In August 1942, President Roosevelt and others noticed that the progress of the FEPC was slowing. The agency had earlier that year been put under control of the
War Production Board via Executive Order 9040, which was established to replace the Office of Production Management after US entry into the war, when it needed to convert industry to a wartime footing. Opponents of this action believed that Roosevelt was yielding to pressure from powerful southern Democrats in Congress. FEPC chairman MacLean objected to the transfer, saying that Roosevelt's administration was reducing the FEPC to "a small Federal bureau without power." A. Philip Randolph said the White House's policy was completely "emasculating" the usefulness of the committee. Randolph and other activists protested as well, threatening a march on Washington to put pressure on the administration. In May 1943, Roosevelt strengthened the FEPC by
Executive Order 9346, giving it independence by placing it within the Office for Emergency Management in the Executive Office of the President. The new executive order required that all government contracts have a mandatory non-discrimination clause, authorized twelve regional offices and appropriate staff and broadened the jurisdiction of the agency to federal government agencies. During
World War II the federal government was operating airfields, shipyards, supply centers, ammunition plants, and other facilities that employed millions. The FEPC operated until the end of the war overseeing defense industries and federal agencies. The FEPC expanded its jurisdiction to federal government departments and agencies as employers; they were "now were explicitly covered along with war industries, unions, and war-training programs." Agency records show that New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco, all major sites of defense industries, were the cities with the largest number of cases filed with the FEPC, about 200 in each place. With the help of the FEPC, black men outside the South made substantial economic progress in the 1940s. As suggested by William J. Collins, the FEPC helped make opportunities by the following: • providing advice on how to integrate the workplace; • giving managers a ready excuse for hiring blacks if whites objected; • threatening to bring more powerful federal agencies into the fray on the side of the FEPC; and/or • publicly embarrassing firms or unions that refused to hire blacks. To promote the establishment of a permanent FEPC in the government, A. Philip Randolph recruited young feminists
Anna Arnold Hedgeman in 1944 to work with a National Council to lobby for this goal. Because of limited funds, Hedgeman hired a staff of women and college students to help with the publicity and fundraising for the FEPC. She wanted the FEPC Councils to promote fair employment policies in both state and local governments. Her staff introduced laws to this effect in almost every state, but not many state legislatures then supported such bills. A bill for a nationwide FEPC and anti-discrimination in employment made its way to
Harry S. Truman after the death of President Roosevelt in 1945, who wanted to lobby the bill. By the time the Second World War ended in August, Congress "provided some additional funding but ordered the FEPC to cease all operations by June 30, 1946." Continuing tensions in cities that were booming with increased populations for the defense industries erupted in race riots in 1943 in
Detroit,
Los Angeles,
Mobile, Alabama; and
Beaumont, Texas. In each city, new populations were competing for jobs and housing, and expectations were rising among African Americans to share in the wartime boom. In many places, white workers were resisting this change. In the Detroit Packard plant, 25,000 white workers walked off the job in 1943 when three blacks were promoted to work next to whites in the assembly line. The FEPC worked to avoid such "hate" strikes and help employers manage integration, and to negotiate settlements in cases when strikes did take place. ==Legacy==