GHQ On the outbreak of war Colonel Harper was placed in charge of the Oa (planning operations and written orders) section at BEF GHQ. The I (intelligence) and Ob (written records) sections were subordinate to Oa, making Oa in practice something of a bottleneck. He had a poor relationship with the BEF chief of staff
Murray, as he was used to working with Murray's deputy and rival
Wilson. On 24 August (the day after the
Battle of Mons) Harper refused to do anything for Murray, so that
Lord Loch had to write messages even though it was not his job. Wilson had to intercede to prevent
Sir John French from sacking Harper (Wilson diary 7 Sep) but a week later recorded (Wilson diary 14 Sep), that Murray and Harper argued constantly.
Robertson (Quarter-Master-General of the BEF) was known to remark - by one account to some visiting politicians at Abbeville in 1914 who saw the letters written on a door - that "Oa" stood for "Old 'Arper". Robertson, now BEF chief of staff, removed Harper – who had been promoted temporary brigadier-general in November - "in a very untactful way" (
Rawlinson diary 29 Jan & 8 Feb 1915) whilst Wilson was away touring the French front. Robertson separated Staff Duties and Intelligence out from Operations into separate sections, each headed by a Brigadier-General. Although Harper's removal was part of a restructuring at GHQ, his successor
Whigham was more focussed and approachable than Harper.
Division commander (front centre), with General
Plumer (behind KGV), Lieutenant General
Godley (on KGV's right) and Major General Harper (on KGV's left), inspecting men of the
New Zealand Division about to entrain at
Steenwerck, France, August 1916. In February 1915, after being promoted to the temporary rank of brigadier general, he succeeded
W. R. B. Doran in command of the
17th Infantry Brigade, part of the
6th Division. and became
general officer commanding (GOC) of the
51st (Highland) Division which saw action during the
Battle of the Somme the following year. remained a favourite of Wilson, and throughout 1916, whilst Wilson commanded
IV Corps, they would – as Andy Simpson puts it – regularly "meet, eat and criticise others". He told Wilson (24 September 1916) that GHQ was out of touch with the troops and had no knowledge and no imagination. Harper's 51st Division took part in the
Battle of the Ancre. He blamed the failure on the creeping barrage being too fast, causing his "impetuous" men to become caught up in their own barrage.
Arras (both in the middle), watching the sports meeting held by the battalion at Bailleul-aux-Cornailles, May 1917. Harper's division also saw action in the
Battle of Arras in spring 1917. Spears described him as "fine-looking, with an aquiline nose and snow-white hair, although his moustache was black". He was known as "Uncle" or, occasionally, "Daddy".
Third Ypres Lieutenant General
Ivor Maxse (GOC
XVIII Corps) wrote a glowing report of Harper's performance between 31 July and 22 September 1917 (he was highly critical of
H. D. Fanshawe of
58th Division and
Cuthbert,
39th Division). Maxse's report stressed Harper's skill both at training and command, and mentioned the improvement in the 51st Division, and recommended him for promotion to corps command. 51st Division took part in
Gough's attacks to assist
Plumer's offensive at
Menin Road (September 1917). In an attempt to economise on soldiers' lives, he attacked with only one brigade, reinforced to six battalions, unlike most divisions which attacked with two brigades ("two up") and one in reserve. However, his division was driven back by German counterattacks.
Cambrai Harper's 51st Division also took part in the
Battle of Cambrai in November 1917. Christopher Baker-Carr later claimed in his memoirs (
From Chauffeur to Brigadier – 1930) that the attack on Flesquieres failed as a result of Harper using his own idiosyncratic tactical drill. Although widely repeated, this claim is dismissed by Bryn Hammond as "plainly rot" – Baker-Carr made no such complaint at the time (he in fact praised the arrangements), it is not corroborated in other contemporary accounts, and it was Baker-Carr's own brigade which failed. To retake Fontaine on 23 November, Harper concurred with the brigade commander Henry Pelham Burn's suggestion to attack with only two of his seven battalions in a misguided attempt to conserve lives. Bryn Hammond attributes Harper's failure to take Flesquieres to a strong German defence, to the holding back of his reserve brigade, and partly to the overextended command and control structure (Harper had sited his HQ too far back, 8,000 yards (over 4.5 miles) behind the original British front line, and 7 miles from Flesquieres). Brigadier-General
Hardress-Lloyd (GOC 3 Tank Brigade) thought Harper "an old ass" and claimed (according to the May 1918 journals of
J.F.C. Fuller) that he had expressed scepticism about the new tactics of infantry advancing in single file ("worms") and had remarked that they should advance in line as if "you were walking arm-in-arm with a girl". Hardress-Lloyd claimed to have retorted "if the late
Oscar Wilde were walking with you, where do you think he would go?” and that Harper almost had to be "carried from the room in an ambulance".
Corps commander church service in France in September 1918. The division's GOC, Major General
Andrew Hamilton Russell, stands in the right foreground. Harper was promoted to temporary lieutenant general and to GOC
IV Corps on 11 March 1918, as part of a reshuffle in which a number of older corps commanders were retired from front-line command. He held this command, part of the
British Third Army under General
Sir Julian Byng, until the end of the war. In September, during the
Hundred Days Offensive, during the period after the
Battle of Albert and whilst Byng's Third Army was advancing towards the
Hindenburg Line, Haldane regularly vented in his diary about Harper's supposed shortcomings. At one point Haldane lobbied the Army commander to urge Harper to make quicker progress, and when Byng pointed out that IV Corps were making progress, recorded "I should "progress" by sending Harper to the rear". Haldane was concerned that Third Army orders gave Harper (on Haldane's right, i.e. southern flank) "an excuse for not coming forward at the same time as my Corps" (22 September). Haldane appealed to Byng, who refused to overrule Harper. Haldane attributed this to their lack of experience of the
NorthWest Frontier. Byng's decision was wrong and Haldane's advance was thus hampered by Harper's failure to seize the high ground. ==Postwar==