Clean hands doctrine

The doctrine prevents those who have acted wrongly in some way relating to the matter at hand from receiving the help they seek from the courts, even if they are otherwise right in the case. This happens regardless of how the adversary has treated them. It will also apply to, for example, unjust enrichment cases when the misled wrongdoer tries to recover funds from an innocent party. The party which acted dishonourably is said to have "unclean hands". In general, the concept applies to lawsuits in equity (such as when requesting injunctions or specific performance), but with law-equity distinction becoming much less important, it is gradually expanding to suits in law. In other words, "if someone is a liar, a thief, or a notorious bad actor in general but not in a given transaction, equity is still available to that person." It also generally applies to given parties in the case only. The consequence is that, for example, in patent cases, unclean hands will merely render the patent unenforceable in a given case, and not invalid. However, the conduct that gives rise to the "unclean hands" defence does not need to be illegal. Non-criminal bad-faith, unethical or unfair behaviour may also be used as a basis of invoking the rule. If the public interest in not dismissing the claims is overwhelming, Similarly, minor misconduct is unlikely to invalidate claims. Appearance in English law An article in Conveyancer and Property Lawyer, a law journal, traced back the origin of the doctrine in English law to around 1600 at the latest. Initially it seemed to only apply to cases where the plaintiff was found to have done something illegal (such as fraud), but there were cases such as Gobe v Dore (1604) which explicitly barred remedies for non-criminal but improper conduct. In that dispute, the plaintiff tried to deceive the landlord, whom he had poor relations with. The plan was to give money to the defendant as to make his name appear on the copyhold, but have the defendant let the plaintiff de facto use the parcel even though the landlord did not want it. The court denied eviction of the defendant, and so the plaintiff lost £100 (£ in pounds). Other precursor cases are Jones v. Lenthal (1669), the Bodly’s Case (1679) and Small v. Brackley (1702). These principle are distinct in that the former applies to future conduct while the latter applies to conduct that already happened. The doctrine is closely related to the (“you too!”) argument. In short, blaming or condemning someone for wrongdoing that they are themselves guilty of is hypocritical. This would be analogous to "pot calling the kettle black", or to saying "Look who's talking!" in informal speech. == Purpose ==

There are several reasons for adoption of this doctrine. The main one is that it prevents a dishonest party from profiting from its own wrongdoing. It also prevents the party from defeating the adversary's defences, because there is a principle in common law systems that using an equitable defence to further inequities is abusive. That said, these systems distinguish equitable remedies from legal remedies, and the latter cannot be barred by claiming "unclean hands". Another goal of this doctrine is to protect judicial integrity, because the courts would otherwise be encouraging the wrongdoing by making themselves an instrument of injustice. There is also the question of finding a convenient term for protecting the public interest in cases where the bad conduct causes harm to unrelated people. Ori Herstein of Cornell Law School and the Restatements of the Law also see the doctrine in punitive terms. This is because it lets wrongdoers know that their right to be heard in court may be forfeit due to their bad actions. This has a positive side effect of deterring dishonest parties from bad conduct. However, US courts, including the Supreme Court, often write that the doctrine is not meant to punish. == Examples of application ==

• An employee settled his workplace accident lawsuit against a school in Alabama for $40,000, with the condition that the money be spent on relevant medical expenses. The school set up accounts at local pharmacies in his name so that he could buy medication. However, a school official noticed that he misused the money to buy products that were not related to his back injury. The accounts were terminated, effectively locking the employee out of his settlement funds. He sued to reopen the account. However, the Alabama Court of Civil Appeals refused because the employee violated the terms of the settlement he had agreed to. • Citizens of Lake County, Indiana denied re-election to a county commissioner by choosing his opponent in the primary. The rival won the general election. The plaintiff was a protégé of the ousted commissioner. Due to his connections, he was employed by the county in what he admitted was a sinecure. Providing "ghost employment" in the government is a felony under Indiana Code § 35-44.1-1-3. When the new commissioner, Rudolph Clay, was sworn in, he immediately fired the plaintiff and installed Clay's own son in his place.The plaintiff filed a Section 1983 civil rights lawsuit against Clay and the county and cited case law that interpreted the First Amendment to forbid a public employer to fire an employee on political grounds unless the employee is either a policy-making employee or a confidential one. The plaintiff was neither. Meanwhile, that same person was convicted of tax evasion and sentenced to nine years in prison. The plaintiff sought reinstatement and back pay for the illegal dismissal. However, the court denied it not only because of impracticality and possibly outrageousness of employing inmates in the government, but also because of the plaintiff's "parasitism" on county coffers, which caused harm to taxpayers. He could not argue that the First Amendment both guarantees the spoils system for him but forbids it for county executives. Although this meant that the new county commissioner got his way, the Seventh Circuit assured the sinecure for Clay's son would not last forever as "he who lives by patronage shall perish by it". • (1852). If the hitmen fail to murder the target, the person who paid them cannot go to court to plead "breach of contract killing" and ask the money backA secretary of a charity approached a colonel. The secretary promised that he would be able to get a knighthood if he donated to the charity. The colonel contributed £3,000 (£ in pounds), but did not receive the title. He sued to recover the money. The promise was fraudulent because the charity had no influence on the process of granting knighthood, and it was in breach of contract, too. However, he was essentially trying to bribe his way into honours. Even if the contract had been legal (which it was not), it would be against public policy to support this conduct. The money was lost.However, backtracked on some of the logic of that case. In this case, Patel paid Mirza £620,000 (£ in pounds) as part of a contract that aimed to profit from Mirza's insider information regarding a relevant government announcement about the Royal Bank of Scotland. Mirza promised to place bets on Patel's behalf but it became clear that his information was mistaken, so he did not, but he also refused to return the money. Patel sued. Insider trading is unlawful, but the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom did allow Patel to recover money because this outcome would return the parties to . The alternative would be to let Mirza unjustly enrich himself even though he was the one peddling insider information. This would not further justice. The ruling also noted that sensibilities changed since 1925, and letting bribes stay in the pockets of a politician, a party or a charity that solicited a bribe would be frowned upon much more than returning the money to the person who gave it. A later ruling by the England and Wales Court of Appeal altogether suggested that the original knighthood case was bad precedent. • A husband and a wife were both claiming undivided ownership of a lakeside property in Ontario. The husband was the original owner of the house. However, he also owed a lot of unpaid taxes to Revenue Canada, and so was afraid that the tax authority would seize it. On advice of a lawyer, the husband transferred the property to his then-fiancée, since he wanted to avoid declaring bankruptcy. But the stipulated price in the contract was never paid. When the couple separated, the husband claimed continued ownership of property via resulting trust, and when the house was sold by the wife to a third party, he sued to get the proceeds. However, both parties agreed that the real purpose of the initial "sale" was to hide assets from the taxman. The court thus found that the husband had no legitimate interest in the property. If he first told the creditor (Revenue Canada) that the owner was his wife, he was barred from later asserting in court that the property was his own. In a similar case from North Carolina, an appeals court denied a man the possibility to have his house returned since he had bought it with money he earned from bootlegging.On the other hand, the House of Lords decision in took the approach that mere unlawful conduct was not enough, and instead it needs to be demonstrated that the party that allegedly had unclean hands could not justify their claims through any way that would not implicate illegality, immorality or unfairness. Since Milligan could rely on a legal reason (that is, that she paid half of the purchase money and maintained the house), and did not need to implicate her welfare fraud in her arguments to get half the house, the Lordships ruled that "unclean hands" did not apply. The verdict was overturned by Patel v Mirza (see above) as under Tinsley, wrongdoers could go scot-free if they were lucky to be able to justify bad conduct in retrospect through plausibly legal mechanisms. • Plaintiff owned an Internet media consulting firm and a website for transgender people. Defendant, who owned websites that advertised escort services and gender counselling, attacked the plaintiff as a "mentally ill transvestite man who attacks transsexual women in Toronto". The plaintiff sought a court order to remove articles containing this libellous statement. However, just after 9/11, he had also published an article saying that the defendant was providing escort services to Osama bin Laden when the leader of Al-Qaeda supposedly was in Canada. When confronted, the plaintiff could not explain this away, other than with a disclaimer that the piece was for "entertainment purposes only". The requested injunction was denied. • A private limited company, anonymized as , delivered wine to another company, (, a type of company in Polish law), but the company did not pay. sued A.D., the unlimited liability partner of At the same time, was a limited liability partner of the same The authorised agent () of was simultaneously the chief executive officer of In their capacity as CEO, they refused to help in the litigation. A.D., who stood to lose money, argued that the facially sound lawsuit was in fact abusive. Their contention was that had a fiduciary duty to as a partner, and yet its CEO was sabotaging 's defence. Coupled with the fact that the CEO was also the authorised agent of the sued company, this showed that the CEO/authorised agent was not loyal to , and so was entitled to nothing. Lower courts agreed with this framing, but the Supreme Court of Poland overturned their rulings. The reasoning in the cassation verdict was that , and A.D. by extension, were also at fault for not paying for the wine in the first place, regardless of the complicated connections between the parties in the case. • Kishore Samrite was a member of the legislature of Madhya Pradesh. In Allahabad High Court, Samrite wrote a brief on behalf of three people—a Congress worker, his wife and their daughter—as a next friend. He alleged that they were falsely imprisoned and possibly missing, and also that the daughter was gang-raped by foreigners. However, a lawyer in Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh, had already his complaint based on the same allegations dismissed. The High Court transferred his case to a division bench without letting Samrite know about the change. The bench made a referral to the Central Bureau of Investigation for making false accusations and imposed ₹5 million in court costs. Samrite appealed to the Supreme Court of India, protesting both the lack of notice and the big sum for payment. The top court agreed that the transfer to a division bench was procedurally improper. But it also found that the lawsuit was based on falsehoods, Samrite did not disclose that a substantially same lawsuit had been dismissed, and also stated that the case was driven by malice and political animus. Not only did Samrite lose, he was ordered to pay ₹500,000 in exemplary damages to the person he accused of wrongdoing for filing a frivolous lawsuit. The unidentified person was exonerated. == Countries that apply it ==

Canada Common-law Canadian jurisprudence recognises the doctrine of clean hands in various contexts, with its usual limitations, and has been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Canada. "Unclean hands" may be in particular applied in proceedings (without the presence of the other party), but the party seeking a remedy through that procedure must make full disclosure of all facts known to it, rather than just not misleading the court, lest their motion be denied. Quebec Quebec has a civil-law based system for private law matters, so it does not operate on precedent. Whether the clean hands doctrine () may be invoked in Quebec courts is controversial. The , a government institution, reposted a law dictionary entry that says that the province's legal practice is incompatible with the concept of clean hands due to the requirement that judges a) apply higher-order rules and principles first and b) balance the claims of both parties regardless of degree of fault. That said, in practice, this common law theory has found partial acceptance in Quebec's civil law, at least with respect to injunctions. India Although India has a Code of Civil Procedure, Indian courts have applied the clean hands doctrine to deny equitable relief. In fact, the Supreme Court has imposed exemplary damages on unscrupulous parties, and treats parties who are forum shopping as those having unclean hands. Public interest litigants are not exempted from the doctrine. However, very important constitutional or legal questions unrelated to the party's misconduct sometimes have been nevertheless decided separately. Courts may still deny relief to the misbehaving party but will rule on the underlying claims for future guidance, instead of dismissing the case out of hand. The Civil Code provision says that "It is not allowed to derive benefit from a right if this would be against the socio-economic purpose of that right or against the rules of social co-existence. Such action or omission by the holder of rights is not considered an exercise of these rights and is not protected." However, like in other countries, the application of the "unclean hands" rule is not automatic. Courts in the United States recognise this doctrine. However, it only applies to suits in equity and only where there is no law that covers the disputed matter. Many US courts deny application of the unclean hands doctrine in antitrust cases. In , plaintiffs operated Midas franchises. As a condition of cooperation, Midas imposed several anti-competitive practices. But franchisees willingly sought and bought more of the franchises, fully aware of the tight restrictions, until at one moment they decided to sue. The Supreme Court said that it did not find Congress actually wanted to allow the use of defence in private antitrust action, and there was a valid public purpose for busting anti-competitive practices, and so it granted the relief requested (striking the restrictions). Employment law The unclean hands doctrine applies to lawsuits alleging employee misconduct, which may bar claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Age Discrimination in Employment Act or Americans with Disabilities Act. The Supreme Court recognised in that if the employer would have fired or will fire a worker anyway for a legal reason, courts should not intervene to reinstate the employee. The employer does not need to prove that the misconduct was so severe as to cause termination of employment. The same logic may also bar the award of front pay. Front pay is the equivalent of damages in employment law that the Supreme Court nevertheless qualifies as equitable relief. Environmental litigation Courts tend to dismiss the defence in Superfund lawsuits. The party that raises the issue of "unclean hands" requires clear and convincing evidence to prove it, which may be difficult. In Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc. (1999), the Federal Circuit upheld a patent for a carbonated drink machine that was serving drinks post-mix (that is, loaded with syrup and water separately and then mixed inside the machine) but had a device that led consumers to believe the drink was pre-mixed (i.e. initially filled with a ready drink formulation). However, standard equity defences apply to patents too, per eBay Inc. v. MercExchange LLC (2006). The Mitchell court required the person invoking the "clean hands doctrine" to demonstrate that the copyright holder directly harmed the person, which, however, happens rarely in the context of copyright litigation. However, as of 2007, no court developed the notion of "trademark misuse", by analogy with patents and copyrights. Government misconduct There is controversy as to whether the government is bound by the clean hands doctrine. Justice Brandeis’s dissent in Olmstead v. United States argued that the doctrine should apply doubly to the executive (a position since rejected by case law), but some lower courts, particularly the federal district court for the District of Columbia, take the position that it does not apply to the government at all. The Supreme Court did exempt the government from certain defences, such as laches or non-mutual offensive collateral estoppel, but it did not explicitly do so for unclean hands. In fact, when the Solicitor General in Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, Inc. (1984) pressed the Supreme Court to recognise that unclean hands could never estop the government, the court refrained from issuing a ruling to that effect. William Baude of the University of Chicago Law School argues that there are legitimate cases when the doctrine may be applied to government's actions, but it is a narrower set of cases than typically allowed for private parties due to the special nature of the government as sole prosecutor and an agent specifically created to enforce public interest. As examples of legitimate cases, he mentions Justice Sotomayor's dissent in D.V.D. v. Department of Homeland Security (2025), where the Trump administration successfully argued to overturn a district court injunction against deporting illegal immigrants that it had appeared to violate or to evade. Another is United States v, Russell (D. Md. 2025; appealed to the Fourth Circuit), where the administration sued the whole district court for imposing a standing order that automatically applies 48-hour protection to habeas corpus petitioners in immigration cases. Baude says it was likely created due to the government's bad conduct in prior immigration cases and the court's fear that the government would retaliate against petitioners by deporting them before their case could be heard—which could be reasonably construed as "unclean hands" conduct. == Countries that do not recognise the doctrine ==

Switzerland In the context of a competition law case decided in 2003, the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland declared that the "unclean hands" doctrine does not exist in Swiss law. Specifically, the court said that "there is no general rule saying that only the one who respects the law may ask that it be respected. [...] Also, federal jurisprudence has long excluded said objection, even if it did not use the [exact] expression that characterises it ("unclean hands")". Germany Germany does not have the unclean hands defence as such. There are legal provisions that approximate the concept, namely article 242 of the Civil Code (which codifies the duty to act in good faith) and article 8 of the Unfair Competition Act (prohibiting abuse of rights). However, denial of claims generally requires some form of egregious conduct or conduct plainly aimed at undermining the other party. For example, just because a company uses the same misleading advertising tactics that it accuses the other party of does not by itself disqualify the lawsuit. But if these cease-and-desist letters were sent en masse, or if the real purpose of the court case is to gain an unfair advantage at the expense of the defendant (who is a competitor), a judge may dismiss a lawsuit. == Position in international law ==