The naval
operations of this war were entangled with the
War of Jenkins' Ear, which broke out in 1739 in consequence of the long disputes between Britain and Spain over their conflicting claims in America. The war was remarkable for the prominence of privateering on both sides. It was carried on by the Spaniards in the West Indies with great success, and actively at home. The French were no less active in all seas. Mahé de la Bourdonnais's attack on Madras partook largely of the nature of a privateering venture. The British retaliated with vigour. The total number of captures by French and Spanish
corsairs was in all probability larger than the list of British—as the French wit
Voltaire drolly put it upon hearing his government's boast, namely, that more British merchants were taken because there were many more British merchant ships to take; but partly also because the British government had not yet begun to enforce the use of
convoy so strictly as it did in later times.
West Indies Edward Vernon War on Spain was declared by Great Britain on 23 October 1739, which has become known as the
War of Jenkins' Ear. A plan was laid for combined operations against the Spanish colonies from east and west. One force, military and naval, was to assault them from the
West Indies under Admiral
Edward Vernon. Another, to be commanded by Commodore
George Anson, afterwards Lord Anson, was to round
Cape Horn and to fall upon the Pacific coast of Latin America. Delays, bad preparations,
dockyard corruption, and the squabbles of the naval and military officers concerned caused the failure of a hopeful scheme. On 21 November 1739, Admiral Vernon did, however, succeed in capturing the ill-defended Spanish harbour of
Porto Bello in present-day
Panama. When Vernon had been joined by Sir
Chaloner Ogle with massive naval reinforcements and a strong body of troops, an attack was made on
Cartagena de Indias in what is now
Colombia (9 March24 April 1741). The delay had given the Spanish under
Sebastián de Eslava and
Blas de Lezo time to prepare. After two months of skilful defence by the Spanish, the British attack finally succumbed to a massive outbreak of disease and withdrew having suffered a dreadful loss of lives and ships. The war in the West Indies, after two other unsuccessful attacks had been made on Spanish territory, died down and did not revive until 1748. The expedition under Anson sailed late, was very ill-provided, and less strong than had been intended. It consisted of six ships and left Britain on 18 September 1740. Anson returned alone with his
flagship the
Centurion on 15 June 1744. The other vessels had either failed to round the Horn or had been lost. But Anson had harried the coast of
Chile and
Peru and had captured a Spanish galleon of immense value near the
Philippines, completing a
circumnavigation of the world. His cruise was a great feat of resolution and endurance. After the failure of the British invasions and a Spanish
counter invasion of
Georgia in 1742, belligerent naval actions in the Caribbean were left to the
privateers of both sides. Fearing great financial and economic losses should a
treasure fleet be captured, the Spanish reduced the risk by increasing the number of convoys, thereby reducing their value. They also increased the number of ports they visited and reduced the predictability of their voyages. In 1744, a British force of 300 men accompanied by two
privateers from
Saint Kitts successfully captured the French half of neighbouring
Saint Martin, occupying it until the 1748
Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. In late May 1745 two French royal frigates of 36 and 30 guns respectively under Commodore La Touché, plus three privateers in retaliation sailed from
Martinique to invade and capture the British colony of
Anguilla but were repelled with heavy loss in the
Battle of Anguilla. The last year of the war saw two significant actions in the Caribbean. A second British
assault on Santiago de Cuba which also ended in failure and a naval action which arose from an accidental encounter between two convoys. The
action unfolded in a confused way with each side at once anxious to cover its own trade and to intercept that of the other. Capture was rendered particularly desirable for the British by the fact that the Spanish homeward-bound fleet would be laden with
bullion from the American mines. The advantage lay with the British when one Spanish warship ran aground and another was captured but the British commander failed to capitalise and the Spanish fleet took shelter in
Havana.
Mediterranean drove off the British fleet under
Thomas Mathews near
Toulon in 1744. in 1745 While Anson was pursuing his
voyage round the world, Spain was mainly intent on the Italian policy of the king. A squadron (led by General Commander Rywick) was fitted out at
Cádiz to convey troops to Italy. It was watched by the British admiral
Nicholas Haddock. When the blockading squadron was forced off by want of provisions, the Spanish admiral Don
Juan José Navarro put to sea. He was followed, but when the British force came in sight of him Navarro had been joined by a French squadron under
Claude-Élisée de Court de La Bruyère (December 1741). The French admiral told Haddock that he would support the Spaniards if they were attacked and Haddock retired. France and Great Britain were not yet openly at war, but both were engaged in the struggle in Germany—Great Britain as the ally of the Queen of Hungary, Maria Theresa; France as the supporter of the Bavarian claimant of the empire. Navarro and de Court went on to
Toulon, where they remained until February 1744. A British fleet watched them, under the command of Admiral
Richard Lestock, until Sir
Thomas Mathews was sent out as commander-in-chief and as Minister to the Court of
Turin. Sporadic manifestations of hostility between the French and British took place in different seas, but avowed war did not begin until the French government issued its declaration of 30 March, to which Great Britain replied on 31 March. This formality had been preceded by
French preparations for the invasion of England, and by the
Battle of Toulon between the British and a Franco-Spanish fleet. On 11 February, a most confused battle was fought, in which the van and centre of the British fleet was engaged with the Spanish rear and centre of the allies. Lestock, who was on the worst possible terms with his superior, took no part in the action. Mathews fought with spirit but in a disorderly way, breaking the formation of his fleet, and showing no power of direction, while Navarro's smaller fleet retained cohesion and fought off the energetic but confused attacks of its larger enemy until the arrival of the French fleet forced the heavily damaged British fleet to withdraw. The Spanish fleet then sailed to Italy where it delivered a fresh army and supplies that had a decisive impact upon the war. The mismanagement of the British fleet in the battle, by arousing deep anger among the people, led to a drastic reform of the British navy.
Northern waters The French scheme to invade Britain was arranged in combination with the
Jacobite leaders, and soldiers were to be transported from
Dunkirk. In February 1744, a French fleet of twenty sail of the line entered the
English Channel under
Jacques Aymar, comte de Roquefeuil, before the British force under Admiral
John Norris was ready to oppose him. But the French force was ill-equipped, the admiral was nervous, his mind dwelt on all the misfortunes which might possibly happen, and the weather was bad. De Roquefeuil came up almost as far as
The Downs, where he learnt that Sir John Norris was at hand with twenty-five sail of the line, and thereupon precipitately retreated. The military expedition prepared at Dunkirk to cross under cover of De Roquefeuil's fleet naturally did not start. The utter weakness of the French at sea, due to long neglect of the fleet and the bankrupt state of the treasury, was shown during the Jacobite rising of 1745, when France made no attempt to profit by the distress of the British government. The Dutch, having by this time joined Great Britain, made a serious addition to the naval power opposed to France, though the Dutch Republic was compelled by the necessity for maintaining an army in Flanders to play a very subordinate part at sea. Not being stimulated by formidable attack, and having immediate interests both at home and in Germany, the British government was slow to make use of its latest naval strength. Spain, which could do nothing of an offensive character, was almost neglected. During 1745 the
New England expedition which took Louisburg (30 April16 June) was covered by a British naval force, but little else was accomplished by the naval efforts of any of the belligerents. In 1746, a British combined naval and military expedition to the coast of France—the first of a long series of similar ventures which in the end were derided as "breaking windows with guineas"—was carried out during August and October. The aim was the capture of the
French East India Company's dockyard at
Lorient, but it was not attained. '' by
Samuel Scott. The
Battle of Cape Finisterre, 1747 From 1747 until the close of the war in October 1748, the naval policy of the British government, without reaching a high level, was more energetic and coherent. A closer watch was kept on the French coast, and effectual means were taken to intercept communication between France and her American possessions. In the spring information was obtained that an important convoy for the East and West
Indies was to sail from
Lorient. The convoy was intercepted by Anson on 3 May, and in the
First Battle of Cape Finisterre, British admiral George Anson's fourteen ships of the line wiped out the French escort of six ships of the line and three armed Indiamen, although in the meantime the merchant ships escaped. On 14 October, another French convoy, protected by a strong squadron, was intercepted by a well-appointed and well-directed squadron of superior numbers—the squadrons were respectively eight French and fourteen British—in the
Bay of Biscay. In the
Second Battle of Cape Finisterre which followed, the French admiral,
Henri-François des Herbiers, Marquis de l'Estenduère, succeeded in covering the escape of most of the merchant ships, but
Hawke's British squadron took six of his warships. Most of the merchantmen were later intercepted and captured in the West Indies. This disaster convinced the French government of its helplessness at sea, and it made no further effort.
Indian Ocean In the East Indies, attacks on French commerce by a British squadron under
Curtis Barnett in 1745 led to the despatch of a French squadron commanded by
Mahé de la Bourdonnais. After
an inconclusive clash off
Negapatnam in July 1746,
Edward Peyton, Barnett's successor, withdrew to Bengal, leaving Bourdonnais unopposed on the
Coromandel Coast. He landed troops near
Madras and
besieged the port by land and sea, forcing it to surrender on 10 September 1746. In October the French squadron was devastated by a cyclone, losing four ships of the line and suffering heavy damage to four more, and the surviving ships withdrew. French land forces went on to make several attacks on the British settlement at
Cuddalore, but the eventual replacement of the negligent Peyton by
Thomas Griffin resulted in a return to British naval supremacy which put the French on the defensive. Despite the appearance of another French squadron, the arrival of large-scale British reinforcements under
Edward Boscawen (who considered but did not make an attack on
Île de France on the way) gave the British overwhelming dominance on land and sea, but
the ensuing siege of
Pondichéry organised by Boscawen was unsuccessful.
Military methods and technologies European warfare in the
early modern period was characterised by the widespread adoption of
firearms in combination with more traditional
bladed weapons. Eighteenth-century European armies were built around units of massed
infantry armed with
smoothbore flintlock muskets and
bayonets.
Cavalrymen were equipped with
sabres and
pistols or
carbines;
light cavalry were used principally for
reconnaissance,
screening and
tactical communications, while
heavy cavalry were used as
tactical reserves and deployed for
shock attacks. Smoothbore
artillery provided
fire support and played the leading role in
siege warfare. Strategic warfare in this period centred around control of key
fortifications positioned so as to command the surrounding regions and roads, with lengthy sieges a common feature of armed conflict. Decisive field battles were relatively rare, though they played a larger part in Frederick's theory of warfare than was typical among his contemporary rivals. The War of the Austrian Succession, like most European wars of the eighteenth century, was fought as a so-called
cabinet war in which disciplined
regular armies were equipped and supplied by the state to conduct warfare on behalf of the sovereign's interests. Occupied enemy territories were regularly taxed and extorted for funds, but large-scale atrocities against civilian populations were rare compared with conflicts in the previous century.
Military logistics was the decisive factor in many wars, as armies had grown too large to support themselves on prolonged campaigns by foraging and plunder alone. Military supplies were stored in centralised
magazines and distributed by
baggage trains that were highly vulnerable to enemy raids. Armies were generally unable to sustain combat operations during winter and normally established
winter quarters in the cold season, resuming their campaigns with the return of spring. ==Strength of armies, 1740==