English football – pictured playing for
Liverpool during the
2006–07 season – played in a number of midfield roles throughout his career, including that of a playmaker. Classical number 10 and deep-lying playmakers are not often renowned for their tackling or defensive capabilities, hence English commentators have often seen them as a luxury in a football team, but they retain their places due to their ability to change games. Because of this, it became common in the past for
box-to-box midfielders with good vision, tackling, tactical intelligence, passing and technical ability to play in the playmaker role in England, as shown by various coaches employing players such as Paul Scholes,
Steven Gerrard,
Frank Lampard,
Yaya Touré and Xabi Alonso in this position. In a 4–4–2 formation, a playmaker will usually play alongside a defensive midfield player to ensure that the team is not vulnerable to attack. With different formations, however, a team may play with multiple playmakers. Most English teams usually use only one playmaker to minimize defensive frailties and also because using more than one may inhibit each playmaker's playing style. The downside to this approach is that a team lacks the necessary creativity when faced with a defensive opponent. Some contemporary teams using formations such as 4–2–3–1, 4–4–1–1, 4–5–1, and 4–1–2–1–2/4–3–1–2, have multiple playmakers. Some examples of the few notable English players in this position are
Paul Gascoigne and
Glenn Hoddle, while most playmakers have tended to be foreigners in the Premier League.
Italian football Carlo Mazzone and
Carlo Ancelotti were known for having been able to adopt their formations to allow them to implement various playmakers into their starting formation. At
Brescia, Mazzone moved Andrea Pirlo, originally an attacking midfielder, into the deep-lying role behind the midfield, whilst Roberto Baggio played the attacking midfielder role. Due to the strength of Milan's midfield during his tenure with the club, Ancelotti was able to win several domestic and international titles.
Marcello Lippi also utilised two playmakers during Italy's victorious
2006 FIFA World Cup campaign, fielding Francesco Totti in the advanced creative role behind the forwards, and Pirlo in the deep-lying playmaking role. The two playmakers were supported defensively by box-to-box midfielders, such as Daniele De Rossi, Gennaro Gattuso and
Simone Perrotta; both Pirlo and Totti finished as two of the joint top-assist providers of the tournament. spent his entire career with
Roma, also serving as the team's
captain. Former Italy manager
Ferruccio Valcareggi, however, devised a different strategy altogether, which allowed him to use two playmakers during his run to the
1970 World Cup final, where Italy was ultimately heavily defeated by
Brazil. Due to his focus on defensive stability, as well as the presence of two pure, prolific goalscoring strikers,
Gigi Riva and
Roberto Boninsegna, Valcareggi felt that it would not be possible to field Italy's two most revered advanced playmakers at the time,
Gianni Rivera, and
Sandro Mazzola, alongside each other. He believed the two creative players to be incompatible with each other, due to the
rivalry between their respective clubs, and as he felt that deploying both players alongside the forwards would offset the balance within the starting line-up, in particular as Rivera, unlike Mazzola, was not renowned for his athleticism or defensive work-rate. He therefore conceived the infamous "staffetta" (
relay) game-plan, which essentially consisted of Mazzola playing the first half of each match, whilst Rivera would play the second half; during Valcareggi's eight-year tenure with Italy, the national side only lost six matches. Despite Italy's victory at
UEFA Euro 1968 and their second-place finish at the
1970 World Cup, the tactic was widely criticised by the media, in particular due to Italy's poor performance during the group-stage and in the final, despite demonstrating their ability to successfully apply a more offensive, exciting style of play with Rivera in the
semi-final against
West Germany. During the
1998 World Cup, Italy manager
Cesare Maldini underwent similar widespread media criticism for employing a strategy reminiscent of the 1970 "staffetta" between Roberto Baggio and
Alessandro Del Piero, who alternated occupying the creative second striker role, alongside an out-and-out striker or centre-forward (usually
Christian Vieri or occasionally
Filippo Inzaghi) in a 4–4–2 formation; manager
Giovanni Trapattoni was also initially criticised for not fielding playmakers Francesco Totti and Del Piero alongside each other during the
2002 World Cup. (left) playing for Italy alongside
Gianni Rivera (right); the two playmakers would be involved in manager
Ferruccio Valcareggi's infamous
staffetta policy at the
1970 World Cup. During his run to the
Euro 2012 final and the
2013 FIFA Confederations Cup semi-finals, the former Italy coach
Cesare Prandelli also used several playmakers in his squad; he often deployed either
Riccardo Montolivo,
Alberto Aquilani, Daniele De Rossi,
Antonio Nocerino or
Thiago Motta in the false 10 playmaking role, as well as in other midfield positions, in his 4–3–1–2 formation; this formation was devoid of an authentic attacking midfielder, and was centred on the midfielders constantly switching positions. Prandelli's midfield was focussed on the creative playmaking of Andrea Pirlo and Montolivo in their deep-lying playmaker and false attacking midfield roles, with Pirlo seemingly being deployed as a defensive midfielder in front of the defense, in order to be left with more time on the ball, in an "inverted" midfield diamond (4–1–3–2). Pirlo was supported defensively by dynamic box-to-box midfielders, such as
Claudio Marchisio and De Rossi, due to his lack of pace or notable defensive ability. The space created by the movement of Montolivo as the false 10 allowed quicker, more offensive minded midfielders, such as Marchisio, to make attacking runs in order to receive Pirlo and Montolivo's long passes from the midfield, whilst the second striker
Antonio Cassano would drop out wide onto the wing or into the attacking midfielder position to link up the play between the attack and midfield. As well as functioning as a playmaker, and creating space, in the false 10 role, Montolivo was also able to alleviate the pressure placed upon Pirlo in the deep lying playmaker role, by supporting him defensively and providing Pirlo and the team with a secondary creative option. creative playmakers played a fundamental part in
Inter Milan's success during this period. Herrera and former Grande Inter players, including Mazzola and Facchetti, would state that they felt the Grande Inter side to be more offensive than it was often made out to be, and that imitators of Herrera's catenaccio tactics had often replicated his pragmatic style of football imperfectly.
Luis Suárez (formerly an offensive playmaker who had first flourished under Herrera's more fluid, offensive tactics at Barcelona) was the primary creative force of Herrera's Inter side, functioning as a deep-lying playmaker, due to his ball skills, vision and passing range.
Sandro Mazzola, in the role of a winger, attacking midfielder, inside-right or supporting striker, and
Armando Picchi in the Libero or
sweeper position, would also function as secondary playmakers at times, as well as left-winger
Mario Corso. Aside from the strength of the almost impenetrable defence, some of the key elements of Herrera's Inter side were the use of vertical football and very quick, efficient and spectacular
counter-attacks, which would lead to goals being scored with very few touches and passes. This was made possible due to Herrera's use of very quick, energetic, offensive, two-way full-backs to launch counter-attacks, such as
Giacinto Facchetti, and
Tarcisio Burgnich. Under Herrera, most frequently during away matches in Europe, the highly organised and disciplined Inter players would usually defend by sitting patiently behind the ball, often leading to very closely contested victories. Upon winning back possession, Picchi, usually a traditional and defensive minded sweeper, would often advance into the midfield, and occasionally play long balls to the forwards, or, more frequently, carry the ball and play it towards Luis Suárez, whose playmaking ability played a crucial role in Inter's adeptness at counter-attacking football. Due to Suárez's outstanding vision and passing ability, he could quickly launch the forwards or full-backs on counter-attacks with quick long passes once he had received the ball, usually allowing the fullbacks to advance towards goal and score, or to help create goal-scoring chances.
Spanish football playing for
Barcelona in 2012 During his highly successful spell as the head coach of
Barcelona, Pep Guardiola was able to incorporate several skillful players with playmaker qualities into his team, such as Xavi,
Andrés Iniesta,
Sergio Busquets, Cesc Fàbregas and Lionel Messi, through the use of his personal variation on
tiki-taka tactics, allowing the team to move the ball around, switch positions, create space by making attacking runs, and retain possession. His use of heavy pressing in his 4–3–3 formation gave each player defensive responsibilities when possession was lost. Guardiola also frequently deployed Messi in the false-9 role, which was particularly effective due to the frequency of attacking runs made by the Barcelona players, as well as their disciplined positioning, team-work, vision, technical skills, creativity, and passing ability, which allowed Messi to create and score several goals. Vicente del Bosque also incorporated similar tactics (such as the use of
tiki-taka, heavy pressing and the false-9 in a 4–3–3 or 4–6–0 formation) during his successful run of reaching three consecutive international finals as Spain's manager, between
2010 and
2013, winning the
2010 World Cup and
UEFA Euro 2012. His tactics allowed several playmaking midfielders, such as Xabi Alonso, Sergio Busquets, Xavi, Andrés Iniesta,
David Silva,
Juan Mata and Cesc Fàbregas, to function together effectively. ==See also==