recognised that there had been a woefully inadequate allowance for depreciation—insufficient even to cover the write-off of the old Syndicate plant— but did not call a halt to the loss-making operations, which were burdened by the crippling interest payments to debenture holders. On 30 December 1913, an informal meeting of shareholders, highly critical of the board's actions, was held. A report of the meeting stated, "
In regard to finance, the directors had not shown themselves any more expert than they had in dealing with the machinery. The initial mistake was over capitalisation The purchase consideration amounted to over £1,000,000 talking in round figures and the preliminary expenses to £160,000 leaving only about £114,746 working capital which was far too small and the company had been suffering in consequence, Why was so high a price paid for this property? The prospectus showed that the vendor bought it for £800,000 and sold it to the company for £1,006,000 and for finding subscriptions for shares and debentures to a total of £1,000 000 he received a commission of £140,000 of which £50,000 was paid in cash. Thus £350,000 of water was introduced into the capital. For this there were no assets on the other side of the accounts." Two of the dissident shareholders stood for election to the board of directors, but were defeated by incumbent directors in a ballot. Supplying low-grade 'basic' ore from C.S.A. to the Great Cobar was one justification for a new branch railway to the C.S.A. mine, In the end, the precise reasons did not matter; the financial bottom line did. An ominous sign was the price of the debentures: by the end of 1913, only £55 for a £100 debenture face value, Work continued on essential tasks, such as filling mined-out stopes with mullock, to stabilize them. The receiver in London authorised this work to begin, during May 1914, and an electrically powered conveyor was installed to move the mullock to the mullocking shaft. During this work, there was another fatality. In June 1914, Arthur Henwood's lifeless body emerged from a mullock pass, but how it came to be there was not known. An inquest determined that he died from suffocation. At the beginning of August 1914, the filling work had largely been completed when a cable arrived from London, resulting in 160 of the remaining workers being laid off. Initially, around 60 men were kept on to complete the remaining work. The events in Europe leading to the outbreak of the First World War, paradoxically, had caused a fall in the price of copper. The pumps were kept running until 6 September 1915, when pumping stopped for the first time in 24 years. The engine drivers agreed to work for nothing for another fortnight, to prevent the mine from filling. During that time, it was hoped that the
NSW Government would provide a loan to assist the receiver in reopening the mine. The Premier,
William Holman, announced, in early November 1915, that the government would provide the loan, clearing the last obstacle for a recommencement of operations. == Operations during receivership (1915–1919) ==