Overland journey to Italy A campaign to Italy was originally planned by Hasdrubal, who was stationed in the Iberian Peninsula for eight years until 221 BC. Soon, the Romans became aware of an alliance between Carthage and the
Celts of the
Po Valley in northern Italy. When Hannibal arrived in the Po Valley, roughly 10,000 Celtic tribesmen joined his army. The Celts were amassing forces to invade farther south in Italy, presumably with Carthaginian backing. Therefore, the Romans pre-emptively invaded the Po region in 225 BC. By 220 BC the Romans had annexed the area as
Cisalpine Gaul. Hasdrubal was assassinated around the same time (221 BC), bringing Hannibal to the fore. It seems that the Romans lulled themselves into a false sense of security, having dealt with the threat of a Gallo-Carthaginian invasion, and perhaps knowing that the original Carthaginian commander had been killed. Hannibal departed Cartagena, Spain (New Carthage) in late spring of 218 BC. He fought his way through the northern tribes to the foothills of the
Pyrenees, subduing the tribes through clever mountain tactics and stubborn fighting. He left a detachment of 20,000 troops to garrison the conquered region. At the Pyrenees, he released 11,000 Iberian troops who showed reluctance to leave their homeland. Hannibal reportedly entered
Gaul with 40,000 foot soldiers and 12,000 horsemen. Hannibal recognized that he still needed to cross the Pyrenees, the
Alps, and many large rivers. Additionally, he would have to contend with opposition from the Gauls, whose territory he passed through. Starting in the spring of 218 BC, he crossed the Pyrenees, and by conciliating the Gaulish chiefs along his passage before the Romans could take any measures to bar his advance, he was able to reach the
Rhône by September. Hannibal's army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 38 elephants, almost none of which would survive the harsh conditions of the Alps. , by
Heinrich Leutemann Hannibal outmanoeuvred the natives who had tried to prevent his crossing, then evaded a Roman force marching from the Mediterranean coast by turning inland up the valley of the Rhône. His exact route over the Alps has been the source of scholarly dispute ever since (Polybius, the surviving ancient account closest in time to Hannibal's campaign, reports that the route was already debated). The most influential modern theories favour either a march up the valley of the
Drôme and a crossing of the main range to the south of the modern highway over the
Col de Montgenèvre or a march farther north up the valleys of the
Isère and
Arc crossing the main range near the present
Col de Mont Cenis or the
Little St Bernard Pass. Recent
numismatic evidence suggests that Hannibal's army passed within sight of the
Matterhorn. Stanford geoarchaeologist Patrick Hunt argues that Hannibal took the
Col de Clapier mountain pass, claiming the Clapier most accurately meets ancient depictions of the route: wide view of Italy, pockets of year-round snow, and a large campground. Other scholars have doubts, proposing that Hannibal took the easier route across Petit
Mount Cenis. Hunt responds to this by proposing that Hannibal's Celtic guides purposefully misguided the Carthaginian general. Most recently, W. C. Mahaney has argued
Col de la Traversette closest fits the records of ancient authors. Biostratigraphic archaeological data has reinforced the case for Col de la Traversette; analysis of peat bogs near watercourses on both sides of the pass's summit showed that the ground was heavily disturbed "by thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, of animals and humans" and that the soil bore traces of unique levels of
Clostridia bacteria associated with the digestive tracts of horses and mules. Radiocarbon dating secured dates of 2168
BP or c. 218 BC, the year of Hannibal's march. Mahaney
et al. conclude that this and other evidence strongly supports the Col de la Traversette as being the "Hannibalic Route" as had been argued by
Gavin de Beer in 1954. De Beer was one of only three interpreters—the others being John Lazenby and Jakob Seibert—to have visited all the Alpine high passes and presented a view on which was most plausible. Both De Beer and Seibert had selected the Col de la Traversette as the one most closely matching the ancient descriptions. Polybius writes that Hannibal had crossed the highest of the Alpine passes: Col de la Traversette, between the upper
Guil valley and the upper Po river, is the highest pass. It is moreover the most southerly, as Roman general
Varro in his
De re rustica relates, agreeing that Hannibal's passage was the highest in the western Alps and the most southerly. Mahaney
et al. argue that factors used by De Beer to support Col de la Traversette including "gauging ancient place names against modern, close scrutiny of times of flood in major rivers and distant viewing of the Po plains" taken together with "massive radiocarbon and microbiological and parasitical evidence" from the alluvial sediments on either side of the pass furnish "supporting evidence, proof if you will" that Hannibal's invasion went that way. If Hannibal had ascended the Col de la Traversette, the Po Valley would have been visible from the pass's summit, vindicating Polybius's account. By Livy's account, the crossing was accomplished in the face of huge difficulties. These Hannibal surmounted with ingenuity, such as when he used
vinegar and fire to break through a rockfall. According to Polybius, he arrived in Italy accompanied by 20,000 foot soldiers, 4,000 horsemen, and only a few elephants. The fired rockfall event is mentioned only by Livy; Polybius is mute on the subject and there is no evidence of carbonized rock at the only two-tier rockfall in the western Alps, located below the Col de la Traversette (Mahaney, 2008). If Polybius is correct in his figure for the number of troops that he commanded after the crossing of the Rhône, this would suggest that he had lost almost half of his force. Historians such as Serge Lancel have questioned the reliability of the figures for the number of troops that he had when he left Hispania. From the start, he seems to have calculated that he would have to operate without aid from Hispania. Hannibal's vision of military affairs was derived partly from the teaching of his Greek tutors and partly from experience gained alongside his father, and it stretched over most of the Hellenistic world of his time. The breadth of his vision gave rise to his grand strategy of conquering Rome by opening a northern front and subduing allied city-states on the peninsula, rather than by attacking Rome directly. Historical events that led to the defeat of Carthage during the First Punic War when his father commanded the Carthaginian Army also led Hannibal to plan the invasion of Italy by land across the Alps. The task involved the mobilization of between 60,000 and 100,000 troops and the training of a
war elephant corps, all of which had to be provisioned along the way. The alpine invasion of Italy was a military operation that would shake the Mediterranean world of 218 BC with repercussions for more than two decades.
Battle of Trebia Hannibal's perilous march brought him into the Roman territory and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on foreign ground. His sudden appearance among the Gauls of the Po Valley enabled him to detach those tribes from their allegiance to the Romans before the Romans could take steps to check the rebellion.
Consul Publius Cornelius Scipio, the father of
Scipio Africanus, assumed responsibility for dealing with Hannibal. The victory was minor, but it encouraged the Gauls and
Ligurians to join the Carthaginian cause. Their troops bolstered his army back to around 40,000 men. Scipio was severely injured, his life only saved by the bravery of his son who rode back onto the field to rescue his fallen father. Scipio retreated across the
Trebbia to camp at
Placentia with his army mostly intact. The only alternative route to central Italy lay at the mouth of the
Arno. This area was mostly marshland and happened to be overflowing more than usual that spring. Hannibal knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and quickest way to central Italy. Polybius claims that Hannibal's men marched for four days and three nights "through a land that was under water", suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced want of sleep. He crossed without opposition over both the
Apennines (during which he lost his right eye because of
conjunctivitis) and the seemingly impassable Arno, but he lost a large part of his force in the marshy lowlands of the Arno. He arrived in
Etruria in the spring of 217 BC and decided to lure the main Roman army under Flaminius into a
pitched battle by devastating the region that Flaminius had been sent to protect. As Polybius recounts, "he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation) would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country but would spontaneously follow him... and give him opportunities for attack." At the same time, Hannibal tried to break the allegiance of Rome's allies by proving that Flaminius was powerless to protect them. Despite this, Flaminius remained passively encamped at Arretium. Hannibal marched boldly around Flaminius' left flank, unable to draw him into battle by mere devastation, and effectively cut him off from Rome, executing the first recorded
turning movement in military history. He then advanced through the uplands of Etruria, provoking Flaminius into a hasty pursuit and catching him in a
defile on the shore of
Lake Trasimenus. There Hannibal destroyed Flaminius' army in the waters or on the adjoining slopes, killing Flaminius as well. This was the most costly ambush that the Romans ever sustained until the
Battle of Carrhae in 53 BC. Hannibal had disposed of the only field force that could check his advance upon Rome. He realized that without
siege engines, he could not hope to take the capital. He opted to exploit his victory by entering into central and southern Italy and encouraging a general revolt against the sovereign power. The Romans appointed
Quintus Fabius Maximus Verrucosus as their dictator. Departing from Roman military traditions, Fabius adopted the
strategy named after him, avoiding open battle while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal's vicinity in order to watch and limit his movements. Hannibal ravaged
Apulia but was unable to bring Fabius to battle, so he decided to march through
Samnium to
Campania, one of the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw Fabius into battle. Fabius closely followed Hannibal's path of destruction yet still refused to let himself be drawn out of the defensive. This strategy was unpopular with many Romans, who believed that it was a form of cowardice. Hannibal decided that it would be unwise to winter in the devastated lowlands of Campania, but Fabius had trapped him there by ensuring that all the exit passes were blocked. This situation led to the night
Battle of Ager Falernus. Hannibal had his men tie burning torches to the horns of a herd of cattle and drive them up the heights nearby. Some of the Romans, seeing a moving column of lights, were tricked into believing it was the Carthaginian army marching to escape along the heights. As they moved off in pursuit of this decoy, Hannibal managed to move his army in silence through the dark lowlands and up to an unguarded pass. Fabius was within striking distance, but in this case his caution worked against him, as rightly sensing a trick he stayed put. Thus, Hannibal managed to stealthily escape with his entire army intact. What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as historian
Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals". This was a severe blow to Fabius' prestige, and when his dictatorial term ended soon after, it was not renewed. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters in the Apulian plain.
Battle of Cannae , courtesy of the Department of History, United States Military Academy In the spring of 216 BC Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at
Cannae in the Apulian plain. By capturing Cannae, Hannibal had placed himself between the Romans and their crucial sources of supply. Once the Roman Senate resumed their consular elections in 216 BC, they appointed
Gaius Terentius Varro and
Lucius Aemilius Paullus as consuls. In the meantime, the Romans hoped to gain success through sheer strength and weight of numbers, and they raised an army of unprecedented size, estimated by some to be as large as 100,000 men but more likely around 50,000–80,000. The Romans and allied legions resolved to confront Hannibal and marched southward to Apulia. They eventually found him on the left bank of the
Aufidus River and encamped away. On this occasion, the two armies were combined into one, the consuls having to alternate their command on a daily basis. According to Livy, Varro was a man of reckless and hubristic nature, and it was his turn to command on the day of battle. This account is possibly biased against Varro as its main source, Polybius, was a client of Paullus's aristocratic family whereas Varro was less distinguished. Some historians have suggested that the sheer size of the army required both generals to command a wing each. This theory is supported by the fact that after Varro survived the battle he was pardoned by the Senate, which would be peculiar if he were the sole commander at fault. As a result of this victory, many parts of Italy joined Hannibal's cause. As Polybius notes, "How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae, than those that preceded it can be seen by the behaviour of Rome's allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman Power." During 216 BC the Greek cities in Sicily were induced to revolt against Roman political control, while King
Philip V of Macedon pledged his support to Hannibal, initiating the
First Macedonian War against Rome. Hannibal also secured an alliance with newly appointed tyrant
Hieronymus of Syracuse. It is often argued that if Hannibal had received proper material reinforcements from Carthage, he might have succeeded with a direct attack upon Rome. Instead, he had to content himself with subduing the fortresses that still held out against him, and the only other notable event of 216 BC was the defection of certain Italian territories, including
Capua, the second largest city of Italy, which Hannibal made his base. However, only a few of the Italian city-states that he had expected to gain as allies defected to him.
Stalemate The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate. The Romans used the attritional strategy that Fabius had taught them, which they finally realized was the only feasible means of defeating Hannibal. Fabius received the name "Cunctator" ("the Delayer") because of his policy of not meeting Hannibal in open battle. The Romans deprived Hannibal of a large-scale battle and instead assaulted his weakening army with multiple smaller armies in an attempt to both weary him and create unrest in his troops. For the next few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a
scorched earth policy and obtain local provisions for protracted and ineffectual operations throughout southern Italy. His immediate objectives were reduced to minor operations centred mainly around the cities of
Campania. The forces detached to his lieutenants were generally unable to hold their own, and neither his home government nor Philip V helped to make up his losses. His position in southern Italy therefore became increasingly difficult, and his chance of ultimately conquering Rome grew ever more remote. Hannibal still won a number of notable victories: completely destroying two Roman armies in 212 BC, and slaying two consuls including the famed
Marcus Claudius Marcellus in a battle in 208 BC. However, Hannibal slowly began losing ground—inadequately supported by his Italian allies, abandoned by his government (either because of jealousy or simply because Carthage was overstretched), and unable to match Rome's resources. He was not able to bring about another grand decisive victory that could produce a lasting strategic change. Carthaginian political will was embodied in the ruling
oligarchy. There was a Carthaginian Senate, but the real power was with the inner "Council of 30 Nobles" and the board of judges from ruling families known as the "
Hundred and Four". Two political factions operated in Carthage: the war party, also known as the "Barcids" (Hannibal's family name), and the peace party led by
Hanno II the Great. Hanno had been instrumental in denying Hannibal's requested reinforcements following the Battle of Cannae. He and his allies relied on trade with Rome to sustain their wealth and resented how Hannibal's unauthorized attack of Saguntum had forced them to choose between losing prestige or committing Carthage to war. Thus, they repeatedly acted to thwart Hannibal's plans; requests for supplies and equipment that would have made besieging Rome and its fortified cities possible were either delayed or ignored, and Carthaginian soldiers in northern Africa were not sent to reinforce Hannibal, forcing him to increasingly rely on local mercenaries who refused to be disciplined and whose loyalty lasted only until there was no plunder for them to earn.
Retreat , and originally from the
Tomb of the Scipios In March 212 BC Hannibal
captured Tarentum in a surprise attack, but he failed to obtain control of its harbor. The tide was slowly turning against him and in favor of Rome. The Roman consuls mounted a
siege of Capua in 212 BC. Hannibal attacked them, forcing their withdrawal from Campania. He moved to Lucania and destroyed a 16,000-man Roman army at the
Battle of the Silarus, with 15,000 Romans killed. Another opportunity presented itself soon after, a Roman army of 18,000 men being destroyed by Hannibal at the
first battle of Herdonia with 16,000 Romans dead, freeing Apulia from the Romans for the year. The Roman consuls mounted another
siege of Capua in 211 BC, conquering the city. Hannibal's attempt to lift the siege with an assault on the Roman siege lines failed. He marched on Rome to force the recall of the Roman armies. He drew off 15,000 Roman soldiers, but the siege continued, and Capua fell. In 212 BC Marcellus
conquered Syracuse, and the Romans destroyed the Carthaginian army in Sicily in 211–210 BC. In 210 BC, the Romans entered into an alliance with the
Aetolian League to counter Philip V. Philip, who attempted to exploit Rome's preoccupation in Italy to conquer
Illyria, found himself under attack from several sides at once and was quickly subdued by Rome and her Greek allies. In 210 BC Hannibal again proved his superiority in tactics by inflicting a severe defeat at the
Battle of Herdonia in Apulia upon a
proconsular army and, in 208 BC he destroyed a Roman force engaged in the siege of
Locri at the
Battle of Petelia. But with the loss of Tarentum in 209 BC and the gradual reconquest by the Romans of
Samnium and
Lucania, his hold on south Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC he succeeded in making his way again into Apulia, where he waited to concert measures for a combined march upon Rome with his brother Hasdrubal. On hearing of Hasdrubal's defeat and death at the
Battle of the Metaurus he retired to
Calabria, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years. Hasdrubal's head had been cut off, carried across Italy, and tossed over the palisade of Hannibal's camp as a cold message of the iron-clad will of the Roman Republic. The combination of these events marked the end to Hannibal's success in Italy. With the failure of his brother Mago in
Liguria (205–203 BC) and of his own negotiations with Phillip, the last hope of recovering his ascendancy in Italy was lost. ==Conclusion of the Second Punic War (203–201 BC)==