In
economics, incentives are analyzed through the systems that determine how agents can be motivated to achieve outcomes desired by a principal. These schemes reinforce the link between work and reward. Incentives, however, can also produce unintended outcomes. Poorly designed systems may encourage "gaming" behavior, where individuals maximize rewards without meeting actual objectives. This is central to the
principal–agent problem, in which the goals of the principal (such as a government or company) diverge from those of the agent (such as employees). Misaligned incentives can lead to
moral hazard—where agents take risks without bearing full costs—or to
adverse selection, when asymmetric information causes inefficient or distorted outcomes.
Self-selection effects of incentives Because employees know more about their own skills, competitiveness, and risk attitudes than employers do, firms also design incentives to
recruit suitable workers. This is called the self-selection or sorting effect. For example, pay-for-performance schemes attract more productive, less risk-averse workers, while fixed wages appeal to more risk-averse individuals.
Misaligned incentives A misaligned incentive arises when the goals of different parties conflict. This can occur within firms, but also in government, healthcare, education, and environmental policy. For example, principals in a firm want agents to act in the firm's best interests, but employees may pursue different objectives. Because of
information asymmetry, principals often lack precise knowledge of how to motivate or evaluate agents. Compensation plans are therefore difficult to design. Principal–agent theory is often used to align incentives with employee effort in order to achieve efficient output. In this relationship, agents usually have informational advantages over principals. Moral hazard arises when principals cannot be sure that agents are exerting full effort, while adverse selection occurs when principals cannot determine which agents are best suited for tasks. Agents may shirk, leak information, misreport, or conceal abilities in order to reduce their workload or benefit competitors.
Tournament theory Tournament theory describes a framework of compensation based on an individual's position within a firm's hierarchy, Team-based incentives reward collective performance, fostering cooperation, trust, and cohesion. Studies find positive effects on efficiency, stability, pay, and company output.Team-based incentives, however, may be seen as unfair if unequal contributions receive equal rewards. Team-based incentives may also induce
free-riding. This happens, for example, if employees have to share team output so that each employee only gets a fraction of what he or she generates. Managers may mitigate this through sufficiently strong incentives, penalties, or
peer rating systems., or by relying on peer pressure or hiring intrinsically motivated employees. Free-riding also arises when team members'
responsibility diffuses because members cannot be jointly held accountable. In this case, declaring a single person responsible may help. Another study found that financial rewards improved test performance among US students, but not among students in China. These findings align with cross-cultural studies showing that
pay-for-performance is more common in
individualistic societies, such as the US and UK, than in
collectivist ones.
Potential issues in firms Ratchet effect Incentives can sometimes reduce productivity through the
ratchet effect. Firms may use an employee's initial output as a benchmark for future standards. Anticipating this, employees may withhold effort at the start or conceal their true capabilities, later increasing output strategically to gain rewards. This reduces efficiency in both firms and
planned economies.
Crowding-out effect Economists and psychologists have also studied the
crowding-out effect, in which extrinsic incentives undermine intrinsic motivation. Richard Titmuss's 1970 book
The Gift Relationship argued that monetary incentives disrupted social norms around voluntary contribution. Large incentives may temporarily offset this, but may also signal undesirable implications, reducing their effectiveness. Removing temporary incentives can also depress effort below baseline levels.
Pay variance conflicts Pay inequality within firms can also lower morale. Low-paid employees may reduce effort, disengage, or find it harder to cooperate with higher-paid colleagues, lowering overall productivity. Bonus-based systems may also reduce motivation if rewards fluctuate with company profits rather than effort. Firms sometimes offset this by using non-monetary rewards, such as promotions or extra vacation time, to maintain fairness and engagement. == Philanthropy and charity ==