As Saxe considered his infantry inferior to their opponents, he placed them behind
defensive works and fortified the villages. The French line ran along the crest of a plateau, the right flank resting on the Scheldt, the left stationed behind the
Bois de Barry, with the ''Redoubt d'Eu
and Redoubt de Chambonas
covering the gap between the wood and their centre in the village of Fontenoy. From there, the Chemin de Mons'' sloped down to the
hamlets of Vezon and Bourgeon below, exposing any frontal attack to prolonged fire from three sides. The Allies made contact with the French outposts on the evening of 9 May, but a hasty reconnaissance by Cumberland and his staff failed to spot the ''Redoubt d'Eu''. On 10 May, British and Hanoverian cavalry under
James Campbell pushed the French out of Vezon and Bourgeon. Campbell's deputy, the
Earl of Crawford, then recommended that infantry be sent to clear the
Bois de Barry, while the cavalry swung around it to outflank the French left. Unfortunately, this plan was abandoned when Dutch hussars reconnoitring the route were fired on by French troops in the wood and withdrew. The attack was postponed until the following day, both armies camping overnight on their positions. At 4:00 a.m. on 11 May, the Allies formed up, British and Hanoverians on the right and centre, Dutch on the left, with the Austrians in reserve. The Dutch were ordered to take Fontenoy and Antoing, while a brigade under
Richard Ingoldsby captured the
Redoubt de Chambonas, and cleared the
Bois de Barry. Once both flanks were engaged, massed Allied infantry in the centre under Ligonier would advance up the slope, and dislodge the main French army. As soon as it was light, the Allied artillery opened fire on Fontenoy, but the bombardment had little effect on the dug-in French infantry. Because Cumberland had badly under-estimated French numbers, he assumed their main force was in the centre, and failed to appreciate the strength of the flanking positions. This meant the true strength of the French left only became apparent when at 6 a.m. Ingoldsby ran into the ''Redoubt d'Eu
. He requested artillery support, and the advance halted while his men skirmished in the woods with light troops known as Harquebusiers de Grassins''. Although these probably numbered less than 900, Ingoldsby was uncertain of their strength and advanced with extreme caution. This was understandable given the earlier failure to detect the redoubt, but delayed the main attack. and the
1st Regiment of Foot Guards invite each other to fire first Ingoldsby's brigade was irresolutely handled and halted time after time; and after waiting as long as possible, Campbell's cavalry moved forward and spread out across the plain, immediately becoming an excellent target of the French cannonade that killed its commander and drove it back. Growing impatient, at 7:00 a.m., Cumberland ordered Ingoldsby to abandon his assault on the ''Redoubt d'Eu
and join the main column, although he failed to inform Ligonier. As the Dutch advanced on Fontenoy, they were fired on by French troops in the nearby walled cemetery and fell back with heavy losses. At 9:00 a.m., Ligonier sent an aide instructing Ingoldsby to attack the Redoubt d'Eu'' immediately and was apparently horrified when Ingoldsby shared his change of orders. At 10:30 a.m., the Dutch assaulted Fontenoy again, supported by the
42nd Foot; after some initial success, they were forced to retreat, and at 12:30 p.m., Cumberland ordered the central column forward. Thought to comprise some 15,000 infantry, the column advanced up the slope led by Cumberland and Ligonier, and despite heavy casualties reached the French position still in formation. After halting to dress their lines, the Guards in the first rank allegedly invited the
Gardes Françaises to open fire. First reported by
Voltaire in 1768, there is some doubt as to the reliability of this anecdote, but the opening
volley was considered so important that commanders often preferred their opponents to go first, particularly if their own troops were well disciplined and thus able to absorb it without losing cohesion. Thus goaded, the
Gardes fired prematurely, greatly reducing the impact of their first volley. That of the British killed or wounded 700 to 800 men, and the French front line broke up in confusion. Many of their reserves had been transferred to meet the Dutch attack on Fontenoy, and the Allies now advanced into this gap. Seeing this,
Noailles, who was observing the fighting from a position near
Notre Dame de Bois along with Louis XV and
his son, implored the king to seek safety. However, Saxe assured Louis the battle was not lost, while
Löwendal ordered a series of cavalry attacks, which although poorly co-ordinated forced the Allies back. Isolated in the middle of the column, Cumberland had lost control of the main battle and made no attempt to relieve pressure on the Allied centre by ordering fresh attacks on Fontenoy or the ''Redoubt d'Eu
. Under fire from both flanks and in front, the column formed itself into a hollow, three sided square, reducing their firepower advantage. Their cavalry charges gave the French infantry time to reform, and at 14:00 Saxe brought up his remaining artillery, which began firing into the Allied square at close range. This was followed by a general assault, with the d'Aubeterre,
du Roi,
Royal and de la Couronne attacking from the right, the Irish Brigade, des Vaisseaux,
Normandie, d'Eu
and two battalions of the Gardes françaises'' from the left. '' by
Horace Vernet, 1828. Captured British colours are being presented to
Louis XV and his son, the
Dauphin The assault incurred heavy casualties, the
Aubeterre regiment losing 328 wounded or killed, the four battalions of the
Régiment Royal a total of 675, and the Irish Brigade 656. Despite this, Saxe and Löwendal led the
Gardes Françaises in a second attack, while D'Estrées and Richelieu brought up the elite
Maison du roi cavalry, forcing the column back with heavy losses. The Hanoverian
Böselager regiment suffered 377 casualties, the largest of any single Allied unit, the
23rd Foot lost 322, and the three Guards regiments over 700 in total. Despite this, discipline and training allowed the Allied infantry to make an orderly withdrawal, the rearguard halting at intervals to fire on their pursuers. On reaching Vezon, the cavalry provided cover as they moved into columns of march, before withdrawing to
Ath, largely undisturbed by the French. The decision was opposed by Waldeck and other Dutch officers, who were reluctant to abandon their garrison in Tournai; one of them later wrote that "We were repulsed without being [defeated but ...] our hasty retreat makes us look beaten ...[while] we have left [much] baggage and many wounded". Next day, French cavalry captured 2,000 wounded Allied soldiers at Leuze, along with forty-four guns. ==Aftermath==