Origins The F-22 originated from the
Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) program that the U.S. Air Force (USAF) initiated in 1981 to replace the
F-15 Eagle and
F-16 Fighting Falcon. Intelligence reports indicated that their effectiveness would be eroded by emerging worldwide threats emanating from the
Soviet Union, including new developments in surface-to-air missile systems for integrated air defense networks, the introduction of the
Beriev A-50 "Mainstay" airborne warning and control system (AWACS), and the proliferation of the
Sukhoi Su-27 "Flanker" and
Mikoyan MiG-29 "Fulcrum" class of fighter aircraft. Code-named "
Senior Sky", the ATF would become an air superiority fighter program influenced by these threats; in the potential scenario of a Soviet and
Warsaw Pact invasion in
Central Europe, the ATF was envisaged to support the
air-land battle by spearheading
offensive and defensive counter-air operations (OCA/DCA) in this highly contested environment that would then enable following echelons of NATO strike and attack aircraft to perform
air interdiction against ground formations; to do so, the ATF would make an ambitious leap in capability and survivability by taking advantage of the new technologies in fighter design on the horizon, including
composite materials, lightweight
alloys, advanced flight control systems and avionics, more powerful propulsion systems for supersonic cruise (or
supercruise) around Mach 1.5, and stealth technology for low observability. The USAF published an ATF
request for information (RFI) to the aerospace industry in May 1981, and following a period of concept and specification development, the ATF System Program Office (SPO) issued the demonstration and validation (Dem/Val)
request for proposals (RFP) in September 1985, with requirements placing strong emphasis on stealth, supersonic cruise and maneuver. The RFP saw some alterations after its initial release, including more stringent signature reduction requirements in December 1985 and the addition of the requirement for flying technology demonstrator prototypes in May 1986. Owing to the immense investments required to develop the advanced technologies, teaming among companies was encouraged. Of the seven bidding companies,
Lockheed and
Northrop were selected on 31 October 1986 as Dem/Val finalists. Lockheed, through its
Skunk Works division at
Burbank, California, teamed with
Boeing and
General Dynamics while Northrop teamed with
McDonnell Douglas. These two contractor teams undertook a 50-month Dem/Val phase to compete for ATF full-scale development, culminating in the flight test of two technology demonstrator prototypes, the
Lockheed YF-22 and
Northrop YF-23; while they represented competing designs, the prototypes were meant for demonstrating concept viability and risk mitigation rather than a competitive flyoff. Concurrently,
Pratt & Whitney and
General Electric competed for the ATF engines. Dem/Val was focused on
system engineering, technology development plans, and risk reduction over point aircraft designs; in fact, after down-select, the Lockheed team completely redesigned the airframe configuration in summer 1987 due to weight analysis, with notable changes including the
wing planform from swept trapezoidal to diamond-like delta and a reduction in forebody planform area. The team extensively used analytical and empirical methods including
computational fluid dynamics and
computer-aided design,
wind tunnel testing (18,000 hours for Dem/Val), and
radar cross-section (RCS) calculations and pole testing. Avionics were tested in ground prototypes and flying laboratories. During Dem/Val, the SPO used
trade studies from both teams to review the ATF system specifications and adjust or delete requirements that were significant weight and cost drivers while having marginal value. The short takeoff and landing (
STOL) requirement was relaxed to delete
thrust-reversers, saving substantial weight.
Side looking radars and the dedicated
infrared search and track (IRST) system were eventually removed as well, although space and cooling provisions were retained to allow for their later addition. The
ejection seat was downgraded from a fresh design to the existing
ACES II. Despite efforts by both teams to rein in weight, the takeoff gross weight estimates grew from , resulting in engine thrust requirement increasing from class. Each team built two prototype air vehicles for Dem/Val, one for each engine option. The YF-22 had its maiden flight on 29 September 1990 and, in testing, successfully demonstrated supercruise, high angle-of-attack maneuvers, and the firing of air-to-air missiles from internal weapons bays. After the flight test of the demonstrator prototypes at
Edwards Air Force Base, the teams submitted the results and their full-scale development design proposals – or Preferred System Concept – in December 1990; on 23 April 1991, the
Secretary of the USAF,
Donald Rice, announced the Lockheed team and Pratt & Whitney as the winners of the ATF and engine competitions. Both designs met or exceeded all performance requirements; the YF-23 was considered stealthier and faster, but the YF-22, with its thrust vectoring nozzles, was more maneuverable as well as less expensive and risky, having flown considerably more test sorties and hours than its counterpart. The press also speculated that the Lockheed team's design was more adaptable to the Navy Advanced Tactical Fighter (NATF) for replacing the
F-14 Tomcat, but by fiscal year (FY) 1992, the
U.S. Navy had abandoned NATF due to cost.
Full-scale development The program formally moved to full-scale development, or
Engineering & Manufacturing Development (EMD), in August 1991. The production F-22 design (internally designated Configuration 645) had also evolved to have notable differences from the YF-22, which was immature due to being frozen relatively soon after the complete redesign in the summer of 1987. While the overall layout was similar, the external geometry saw significant alterations; the wing's
leading edge sweep angle was decreased from 48° to 42°, while the vertical stabilizers were shifted rearward and decreased in area by 20%. The radome shape was changed for better radar performance, the wingtips were clipped for antennas, and the dedicated airbrake was eliminated. To improve pilot visibility and aerodynamics, the canopy was moved forward and the engine inlets moved rearward . The shapes of the fuselage, wing, and
stabilator trailing edges were refined to improve aerodynamics, strength, and stealth characteristics. The internal structural design was refined and reinforced, with the production airframe designed for a service life of 8,000 hours. The revised shaping was validated with over 17,000 additional hours of wind tunnel testing and further RCS testing at
Helendale, California and the USAF
RATSCAT range before the first flight. Increasing weight during EMD due to demanding ballistic survivability requirements and
added capabilities caused slight reductions in projected range and maneuver performance. Aside from advances in air vehicle and propulsion technology, the F-22's avionics were unprecedented in complexity and scale for a combat aircraft, with the integration of multiple sensors systems and antennas, including electronic warfare, communications,
identification friend or foe (IFF), and software of 1.7 million
lines of code written in
Ada. Avionics often became the pacing factor of the whole program. In light of rapidly advancing computing and semiconductor technology, the avionics was to employ the
Department of Defense's (DoD)
PAVE PILLAR systems architecture and
Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) program technology; the computing and processing requirements were equivalent to multiple contemporary
Cray supercomputers to achieve
sensor fusion. To enable early looks and troubleshooting for mission software development, the software was ground-tested in Boeing's Avionics Integration Laboratory (AIL) and flight-tested on a
Boeing 757 modified with F-22 avionics and sensors, called Flying Test Bed (FTB). Because much of the F-22's avionics design occurred in the 1990s as the electronics industry was shifting from military to commercial applications as the predominant market, avionics upgrade efforts was initially difficult and protracted due to changing industry standards; for instance,
C/
C++ rather than
Ada became predominant programming languages. The roughly equal division of work amongst the team largely carried through from Dem/Val to EMD, with prime contractor Lockheed responsible for the forward fuselage and control surfaces, General Dynamics for the center fuselage, and Boeing for aft fuselage and wings. Lockheed
acquired General Dynamics' fighter portfolio at
Fort Worth, Texas in 1993 and thus had the majority of the airframe manufacturing, and merged with
Martin Marietta in 1995 to form
Lockheed Martin. While Lockheed primarily performed Dem/Val work at its Skunk Works sites in Burbank and Palmdale,
California, it shifted its program office and EMD work from Burbank to
Marietta, Georgia, where it performed final assembly;
Boeing manufactured airframe components, performed avionics integration and developed the training systems in
Seattle, Washington. The EMD contract originally ordered seven single-seat F-22As and two twin-seat F-22Bs, although the latter was canceled in 1996 to reduce development costs and the orders were converted to single seaters. The first F-22A, an EMD aircraft with
tail number 91-4001, was unveiled at
Air Force Plant 6 in
Dobbins Air Reserve Base in Marietta on 9 April 1997 where it was officially named "Raptor". The aircraft first flew on 7 September 1997, piloted by chief test pilot Alfred "Paul" Metz. The Raptor's designation was briefly changed to F/A-22 starting in September 2002, mimicking the Navy's
F/A-18 Hornet and intended to highlight a planned ground-attack capability amid debate over the aircraft's role and relevance. The F-22 designation was reinstated in December 2005, when the aircraft entered service. during testing; the attachment on the back top is for a spin recovery chute.|alt=Rear/starboard view of aerial refueling tanker transferring fuel to a jet fighter via a long boom. The two aircraft are slightly banking left. The F-22 flight test program consisted of flight sciences, developmental test (DT), and initial operational test and evaluation (IOT&E) by the
411th Flight Test Squadron (FLTS) at Edwards AFB, California, as well as follow-on OT&E and development of tactics and operational employment by the
422nd Test and Evaluation Squadron (TES) at
Nellis AFB,
Nevada. Nine EMD jets assigned to the 411th FLTS would participate in the test program under the Combined Test Force (CTF) at Edwards. The first two aircraft conducted envelope expansion testing, such as flying qualities, air vehicle performance, propulsion, and stores separation. The third aircraft, the first to have production-level internal structure, tested flight loads, flutter, and stores separation, while two non-flying F-22s were built for testing static loads and fatigue. Subsequent EMD aircraft and the Boeing 757 FTB tested avionics, environmental qualifications, and observables, with the first combat-capable Block 3.0 software flying in 2001. Air vehicle testing resulted in several structural design modifications and retrofits for earlier lots, including tail fin strengthening to resolve buffeting in certain conditions. Other retired EMD F-22s were repurposed as maintenance trainers. Because the F-22 had been designed to defeat contemporary and projected Soviet fighters, the end of the
Cold War and the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 had major impacts on program funding; the DoD reduced its urgency for new weapon systems and the following years would see successive reductions in its budget. This resulted in the F-22's EMD being rescheduled and lengthened multiple times. Furthermore, the aircraft's sophistication and numerous technological innovations required extensive testing, which exacerbated the cost overruns and delays, especially from mission avionics. Some capabilities were also deferred to post-service upgrades, reducing the upfront cost but increasing total program cost. The program transitioned to full-rate production in March 2005 and completed EMD that December, after which the test force had flown 3,496 sorties for over 7,600 flight hours. Due to the aircraft's sophisticated capabilities, contractors have been targeted by cyberattacks and technology theft.
Production and procurement The USAF originally envisioned ordering 750 ATFs at a total program cost of $44.3 billion and procurement cost of $26.2 billion in FY 1985 dollars, with production beginning in 1994 and service entry in the mid-to-late 1990s. The 1990 Major Aircraft Review (MAR) led by
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney reduced this to 648 aircraft beginning in 1996 and service entry in the early-to-mid 2000s. After the end of the Cold War, this was further curtailed to 442 in the 1993 Bottom-Up Review while the USAF eventually set its requirement to 381 to support its
Air Expeditionary Force structure with the last deliveries in 2013. Throughout development and production, the program was continually scrutinized for its costs and less expensive alternatives such as modernized F-15 or F-16 variants were being proposed, even though the USAF considered the F-22 to provide the greatest capability increase against peer adversaries for the investment. However, funding instability had reduced the total to 339 by 1997 and production was nearly halted by
Congress in 1999. Although funds were eventually restored, the planned number continued to decline due to delays and cost overruns during EMD, slipping to 277 by 2003. In 2004, with its focus on asymmetric
counterinsurgency warfare in
Iraq and
Afghanistan, the DoD under Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld further cut procurement to 183 production aircraft, despite the USAF's requirement for 381; funding for this number was reached by a multi-year procurement contract awarded in 2006, with aircraft distributed to seven combat squadrons; total program cost was projected to be $62 billion (equivalent to approximately $ in ). In 2008, the Congressional defense spending bill raised the number to 187. F-22 production would support over 1,000 subcontractors and suppliers from 46 states and up to 95,000 jobs, and spanned 15 years at a peak rate of roughly two airplanes per month, about half of the initially planned rate from the 1990 MAR; after EMD aircraft contracts, the first production lot was awarded in September 2000. As production wound down in 2011, the total program cost was estimated to be about $67.3 billion (about $360 million for each production aircraft delivered), with $32.4 billion spent on Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) and $34.9 billion on procurement and military construction in then year dollars. The
incremental cost for an additional F-22 was estimated at $138 million (equivalent to approximately $ in ) in 2009. In total, 195 F-22s were built. The first two were EMD aircraft in the
Block 1.0 configuration for initial flight testing and envelope expansion, while the third was a Block 2.0 aircraft built to represent the internal structure of production airframes and enabled it to test full flight loads. Six more EMD aircraft were built in the Block 10 configuration for development and upgrade testing, with the last two considered essentially production-quality jets. Production for operational squadrons consisted of 74 Block 10/20 training aircraft and 112 Block 30/35 combat aircraft for a total of 186 (or 187 when accounting for Production Representative Test Vehicles and certain EMD jets); By 2020, Block 20 aircraft from Lot 3 onward were upgraded to Block 30 standards under the Common Configuration Plan, increasing the Block 30/35 fleet to 149 aircraft while 37 remained in the Block 20 configuration for training.
Ban on exports In order to prevent the inadvertent disclosure of the aircraft's stealth technology and classified capabilities to U.S. adversaries, annual DoD appropriations acts since FY1998 have included a provision prohibiting the use of funds made available in each act to approve or license the sale of the F-22 to any foreign government. Customers for U.S. fighters are acquiring earlier designs such as the F-15 Eagle and F-16 Fighting Falcon or the newer
F-35 Lightning II, which contains technology from the F-22 but was designed to be cheaper, more flexible, and available for export. In September 2006, Congress upheld the ban on foreign F-22 sales. Despite the ban, the 2010 defense authorization bill included provisions requiring the DoD to report on the costs and feasibility for an F-22 export variant, and another report on the effect of export sales on the U.S. aerospace industry. Some Australian defense officials and politicians have expressed interest in procuring the F-22; in 2008, the
Chief of the Defence Force,
Air Chief Marshal Angus Houston, stated that the aircraft was being considered by the
Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) as a potential supplement to the F-35. Some defense commentators have even advocated for the purchase in lieu of the planned F-35s, citing the F-22's known capabilities and F-35's delays and developmental uncertainties. However, considerations for the F-22 were later dropped and the
F/A-18E/F Super Hornet would serve as the RAAF's interim aircraft prior to the F-35's service entry. The Japanese government also showed interest in the F-22. The
Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) would reportedly require fewer fighters for its mission if it obtained the F-22, thus reducing engineering and staffing costs. With the end of F-22 production, Japan chose the F-35 in December 2011. At one point the Israeli Air Force had hoped to purchase up to 50 F-22s. In November 2003, however, Israeli representatives announced that after years of analysis and discussions with Lockheed Martin and the DoD, they had concluded that Israel could not afford the aircraft. Israel eventually purchased the F-35.
Production termination Throughout the 2000s when the U.S. was primarily fighting counterinsurgency wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the USAF's requirement for 381 F-22s was questioned over rising costs, initial reliability and availability problems, limited multirole versatility, and a lack of relevant adversaries for air combat missions. In 2006,
Comptroller General of the United States David Walker found that "the DoD has not demonstrated the need" for more investment in the F-22, and further opposition was expressed by
Bush Administration Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and his successor
Robert Gates, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Gordon R. England, and Chairman of
U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) Senators
John Warner and
John McCain. Under Rumsfeld, procurement was severely cut to 183 aircraft. The F-22 lost influential supporters in 2008 after the forced resignations of Secretary of the Air Force
Michael Wynne and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force General
T. Michael Moseley. In November 2008, Gates stated that the F-22 lacked relevance in
asymmetric post-Cold War conflicts, and in April 2009, under the
Obama Administration, he called for production to end in FY 2011 after completing 187 F-22s. The loss of staunch F-22 advocates in the upper DoD echelons resulted in the erosion of its political support. In July 2008, General
James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated to the SASC his reasons for supporting the termination of F-22 production, including shifting resources to the multi-service F-35 and the electronic warfare
EA-18G Growler. Although Russian and Chinese fighter developments fueled concern for the USAF, Gates dismissed this and in 2010, he set the F-22 requirement to 187 aircraft by lowering the number of major regional conflict preparations from two to one, despite an effort by Wynne's and Moseley's successors
Michael Donley and General
Norton Schwartz to raise the number to 243; according to Schwartz, he and Donley finally relented in order to convince Gates to preserve the
Long Range Strike Bomber program. After President
Barack Obama threatened to
veto further production at Gates' urging, both the Senate and House agreed to abide by the 187 cap in July 2009. Gates highlighted the F-35's role in the decision, and believed that the U.S. would maintain its stealth fighter numbers advantage by 2025 even with F-35 delays. In December 2011, the 195th and final F-22 was completed out of 8 test and 187 production aircraft built; the jet was delivered on 2 May 2012. After production ended, F-22 tooling and associated documentation were retained and mothballed at the
Sierra Army Depot to support repairs and maintenance throughout the fleet life cycle, as well as the possibility of a production restart or a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP). The Marietta plant space was repurposed to support the
C-130J and F-35, while engineering work for sustainment and upgrades continued at Fort Worth, Texas and Palmdale, California. The curtailed F-22 production forced the USAF to extend the service of 179 F-15C/Ds to 2026—well beyond its planned retirement—to maintain adequate air superiority fighter numbers. In April 2016, Congress directed the USAF to conduct a cost study and assessment associated with resuming production of the F-22, citing advancing threats from Russia and China. On 9 June 2017, the USAF submitted their report stating they had no plans to restart the F-22 production line due to cost-prohibitive economic and logistical challenges; it estimated it would cost approximately $50 billion to procure 194 additional F-22s at a cost of $206–216 million per aircraft, including approximately $9.9 billion for non-recurring start-up costs and $40.4 billion for acquisition with the first delivery in the mid-to-late 2020s. The long gap since the end of production meant hiring new workers, sourcing replacement vendors, and finding new plant space, contributing to the high start-up costs and lead times. The USAF believed that the funding would be better invested in its next-generation Air Superiority 2030 effort, which evolved into the
Next Generation Air Dominance (NGAD).
Modernization and upgrades The F-22 and its subsystems were designed to be upgraded over its life cycle via numbered Increments and Operational Flight Program (OFP) updates in anticipation for technological advances and evolving threats, although this initially proved difficult and costly due to the highly integrated avionics systems architecture. Amid debates over the airplane's relevance in asymmetric counterinsurgency warfare, the first upgrades primarily focused on ground attack, or strike capabilities.
Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM) employment was added with Increment 2 in 2005 and
Small Diameter Bomb (SDB) was integrated with 3.1 in 2011; the improved AN/APG-77(V)1 radar, which incorporates air-to-ground modes, was certified in March 2007 and fitted on airframes from Lot 5 onward. To address
oxygen deprivation issues, F-22s were fitted with an automatic backup oxygen system (ABOS) and modified life support system starting in 2012. test-fires an AIM-9X in 2015. In contrast to prior upgrades, Increment 3.2 emphasized air combat capabilities with updates to electronic warfare, CNI (including Link 16 receive), and geolocation as well as
AIM-9X and
AIM-120D integration. Fleet releases of the two-part process began in 2013 and 2019 respectively. Concurrently, OFP updates added
Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System, cryptographic enhancements, and improved avionics stability, among others. A
MIDS-JTRS terminal, which includes Mode 5
IFF and Link 16 transmit/receive capability, was installed starting in 2021. To address obsolescence and modernization difficulties, the F-22's mission computers were upgraded in 2021 with military-hardened
commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) open mission system (OMS) processor modules with a modular open systems architecture (MOSA).
Agile software development process in conjunction with an orchestration system was implemented to enable faster upgrades from additional vendors, and software updates shifted away from Increments developed using the
waterfall model to numbered annual releases. Additional upgrades being tested include new sensors and antennas, integration of new weapons including the
AIM-260 JATM, and reliability improvements such as more durable stealth coatings; the dedicated infrared search and track (IRST), originally deleted during Dem/Val, is one of the sensors added. Other developments include all-aspect IRST functionality for the Missile Launch Detector (MLD), manned-unmanned teaming (MUM-T) capability with uncrewed
collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) or "loyal wingmen", and integration of the
Gentex/
Raytheon (later
Thales USA) Scorpion
helmet-mounted display (HMD). To preserve the aircraft's stealth while enabling additional payload and fuel capacity, stealthy external carriage has been investigated since the early-2000s, with a low drag, low-observable external tank and pylon under development to increase stealthy combat radius. The F-22 has also been used as a platform to test and apply technologies from the NGAD program. Not all proposed upgrades have been implemented. The planned
Multifunction Advanced Data Link (MADL) integration was cut due to development delays and lack of proliferation. While Block 20 aircraft from Lot 3 onwards have been upgraded to Block 30/35 under the Common Configuration Plan, Lockheed Martin in 2017 had also proposed upgrading all remaining Block 20 training aircraft to Block 30/35 as well to increase numbers available for combat; this was not pursued due to other budget priorities. The fleet underwent a $350 million "structures repair/retrofit program" (SRP) to resolve problems identified during testing as well as address improper titanium heat treatment in the parts of early batches. By January 2021, all aircraft had gone through the SRP to ensure full service lives for the entire fleet. The F-22 has also been used to test and qualify alternative fuels, including a synthetic jet fuel consisting of 50/50 mix of
JP-8 and a
Fischer–Tropsch process-produced, natural gas-based fuel in August 2008, and a 50% mixture of biofuel derived from
camelina in March 2011. ==Design==