During the
First World War, the Germans experimented with what were called "storm tactics" in which a small group of highly trained soldiers (
stormtroopers) would open a
salient through which much larger forces could penetrate. That met with only limited success by breaking through the first lines of defence but lacking the staying power to break the opposing forces entirely. The 1939
blitzkrieg, which broke through with coordinated mechanized ground forces with aircraft in close support, was vastly more effective. Towards the end of the
Second World War, the German Army introduced
Kampfgruppe combat formations, which were composed of whatever units happened to be available. Though poor quality ones generally constituted the major part of them, they often performed successfully because of their high degree of flexibility and adaptability.
Mission-type tactics, as opposed to extremely specific directives, which give no discretion to the junior commander, are now widely used by modern militaries because of their force multiplication. Originating from German concepts of
Auftragstaktik, those tactics may be developing even more rapidly in the concept of
network-centric warfare (NCW) in which subordinate commanders receive information not only from their own commanders but also from adjacent units. A different paradigm was one of the results of the theories of
John Boyd, the "high-low mix" in which a large number of less expensive aircraft, coupled with a small number of extremely capable "silver bullet" aircraft, had the effect of a much larger force. Boyd's concept of quick action is based on the repeated application of the "Boyd loop", consisting of the steps :*
Observe: make use of the best sensors and other intelligence available :*
Orient: put the new observations into a context with the old :*
Decide: select the next action based on the combined observation and local knowledge :*
Act: carry out the selected action, ideally while the opponent is still observing your last action. Boyd's concept is also known as the
OODA Loop and is a description of the decision-making process that Boyd contended applies to business, sports, law enforcement and military operations. Boyd's doctrine is widely taught in the American military, and one of the aims of network centric warfare is to "get inside his OODA loop." In other words, one should go from observation to action before the enemy can get past orientation, preventing him from ever being able to make an effective decision or put it into action. Small unit leadership is critical to this, and NCW's ability to disseminate information to small unit leaders enables such tactics. Network-centric warfare can provide additional information and can help prevent
friendly fire but also allows "swarm tactics" and the seizing of opportunities by subordinate forces. defines "a swarming case is any historical example in which the scheme of maneuver involves the convergent attack of five (or more) semiautonomous (or autonomous) units on a targeted force in some particular place. "Convergent" implies an attack from most of the points on the compass." Another version of "swarming" is evident in air-to-ground attack formations in which the attack aircraft do not approach from one direction, at one time, or at the same altitude, but schedule the attacks so each one requires a Boyd-style OODA iteration to deal with a new threat. Replacement training units (RTU) were "finishing schools" for pilots that needed to know not just the school solution, but the actual tactics being used in Vietnam. Referring to close air support, "In the RTU, new pilots learned the rules of the road for working with a
forward air controller (FAC). The hardest part was finding the small aircraft as it circled over the target area. The fast-moving fighters used directional finding/steering equipment to get close enough to the slow, low FAC until someone in the flight could get an eyeball on him—a tally-ho. Once the FAC was in sight, he would give the fighters a target briefing—type of target, elevation, attack heading, location of friendlies, enemy defensive fire, best egress heading if hit by enemy fire, and other pertinent data. Usually the fighters would set up a circle, called a wheel or "wagon wheel", over the FAC, and wait for him to mark the target. Once the target was marked, the flight leader would attack first. ==Psychology==