Normative ethics is a field in Moral Philosophy that investigates how one
ought to act. What is morally right and wrong, and how moral standards are determined. Superficially, this approach may seem intrinsically anthropocentric. However, theoretical frameworks from traditional normative ethical theories are abundant within contemporary environmental ethics.
Consequentialism Consequentialist theories focus on the consequences of actions, this emphasizes not what is 'right', but rather what is of 'value' and 'good'.
Act Utilitarianism, for example, expands this formulation to emphasize that what makes an action right is whether it maximises well-being and reduces pain. Thus, actions that result in greater well-being are considered obligatory and permissible. It has been noted that this is an 'instrumentalist' position towards the environment, and as such not fully adequate to the delicate demands of ecological diversity.
Rule-utilitarianism is the view that following certain rules without exception is the surest way to bring about the best consequences. This is an important update to act-utilitarianism because agents do not need to judge about the likely consequences of each act; all they must do is determine whether or not a proposed course of action falls under a specific rule and, if it does, act as the rule specifies.
Aldo Leopold's
Land Ethic (1949) tries to avoid this type of instrumentalism by proposing a more holistic approach to the relationship between humans and their 'biotic community', Thus, the use of natural resources is permissible as long as it does not disrupt the stability of the ecosystem. Some philosophers have categorised Leopold's views to be within a consequentialist framework, however it is disputed whether this was intentional. Other consequentialist views such as that of
Peter Singer tend to emphasise the inclusion of non-human sentient beings into ethical considerations. This view argues that all sentient creates which are by nature able to feel pleasure and pain, are of equal moral consideration for their intrinsic value. Nevertheless, non-sentient beings, such as plants, rivers and ecosystems, are considered to be merely instrumental. In the "Handbook of the Philosophy of Climate Change," Mattia Cecchinato of the University of Oxford wrote about the current issues of consequentialist thought in the environmental field, with a significant focus on what he calls the "No Difference Problem." This is the idea that, due to the fact that a single person's choices do not impact the climate enough to have any meaningful increase or decrease of well-being, following act-utilitarianism would not lead to changing ones actions revolving the climate. There is no reason to, say, take eat a vegan burger instead of a beef burger under act-consequentialism, even though, as Cecchinato stresses, a large amount of people doing this would positively impact the environment. This is compounded even further by the idea of "indirect emissions," flying on a plane for example. The idea is that the plane is going to fly regardless of passenger x's decision to fly or not, so passenger x has no obligation under act-utilitarianism not to fly. There are a multitude of consequentialist responses to this issue, some such as
Shelly Kagan argue that as there are environmental "tipping points," each little action could be the one to send us over the tipping point and massively harm the environment, so one would have a moral obligation not to do the little action. Other consequentialist responses include the idea of a "knock-on" effect, where ones individual action may not impact the environment much alone, but could cause someone else to do the same thing, and this chain goes until there is an actual major impact. There is also "virtue consequentialism," defended by philosopher
Dale Jamieson, which claims that a virtuous person is also one who has cultivated the character traits which promote the most net good. Under this kind of consequentialism, one who is virtuous would care for the environment and this care for the environment would include not doing harm to it. This idea also falters under the no difference problem, as if flying doesn't cause harm to the environment directly, would it be a vicious act to fly?
Deontology Deontological theories state that an action should be based on duties or obligations to what is
right, instead of what is
good. In strong contrast to consequentialism, this view argues for principles of duty based not on a function of value, but on reasons that make no substantive reference to the consequences of an action. Something of
intrinsic value, then, has to be protected not because its goodness would maximise a wider good, but because it is valuable in itself; not as a means towards something, but as an end in itself. Thus, if the natural environment is categorised as intrinsically valuable, any destruction or damage to such would be considered wrong as a whole rather than merely due to a calculated loss of net value. It can be said that this approach is more holistic in principle than one of consequentialist nature, as it fits more adequately with the delicate balance of large ecosystems. Theories of rights, for example, are generally deontological. That is, within this framework an environmental policy that gives rights to non-human sentient beings, would prioritise the conservation of such in their natural state, rather than in an artificial manner. Consider for example, issues in
climate engineering;
Ocean fertilisation aims to expand marine algae in order to remove higher levels of CO2. A complication from this approach is that it creates salient disruptions to local ecosystems. Furthermore, an environmental ethical theory based on the rights of marine animals in those ecosystems, would create a protection against this type of intervention. Environmental deontologists such as
Paul W. Taylor, for example, have argued for a
Kantian approach to issues of this kind. Taylor argues that all living things are 'teleological centres of life' deserving of rights and respect. His view uses a concept of '
universalizability', to argue that one ought to act only on actions which could be rationally willed as a universal law.
Val Plumwood has criticised this approach by noting that the universalisation framework, is not necessarily based on 'respect' for the other, as it's based on duty and 'becoming' part of the environment. The preeminent deontologist in contemporary environmental ethics is
Christine Korsgaard. Her 2018 book "Fellow Creatures: Our Obligations to the Other Animals" uses Kantian deontology to advocate for the idea that animals have
intrinsic value. She claims that as we should be viewed as ends in ourselves, we should also view sentient animals as ends in themselves.
Virtue ethics Virtue ethics states that some character traits should be cultivated, and others avoided. This framework avoids problems of defining what is of intrinsic value, by instead arguing that what is important is to act in accordance with the correct character trait. The
Golden mean formulation, for example, states that to be 'generous' (virtue), one should neither be miserly (deficiency) or extravagant (excess). Unlike
deontology and
consequentialism, theories of virtue focus their formulations on how the individual has to act to live a
flourishing life. This presents a 'subjective flexibility,' which seems like an adequate position to hold considering the fluctuating demands of sustainability. However, as a consequence, it can also be said that this is an inherently
anthropocentric standpoint. This anthropocentrism has been refuted by philosophers who claim to be "environmental virtue ethicists," such as Philip Cafaro. For him, it does not work simply to ascribe a human-centered virtue ethic to the environment, but instead we need to build care for the environment into our existing
normative concepts. Environmental virtue ethics has also been claimed to solve the problem of inconsequentialism, or the idea that an individuals actions very rarely has an actual impact on climate change. Furthermore, what traits would be considered as part of environmental
vices? Ronald Sandler argues that detrimental dispositions to human flourishing such as 'greed', 'intemperance' and 'arrogance', lead to detrimental dispositions to the protection of the environment such as 'apathy', against other species, and 'pessimism' about conservation. Views such as this, create a
mutualistic connection between virtuous human flourishing and environmental flourishing. == Anthropocentrism ==