Early war Cavalry brigade: Mons to the Marne At the outbreak of war in August 1914, Gough took the
3rd Cavalry Brigade to France, under the command of
Allenby (GOC
Cavalry Division). On 22 August one of Gough's artillery batteries was the first British battery to open fire on the Germans. The brigade fought at the
Battle of Mons (23 August). During the following days Gough detached himself from Allenby's command and linked up with Haig's
I Corps on the BEF right. Allenby publicly laughed this off as "only Gough's little way" but was privately furious at French (Commander-in-Chief of the
British Expeditionary Force (BEF)) and Haig's tolerance of Gough's behaviour; relations between Allenby and Gough were strained thereafter. The brigade fought at the
Battle of Le Cateau (26 August). By 1 September they were at
Villers-Cotterêts, south of the
Aisne, after a retreat of 180 miles (100 miles as the crow flies), assisting a rearguard of
Irish Guards (part of I Corps) in the last major action of the retreat. On 5 September Gough linked up for the first time with British transport and supplies.
Cavalry division By the time of the
Battle of the Marne 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades had been formed into "Gough's Command", an
ad hoc cavalry force separate from Allenby's Cavalry Division. On 15 September Gough's Command, with the addition of supporting troops, was formed into
2nd Cavalry Division and he was appointed
GOC on 16 September. 2nd Cavalry Division was on the BEF western flank, and tried to turn the German west flank, but was ordered to halt by Allenby. On 14 October Gough linked up with Rawlinson's
IV Corps moving down from the coast, removing the danger of being cut off. Gough advanced again but met new German forces trying to turn the
British flank; Gough was promoted
major-general on 26 October backdated to 15 September. From 30 October to the night of 31 October – 1 November Gough's small division, assisted by
Indian and
London Scottish Territorial troops, held Messines-Wytschaete Ridge against a strong attack from the south-east by
Max von Fabeck. ,
Joseph Joffre and
Sir Douglas Haig (left to right) visit the front line in 1915. Gough is on the extreme right, next to
Sir Henry Wilson. Gough's division returned to the front at
Hooge, near Ypres, on 12 February 1915. On 13 February he was offered a command in the planned
Salonika expedition (in the event these troops were sent to
Gallipoli) but declined after consulting his brother and BEF Chief of Staff
"Wully" Robertson. Johnnie Gough died of wounds later in February. Haig asked for Gough to be attached to his forces in case he "br[oke] the enemy line" at
Neuve Chapelle (10–13 March); Gough's division was in GHQ Reserve for that battle.
Infantry division Gough was appointed GOC of
7th Division on 18 April 1915, part of Rawlinson's IV Corps, itself part of Haig's
First Army; Gough may have been appointed as a counterbalance to Rawlinson, with whom Haig had a wary relationship. 7th division was in reserve at
Second Ypres (22 April). Gough commanded 7th Division at the Battle of Aubers Ridge in May. It was in corps reserve on 9 May, and that night was ordered to relieve 8th Division in the line, ready to attack the next day. After protests from the brigadiers that the support trenches were full of men – alive, wounded and dead – Gough cancelled the relief on his own authority. He expected to be disciplined by Rawlinson, but instead his division was redeployed to the sector of
Charles Monro's I Corps, where diversionary attacks were to be mounted to assist the French. Monro gave Gough and his artillery officer
"Curly" Birch great freedom. They bombarded for a few minutes, leaving a gap to tempt the Germans out of their shelters (repeated several times in preceding days), bringing some guns forward on muffled wheels for surprise. The assault began at 3:15 am on 16 May; the right of 7th Division was the only part of I Corps attack to succeed. The next day Gough made little further progress despite help from almost every First Army gun in range.
Corps commander: Loos Planning Gough was appointed GOC I Corps, still part of Haig's First Army, and promoted temporary
lieutenant-general on 13 July 1915. During the upcoming Battle of Loos Haig (13 August) had asked Gough to plan to take the
Hohenzollern Redoubt (roughly north-east), while Rawlinson's IV Corps was to take
Loos and possibly Hill 70 (roughly south-east) to open a gap for the reserves to push due east to take
Hulluch. Gough (22 August) proposed that
9th (Scottish) Division should "rush" the German positions on his left (Hohenzollern Redoubt, Fosse 8) just before dawn (4 am) after a barrage and
gas attack, while the following night 7th Division would push through the Quarries to Citie St Elie.
Gough's attacks On 25 September chlorine gas was released to assist the British attack, despite unfavourable wind likely to blow it back over British troops. Although Captain
Ernest Gold (meteorological officer) and Maj-Gen
Henry Horne (GOC 2nd Division) were later blamed,
Charles Foulkes (the gas officer) later hinted that "still higher authority" may have been responsible, and a gas officer Lt Sewill recorded being told that the order came from Gough. At 5:20 am Gough had advised Haig that it was too late to cancel the gas release. However,
Nick Lloyd argues that the fault lay with Haig for agreeing to the plan. On Gough's left 2nd Division met heavy losses. On Gough's right 7th Division captured the enemy first line with heavy loss. Gough was away from his HQ for two hours trying to discover why 28 Brigade (in his centre) were not making progress. Major-General
George Thesiger, GOC
9th (Scottish) Division, "dissociated" himself from Gough's orders to attack again at noon. Orders reached the two forward battalions just before noon; they attacked hastily at heavy loss. The divisional history (1921) was scathing about this episode, of which Gough's memoirs later made little mention. Nick Lloyd argues that Gough displayed the impatient aggression for which he was later to become notorious. Gough later recorded in his memoirs that he himself had been under great pressure from Haig to attack and make progress.
Ousting of Sir John French Gough began a corps-level inquiry into the lessons of the battle (10 October), which was followed by a First Army inquiry (20 October). Gough's inquiry found that attacks had been stymied by lack of grenades, but had come close to a breakthrough where the wind had carried British gas over the German lines. Gough was one of the senior officers who criticised French's command of the BEF to
Lord Haldane (9 October 1915) and King
George V (24 October 1915). Haig succeeded French, who was forced to "resign" as C-in-C.
Military ideas Gough later commented on the draft of the
Official History (1926) that a limited attack at Loos would have been more sensible, as it could have been reinforced if
Joseph Joffre's offensive succeeded, and was critical of Haig for – as so often – attempting to achieve decisive victory with insufficient means. Notes from a conference held by Gough on 20 December 1915 show that he still thought in terms of the principles of warfare as taught at Staff College: he still expected an "advance guard" to move forward until, after two or three days, a plan had been decided on for deploying the bulk of British forces, whereas in reality, by 1917, the opening day would often prove the most effective. Like many British generals, he blamed the failures of 1915 on human error in applying the principles of warfare, rather than on the need to concentrate artillery, learn new tactics, and allow senior officers to gain experience.
The Somme 1916 Initial phases Training cavalry and plans for exploitation Haig told Gough, who in January 1916 was made
KCB, to be prepared to take I Corps up to Flanders. Haig had not completely abandoned his hopes of a Flanders offensive at least as late as June. Gough was appointed GOC Reserve Corps, which was to exploit any breakthrough achieved at the Somme, on 4 April 1916. Gough spent most of the next two months supervising the training of the cavalry divisions. Gough's staff had to liaise with
XIII and
XV Corps (on the right of General Sir
Henry Rawlinson's
Fourth Army) to draw up contingency plans in case "things went as we hoped for" and with Lieutenant General
Claud Jacob, whose II Corps was also earmarked for the exploitation. By mid-June Gough was also training the
1st Indian Cavalry Division and
2nd Indian Cavalry Division. In May, after discussions with Rawlinson, Gough proposed to use a cavalry brigade in the north (the
Ancre Valley) and another in the south (
Montauban), to assist if the Germans collapsed. Haig, thinking the ground unsuitable, vetoed his suggestion that a further entire cavalry division should be used in the north to help roll up the enemy second line. Reserve Corps was renamed Reserve Army on 22 May 1916, Haig told Gough (diary 27 June) he was "too inclined to aim at fighting a battle at Bapaume" but should instead aim to push on, before the Germans had a chance to attack him from the north. Haig would have preferred Gough to take command of the two left hand corps (
VIII Corps and
X Corps) prior to the attack but instead, that evening, approved Rawlinson's plan for Gough to set up HQ at Albert as soon as the Pozières Heights had fallen. By now Reserve Army had three infantry and three cavalry divisions. Research by Stephen Badsey among the surviving evidence suggests that the final plan was for Gough to exploit any breakthrough with the
25th Division, followed by two of the three cavalry divisions, then the II Corps (three divisions). Gough visited Rawlinson in the afternoon (the third time that day) but was told that there would be no breakthrough that day, so he ordered cavalry to return to billets. At 7 pm Rawlinson put Gough in command of X and VIII Corps (the northern sector of the Somme front), with orders to "push them on again". In the early hours of 3 July, Rawlinson ordered Gough to renew the attack, orders which Haig then countermanded. Gough was ordered to attack towards
Schwaben Redoubt to rescue British survivors of 1 July. Despite Haig and Rawlinson's preference for minor attacks, they allowed Gough to
attack a salient south-east of Thiepval, with six battalions. Sheffield wrote that the attack was "a complete shambles", but Gough was not entirely to blame and that it typified the "chaos" of British operations at that stage. Gough later claimed to have regretted the attack. In the afternoon of 3 July, Reserve Army was formally made independent of Fourth Army. Over the following months most of the shells and heavy artillery would be supporting Rawlinson's efforts, and although Gough was given extra guns later, he never had as many as Fourth Army. Haig's orders were to "sap" with small penetrations to open up he German lines to flanking attacks. Kiggell (BEF Chief of Staff) wrote Gough a memo (4 July) that his role was to assist Rawlinson by pinning down German reserves and that he was to keep within his allotted quantity of shells. In July Gough believed that frequent small narrow-front attacks would keep the Germans "off balance" with low British casualties, but they allowed the Germans to concentrate their fire, contributing to the massive British losses of that month. Gough was promoted to temporary
general on 7 July 1916, aged just 45. The Reserve Army took Ovillers on 16 July.
Summer Pozières The slaughter of 1 July had shown that the German positions on VIII Corps sector and much of X Corps sector were too strong to attack frontally. Until early September Gough attacked with two divisions of X Corps, later assisted by the newly arrived II Corps to assist Rawlinson's left flank, but on only two occasions before 3 September, were efforts coordinated with Fourth Army and one of those (22/23 July) by accident. This was the most important attack yet expected of Gough. Walker later wrote that he had to demand extra artillery, and only obtained permission to attack from the south east rather than the south west (the direction of previous unsuccessful attacks) as Gough wanted after taking Edward "Moses" Beddington, a staff officer whom Gough trusted, with him to reconnoitre the position. Gough later claimed (letter to Edmonds in 1939) he had given Walker no choice but had
himself ordered the change in the direction of the attack. The attack was delayed until 12:30 am on the night of 22/23 July and Pozières was taken, partly as a result of planning and partly as tired German troops were being relieved by fresh troops. The fall of Pozières on 22/23 July was the most successful part of a Big Push involving eight divisions, spread across five corps, from Pozières on the left to
Guillemont on Rawlinson's right.
Clashes with subordinates Gough used his corps as "postboxes", whereas Rawlinson was more tolerant of debate and discussion. Gough was reluctant to allow corps their normal role of control of artillery (which he centralised at Army level under Brigadier-General Tancred) and in planning operations.
Neill Malcolm (Chief of Staff Reserve Army) recorded several instances in his diary (6 July, 13 July, 18 July) of corps commanders chafing at his "interference".
Aylmer Hunter-Weston (GOC VIII Corps) wrote to his wife (3 August) that his staff were glad to be moving to the Second Army at Ypres, that Reserve Army staff had not run smoothly and that although he liked Gough and thought him "a good soldier ... he is hardly a big minded enough man to make a really good Army Commander". Gough also clashed badly with
Philip Howell, Chief of Staff of II Corps, who thought Gough "very loveable in many ways", if perhaps not quite sane, and "really quite a child & can be managed like one if treated as such & humoured". By late July and throughout August 1916 Howell complained repeatedly about Army-level micromanagement, with Reserve Army allegedly even taking direct control of four of 12th Division machine guns during an attack on 2 August. Howell claimed (29 August 1916) that
Claud Jacob (II Corps),
Edward Perceval (
49th Division) and even Malcolm (!) were terrified of Gough. Gough thought Howell a "great thorn" who spent much time "trying to argue", avoiding fighting and disobeying orders. Howell was killed by shellfire in September. Gough also clashed with
Lord Cavan (
XIV Corps) (3 August).
Mouquet Farm Gough ordered further attacks to seize the German OG1 and OG2 trenches north of Pozières, and to take Mouquet Farm (which lies approximately between Pozières and Thiepval). The first attack, by tired troops in the dark, failed.
1st Australian Division were withdrawn on 25 July and replaced by
2nd Australian Division.
Gary Sheffield & Daniel Todman argue that Gough's "direct operational control" of 2nd Australian Division on 29 July contributed to the failure of that attack, as Gough pressured Maj-Gen
James Gordon Legge to attack before preparations were complete. The German positions were on a reverse slope, so wire and machine gun positions could not be destroyed by bombardment.
Charles Bean blamed Legge for not standing up to Gough, and wrote that
Brudenell White blamed himself for not doing so, although Sheffield argues that this is not entirely fair, as Legge, a "colonial", should have had more support from Corps level. By the end of July it was clear that the Germans were not about to crumble as Haig had hoped, and on 2 August he ordered Reserve Army to conduct methodical attacks in the area from Pozières to Mouquet Farm and
Ovillers, as economically with men and munitions as possible, so as to draw in German reserves and thus assist with Rawlinson's attacks on Gough's right flank. Haig recorded (diary 3 August) that Gough had demanded "reasons in writing" from Legge, after the failure of the Australian attack. Gough had written to
William Birdwood (1 ANZAC Corps Commander) demanding an explanation and asking if the attack would have succeeded given "greater energy and foresight on the part of the higher commanders". Birdwood refused to pass this note on to Legge as he thought it was "essential to give (him) a fair trial". Legge's second attack on Mouquet Farm, was better planned and succeeded on 4 August. Gough almost pushed Maj-Gen
Robert Fanshawe (
48th Division) (25 August) to the point of resignation. In over a month of fighting II Corps and I ANZAC Corps advanced towards Mouquet Farm and Thiepval. The BEF (not just ANZACs but also the 12th,
25th, 48th divisions and the
Canadian Corps) suffered approximately 20,000 casualties in these attacks from 7 August to 12 September. The ANZACs had suffered 23,000 casualties in six weeks, a similar loss to what they had endured in eight months at Gallipoli. Prior & Wilson criticised Gough for his responsibility for what they called "the Mouquet Farm fiasco", not least because at some point in September (documentary evidence of the exact date has not been found) Gough had changed his mind and decided to attack Thiepval solely from the front, rather than trying to outflank it via Mouquet Farm. In August, clearly still hopeful that decisive victory could be attained on the Somme, Gough wrote to one of his nephews: "We are breaking in bit by bit and we must not stop until we have made the gap. It would be terrible to ask our men to begin their attacks all over again on fresh defences next year."
Autumn Initial attack on Thiepval A conference was held on 23 August to plan the attack on Thiepval, and the
V Corps Chief of Staff (Brig-Gen
Gerald Boyd) later brushed aside the GOC
6th Division's objections that an afternoon attack was unwise. The next day detailed plans for each division's attack were issued not at corps level but by Reserve Army. V Corps, extending Reserve Army operations into the Ancre valley for the first time, attacked towards St Pierre Divion and
Schwaben Redoubt (north of Thiepval) to attack Thiepval from the north. II Corps (48th and 25th Divisions, moved up in mid-August) attacked Thiepval. These attacks failed. 4th Australian Division gained part of Fabeck Graben Redoubt north of Mouquet Farm, which was then lost by the Canadian Corps when it relieved 1 ANZAC Corps in the line. The attack by
39th and 49th divisions (part of II Corps) failed, with some battalions taking between 30% and 50% casualties. Gough attributed the failure to lack of "martial qualities", lack of "discipline and motivation", "ignorance on the part of the Commanding officers" and "poor spirit in the men", to which Claud Jacob, GOC II Corps, added "want of direction", "stage fright", and cowardice on the part of the brigadier, while also commenting adversely on the lack of casualties among the C.O.s. V Corps, at Reserve Army's insistence, sent a detailed critique of the operation to 39th Division.
Assisting Rawlinson's offensive Gough had submitted (28 August) an ambitious plan for the capture of
Courcelette on his right flank. This was rejected by
Launcelot Kiggell, who told him that he was to continue to conduct limited operations to assist Rawlinson with the
Battle of Flers–Courcelette the next Fourth Army attack, which, if successful, would enable
Rawlinson to attack Thiepval (on Gough's front) from the rear. In the event Haig changed his mind at the last moment. II and V Corps were also to make feint attacks at Thiepval. The Canadian assault on Courcelette was a great success. Gough wrote (to his brother Johnnie's widow Dorothea, 23 September 1916) that many corps and division commanders were "incompetent" and that "considerable exercise of firmness" was needed to get them to obey orders. Gough's plan was for 18th Division to capture Thiepval and Schwaben Redoubt, 11th Division to capture Mouquet Farm and Zollern and
Stuff Redoubts (roughly north of Mouquet Farm) while on the right 1st and 2nd Canadian divisions were to attack from Courcelette to Regina Trench which lay just beyond the ridge line. Gough allocated all seven of his tanks (five of which broke down before reaching the lines) to the Canadians. This was the heaviest barrage yet fired by Reserve Army, assisted by an indirect machine gun barrage into the German rear areas. Gough had 570 field guns and 270 howitzers to attack along a front (roughly twice the concentration of 1 July, but only half that of the Battle of Bazentin Ridge on 14 July and much the same as that of the Battle of Flers–Courcelette on 15 September. Allenby's Third Army was to co-operate with an attack on Gough's left flank (Haig diary 24 September 30 September). In the event poor weather delayed the attacks until the early afternoon of 25 September. As Gough planned to use a few tanks to assist his attack, Haig ordered him to delay until the following morning when they could be concealed in the morning mist but in the event further delays, for which the reason is unclear, meant that Gough attacked at 12:35 pm on 26 September, exactly a day after Rawlinson and Foch. This fighting demonstrated that, either attacking German positions with proper artillery support, or in hand-to-hand fighting in which artillery support mattered little, British volunteer infantry could fight as well as the Germans. The same would prove true in November. Gough's capture of Thiepval (an original objective for 1 July) preserved his status with Commander-in-Chief. He recommended aiming for deep advances into enemy positions, with troops attacking up to five consecutive preassigned objectives, with waves aiming for predetermined objectives in a conveyor-belt approach. Each brigade was to attack in up to eight "waves": two battalions, making up the first four waves, were to take the first objective and another two battalions, perhaps deployed in columns for speed of movement, would then take the second, with
no battalions held in brigade-level reserve (the argument being that orders would never reach them in time). He recommended that each
division attack with two brigades and hold a third
brigade in reserve, ready to take the third objective, by which time the first two brigades would have been reorganised to take the fourth objective. The fifth objective would require fresh troops. Gough agreed with Haig's suggestion (Haig diary 8 October) that "the deterioration of the Enemy's fighting qualities" meant that it was not necessary for British troops to be protected by a barrage once they had captured an enemy position, as this would hamper reserves from pushing on to the next objective. General
Tom Bridges later wrote (in "Alarms and Excursions") that "With the true cavalry spirit, (Gough) was always for pushing on". Rawlinson (diary 9 October) recorded his concerns at Gough's "hourush tactics and no reserves, as they are not sound". The fighting at Thiepval went on until November and was later criticised by the Official Historian for lack of co-ordination and excessive reliance on infantry
elan. Haig issued orders (29 September) for further advances by Reserve and Fourth Armies. Gough was to attack Loupart Wood from the south and
Beaumont-Hamel from the west. The plan was for Reserve Army to advance and capture more ground in one battle than in three months of campaigning. On 8 October, the
1st and
3rd Canadian divisions, on Gough's right flank, assisted another of Rawlinson's offensives by attacking unsuccessfully towards
Le Sars and Regina Trench, only to be held up by German wire. Speaking to Haig that afternoon, Gough blamed the 3rd Canadian Division, claiming that in some cases they had not even left their trenches. Stuff Redoubt fell (9 October) to a battalion of 25th Division. Schwaben Redoubt was attacked unsuccessfully (9 October) in a surprise night attack with no barrage, then successfully on 14 October after a two-day bombardment. These costly penny-packet attacks sometimes involved little more than a single battalion. After two weeks of rain had rendered plans for exploitation unrealistic, Gough issued a new, more cautious plan (15 October), in which 45 tanks were to be used, although he was still under pressure from Haig to exploit to the north and north-east. Stuff and Regina Trenches (which ran approximately west–east north of a line from Thiepval to Courcelette) were then captured in a major attack by
35th, 25th,
18th and
4th Canadian divisions, completing the capture of the Ancre Heights. The battle testified to the revived German defence after their panic of September. Wilson, whom Gough had disliked since the
Curragh incident, commanded
IV Corps first alongside then under Gough in 1916. Wilson commented in his diary (21 October) on reports of Gough micro-managing divisions and even brigades. That autumn
Edward Loch, 2nd Baron Loch told Wilson "Goughie is the best hated & most useless & most dangerous General we have got". After the success of 21 October, Gough once again presented more ambitious plans, with Haig offering (24 October) to place an extra two cavalry divisions (for three in total) at his disposal – this at a time when even quite minor infantry attacks on Fourth Army sector were having to be cancelled because of mud. Gough complained that Brigadier-General
Percy Radcliffe (chief of staff, Canadian Corps) "made unnecessary difficulties" (Haig Diary 30 October 1916). After continuous rain between 24 October and 3 November, Fifth Army was ordered (5 November) to conduct only a "limited" attack and authorised to wait until the weather was good enough. Haig sent
Launcelot Kiggell (Chief of Staff BEF) to Gough's HQ (8 November) to explain the motivation for the attack, although Kiggell stressed that Haig did not want the attack to proceed unless there were good prospects of success. The aim was to pin down German troops which might otherwise have been sent to
Romania, to impress on the Russians that the BEF was still fighting, as well as strengthening Haig's hand in the
inter-Allied conference due to start at Chantilly on 15 November, at which the possible transfer of Western Allied troops to
Salonika was to be discussed. Gough later recorded that the first murmurings against Haig's leadership were beginning to be heard in London. Gough then consulted his corps commanders (10 November):
Claud Jacob (II Corps) was persuaded to try for deeper objectives as
Edward Fanshawe (V Corps) and
Walter Congreve (XIII Corps) wanted. The attack was agreed for 13 November. Staff officers and patrols inspected the ground and Gough (10–11 November) visited six divisional commanders and ten brigadiers, also seeing two battalion commanders at each brigade headquarters. He had asked his corps commanders to make similar inquiries. He found no consensus as to whether or not the ground was dry enough. The start time was set for 5:45 am after further consultations with Jacob, Fanshawe and divisional commanders. Sheffield comments that this sequence of events indicates that Haig enjoyed warmer relations with Gough than with, say, Rawlinson, but also suggests that he felt the need to supervise him closely. He also comments that although Gough consulted his subordinates, it is unclear that he took their advice: Simon Robbins quotes evidence of warnings from some corps, division and brigade staffs that troops were exhausted and conditions too poor to attack. Neill Malcolm's
Memorandum on Operations (13 November 1916) recorded the political reasons for the attack.
Initial success The Ancre attack employed 282 heavy guns and a creeping barrage, over an area which had not been heavily fought over so far, thus allowing men and guns to be moved more easily over relatively undisturbed ground. The volume of shells exceeded that put on the entire enemy line on 1 July. Lessons were also learned from previous battles: a mine was blown at Beaumont-Hamel, simultaneously with the commencement of the artillery barrage, far more successfully than the mine which had been blown in the same area 10 minutes prior to the infantry assault on 1 July. The attack began at 5:45 am, behind an effective creeping barrage, with the German machine guns on the crest behind Beaumont-Hamel completely suppressed by 40 guns specifically given this task. The attack succeeded in the southern sector, where the
63rd Royal Naval Division took Beaucourt by 10:45 am, albeit with some attacking battalions taking 40–50% casualties, and the
51st Highland Division took Beaumont-Hamel and St Pierre Divion, where the French practice was adopted of assigning a 4.5 inch howitzer to shell the entrance of each German dugout until the "mopping-up" platoons had reached them. However, further north in V Corps sector the attack on
Serre was less successful because of mud and uncut wire, despite Gough visiting the sector at 2 pm to order further attacks. Those who fought at Beaumont Hamel thought it had been well-planned. Haig wrote in his diary (13 November) "the success has come at a most opportune moment". Brigadier-General
Archibald Fraser Home of the Cavalry Corps noted (15 November) that the rumours that Gough was to be promoted to Commander-in-Chief in Haig's place were "too comic as I don't think they could ever make him do what they wanted".
Final stages After the first attempt to take Munich and Frankfort trenches (15 November) failed, the commanders of 2nd and 51st Divisions were asked for detailed reports. Maj-Gen
George Harper (GOC 51st Division) blamed the slowness of the creeping barrage, which caused his "impetuous" men to suffer casualties from friendly fire, and the fact that the attack had not been "under one command". Maj-Gen
William George Walker (GOC 2nd Division) commented that the attack had been too hurried, as his troops had not been familiar with the ground, and that Fanshawe (GOC V Corps) had rejected his requests for a delay and for a daylight attack. Gough forced 2nd Division to attack for two consecutive days despite protests from its commander (Walker) and chief of staff that the ground was impassable. Malcolm issued a confidential memo to Corps Commanders (16 November) complaining about their tendency to query and argue about orders. The attacks on 18 November suffered around 10,000 casualties. One officer of II Corps later wrote to Edmonds (in 1936) that it had been a "cruel useless sacrifice of life" with men dead from exhaustion in trying to crawl out of the mud, and that given the weather it was obvious "to the very stupidest brain that no success could possibly result". Haig called off the battle. Kiggell later wrote to Edmonds (in 1938) "the later stages of the fight were hardly justified, but Gough was so keen and confident the C-in-C decided to permit them". Gough rebuked Fanshawe in writing (21 November) for lack of grip, and for failing to issue detailed written artillery orders, during 15 November attack. On his copy of the report, against the comment that copies of Gough's remarks were to be sent to the two divisional commanders, Fanshawe wrote "I hope not all of them" and protested in the margin that he had been in telephone contact with divisions throughout. Simpson criticises Gough for his "poor reasoning and indifference to the views of the men on the spot", although he is also critical of Fanshawe for attempting to blame his own subordinates. Sheffield writes "Some of Gough's points were fair, if harshly expressed, but others were not; some were based on factual inaccuracies. All this suggests a commander who had an incomplete grasp of the realities of the battle." He also remarks on Gough's deliberate humiliation of Fanshawe in front of the latter's subordinates. Walker was relieved of command of 2nd Division on 27 December.
Michael Howard cited Gough's love of micro-managing divisions as evidence that he had been overpromoted, and Gary Sheffield concedes that Gough's reputation for touring the trenches to spot dirty rifles suggests that he had found it hard to adapt to his greater responsibilities. Sheffield argues that Gough's behaviour was to some extent an attempt to answer the dilemma noted by Malcolm (diary 29 June 1916). The BEF had recently grown from 7 divisions to 70 – the Army had not anticipated or trained for the challenges of officers having to command large formations, nor for trench warfare, nor for the difficulties in communication (which would remain until battlefield radios came into use) involved. Officers' personalities, and how they related with one another, mattered a great deal in how they managed these changes. Some of Gough's ideas were adopted in other armies: Fourth Army's document
Artillery Lessons of the Battle of the Somme (18 November) reflected Gough's prescriptive approach rather than the delegation encouraged under
Field Service Regulations, or practised by Rawlinson during the Somme. He was awarded the
GCVO in 1917. Limited operations were conducted between 10 January and 13 February (at which point there was a cold snap), to seize points of high ground off the enemy. In mid February, having heard reports that the German trenches opposite were thinly held, Gough ordered his divisional commanders to prepare for a general advance. Reconnaissance was hampered by German air superiority. Beginning on the night of 23/4 February the Germans conducted a limited withdrawal on the Ancre Heights which allowed operations to be stepped up by
63rd,
18th and 2nd Divisions, and by 1 ANZAC Corps. Fifth Army occupied
Miraumont, Serre and
Pys. Brigadier-General
Hanway Cumming later (in 1922) recalled Gough's visit to the headquarters of
91st Brigade in February 1917. Gough's demands for an immediate advance were impractical owing to the state of the ground and the exhaustion of his troops, and only Gough's departure had allowed his staff to get on with preparing the next day's operations. With relations between the French Commander-in-Chief
Robert Nivelle and the British generals becoming particularly strained, Nivelle asked the British government (7 March 1917) that Haig be sacked and replaced by Gough. Haig openly confronted Gough about the rumours (which
Lord Esher had recorded in his diary on 9 March). Gough, to his own ultimate detriment (and unlike Haig) made little effort to cultivate the press. Gough's own view of the Calais Scheme to place the BEF under Nivelle's command was that it would leave Britain a puppet of
France as
Serbia and
Romania were of
Russia, and
Austria-Hungary of
Germany, and correspondingly likely to be cheated at the peace conference after the war. Fifth Army stormed the German intermediate line, which had been reached by the end of February, on 10 March.
Advance to the Hindenburg Line, Arras and Bullecourt Haig had ordered Gough to prepare a major offensive, in "bites" but with "the object of breaking the enemy's front and attracting as many of his reserves as possible" to coincide with Allenby's offensive, originally due to start on or after 15 March. On 14 March V Corps was repulsed from
Bucquoy on the north of Gough's sector; Gough later claimed that he had thought the enemy defences too strong but had permitted the attack at the request of the corps commander. Building on his experiences on the Aisne in September 1914, Gough formed mixed brigades of infantry, cavalry, artillery and engineers during the German withdrawal to the
Hindenburg Line in mid March. 2–9 April saw costly fighting on the outskirts of the Hindenburg Line. Simkins writes that "(Haig) yet again indulged Gough's tendency to launch precipitate and ill-considered attacks", while Prior & Wilson describe the attack as "singularly barren". Bullecourt became known as the "Blood Tub". Gough was ordered (Haig diary 14 April) to prepare to "pierce" the Hindenburg Line "astride the Bapaume–Cambrai Road" if Allenby's main attack made sufficient progress. Gough attended an Army commanders' conference on 16 April. With the Arras offensive bogging down, he later declined to conduct further infantry attacks as part of the 23 April push, restricting his efforts to artillery only. At the Army Commanders' Conference on 30 April 1917 Haig, who had just been told that Nivelle was to be sacked, still expected
Italian and (contrary to the
War Office view) Russian offensives to take place that year. He told the Army commanders that he was not entirely clear what the BEF would be doing for the rest of the year but that he wanted to "shift the centre of gravity up to the Second Army". In the afternoon after the conference he told Gough that he was to command the proposed Flanders Offensive, and ordered him to speak to Colonel
Norman MacMullen (who had presented plans, later abandoned, for a tank-led assault at Ypres) and visit the workshop at
Érin, where tanks were being prepared for
Operation Hush, a proposed amphibious landing on the Belgian Coast. Sanders Marble writes: "The results could largely have been predicted before so many lives were lost. Hasty attacks failed with heavy losses. Once adequate time was allowed for preparations the village was finally wrested from the Germans ... it was not the BEF's finest hour" Bullecourt "did not win many plaudits" and further worsened Gough's reputation in the eyes of the Australians. Haig's admiring biographer
John Terraine later wrote that putting Gough in charge of the early stages of Third Ypres was "Haig's greatest and most fatal error". The war correspondent
Charles à Court Repington and the CIGS, General
William Robertson, agreed with one another as early as 5 July 1917 that Plumer should have been chosen because of his knowledge of the Ypres Salient, and Gough himself later came to agree. Gough later wrote highly of Maxse (
XVIII Corps), Jacob (II Corps) and Congreve (XIII Corps), his corps commanders in 1917, although not of
Herbert Watts (
XIX Corps). However, Simon Robbins suggests that the "climate of fear" still pervaded throughout Fifth Army in 1917 and even into 1918. Gough held his first corps commanders' conference on 24 May 1917, before he had moved his HQ to the Ypres sector – the composition of divisions and corps for Third Ypres had already been chosen by this point. Simpson argues that by this time, possibly because staff officers had become more experienced at their jobs, Fifth Army's approach appears to have become "more hands-off and consultative" than in 1916, e.g. suggesting that each corps hold two divisions in the front and two in reserve. On 30 May Gough moved his HQ to Lovie Château two miles outside
Poperinge, and the HQ was up and running by 2 June. Much of the tactical discussion concerned how far the British infantry should realistically be expected to push. The immediate targets were the Black Line, just under forward, the Green Line further on and the Red Line further. Gough agreed with Maxse's proposal (31 May) for attacks just before sunset (giving troops more rest prior to the attack, and the Germans less time to counterattack) and advancing further than the Black Line to the River Steenbeck. Gough agreed that opportunities had gone to waste at Arras (9 April) as the initial attack had not been pressed hard enough. At the next corps commanders' conference (6 June) Gough declared that "should the enemy be thoroughly demoralised during the initial attack, it might be possible to gain portions of the Red Line (at that stage still a second day's objective) during the first 24 hours," although he was keen to distinguish between a bold attack against a crumbling enemy and "an organized attack against ... organized resistance". A document circulated on 7 June stressed that platoon, company and battalion commanders were to be urged to act with initiative to seize ground, in the hope of repeating the successes of 1 July 1916 (the First Day of the Somme, on the southern part of the British line), 13 November 1916 (the first day of the Ancre) or 9 April 1917 (the first day of Arras). Simpson comments that as adequate field artillery support on the first day would only extend as far as the Green Line in places, "a repulse was almost inevitable" for those units which pushed on further, and that Gough still did not appear to realise that an offensive might stall because of stronger German resistance and counter-attacks, rather than from lack of initiative among junior officers.
Failure to exploit Messines After his victory at
Messines, and in accordance with prior plans, Plumer ordered II and VIII Corps to exploit German disorganisation by attacking the Gheluveld Plateau. When their patrols encountered resistance (8 June), Haig asked Plumer to launch this attack at once, instead of waiting three days to redeploy sixty heavy and medium guns as arranged. When Plumer, after consultation with his corps commanders, declined to be rushed in this way, Haig placed II and VIII Corps under Gough's command, ordering him to prepare to seize the area around Stirling Castle. Gough, despite being given Plumer's plan (9 June), did not then make any such attack, and at the next Army Commanders' Conference (14 June) stated that he had not wanted to push his men into the small salient which such an attack would achieve, and that he wished to attack the Gheluveld Plateau
simultaneously with his main attack (Gough later described this as "a slight change of plan" and also claimed that he did not want to rush into an advance because of his experience at Bullecourt). Haig approved this, and stated at the conference that he hoped to capture Passchendaele–Staden–Klerken Ridge on 25 July. The failure to seize the Gheluveld Plateau (the German Army Group Commander,
Crown Prince Rupprecht, had recorded in his diary on 9 June that the area might have to be abandoned) was to have unhappy consequences. Besides the four divisions of II and VIII Corps (VIII Corps, still under
Aylmer Hunter-Weston, was soon moved out of the sector) Gough was also given another four of Plumer's divisions at the end of June, together with two from GHQ Reserve. Another six were transferred from Horne's First Army. (This makes a total of 16 divisions: Farrar-Hockley states that he also had a division in Army reserve, with another in GHQ Reserve close by). Plumer, now left with only 12 divisions, was also required to transfer half his artillery and all his tanks to Gough.
Final plans The Germans had between five and seven (on the Gheluveld Plateau) defensive lines, and their positions had been strengthened since mid-June by Colonel
Fritz von Lossberg. The fourth position, Flandern I, was away. Intelligence reports, filed mistakenly with the Messines operations in the
Australian War Memorial, show that Fifth Army was largely aware of the digging of the German defences throughout June. After another corps commanders' conference on 26 June, results of the discussions were published as orders. Gough planned a four-phase attack across a front of : "a series of organised battles". First the enemy's front system (the crest of Pilckem Ridge and the edge of Shrewsbury forest on the Gheluveld Plateau) was to be taken, then the second line after a pause of 30 minutes. After a pause of four hours the third objective was to be attacked – advancing to the River Steenbeek, entering Polygon Wood and taking the German third line, in front of which lay their field (as opposed to heavy) artillery and counterattack reserves – for a planned advance of in total, i.e. up to the Green Line. Army was to control artillery initially, which would then be delegated to corps an hour after the third objective had been taken. There would then, "without any settled pause" and "either immediately or within a few hours" be a fourth phase: an extra , taking the attackers to Passchendaele Ridge itself at Broodseinde, with the left flank along Gravenstafel spur to Gravenstafel and Langemarck (the Red Line). Although the
strength of the fourth advance was to be left to the discretion of divisional commanders, Gough, in the words of the Official Historian, "instead of confining his first day's operation to a short fixed advance, was in favour of going as far as he could", and more than twice as deep than Rawlinson and Plumer had earlier recommended. All available heavy artillery was to be ready to lay a protective barrage in front of the fourth objective, where Gough expected that resistance by German reserves would be met. However, if little opposition was met, a further advance was to be made that same afternoon to Passchendaele Village itself (technically a fifth objective, although not specifically numbered as such), an objective which Gough more realistically hoped to attain on the third or fourth day. Haig did not interfere, and Gough would later tell the Official Historian that Haig had hoped to reach the Belgian coast within a matter of weeks. Brigadier-General
"Tavish" Davidson, Director of Military Operations at GHQ, now (25 June) proposed that Gough make jumps of "not less than and not more than ", while also recommending jumps of only about a mile (). This would enable greater concentration of artillery fire, while attacking troops would be less disorganised and less vulnerable to counterattack, as well as being better able to maintain their morale and to be relieved by fresh troops, ready for an advance to the Red Line three days later. Although Davidson later wrote that Haig had seen and approved his memorandum, Haig's diary makes no mention of it. Gough's response to the memorandum declared himself "in agreement" with the "broad principles" of "a continuous succession of organised attacks" but criticised Davidson's suggestion that major attack could be mounted every three days, Gough thinking ten days a more realistic interval. Gough and Maxse (who wrote "BALLS!" on his copy of Davidson's paper) agreed with one another that opportunities for further advance should be taken, and blamed the failures at Arras after 11 April, on renewed attacks without adequate artillery preparation. By Davidson's later account, at a conference on 28 June, Plumer also favoured permitting local commanders to attempt a deeper advance. Gough would later claim (in the 1940s) that he had wanted a shallower advance but had been overruled by Haig and Plumer – this appears to be at best a false recollection, if not a lie. Simpson wrote that Gough's wish to allow infantry to push forward was "more cautious than is usually supposed". Rawlinson was not involved in these discussions and his view that Gough wanted to go forward at the "Hurroosh" may well be more a comment on his knowledge of Gough's temperament than a strictly accurate description of Gough's plans by this stage.
Eve of the offensive Haig briefed Gough (diary 28 June) that "the main advance" should be limited until the Gheluveld Plateau had been secured as far as Broodseinde. Haig was principally concerned that Gough was not giving sufficient weight to the attack on Gheluveld Plateau. Prior & Wilson write: "It is not evident that Gough allowed these views greatly to influence the disposition of his forces". A XIV Corps memorandum states that they had sufficient high-explosive shell but insufficient heavy guns to bombard as thoroughly as they would have liked. Prior & Wilson point out that, had Gough followed Haig's advice to concentrate more weight against the Gheluveld Plateau, that would have reduced the effectiveness of the attack on his left and centre, but also argue that more heavy guns could have been obtained from Rawlinson's forces (threatening a diversionary attack along the Belgian Coast) and Plumer's Second Army (some of which was attacking the Gheluveld Plateau, but some of which was mounting largely fruitless diversionary attacks further south). Rawlinson urged the
CIGS Robertson (29 June) of "the desirability of holding on to Goughy's coat tails and ordering him only to undertake the limited objective and not going beyond the range of his guns". He repeated this advice to Haig over dinner (3 July) although he was concerned that Haig would not insist hard enough.
Aylmer Haldane recorded in his diary (30 June 1917) his lack of keenness at going to Fifth Army and wrote that Gough was "very impetuous and difficult to get on with" as well as "excitable and thoughtless and impatient". Another memo by Gough (30 June) raised the possibility that open warfare might be attained after 36 hours, although "this is a result which we can hardly hope to attain until the enemy has been beaten in two or three heavy battles." Haig annotated this to insist that the capture of Passchendaele–Staden Ridge, not just the defeat of the German forces, must be the object of the offensive. Like Plumer, Gough believed that Haig was being fed an exaggerated picture of German weakness by his intelligence advisor
John Charteris. In his instruction of 5 July, Haig ordered that Passchendaele–Staden Ridge was to be taken within weeks, and that thereafter a chance for the "employment of cavalry in masses is likely to occur" as they exploited towards
Bruges, Roulers and
Ostend. Haig hoped to reach Roulers by 7–8 August, in time for Fourth Army to catch the high tides for their coastal operations.
Pilckem Ridge The bombardment began on 16 July. The battle was to have commenced on 25 July. Gough was granted three extra days for bombardment as it had taken longer than expected to get heavy artillery into place. A further delay was granted for General
François Anthoine (commanding the
French Army on Gough's left flank) as bad weather was hampering his
counter-battery programme. Haig noted in his diary (23 July) that three of the four British corps commanders (but not Jacob of II Corps) welcomed the delay for the same reason (Charteris later described the conference as "definitely heated" and Haig as "very moody" after he had to bow to their wishes for a further delay). Fifth Army intelligence at the time recorded weather conditions as "bad" and "poor" for much of the pre-31 July period (making it difficult for aircraft to spot German batteries behind Passchendaele Ridge and the Gheluveld Plateau, or for
sound-ranging to operate in the prevailing westerly wind).
Walter Guinness wrote of the slipshod staff planning, engineering and signalling arrangements of Fifth Army in 1917: "None of the lessons taught by Plumer's success seem to have been learned." Edmonds later stressed in the
Official History that after four days Gough's men were less than halfway to their first day objectives and had lost 30–60% of their fighting strength. Prior & Wilson point out that the attack had captured 18 square miles, including two of the German defensive lines on the left, at a cost of 27,000 casualties and inflicted approximately equal German casualties (as opposed to the First Day of the Somme, which had captured 3.5 square miles, for a cost of 57,000 British casualties, with minimal German losses). Ypres had been almost entirely removed from enemy observation. However, the attack had failed to capture the Gheluveld Plateau, and infantry pushing too far ahead had been vulnerable to counterattack. Farrar-Hockley writes that at the time "the results were not considered disappointing." John Lee writes that the results on 31 July were "mixed", with much of the ground taken lost, even on the first day, to "stupendous" counterattacks and that attempts to push forward after initial success led to "less than happy results". Andy Simpson writes of "the limited nature of the debatable success". It came on to rain on 31 July.
Early August Gough had issued orders for II Corps to capture the Third objective (Tower Hamlets and Polygon Wood) on the Gheluveld Plateau, but at a Corps Commanders' conference on the evening of 31 July Jacob told him that this was not on, as the
30th Division had been pushed back to or just behind the first objective. Gough ordered II Corps to make a limited advance on the Gheluveld Plateau to reach the Black Line (the original second objective) on 2 August, while the other three corps were to retake the ground lost to counterattacks on 31 July and to reach the Green Line (the original third objective) on 4 August, and to take
Langemark, with the Red Line (the limit beyond which opportunist exploitation was not to pass) to be taken at a later date. Haig agreed. Haig urged Gough (Haig diary 31 July) to stick to "the original plan" and consolidate the ground gained and prepare for the next advance "only after adequate bombardment and after dominating the enemy artillery". Davidson (1 August) objected to hurried preparations, the use of "part worn" troops, and recommended Gough wait for two or three days of good flying weather to allow "careful and accurate (artillery) shooting". Haig now agreed with Davidson, urging Gough (who, he claimed, "quite agreed") that he should concentrate on the Gheluveld Plateau and that he should wait for two or three days of dry weather for artillery and infantry to operate effectively (Haig diary 2 August). Lunching with Gough on 5 August, six days after Third Ypres began, Rawlinson recorded that "he is converted from the "huroosh" and now accepts the limited objective as the normal tactics". Haig urged Gough (8 August), given the bad state of the ground, to limit the depth of his advance to about , so that his men would still be fresh to defeat German counterattacks. In August there were only three days (7, 19, 22) in which no rain was recorded; rainfall for the month was almost double the August average. Much of the battlefield turned into a quagmire in which men and animals sometimes drowned, making movement of men and supplies difficult and severely reducing the accuracy and effectiveness of artillery.
Battle of Langemarck Gough delayed his planned attacks for a week. During the 2–10 August delay, corps reserves had to be used to relieve exhausted units in the line, instead of being kept to exploit the attack. The 10 August attack was in good weather but after rain two days earlier, not giving the ground enough time to dry. The 18th and 25th divisions attacked the Gheluveld Plateau on 10 August, aiming to capture the second objective from 31 July. They were heavily shelled by unsubdued German guns, and after initial progress were subjected to counterattacks, suffering 2,200 casualties for a gain of on the left and no progress on the right. Part of the reason for the failure of the
attack on Westhoek to hold ground east of the village, was that Gough had dispersed his artillery along the rest of his front in readiness for the next big push. The 16 August attack was originally scheduled for 14 August but Gough, Farrar-Hockley claims under pressure from Haig to make rapid progress to link up with the planned seaborne landing, allowed Jacob a postponement of only one day. A thunderstorm forced another. Although Second Army artillery were providing some assistance on the Gheluveld plateau, much of their strength was being dissipated assisting the
Battle of Hill 70, a First Army attack by the
Canadian Corps at
Lens. Farrar-Hockley describes the 16 August attacks as "on balance a failure". Gough later claimed in his memoirs that he had visited Haig in his railway carriage twenty miles from Ypres and had advised him that "tactical success was not possible, or would be too costly under such conditions, and advised that the attack should now be abandoned" and that Haig had told him that with Russia dropping out of the war it was necessary for the BEF, the strongest Allied army at the moment, to wear down German strength, to prevent the Germans defeating France or Italy, as well as capturing the submarine bases and
Gotha bomber bases and of the difficulties of persuading Lloyd George to see "the realities of the situation". In the centre, the
16th (Irish) Division and
36th (Ulster) Division, both part of Watts' XIX Corps, had to attack fortified German farmhouses on Zonnebecke Ridge, not one of which had been subdued by artillery fire. When Gough accused the troops in question of not being able to hold onto their gains because they "were Irish and did not like the enemy's shelling", Haig was not impressed by Gough "playing the Irish Card" and noted that the men had been exhausted and that the bombardment had been ineffective. Gough later came to regret the "Irish card" comments when he learned the facts. He told one of his chaplains in late August that the heart had gone out of a part of Fifth Army. Haig noted (diary 18 August) that "Failure to advance on the right centre" was caused by "Commanders being in too great a hurry" and that three more days should have been allowed to allow artillery to gain the upper hand – the same advice he had given before the battle but had not enforced. He demanded Gough get the facts and then "talk the matter over with him". There is no evidence of Gough thinking the same way: at a conference of his corps commanders (17 August), he noted the tendency of his men to be driven back by counterattacks, wanting to court martial some officers and NCOs for "glaring instances" of this, and also complained that divisions were being rotated too quickly through the line, which might risk Fifth Army "running out of men". Gough proposed a series of piecemeal operations: XVIII Corps were to attack on 19 August, XIX Corps on 21 August, then II Corps on 22 August, in each case to seize the objectives which they had failed to achieve on 16 August. XIV, XVIII and XIX Corps were then to attack on 25 August, followed by II Corps later on the same day. There would then be a general advance at some unspecified future date. This plan was then abandoned as XIX and II Corps did not have enough fresh troops to attack. It was decided instead that Maxse's XVIII Corps would attack on 19 August, then XIV and II Corps on 22 August. The former attack was successful, capturing fortified farmhouses near St Julien which had caused difficulty on 16 August (as the farmhouses were on dry ground, Maxse was able to use twelve tanks, protected by a smoke barrage). The attack on 22 August was unsuccessful owing to the ineffectiveness of the bombardment and German counterattacks, with no ground at all being gained on the Gheluveld Plateau. Rain began again on 23 August. On 24 August Gough's intelligence branch informed him that the German defences were not linear but consisted of strongpoints in a chequerboard formation, with many German units held back for counterattack. Gough issued a new paper ''Modifications Required in Our Attack Formations to Meet the Enemy's Present System of Defence'' (24 August) –with a greater percentage of "moppers-up" to deal with bypassed enemy strongpoints, while larger numbers of troops were employed to withstand counterattacks. These tactics ("waves" followed by "worms") were later demonstrated to Third Army on 14 September, although in Simpson's view Gough did not appear to have realised that artillery superiority was needed to use them effectively.
Plumer takes over Haig then saw Plumer (25 August), the day after the German counterattacks which recaptured Inverness Copse, and informed him that II Corps would soon be returned to his command, and that his Second Army was to take the lead in the offensive, to take the Gheluveld Plateau with a more cautious and methodical approach. He saw Gough later the same day and informed him that he was to undertake subsidiary attacks to assist Plumer. By 26 August the rain had become torrential. XVIII Corps attacks on the St Julien spur failed (27 August), while that day Inverness Copse (on the Gheluveld Plateau) resisted its fourth assault. Simpson writes that the large attacks on 27 August were, like those on 22 August, "no more successful than those before". The
Official History writes that the attack resulted in "considerable further casualties and very little gain in ground". Plumer's biographer describes it as "a bloody fiasco" in which some of Gough's men were left standing up to their knees in water for up to ten hours before zero hour. Prior & Wilson write that Gough's troops were exhausted by now after repeated attacks. Gough ordered another attack for 31 August. Haig ordered Gough (28 August) to hand over command of II Corps effective early September, although he initially permitted him to make further limited attacks in the region of Inverness Copse until then which would facilitate the upcoming big push, but otherwise to train and rest his divisions ready to assist Plumer. However, when Gough proposed (30 August) to take this region on 3 September, Haig withheld permission as the weather conditions were not suitable. Rawlinson, who was highly sceptical about the likelihood of the campaign succeeding, told Wilson that the command change was being made because "even he (Haig) began to see that Goughie was quite unable to do the job" (Wilson diary 29 August and 5 September). Haig wrote (diary 7 September) "I decided to stop Gough from going on with ... little attacks" which Haig thought "wasteful". In early September Gough ordered XIX Corps to make small-scale attacks in the St Julien area. Not one of the fortified farmhouses was captured, and after the fourth attack Haig remonstrated with Gough. However, Gough protested (Haig diary, 9 September) that two of the divisions were soon to leave the salient, and that for the sake of their "training and morale" they should be made to retake ground which they had recently lost to counterattacks. Haig permitted a fourth, equally unsuccessful attack on 10 September. Kiggell (Haig diary 10 September) reported that "some of Gough's subordinates" did not give an honest answer as to the likely success of attacks and remarked to Neil Malcolm of the order to make only limited attacks: "We did not expect you to pursue the matter so vigorously". Fanshawe – GOC V Corps, which had recently replaced Watts' XIX Corps in the line – was opposed to further attacks, while the other corps commander McKenzie, possibly put up to it by Gough, was in favour. Haig then interviewed the divisional commanders, then urged Gough to desist, which Gough agreed to do. Aylmer Haldane recorded in his diary (10 September)
William Lambton's lack of keenness at going to Fifth Army.
Sidelined Beginning on 20 September and into early October Plumer captured the Gheluveld Plateau, in drier weather and under cover of intense artillery fire (he had guns brought in from First, Third and Fourth Armies, and had twice as many guns for counter-battery alone as Gough had had for all purposes prior to 31 July), Fifth Army played a supporting role in Plumer's victory at Menin Road, making more use of new tactics: the "draw-net barrage" (which began
behind the German front line then drew back towards it, demoralising the defenders), using the
Stokes mortar as part of the creeping barrage, small columns of infantry following a wave of skirmishers and greater use of the rifle (as opposed to hand grenades) to repel counterattacks. Maxse also felt, ironically in view of the tactical debates of late June, that limiting the depth of the attack to had been worthwhile. The Fifth Army portion of the attack was conducted by 9th (Scottish) Division and
55th Division (under V Corps);
20th (Light) Division (under XIV Corps), and 51st (Highland) Division &
58th Division (under XVIII Corps). John Lee observes that 9th Scottish and 58th London, which were new to Fifth Army, reached their objectives, whereas the others did not, suggesting that the men had probably been worn out by excessive time spent on trench duty and labouring tasks, adding that "the anecdotal evidence of soldiers preferring service in Second, or any other, Army than Fifth is hard to ignore." With a breakthrough apparently imminent, Haig ordered (26 September) that forces for exploitation, including cavalry, be ready to exploit to Roulers by 10 October, ready to link up with the long-postponed coastal advance and seaborne landing. Gough protested that 16 October was a more realistic date (Plumer's suggestion was 13–14 October) but was over-ruled by Haig. Gough appears to have anticipated a dramatic exploitation by mounted cavalry, but marginal notes by Haig on a memo from Neill Malcolm (1 October) indicate that he had misunderstood the Commander-in-Chief's intent – Haig envisaged cavalry being used more cautiously at first, in a dismounted role, in the event of German resistance breaking, a far cry from the dramatic exploitation which had been anticipated at the Somme. The rain then resumed. Edmonds later claimed in the
Official History, that at a conference on 7 October Gough and Plumer urged "a closing down" of the campaign, but were over-ruled by Haig, who cancelled the plans for cavalry exploitation but ordered that Passchendaele Ridge be taken. Prior & Wilson point out that there is no documentary evidence for the existence of this conference, either in contemporary records or in Haig's diary, nor did Gough make any such claim in his memoirs, although it would have been in his interests to do so. Gough had written to
Howell Arthur Gwynne, editor of
The Morning Post, on 6 October that he hoped the weather, although "wintry and rather wet", would hold long enough to permit further attacks. During the night before
First Passchendaele (12 October) Gough telephoned Plumer to suggest a postponement because of the foul weather, but Plumer, after consulting his corps commanders, decided to push on. Gough recommended to Kiggell that the final operation (
Second Passchendaele, in which the Canadians played a key role) be delayed until frost had dried out the ground, but Haig vetoed Kiggell's suggestion of a conference with Gough and Plumer and demanded (diary 26 October) that Gough and Plumer inspect the front lines and then report back to him. The offensive went ahead as planned. Rawlinson recorded "things had not been running at all smoothly" in Fifth Army Staff (Diary 11 and 13 October 1917). In November Kiggell warned Haig "of the strong wish of divisions not to be sent to Gough's Army".
Spring 1918 Preparing the defence Gough moved his HQ to
Nesle (12 miles south of
Péronne) in mid December 1917. In January 1918 Lt-Col Armitage recorded that in his meeting with
Jan Smuts and
Maurice Hankey (who were interviewing senior British generals to assess their suitability to replace Haig as Commander-in-Chief) "Gough, compared with other army commanders, did not come convincingly out of that interview as his views were somewhat narrow and he failed to put before Smuts the perilous position on his front". Yet Smuts' own account of the meeting recorded that he learned more about conditions at the front from Gough than from other generals, while Hankey recorded that Gough was "a terrific fellow, oozing with character and Irish humour". Haig, anxious to protect the Channel Ports, had concentrated his reserves further north, leaving Fifth Army – now redeployed back down to the Somme, the southern part of the BEF's line – to bear the brunt of the German
Operation Michael offensive. Gough was ordered to prepare a "battle zone" deep, behind the front line, and a "rearward zone" behind the battle zone. The only defensive feature of note was the River
Somme (which runs roughly north–south south of Péronne) in his rear, and the Crozat Canal connecting the Somme to the Oise. He had only eleven divisions (and 3 cavalry, equivalent in firepower to one infantry division) rather than the seventeen he demanded.
39th and
20th (Light) Divisions, both in GHQ Reserve, were placed in his rear. Gough had to take over two more sections of line ( and respectively) in mid January, At a corps commanders' conference on 3 February, Gough warned them that intelligence had deduced that
Oskar von Hutier, who had recently
taken Riga in September 1917, was opposite them. Edward Beddington acted as Fifth Army Chief of Staff until 10 February 1917, when Neill Malcolm's replacement Brigadier-General
Jocelyn Percy became available. Beddington later wrote highly of Gough's active mind, "full of ideas, some excellent and some the reverse". Gough also badgered Haig and Pétain (Anthoine, his old colleague from Third Ypres, was now Chief of Staff at French GQG) and was assured that
Georges Louis Humbert's
French Third Army at
Clermont was earmarked to reinforce him.
Asking for reinforcements A memorandum (4 February 1918) from Maj-Gen
Tavish Davidson (Chief of Operations at GHQ) discussed the possibility of Gough having to fall back to positions defending the Somme Crossings, although he stressed that such a retreat would be bad for morale, but made no mention of Gough's lack of manpower. Davidson proposed building a fortified bridgehead around the Somme crossings at
Brie and
Péronne, and wanted Gough to fortify the River Tortille, which runs roughly northeast from Péronne to the
Canal du Nord. A further request for reinforcements resulted in formal orders (9 February 1918) from Lt-Gen
Herbert Lawrence (Chief of Staff BEF), ordering Gough to be prepared to conduct a fighting retreat and then conduct counterattacks – it may well be that although the German attack was expected it was thought it would be a subsidiary attack prior to an attack on the French in Champagne. Some extra labourers were made available. The total number of labourers in Fifth Army sector rose from 17,400 (30 December) to 24,217 (early February) to 48,154 by mid March (out of 354,577 in the BEF as a whole) but no more than 8,830 were ever available per week. Most of them were used to build roads, railways, depots, hospitals, water reservoirs – not fortifications. Derby wrote to Haig (5 March) that Gough did "not have the confidence of the troops he commands", that Lloyd George had "spoken to (Haig) on the subject" and that his letter was an "indefinite order" which Haig could use as "a loophole" to remove Gough. It is unlikely that Derby, a
Conservative, was much influenced by
Liberal MPs who remembered the Curragh incident, but he may well have been influenced by Henry Wilson. When he visited Divisional HQ of 16th Irish Division on 14 March Maj-Gen
Charles Hull suggested strengthening the battle (second) zone, but Gough replied "The Germans are not going to break my line". Haig inspected the front with Gough (7 March). From north to south Fifth Army then consisted of
Walter Congreve's
VII Corps,
Herbert Watts' XIX Corps (containing 66th Division now commanded by Neill Malcolm),
Ivor Maxse's XVIII Corps and
III Corps. The latter was commanded by
Richard Butler, recently removed as Deputy Chief of Staff BEF, and who had never before commanded a large formation in battle but was now holding the weakest part of the front. None of these corps had any division in reserve. After this inspection Haig released 39th Division (north of Péronne) to control of Fifth Army, and brought
50th Division, still in GHQ Reserve, down from Flanders to a point west of
St Quentin – given the 24 hours' notice required, it would take two and a half days to reach the front when needed. Gough also requested that men from 20th (still in GHQ Reserve behind his front) and 50th Divisions be used to help dig defences, but this was vetoed by GHQ. Gough had a reasonable idea of the size and timing of the German attack from air reconnaissance and interrogation of prisoners, although many at GHQ believed the attack would not be until a few days or weeks. Lawrence was in the habit of referring to Gough as "young Goughie", although the latter was his senior in rank Farrar-Hockley argues that Lawrence and Davidson were personally unsympathetic to Gough and in early 1918 effectively starved him of reinforcements which Haig might, if asked, have agreed to send. He argues that Gough ought to have demanded to speak to Haig personally, which was his right but not the etiquette of the time. On the evening of Tuesday 19 March Lawrence ("purring on the telephone like a damned pussycat") once again refused permission to move up the 20th and 50th Divisions.
21 March The German attack began at 4:40 am on 21 March; Gough, Beddington and other rear echelon officers recorded being awakened at around 5:10 am, when British artillery, hampered by the fog, began to return fire. The Germans had over 8,000 guns and trench mortars. Much of the German bombardment (described by eyewitnesses as "a wall of orange flame" and "a sea of fire") concentrated on British headquarters and communications, while pauses were left in the bombardment of the British front lines to tempt the defenders out of their shelters. Gas was also used, although mustard gas was not used in areas through which German troops were to pass. 19 German divisions assaulted six of
Julian Byng's Third Army, while 43 German divisions attacked Fifth Army (13 divisions plus 2 in GHQ Reserve). Many British divisions were at little more than half strength, and none more than two-thirds, giving the Germans a 4:1 numerical superiority on Byng's front and over 8:1 on Gough's. At 8:30 am Gough ordered the 20th and 50th Divisions to be ready to move up to the front, and obtained retrospective permission from GHQ. Gough spent the morning at his own headquarters listening to reports as they came in – III Corps forward zone was already reported overrun by 10 am – and reading reports of the rounding up of labourers and pioneers into
ad hoc fighting units, as he would have been putting himself out of communication had he attempted to tour the front. At around 1 pm General Humbert arrived, telling Gough that he had only a skeleton staff but no troops to send (''je n'ai que mon fanion'' – "I've only the pennant on my car"), and promising to lobby GQG to send French divisions. At 2 pm, after studying aerial reconnaissance reports (the fog had cleared enough by 12:30 pm for British planes to be launched), Gough ordered the corps commanders to begin a fighting retreat, described by Beddington as "a right and brave decision arrived at very quickly". He was disinclined to speak to Lawrence or Davidson again, and disappointed not to hear directly from Haig himself that day. In the afternoon he visited his corps commanders one by one. Formal orders to fall back were issued at 9:45 pm. Haig (diary 21 March) approved Gough's withdrawal. Haig (diary 21 March) appears to have regarded the initial day's fighting as a creditable result, knowing as he did that the first day was often the most successful of any offensive, and GHQ (from their 2 March appraisal) appear to have believed that the main German effort would fall somewhere else, perhaps against the French in Champagne.
Martin Kitchen takes a rather different point of view, arguing that Haig was misled by Gough's overly favourable report. Haig therefore did not ask the French for reinforcements until after midnight of 21/22 March, and then asked for only three divisions – half what had been agreed under "Hypothesis A" – which reached the British line on 23 March. Following Haig's request, Pétain agreed to send two divisions and some dismounted cavalry under General
Maurice Pelle to cover the French left flank. This news reached Gough the following morning. On the evening of 21 March Pétain, having heard that Butler's III Corps had been unable to hold the line of the Crozat Canal the previous evening, had also at last agreed that French 125th Division be deployed to III Corps sector.
22–25 March At 10:45 am on 22 March, following a telephone request from Congreve for clarification of his previous verbal instructions, Gough issued written orders to corps commanders to retreat "in the event of serious hostile attacks" the forward line of the Rear Zone ("the Green Line" in front of the Somme – in practice little more than a line of signposts and wire). Fifth Army staff also informed corps commanders of the impending French reinforcement and Gough's hopes to withdraw III Corps to form a reserve. On receiving these messages at around noon, Maxse ordered XVIII Corps to withdraw immediately, without cover of artillery fire, and they fell back behind the Somme altogether that evening. Gough attempted to halt Maxse's withdrawal when he heard of it, but it was too late. Maxse's precipitate retreat allowed a German penetration at
Béthencourt on his left flank, forcing Watts XIX Corps on his left to fall back also. Watts' falling back in turn jeopardised
V Corps (part of Byng's Third Army) still holding the
Flesquières Salient. London was soon awash with exaggerated rumours, based largely on accounts of stragglers and chaos in rear areas, that Fifth Army had broken. Haig at last visited Gough on 23 March, meeting his requests for reinforcements with a laconic "well, Hubert, you can't fight without men," but wrote in his diary of his dismay that Fifth Army had "gone so far back without making some kind of stand". At 4 pm on 23 March Haig and Pétain met at Dury. Pétain agreed to deploy his Reserve Army Group (GAR – two armies under
Émile Fayolle) to operate in the Somme Valley. Gough was ordered to hold the line of the Somme (roughly north–south south of Péronne) "... at all costs. There will be no withdrawal...." and informed that as of 11 pm on Sunday 24 March Fifth Army would be placed under Fayolle's orders, making the Somme (roughly east–west between Amiens and Peronne) the Anglo-French boundary. VII Corps, north of the bend in the Somme, was placed under Third Army's orders at the end of 24 March. Bertie recorded (24 March), somewhat prematurely, that Haig had saved Gough's job. Reinforcements (1st Cavalry Division on Gough's left to maintain contact with Third Army, 35th Division down from Flanders into VII Corps sector, and Robillot's II French Cavalry Corps (whose formations were in fact mainly infantry) in XVIII Corps sector) were beginning to take their place in Gough's line. On Gough's right III Corps were now under the command of General Pelle, but its units were becoming interspersed with French units as Butler had been attempting to withdraw them, and had lost control of the situation. Herbert Lawrence visited Fifth Army on 24 March (Haig was visiting Byng's Third Army that day) and reported that it had "still plenty of life" despite shortage of numbers, and that Gough was planning a counterattack by four British brigades and 22nd French Division against a bridgehead which the Germans had made over the Somme at
Pargny (threatening a breach between Watts' and Maxse's Corps). The planned counterattack did not take place as General Robillot refused to co-operate, despite a personal visit from Maxse on the morning of 25 March, and Watts' Corps had to fall back from the line of the Somme. Gough spent much of that day visiting Maxse and Watts, and reconnoitring the ground east of Amiens which his troops would have to hold next. Gough ordered 2,000 rear echelon troops – mainly engineers (including 500 Americans), tunnellers, and signallers – to be formed into a unit under temporary command of Maj-Gen PG Grant, Fifth Army Chief Engineer, to work on the defences and fight if necessary. Brigadier-General Carey, due to return from leave on the afternoon of the 26th to take command of a division, was notified that he was instead to take command of this force, to be known as "Carey's Force".
26 March Gough was not invited to the Army Commanders' meeting 11 am on 26 March, at which Haig told Plumer, Horne and Byng that
Amiens was to be held "at all costs" until the French were in a position to give more support. Brigadier-General
James Walter Sandilands later recorded that, returning from leave, in the chaos he was unable to locate his brigade (
104th Brigade, part of
35th Division), or even find out which corps it was currently part of. Making his way to Fifth Army Headquarters on 26 March by asking a lift from a man who knew him by sight, he found Gough having his teeth examined, but decided "discretion was the better part of valour" and beat a hasty retreat from the room. At about 11am a car drew up containing
Alfred Milner (Secretary of State for War) and Wilson, now CIGS, who asked whether it was safe to drive into Amiens. Sandilands pointed out that Gough was in the building, assuming that they would wish to speak to him, but Wilson replied "Oh he is here is he? Well good morning" and drove off. Sandilands thought "that's the end of Gough". He later realised that they had been on their way to the
Doullens Conference at which
Ferdinand Foch was appointed generalissimo. At the Doullens Conference that afternoon Wilson suggested to Haig that Rawlinson and his staff, currently at Versailles, could replace Gough). Pétain (who, according to Haig had "a terrible look. He had the appearance of a commander who had lost his nerve") said of Gough's Fifth Army "Alas it no longer really exists ... From the first they have refused to engage the enemy ... they have run like the Italians at
Caporetto". This was an exaggeration, and angered even the Francophile Henry Wilson. Pétain told the meeting that 24 French divisions (at another meeting at Compiegne the previous day he had given the figure as 15 divisions) were en route to prevent a German breakthrough to Amiens. By 26 March Gough had received a British infantry division from Italy, as well as three Australian and one New Zealand Divisions. Maxse was maintaining his place in the line, despite pressure from the French to join them in retreating south-westwards. Gough had to send a messenger,
Paul Maze, to Humbert's headquarters, with orders to get back XVIII Corps artillery which had been lent temporarily to the French, with orders not to leave until he had obtained written orders for its return. Gough spent much of the afternoon with Watts, whose sector was also being strongly attacked. Gough returned to his headquarters, now moved back from Villers-Bretonneux to Dury, for a meeting with Foch (who was also establishing his own headquarters at Dury) and
Maxime Weygand at 4 pm. Speaking in French, Foch demanded to know why Gough was not in the front line himself, why Fifth Army was falling back, and why there was no defence as at First Ypres in 1914. Gough thought him "peremptory, rude and excited", but such a manner was common in French generals, whose subordinates also sometimes answered back in similar vein. Gough telephoned Haig to complain, adding that French troops were falling back at a much faster rate than his own. Haig recorded that Gough complained that Foch had been "most impertinent" to him. After meeting with Gough, Foch saw Fayolle (Reserve Army Group commander) and was rather more civil to him. At 5 pm, after the Doullens conference, Haig met Milner and Wilson – he recorded that he told them that no matter what opinion at home might think, or what Foch had just said, he thought Gough "had dealt with a most difficult situation very well. He had never lost his head, was always cheery and fought hard."
Dismissed Bertie recorded (27 March) that Haig himself might be sacked instead of Gough. Gough handed over command to Rawlinson at 4:30 pm on 28 March. Beddington and other staff officers remained to ease the transition. Over dinner (29 March) Haig told Gough that he wanted him out of the line, along with a Reserve Army staff, to prepare an east–west line of defence along the Somme from Amiens to the sea (in case the Germans broke through and the BEF had to form a defensive perimeter around the Channel Ports). Gough set up Reserve Army HQ at
Crécy on 3 April – this would later form the nucleus of the reconstituted Fifth Army under
William Birdwood (remnants of Gough's previous army were now renamed the Fourth and under Rawlinson). Haig defended Gough to
Lloyd George during a car journey (3 April) – he recorded that Lloyd George was looking for a scapegoat for the manpower problem and for his attempts to redeploy divisions to the Middle East contrary to Robertson's advice, and that Lloyd George demanded Gough's dismissal on the grounds that he had neither held nor destroyed the Somme bridges. Haig, by his own account, replied that "could not condemn an officer unheard" and refused to sack him unless given a direct order to do so. The next day (4 April) Haig received a telegram from Lord Derby ordering that Gough be dismissed altogether on the grounds of "having lost the confidence of his troops". Haig held a farewell lunch with Gough on 5 April. ==Disgrace and after==