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Fashionable Nonsense

Fashionable Nonsense: Postmodern Intellectuals' Abuse of Science, first published in French in 1997 as Impostures intellectuelles, is a book by physicists Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont. As part of the so-called science wars, Sokal and Bricmont criticize postmodernism in academia for the misuse of scientific and mathematical concepts in postmodern writing.

Summary
Fashionable Nonsense examines two related topics: • the allegedly incompetent and pretentious usage of scientific concepts by a small group of influential philosophers and intellectuals; and • the problems of cognitive relativism—the idea that "modern science is nothing more than a 'myth', a 'narration' or a 'social construction' among many others"—as found in the Strong programme in the sociology of science. Incorrect use of scientific concepts versus scientific metaphors The stated goal of the book is not to attack "philosophy, the humanities or the social sciences in general", but rather "to warn those who work in them (especially students) against some manifest cases of charlatanism." Similarly, Lacan is criticized for drawing an analogy between topology and mental illness that, in Sokal and Bricmont's view, is unsupported by any argument and is "not just false: it is gibberish." Sokal and Bricmont claim that they do not intend to analyze postmodernist thought in general. Rather, they aim to draw attention to the abuse of concepts from mathematics and physics, their areas of specialty. The authors define this abuse as any of the following behaviors: • Using scientific or pseudoscientific terminology without bothering much about technical meanings. • Importing concepts from the natural sciences into the humanities without justification for their use. • Displaying superficial erudition by using technical terms where they are irrelevant, presumably to impress and intimidate non-specialist readers. • Manipulating meaningless words and phrases. • Self-assurance on topics far beyond the competence of the author and exploiting the prestige of science to give discourses a veneer of rigor. The postmodernist conception of science Sokal and Bricmont highlight the rising tide of what they call cognitive relativism, the belief that there are no objective truths but only local beliefs. They argue that this view is held by a number of people, including people who the authors label "postmodernists" and the Strong programme in the sociology of science, and that it is illogical, impractical, and dangerous. Their aim is "not to criticize the left, but to help defend it from a trendy segment of itself." Quoting Michael Albert, [T]here is nothing truthful, wise, humane, or strategic about confusing hostility to injustice and oppression, which is leftist, with hostility to science and rationality, which is nonsense. ==Reception==
Reception
According to New York Review of Books editor Barbara Epstein, who was delighted by Sokal's hoax, the response to the book within the humanities was bitterly divided, with some delighted and some enraged; and agreeing that "there does seem to be something about the Parisian scene that is particularly hospitable to reckless verbosity." Several scientists have expressed similar sentiments. Richard Dawkins, in a review of this book, said regarding the discussion of Lacan: Criticism Limiting her considerations to physics, science historian Mara Beller maintained that it was not entirely fair to blame contemporary postmodern philosophers for drawing nonsensical conclusions from quantum physics, since many such conclusions were drawn by some of the leading quantum physicists themselves, such as Bohr or Heisenberg when they ventured into philosophy. Regarding Lacan Bruce Fink offers a critique in his book Lacan to the Letter, in which he accuses Sokal and Bricmont of demanding that "serious writing" do nothing other than "convey clear meanings". Fink asserts that some concepts which the authors consider arbitrary or meaningless do have roots in the history of linguistics, and that Lacan is explicitly using mathematical concepts in a metaphoric way, not claiming that his concepts are mathematically founded. He takes Sokal and Bricmont to task for elevating a disagreement with Lacan's choice of writing styles to an attack on his thought, which, in Fink's assessment, they fail to understand. Fink says that "Lacan could easily assume that his faithful seminar public...would go to the library or the bookstore and 'bone up' on at least some of his passing allusions." This point has been disputed by Arkady Plotnitsky (one of the authors mentioned by Sokal in his original hoax). Plotnitsky says that "some of their claims concerning mathematical objects in question and specifically complex numbers are incorrect", specifically attacking their statement that complex numbers and irrational numbers "have nothing to do with one another". Plotnitsky nevertheless agrees with Sokal and Bricmont that the "square root of −1" which Lacan discusses (and for which Plotnitsky introduces the symbol \scriptstyle (L)\sqrt{-1}) is not, in spite of its identical name, "identical, directly linked, or even metaphorized via the mathematical square root of −1", and that the latter "is not the erectile organ". However, they point out that Irigaray might still be correct in asserting that is a "masculinist" equation, since "the social genealogy of a proposition has no logical bearing on its truth value." Derrida reminds his readers that science and philosophy have long debated their likenesses and differences in the discipline of epistemology, but certainly not with such an emphasis on the nationality of the philosophers or scientists. He calls it ridiculous and weird that there are intensities of treatment by the scientists, in particular, that he was "much less badly treated", when in fact he was the main target of the US press. Derrida then proceeds to question the validity of their attacks against a few words he made in an off-the-cuff response during a conference that took place thirty years prior to their publication. He suggests there are plenty of scientists who have pointed out the difficulty of attacking his response. He also writes that there is no "relativism" or a critique of Reason and the Enlightenment in his works. He then writes of his hope that in the future this work is pursued more seriously and with dignity at the level of the issues involved. ==See also==
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