Up to 60 German divisions were tasked with defending of coastline from the Riviera to the North Sea, composed of varying troops – Cossacks, Volga Tartars, Georgians, among others, equipped with weapons captured from France, Poland, and Yugoslavia. Aside from what he considered troop deficiencies, Rundstedt thought it ludicrous to scatter the German troops so thinly along the French coast, and disagreed with Rommel's ideas for the
Atlantic Wall. The fortifications were inconsistent, with some sections well-constructed while other sections left much to be desired. Also, the ability to direct fire and the capability to deliver firepower along the varying portions of shoreline were equally unreliable. Several days prior to the invasion, the Germans received intelligence reports about the activities occurring across the channel. Deception measures by the Allied intelligence services kept the Germans convinced that the attack would occur near Norway or close to
Calais. Although reconnaissance reports as late as 5 June 1944 indicated that something significant was afoot, none of this intelligence was relayed to the
OKW at Berchtesgaden, nor was it forwarded to Dollmann's 7th Army. It is doubtful whether this would have led to a redistribution of forces, since Hitler remained convinced that the main Allied attack would occur at Pas de Calais. On 5 June 1944, under the cover of darkness, the invasion at Normandy began. By nightfall June 6, up to 130,000 troops and approximately 800 Allied tanks were ashore under a curtain of naval bombardment. Dollmann tried to organize an immediate counter-attack with the
21st Panzer Division. Lieutenant General
Fritz Bayerlein protested; he felt a column march in daytime was merely an invitation to the Allied air forces to decimate his division. He suggested alternative plans, but Dollmann remained adamant. Thus, it was not until 9 June 1944 that Rommel was able to muster his forces. Part of the effort to repel the Allied attack included strategic placement of troops over what appeared to be a growing front. Dollman's 7th Army (over 16 divisions and five corps commands) was sent to the left wing of the invasion front. They learned on 21 June 1944 that the supplies needed to conduct a sustained resistance could not be assured. Although they rendered vigorous resistance, the German forces could only slow the Allied advance. Throughout the course of defending the coastline and in spite of the disastrous circumstances, Dollmann continued to discipline his soldiers by the threat of severe penalties. Inaccurate Wehrmacht intelligence reports and Hitler's assurance that a second invasion was due at any moment left the equivalent of an entire German Army Group, comprising five Luftwaffe divisions, two Panzer divisions, and 24 infantry divisions, sitting immobile awaiting further instructions. In the meantime, the German High Command issued orders for Rommel and Rundstedt to launch a massive armored counterattack against an Allied force of "929,000 men, 177,000 vehicles, and 586,000 tons of materiel", an order which was impossible to obey. ==Cherbourg and death==