At the conclusion of the
Chinese Civil War, the defeated Nationalists stripped China of liquid assets including gold, silver, and the country's dollar reserves as they
retreated to Taiwan. China did not have a meaningful amount of foreign reserves, nor a specialized foreign exchange reserve management system, until 1978. During the Asian financial crisis, Chinese policymakers learned from the experiences of neighboring countries which suffered for their lack of foreign policy reserves (which had been further exacerbated in those countries by
capital flight). China therefore tightened controls over foreign exchange and capital flows, including by making violations of these regulations punishable as criminal offenses. From 2001 to 2006, China's foreign exchange reserves nearly quadrupled. In 2006, China became the world's largest holder of foreign exchange reserves. This rate convinced Chinese leadership that its foreign exchange reserves would continue to grow and help deter capital flight. After 2006, policymakers focused less on attracting foreign capital and instead to evaluate how reserves could advance China's interests domestically and internationally. For example, in December 2006 at a Standing Committee Meeting of the
Tenth National People's Congress, Vice Premier
Zeng Peiyan advocated for the use of foreign exchange reserves to support Chinese companies in obtaining foreign mineral resources, thereby developing China's access to strategic minerals. The volatility of the
2008 financial crisis prompted Chinese policymakers, academics, and
state-owned enterprise executives to begin evaluating whether China was overexposed to US treasury securities. Following the
2008 financial crisis, the Communist Party and the public sentiment generally agreed that investing so much of China's foreign exchange reserves in the US government's debt was untenable. In the view of some Chinese historians, February 2009 comments by Premier
Wen Jiabao to
Financial Times mark a shift from China's passive approach to managing its foreign reserves to actively using its reserves to generate further profits and advance China's domestic economic development. Wen stated: Other advocates of this approach included governor of
China Development Bank Chen Yuan, whose view was that China should hedge against increasing commodity prices and the falling US dollar by using China's foreign exchange reserves to buy energy and minerals. In 2009, there was broad support among Chinese economists for using foreign exchange reserves in this way. China's foreign exchange reserves reached $3.1 trillion in April 2011. That same month, People's Bank of China governor
Zhou Xiaochuan publicly stated that China's foreign reserves had become excessive and recommended that reserves be reduced by instead capitalizing
sovereign funds. Beginning in 2014, and as of at least 2023, China's relative share of global foreign exchange reserves has remained stable. In 2015, China used foreign exchange reserves to recapitalize
China Development Bank and the
Export-Import Bank of China. This in turn empowered those
policy banks to make significant loans in Eurasia, Latin America, Africa, and the Middle East. == Concern over Chinese holdings of U.S. debt==