Construction Division Groves was promoted to
major on 1 July 1940. Three weeks later, he became special assistant for construction to the
Quartermaster General, Major General
Edmund B. Gregory. The two men had known each other a long time, as Groves's father was a close friend of Gregory's. At this point, the US Army was about to embark on a national mobilization, and it was the task of the Construction Division of the
Quartermaster Corps to prepare the necessary accommodations and training facilities for the vast army that would be created. The enormous construction program had been dogged by bottlenecks, shortages, delays, spiralling costs, and poor living conditions at the construction sites. Newspapers began publishing accounts charging the Construction Division with incompetence, ineptitude, and inefficiency. On 12 November 1940, Gregory asked Groves to take over command of the
Fixed Fee Branch of the Construction Division as soon as his promotion to colonel came through. Groves assumed his new rank and duties on 14 November 1940. Groves later recalled: Groves instituted a series of reforms. He installed phone lines for the Supervising Construction Quartermasters, demanded weekly reports on progress, ordered that reimbursement vouchers be processed within a week, and sent expediters to sites reporting shortages. He ordered his contractors to hire whatever special equipment they needed and to pay premium prices if necessary to guarantee quick delivery. Instead of allowing construction of camps to proceed in whatever order the contractors saw fit, Groves laid down priorities for completion of camp facilities, so that the troops could begin moving in even while construction was still under way. On 19 August 1941, Groves was summoned to a meeting with the head of the Construction Division,
Brigadier General Brehon B. Somervell. In attendance were Captain Clarence Renshaw, one of Groves's assistants; Major
Hugh J. Casey, the chief of the Construction Division's Design and Engineering Section; and
George Bergstrom, a former president of the
American Institute of Architects. Casey and Bergstrom had designed an enormous office complex to house the
War Department's 40,000 staff together in one building, a five-story, five-sided structure, which would ultimately become
the Pentagon. The Pentagon had a total square footage of – twice that of the
Empire State Building – making it the largest office building in the world. The estimated cost was $35 million ($ with inflation In the end, the project cost some $63 million ($ with inflation Groves steadily overcame one crisis after another, dealing with strikes, shortages, competing priorities and engineers who were not up to their tasks. He worked six days a week in his office in Washington, D.C. During the week he would determine which project was in the greatest need of personal attention and pay it a visit on Sunday. Groves later recalled that he was "hoping to get to a war theater so I could find a little peace."
Manhattan Project .|alt=Columned facade of a building. The
Manhattan Engineer District (MED) was formally established by the Chief of Engineers, Major General
Eugene Reybold on 16 August 1942. The name was chosen by Groves and MED's district engineer, Colonel
James C. Marshall. Like other engineer districts, it was named after the city where its headquarters was located, at
270 Broadway. Unlike the others, it had no geographic boundaries, only a mission: to develop an
atomic bomb. Marshall had the authority of a division engineer head and reported directly to Reybold. Although Reybold was satisfied with the progress being made,
Vannevar Bush was less so. He felt that aggressive leadership was required, and suggested the appointment of a prestigious officer as overall project director. Somervell, now Chief of
Army Service Forces, recommended Groves. |alt=A man in shirt and tie and another wearing a suit stand behind a writing desk. On the wall behind is a map of the Pacific. Groves met with Major General
Wilhelm D. Styer in his office at the Pentagon to discuss the details. They agreed that in order to avoid suspicion, Groves would continue to supervise the Pentagon project. He would be promoted to brigadier general, as it was felt that the title "general" would hold more sway with the academic scientists working on the Manhattan Project. Groves therefore waited until his promotion came through on 23 September 1942 before assuming his new command so the scientists (in academia the prerogatives of rank were more important than in the Army) would think of him as a general rather than a promoted colonel. His orders placed him directly under Somervell rather than Reybold, with Marshall now answerable to Groves. In August 1943, the MED headquarters moved to
Oak Ridge, Tennessee, but the name of the district did not change. Construction accounted for roughly 90 percent of the Manhattan Project's total cost. The day after Groves took over, he and Marshall took a train to
Tennessee to inspect the site that Marshall had chosen for the proposed production plant at Oak Ridge. Groves was suitably impressed with the site, and steps were taken to
condemn the land. Protests, legal appeals, and congressional inquiries were to no avail. By mid-November
U.S. Marshals were tacking notices to vacate on farmhouse doors, and construction contractors were moving in. Meanwhile, Groves had met with
J. Robert Oppenheimer, a physicist at the
University of California, Berkeley, and discussed the creation of a laboratory where the bomb could be designed and tested. Groves was impressed with the breadth of Oppenheimer's knowledge. He had a long conversation on a train after a meeting in Chicago on October 15, when Groves invited Oppenheimer to join Marshall and Nichols on the
20th Century Limited train returning to New York. After dinner on the train they discussed the project while squeezed into Nichols's one-person roomette, and when Oppenheimer left the train at Buffalo, Nichols had no doubt that he should direct the new lab. Groves saw that Oppenheimer thoroughly understood the issues involved in setting up a laboratory in a remote area. These were features that Groves found lacking in other scientists, and he knew that broad knowledge would be vital in an interdisciplinary project that would involve not just
physics, but
chemistry,
metallurgy, ordnance, and
engineering. Groves also detected in Oppenheimer something that many others did not, an "overweening ambition" which Groves reckoned would supply the drive necessary to push the project to a successful conclusion. Groves became convinced that Oppenheimer was the best and only man to run the laboratory. Few agreed with him in 1942. Oppenheimer had little administrative experience and, unlike other potential candidates, no
Nobel Prize. There was also concern about whether Oppenheimer was a security risk, as many of his associates were
communists, including his brother
Frank Oppenheimer, his wife
Katherine Oppenheimer, and his girlfriend
Jean Tatlock. Oppenheimer's
Communist Party connections soon came to light, but Groves personally waived the security requirements and issued Oppenheimer a clearance on 20 July 1943. Groves's faith in Oppenheimer was ultimately justified. Oppenheimer's inspirational leadership fostered practical approaches to designing and building bombs. Asked years later why Groves chose him, Oppenheimer replied that the general "had a fatal weakness for good men."
Isidor Rabi considered the appointment "a real stroke of genius on the part of General Groves, who was not generally considered to be a genius ..." Groves went to
Donald M. Nelson, the chairman of the
War Production Board and, after threatening to take the matter to the President, obtained a AAA priority for the Manhattan project. It was agreed that the AA-3 priority would still be used where possible. The Combined Development Trust was established by the governments of the United Kingdom, United States and Canada in June 1944, with Groves as its chairman, to procure
uranium and
thorium ores on international markets. In 1944, the trust purchased of uranium oxide ore from companies
operating mines in the
Belgian Congo. In order to avoid briefing the
Treasury Secretary,
Henry Morgenthau Jr., on the project, a special account not subject to the usual auditing and controls was used to hold Trust monies. Between 1944 and the time he resigned from the Trust in 1947, Groves deposited a total of $37.5 million into the Trust's account. Worried by the heavy losses occurring during the
Battle of the Bulge, in late December 1944, President
Franklin D. Roosevelt requested atomic bombs be dropped on Germany during his only meeting with Groves during the war. Groves informed him the first workable bomb was six months away. site in September 1945. The white
overshoes were to prevent
fallout from sticking to the soles of their shoes.|alt=A man smiling in a suit in suit and one in a uniform chat around a pile of twisted metal. In 1943, the Manhattan District became responsible for collecting
military intelligence on Axis atomic research. Groves created
Operation Alsos, special intelligence teams that would follow in the wake of the advancing armies, rounding up enemy scientists and collecting what technical information and technology they could. Alsos teams ultimately operated in Italy, France and Germany. The security system resembled that of other engineer districts. The Manhattan District organized its own counterintelligence which gradually grew in size and scope, but strict security measures failed to prevent the Soviets from conducting a successful espionage program that stole some of its most important secrets. Groves met with
General Henry H. Arnold, the Chief of
U.S. Army Air Forces, in March 1944 to discuss the delivery of the finished bombs to their targets. Groves was hoping that the
Boeing B-29 Superfortress would be able to carry the finished bombs. The
509th Composite Group was duly activated on 17 December 1944 at
Wendover Army Air Field,
Utah, under the command of Colonel
Paul W. Tibbets. A joint Manhattan District – USAAF targeting committee was established to determine which cities in Japan should be targets. It recommended
Kokura,
Hiroshima,
Niigata, and
Kyoto. At this point,
Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson intervened, announcing that he would be making the targeting decision, and that he would not authorize the bombing of Kyoto. Groves attempted to get him to change his mind several times and Stimson refused every time. Kyoto had been the
capital of Japan for centuries, and was of great cultural and religious significance. In the end, Groves asked Arnold to remove Kyoto not just from the list of nuclear targets, but from targets for conventional bombing as well. Groves was promoted to temporary
major general on 9 March 1944. In recognition of his work on the project, the Belgian government made him a Commander of the
Order of the Crown and the British government made him an honorary
Companion of the Order of the Bath. == After the war ==