The use of flanking has been a consistent part of warfare since its invention. The responsibility of defending against flanks falls on the
commander, who has to make the choice of how to best use terrain. In addition, the proper adjustment and positioning of soldiers is imperative in ensuring a protected flank.
Terrain A commander could prevent being flanked by anchoring one or both parts of his line on terrain impassable to his enemies, such as
gorges, lakes or mountains. Notable examples of this being the
Spartans at the
Battle of Thermopylae,
Hannibal at the
Battle of Lake Trasimene, and the Romans at the
Battle of Watling Street. Although not strictly impassable, woods, forests, rivers, uneven, and marshy ground can also be used to anchor a flank:
Henry V at
Agincourt. However, in such instances, it was still wise to have
skirmishers covering the flanks.
Fortification In exceptional circumstances, an army may be fortunate enough to be able to anchor a flank with a friendly castle, fortress, or walled city. In such circumstances, it was necessary not to fix the line to the fortress but to allow a
killing space between the fortress and the battle line so that any enemy forces attempting to flank the field forces could be brought under fire from the
garrison. Natural strongholds formed by terrain can also be incorporated into the battle line: the
Union positions of
Culp's Hill,
Cemetery Hill on the right flank, and
Big Round Top and
Little Round Top on the left flank at the
Battle of Gettysburg. If time and circumstances allowed, field fortifications could be created or expanded to protect the flanks, as the Allied forces did with the hamlet of
Papelotte and the farmhouse of
Hougoumont on the left and right flanks at the
Battle of Waterloo.
Formations When the terrain favors neither side, it is down to the disposition of forces in the battle line to prevent flanking attacks. As long as they have had a place on the battlefield, it was the role of
cavalry to be placed on the flanks of the
infantry battle line. With speed and greater tactical flexibility, the cavalry could both make flanking attacks and guard against them. It was the marked superiority of Hannibal's cavalry at the
Battle of Cannae that allowed him to chase off the Roman cavalry and complete the encirclement of the Roman legions. With equally-matched cavalry, commanders have been content to allow inaction, with the cavalry of both sides preventing the other from action. In a case of no cavalry, inferior cavalry or in armies whose cavalry had gone off on their own (a common complaint), the lack of resulting advantage left the outcome depending on the disposition of the infantry to guard against flanking attacks. It was the danger of being flanked by the numerically superior Persians that led
Miltiades to lengthen the
Athenian line at the
Battle of Marathon by decreasing the depth of the centre. The importance of the flank positions led to the practise, which became tradition of placing the best troops on the flanks. At the
Battle of Platea, the
Tegeans squabbled with the Athenians on who should have the privilege of holding a flank; both having conceded the honour of the right flank (the critical flank in the
hoplite system) to the Spartans. That is the source of the tradition of giving the honour of the right to the most senior regiment present, which has persisted into the modern era. With troops confident and reliable enough to operate in separate dispersed units, the
echelon formation may be adopted. That can take different forms with either equally strong "divisions" or a massively reinforced wing or centre supported by smaller formations in step behind it (forming either a staircase like, or arrow like arrangement). When the foremost unit engages with the enemy the echeloned units remain out of action. The idea is for the enemy to attack the exposed flanks of the foremost unit, but the units immediately echeloned behind the foremost unit would then push forward taking the flankers themselves in the flank. If the echeloned unit is being attacked in turn, the unit behind it would move forward to again attack the flanks of the would be flankers. In theory a cascade of such engagements could occur all along the line for as many units as there were in echelon. In practice, that almost never happened since most enemy commanders saw it for what it was and so resisted the temptation of the initial easy flanking attack. That prudence was used in the manifestation of the
oblique order in which one wing was massively reinforced, creating a local superiority in numbers that could obliterate that part of the enemy line that it was sent against. The weaker echeloned units was sufficient to fix the greater portion of the enemy troops into inaction. With the battle on the wing won, the reinforced flank would turn and roll up the enemy battle line from the flank. In the Roman
chequer board formation, readopted by Renaissance militaries, each of the units in the front line could be thought of as having two lines of units echeloned behind it. As warfare increased in size and scope and armies increased, armies could no longer hope to have a contiguous battle line. To be able to maneuver, it was necessary to introduce intervals between units and these intervals could be used to flank individual units in the battle line by fast acting-units such as cavalry. To guard against that, the infantry subunits were trained to be able to form
squares rapidly that gave the cavalry no weak flank to attack. During the age of
gunpowder, intervals between units could be increased because of the greater reach of the weapons, which raised the possibility of cavalry finding a gap in the line to exploit. Thus, the mark of good infantry was the rapid ability to form from line to square and back again. ==Operational flanking==