Israeli offensive Israel began planning for a military operation as early as six months before the conflict by collecting intelligence on potential targets. The IDF also engaged in a disinformation campaign to give Hamas a false sense of security and to take them by surprise. Defense minister
Ehud Barak stated that the offensive was the result of Israel's "patience running out" over the rocket attacks,
Air strikes preparing for
takeoff At 11:30 am on 27 December 2008, Israel launched the campaign titled Operation Cast Lead. It began with an opening wave of
airstrikes in which
F-16 fighter jets and
AH-64 Apache attack helicopters simultaneously struck 100 preplanned targets within a span of 220 seconds. There was a 95% success rate with zero misses in the opening attack according to the Israeli Air Force. An Israeli
UAV airstrike on the police headquarters of Gaza City killed 40 people, including several dozen police cadets at their graduation ceremony. Approximately 140 members of Hamas were killed, including
Tawfik Jaber, head of Gaza's police force. Another estimate puts the death toll of the police academy strike at 225 Hamas militants killed and 750 injured. Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni told reporters that Israel would strike all targets associated with what she called the "illegitimate, terrorist government of Hamas". police officers are, according to
B'Tselem, presumed to be civilians and likely not legitimate objects of attack under international humanitarian law. Human rights groups critically note that the attacks began around the time children were leaving school. The Israeli attack was the deadliest one-day death toll in 60 years of conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, a day that was called the "Massacre of Black Saturday" by Palestinians in Gaza. Hamas responded with a rocket barrage on Southern Israel, and Palestinian factions in the Gaza Strip kept Southern Israel under constant rocket fire during the entire war.
Beersheba suffered two rocket attacks, the farthest Palestinian rockets had ever reached. Palestinian rocket fire killed three Israeli civilians and one soldier in the early days of the conflict. In the weeks following the initial air raids
F-16Is and
AH-64 Apaches continued to target Hamas facilities while also inflicting severe damage to Palestinian infrastructure. Israel used the 2000-pound
Mark 84 Joint Direct Attack Munition to attack buildings and tunnels along the Gaza-Sinai border. The 500-pound variant was used against underground bunkers. Israeli aircraft also used synthetic aperture radar
targeting pods and high-resolution imaging pods. A study by the
Center for Strategic and International Studies points out that when possible, IAF executed strikes using the smallest precision-guided weapons, and coordinated air strikes and the use of artillery weapons using GPS, in a systematic effort to limit collateral damage. Several high-ranking Hamas commanders were killed, including
Nizar Rayan, Abu Zakaria al-Jamal, and Jamal Mamduch. Hamas leaders often died along with their families in their homes. According to a Hamas spokesperson and Rayyan's son, the IDF warned Rayan, by contacting his cell phone, that an attack on his house was imminent. Israel alleged that Hamas leaders hid in the basements of the Shifa Hospital complex in Gaza City in the
belief that they would be protected by human shields. , 12 January 2009 Among IDF's measures to reduce civilian casualties were the extensive use of leaflets and phone messages to warn Palestinians, including families in high-risk areas and families of Hamas personnel, to leave the area or to avoid potential targets. Israel used A-4 Skyhawks to deliver more than 2 million leaflets urging the population to evacuate. In a practice codenamed
roof knocking, the IDF issued warning calls before air strikes on civilian buildings. Typically, Israeli intelligence officers and
Shin Bet security servicemen contacted residents of a building in which they suspected storage of military assets and told them that they had 10–15 minutes to flee the attack. At several instances, the IDF has also used a sound bomb to warn civilians before striking homes. The air offensive continued throughout the ground invasion that followed, and as of 15 January Israeli forces had carried out 2,360 air strikes. No safe haven or bomb shelters existed, making this one of the rare conflicts where civilians had no place to flee.
Naval operations The
Israeli Navy attacked Hamas' rocket launchers and outposts, command and control centers, a Hamas patrol boat, and the office of Hamas Prime Minister
Ismail Haniyeh, using the
Typhoon Weapon System and
Surface to surface missiles. The navy coordinated with other Israeli forces and used powerful shipboard sensors to acquire and shell targets on land.
Shayetet 13 naval
commandos were also deployed to attack targets on land, and reportedly attacked an
Iranian ship loaded with arms for Hamas, which was docking in
Sudan. On 28 December, Naval vessels shelled the
Port of Gaza. An Israeli spokesman disputed this, and said the collision was caused by the
Dignity attempting to outmaneuver the patrol boats after disobeying Israeli orders to turn back. On 4 January the Israeli Navy extended its blockade of the Gaza Strip to 20 nautical miles. Throughout the war, the Israeli Navy employed
Sa'ar 4.5 class missile boats of
Shayetet 3 and
Super Dvora Mk III class patrol boats of the
Squadron 916.
Ground invasion On the evening of 3 January, Israel began the ground operation with a massive
artillery barrage all along the Gaza boundary, and ground forces were sent into Gaza for the first time since the start of the conflict. The ground invasion, termed the 'second stage' of Operation Cast Lead, sought to control open areas and encircle towns and refugee camps from which militants continued to launch rockets, but not penetrate densely populated areas. One Israeli commander said that booby traps were found in a mosque and one-third of the houses. He said that some of the traps were designed to assist in taking IDF soldiers captive. All such attempts failed. The IDF used
D9 armored bulldozers to ensure that paths were cleared of IEDs. These bulldozers were also used to destroy tunnels. The unmanned, remote-controlled version of the D9 (called Black Thunder) were also used. In one case an armored D9 knocked down a door, which triggered an explosion of a building full of explosive on top of the D9. The D9 survived the explosion and building's collapse.
Combat engineers that inspected the rubbles found a tunnel, cache of weapons and remains of a
suicide bomber. Viper miniature robots were deployed by Israeli forces for the first time. These were used for various tasks including the disabling of IEDs. Along with blocking mobile phone communication, the IDF employed electronic jamming equipment to disable remote operated explosives. Among others, The IDF used the new Bull Island system for the first time to identify booby traps in buildings. Bull Island uses a camera shaped like a tennis ball that can be thrown into a building to transfer 360-degree imagery to the troops outside of the structure. Israeli artillery units worked closely with battalion commanders. For the first time, the Sheder Ham digitized data, mapping, and command-and-control system linked the Artillery Corps into the Army's overall C4I network. Israeli ground troops entered Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza in the early hours of 4 January. Israeli forces reportedly bisected Gaza and surrounded
Gaza City. At least 25 Palestinian rockets were fired into Southern Israel, wounding a woman in
Sderot. On 5 January, IDF forces began operating in the densely populated urban centers of Gaza. Gun battles broke out between the IDF and Hamas on the streets of Gaza as the IDF surrounded the city. IDF combat units were sent in to capture Hamas fighters, and were met with grenades and mortar fire. The Israeli military said that 80–100 Hamas fighters were killed and 100 captured during heavy ground fighting. Some 40 rockets and mortar shells were fired at Israel, injuring four civilians. On 6 January, heavy fighting took place between Israeli troops and Palestinian militants on the outskirts of the northern district of Gaza City, while Israeli helicopter gunships pounded militant positions. The IDF reportedly widened its attacks to
Khan Yunis in southern Gaza, after heavy fighting on the edges of
Deir al-Balah in central Gaza. The attack was originally reported as being on the school. In northern Gaza City, Palestinian gunmen ambushed an Israeli patrol, killing one soldier and wounding four. The patrol returned fire, hitting some of the gunmen, while in
Jabalya, an Israeli tank fired a shell into an abandoned building as
Golani Brigade soldiers were taking cover in it, killing 3 soldiers and wounding 24. The casualties were extracted under the cover of heavy artillery fire and helicopters dropping illumination bombs. In a separate friendly fire incident, an Israeli officer was killed by a misdirected artillery shell. In all, at least 70 Palestinians and 5 Israelis were killed on 6 January. The attack was widely reported to have been conducted by Israeli aircraft, while the Israeli government hinted that it was behind the attack. Naval commandos from the elite
Shayetet 13 unit were reportedly involved in the operation, which included an attack on an Iranian arms ship docking in
Port Sudan.
Attack on Gaza City artillery shell exploding over Gaza City on the 11 January On 7 January, Israel carried out 40 airstrikes overnight. Dozens of other targets were attacked by aircraft and artillery during the day, and the Gaza-Egypt border was bombed after Israeli aircraft dropped leaflets onto
Rafah, urging the residents to leave. A total of 20 Palestinians were killed. A total of 20 rockets were fired into Southern Israel. Israeli troops shot and killed Hamas commander Amir Mansi and wounded two other Hamas fighters as they operated a mortar. On 11 January, the IDF started the third stage of the operation with an attack on the suburbs of
Gaza City. Israeli forces pushed into the south of the city and reached a key junction to its north. During their advance, Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters ambushed Israeli troops at several locations, and heavy fighting ensued, in which 40 Hamas and Islamic Jihad fighters were killed. Two Hamas fighters were killed by an Israeli airstrike in the Southern Gaza Strip. A Palestinian woman was also killed by Israeli artillery fire. Israeli forces continued to push deeper into heavily populated areas around Gaza City. Fierce clashes were reported in the Southern suburb of
Sheikh Ajleen. On 13 January, Israeli tanks continued their advance toward the headquarters of Hamas' preventive security building from the al-Karramah neighborhood in the northwest and the
Tel al-Hawa neighborhood in the northeast. The Israeli Army also said that 25 mortars and rockets were fired into Southern Israel. Before dawn, during the night, Israeli troops and tanks supported by artillery and helicopters advanced 300 metres into Tel al-Hawa, a neighborhood with several high-rise buildings, while Israeli gunboats shelled Hamas targets along the coast. As troops entered the narrow streets, heavy street fighting with militants ensued leaving three Israeli soldiers wounded and 30 Hamas militants dead or wounded, according to the IDF. By morning IDF soldiers were still advancing slowly towards the city center and several buildings were in flames in Tel al-Hawa, where most of the fighting took place. Five Israeli soldiers were wounded during clashes with militants, and an officer was severely wounded by an explosion inside a booby-trapped building. The push into the neighborhood was Israel's deepest incursion into Gaza City. There was widespread
desertion by members of the Qassam Brigades in the face of the IDF advance. The headquarters of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) was also shelled on 15 January. There were 3 people injured and tons of food and fuel intended for 750,000 Palestinian refugees were destroyed. The Associated Press initially reported that an anonymous Israeli military official stated that Gaza militants had fired anti-tank weapons and machine guns from inside the compound. Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert said "it is absolutely true that we were attacked from that place, but the consequences are very sad and we apologize for it, I don't think it should have happened and I'm very sorry." After UNRWA dismissed this as "nonsense", Israel ordered an army investigation into the incident. Israeli officials afterwards "came forward to say that preliminary results showed that the militants ran for safety inside the U.N. compound after firing on Israeli forces from outside". On 16 January, more than 50 Israeli airstrikes were carried out against militants, tunnels, and a mosque suspected of being used as a weapons store. Israeli forces continued their push into Gaza City, while
Israeli Navy vessels shelled militant targets in support. About 10 rockets were fired into Southern Israel. The Israeli government considered a third phase of the operation with the intent of dealing a "knock out blow" to Hamas. Military and intelligence assessments indicating that shifting the goal to destroying Hamas would require additional weeks of deep ground incursions into urban areas and refugee camps. This was expected to result in heavy casualties on both sides and among civilians, reduce the strong domestic support for the war, and increase international criticism.
Humanitarian ceasefires Due to the number of civilian casualties and the deteriorating humanitarian situation, Israel faced significant international pressure for a ceasefire, the establishment of a
humanitarian corridor, access to the population of Gaza and the lifting of the blockade. On 7 January, Israel opened a humanitarian corridor to allow the shipment of aid into Gaza. The Israeli army agreed to interrupt fighting for three hours and Hamas agreed not to launch rockets during the pause. Israel repeated the ceasefire either daily or every other day. Aid officials and the UN praised the truce, but said it was not enough as fighting usually resumed immediately following the humanitarian ceasefires. An independent report commissioned jointly by the Israeli NGO
Physicians for Human Rights and the Palestinian Medical Relief Society notes that according to testimonies by local witnesses, there were several cases where IDF ground forces breached the daily ceasefire agreement.
Palestinian paramilitary activity rockets from Gaza were fired from populated areas. Hamas said that "rockets fired from Gaza were meant to hit military targets, but because they are unguided, they hit civilians by mistake." Political representatives for Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP,
Saiqa, the
Popular Struggle Front, the
Revolutionary Communist Party,
Palestinian Liberation Organization,
Fatah's 'Intifada' faction, and a number of other Palestinian factions in
Syria formed a temporary alliance during the offensive as well. They issued a joint statement refusing "any security arrangements that affect the resistance and its legitimate right to struggle against the occupation", and refusing proposals suggesting international forces be sent to Gaza. The coalition also affirmed that any peace initiatives must include an end to the blockade, and an opening of all of Gaza's crossings, including the Rafah crossing with Egypt.
Preparation Hamas used the months leading to the war to prepare for urban warfare, which was to give them a chance to inflict casualties on the Israeli military. Militants booby-trapped houses and buildings and built an extensive system of tunnels in preparation for combat. A Hamas fighter reported that the group had prepared a tunnel network in Gaza city that would allow Hamas to engage the IDF in urban warfare. IDF commanders said that many Hamas members have dug tunnels for themselves under their homes and hid weapon caches in them. Some houses were booby-trapped with mannequins, explosives and adjacent tunnels: Israeli officers said that houses were set up this way so that "Israeli soldiers would shoot the mannequin, mistaking it for a man; an explosion would occur; and the soldiers would be driven or pulled into the hole, where they could be taken prisoner." A colonel estimated that one-third of all houses encountered were booby-trapped. Ron Ben-Yishai, an Israeli military correspondent embedded with invading ground forces, stated that entire blocks of houses were booby-trapped and wired in preparation for urban confrontation with the IDF. Israel said a map showing the deployment of explosives and Hamas forces in the al-Atatra neighborhood in northern Gaza was found. The map reportedly showed that Hamas placed many explosives and firing positions in residential areas, several mosques, and next to a gas station. Israel deployed the elite
Sayeret Yahalom combat engineering unit throughout the brigades with new equipment including miniature robots and improved wall-breaching munitions to counter the booby-traps. Hamas and Islamic Jihad also manufactured a variety of
improvised explosive devices (IEDs), some of which were anti-personnel bombs and others were planted on the sides of roads or underground to be activated against tanks and armored personnel carriers. According to
The Jerusalem Post, some of the IEDs were manufactured from medicine bottles transferred to the Gaza Strip as humanitarian aid by Israel. The same newspaper also reported that Hamas representatives said they were fighting with the aid of armored vehicles and weapons confiscated from the
Palestinian National Authority, given by Israel, the
United States and other countries. At least one Palestinian witness told an Italian reporter that on many roofs of the tall buildings that were hit by Israeli bombs, including UN building, there were rocket-launchers or Hamas look-outs. On 27 January, the Shin Bet released details given by Hamas captives, including the militants' use of mosques for weapon caches and military training. Militants admitted to the location of Hamas weapon storage sites, in tunnels, in the homes of activists, and in citrus groves and mosques, and told of theory instruction given in mosques as well. Following the visit of the British Army veteran Colonel
Tim Collins to the ruins of one of the mosques targeted by the IDF in Rafah, he said that in his view the evidencies of the secondary explosion, that could have indicated weapon's storage in the mosque, are present.
Palestinian rockets in Gaza According to
Human Rights Watch, On 24 December 2008, a rocket struck a bedroom of a family living in the
Tel al-Hawa area in southern Gaza City, critically wounding one man. The brother of this victim told after the incident no armed group came to apologize. "I was next door in my home when this all happened. When one of those responsible tried to bargain for the shrapnel, I said that if no one took responsibility I will go to the courts, so Hamas came to me privately and admitted it." On 26 December 2008, a Palestinian rocket struck north of
Beit Lahiya, a house was hit killing two cousins and wounding another. The grandfather described the rocket as about one meter in length; according to Human Rights Watch examination the diameter of the pipe is 120 mm. The grandfather said the rocket was taken by Hamas policemen for investigation: "After he left, the war started and we never heard from him again. We got the compensation given to all victims of the war." According to
Human Rights Watch rockets from Gaza were fired from populated areas, an Islamic Jihad fighter said: "the most important thing is achieving our military goals.... We stay away from the houses if we can, but that's often impossible." According to BBC, Palestinian groups had been firing "in response to Israeli massacres". The strike range of Hamas rockets had increased from 16 km (9.9 mi) to 40 km (25 mi) since early 2008 with the use of improved
Qassam and
factory-made rockets. Rockets reached major Israeli cities
Ashdod,
Beersheba and
Gedera for the first time, putting one-eighth of Israel's population in rocket range. On 3 January 2009
Ma'an News Agency reported: "The Al-Qassam Brigades, military wing of Hamas, said that after a week since the start of the 'Battle of Al-Furqan [the criterion]' it has managed to fire 302 rockets, at an average of 44 rockets daily." A source close to Hamas described the movement's use of stealth when firing: "They fired rockets in between the houses and covered the alleys with sheets so they could set the rockets up in five minutes without the planes seeing them. The moment they fired, they escaped, and they are very quick." It is reported that 102 rockets and 35 mortars were fired by Fatah, Hamas' chief rival. Besides the rockets fired by the
Qassam Brigades of Hamas, other factions claimed responsibility for rockets fired into Israel and attacks on Israeli soldiers, including Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades (affiliated with
Fatah), the Abu Ali Mustapha Brigades, the Quds Brigades and the
Popular Resistance Councils. Bersheeba and Gedera were the farthest areas hit by rocket or mortars. Senior Hamas official Mahmoud al-Zahar stated during the operation "they [Israeli forces] shelled everyone in Gaza.... They shelled children and hospitals and mosques, ... and in doing so, they gave us legitimacy to strike them in the same way."
Human Rights Watch noted in the open letter to
Ismail Haniyeh that despite his Foreign Ministry stance as part of response to the
Goldstone Report, Palestinian armed groups remain responsible for firing rockets indiscriminately or deliberately at Israeli civilian objects. HRW also noted that Palestinian militants put Palestinian civilians at risk of Israeli counter-attacks by launching rockets from populated areas. The UN fact finding mission stated that the firing of rockets at Israel constituted a deliberate attack against the civilian population and was in violation of international law. Besides being hit with rockets fired from Gaza, Israel experienced other attacks along the borders with Lebanon and Syria. ==Unilateral ceasefires==