Hezbollah armed strength

Formation The Lebanese Civil War began in 1975. Three years later, the Palestine Liberation Organization occupied much southern Lebanon in an attempt to raise an army and destroy the state of Israel. Israel invaded in 1982 and shattered the PLO, but occupied southern Lebanon and created a Christian proxy militia, the South Lebanon Army (SLA), to hold the territory. A narrow strip of land running the length of the Israeli border was termed the "security zone." Lebanese Shia, driven by a desire to gather forces to fight the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon, founded Hezbollah (the Party of God) in 1982, with the organization being named and reorganized in 1985. In 1982, hundreds of Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) from Iran traveled to Lebanon's rugged Bekaa Valley and began training various Shiite groups, including Islamic Amal and the Dawa Party. these choices imposed a heavy cost on Hezbollah in casualties and in public opinion. The CIA says that prior to spring 1986, Hezbollah's attacks were more "undisciplined acts of desperation" rather than military actions. and to a few thousand in 1985. In mid-1986, Hezbollah massed 5,000 fighters for an event in the town of Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley. At this time, Hezbollah had many part-time fighters and very few full-time members, Hezbollah also received backing from pro-Hezbollah factions of Amal that had split from top Amal leadership. while an independent review says that by 1987 Hezbollah's strategic position was deteriorating. In May 1987, Hezbollah began to coordinate infantry and artillery as combined arms, and "improved their capability to attack Israeli helicopters, and demonstrated improvements in extracting wounded from the battlefield." Originally, Hezbollah was just one of several militias fighting the Israelis, but by 1985 it was preeminent. By the late 1980s, it was clearly dominant. In May 1988, after years of rivalry and clashes, Hezbollah waged a brief but intense war with Amal for control of Beirut's southern suburbs, which at the time contained about one-quarter of Lebanon's population. As Amal was allied with Syria, Hezbollah clashed with the Syrian Army troops occupying Lebanon at that time. Hezbollah won in the streetfighting and escalated to targeted assassinations and encouraging defections, forcing Amal to seek Syrian mediation. Amal and Hezbollah have remained begrudging allies ever since. After Hezbollah prevailed militarily, they soon imposed harsh Sharia law on their territory, such as banning coffee and unveiled women, and lost the hearts and minds of their people. 1990s Hezbollah improved rapidly in the early 1990s, progressing from losing five fighters for every Israeli soldier killed in 1990, to 1.5 in 1993, a ratio that roughly held till the end of the decade. Hezbollah ended human-wave attacks in 1990 and began conducting attacks with two units: an assault team and a fire support team with 81 mm mortars. Accumulating combat experience was critical to this improvement in tactical proficiency. Hezbollah in the early 1990s performed dedicated staff work, mirroring their Israeli adversaries. During the late 1980s and early 1990s, Hezbollah refocused on quality over quantity, substantially improved training, IEDs were the main source of Israeli casualties during the occupation period. The conflict saw the first major use of unguided Katyusha rockets fired onto IDF occupied Israeli areas by Hezbollah, a tactic used by the PLO a decade before and became a defining practice of Hezbollah in the future. Hezbollah started seriously developing anti-tank tactics in 1997, with a focus on being able to hit the same spot on a tank multiple times to defeat Israel's sophisticated reactive armor, a tactic that remains a part of Hezbollah's repertoire today. like IEDs, mortars, and small ambushes. This was probably Hezbollah's first expeditionary endeavor. Hezbollah continued to find suicide attacks morally acceptable, but phased their usage out because they were no longer tactically effective. Hezbollah launched just four suicide attacks in the 1990s. During the 1990s, Hezbollah particularly targeted Shiite conscripts in the SLA for defections, desertion, or intelligence. Along with Hezbollah's use of PSYOPS and propaganda warfare, this led to plummeting morale within the SLA. Hezbollah performed 100 attacks from 1985 to 1989 and 1,030 attacks in the six-year period from 1990 to 1995. It launched 4,928 attacks from 1996 to 2000, Hezbollah considers 1998, 1999, and 2000 to be their most successful years of insurgency. In 1997 and 1998 combined Israeli and SLA casualties exceeded those of Hezbollah. Hezbollah continued to study Israel and adopt to lessons learned, and the group spent a large amount of effort gathering information about Israel. In 2006 Hezbollah pursued an asymmetric, integrated standoff fires and area-denial strategy. Hezbollah launched rockets onto populated Israeli areas and cities while using light infantry, bunkers, and anti-tank teams to defend southern Lebanon and attack the IDF. Hezbollah focused on small self-sufficient units, based in villages, providing home-front attrition with a somewhat effective command-and-control structure and low mobility. Hezbollah was willing to fight from villages and other civilian areas, which while a violation of the laws of war, was tactically advantageous. Hezbollah identified their main shortcoming in the 2006 war as their lack of air defenses, which they considered a "serious problem" and their main task to address. Hezbollah rated the performance of their bunkers and camouflaged firing positions in fenced off "security pockets" in rural areas as worthwhile. Following the war, the IRGC-QF increased transfers of materiel, funding, training, and intelligence sharing. As a hybrid actor, Hezbollah's main weakness is its need to maintain civilian support to hide among the population, while causing great harm to civilians if war breaks out. This causes Hezbollah to have to justify its actions to maintain public support and to avoid war. Syrian Civil War Since 2012, Hezbollah has engaged in a military deployment to Syria to fight for the Assad government in the ongoing civil war. In terms of both casualties and total manpower, this is Hezbollah's largest ever military operation. Estimates vary widely, from about 1,500-8,000, Hezbollah uses short deployments in Syria, around a few weeks to a month. Although some sources suggest that Russia and Hezbollah are cooperating closely, other sources say they have strategic differences and are not cooperating closely. The party's exposure to sophisticated Russian doctrine, EW capability, airpower, and combined arms could improve the party's capabilities, but also deter it by demonstrating the power of Israel. The organization has improved its ability to operate with other Iranian-aligned forces and bettered its ability to conduct sustained operations outside of Lebanon in varied terrain. and their performance in this battle is considered good. Later, the group would take heavier than expected casualties leading the Battle of Aleppo, and Iran reportedly replaced it with the Badr Organization. Despite this, Hezbollah remains the most capable and trusted Iranian-aligned group in Syria, and generally maintains control of most Shiite militias in Syria and Afghan and Pakistani foreign fighters. the war has served as a powerful recruiting drive among Shia youth and has resulted in the preservation, to date, of the Assad government. According to former Shin Bet chief Avi Dichter, Hezbollah's combat experience in Syria "has made [them] a better fighting force and more adept in conventional military warfare." Although Hezbollah's intervention in Syria has "strengthened and battle-hardened" the group, it has also redirected resources away from Israel and reduced the group's standing among Lebanese Sunnis. with one rebel commander describing Hezbollah as "the number one [government] fighters in Syria." Newsweek writes that Hezbollah as a whole is stronger than the Syrian government. Their fighters are noted to stop SAA soldiers from looting and pillaging. Hezbollah changed from "a small cadre of militants" into a semi-military organization and a regional military actor. Hezbollah–Israel conflict (2023–present) Hezbollah's capabilities were severely weakened during the Hezbollah-Israel conflict (2023-2024), also known as the "Support War" or the "Gaza Support War" in Arabic. Despite a ceasefire agreement reached in November 2024, Israel continued to launch airstrikes in Lebanon almost every day, killing 331 people (at least 127 of whom were civilians) by November 2025. Later, the death toll surpassed 500. Hezbollah violated the cease-fire by strengthening its military infrastructure and armaments. == Training ==

In general, Hezbollah runs most of their own training camps, with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, particularly the Quds Force, playing an integral role. The IRGC runs training camps in Lebanon. Hezbollah fighters have traveled to Iran for more advanced training. Hezbollah also runs many of its own camps, particularly for introductory training. In general, there is no expert consensus on the degree of IRGC involvement in arming and training Hezbollah. In terms of design, Hezbollah training camps are structured and inspired by Israeli training camps, which Hezbollah studies. All members, including administrative clerics, have to graduate from a 45-day paramilitary course. Fighters are known to be transported to training camps in blacked-out vans and have little knowledge of the identities of their instructors or comrades. with members "highly skilled at reconnaissance and intelligence gathering in the field." Hezbollah is trained with American and Israeli military manuals that emphasize tactics of attrition, mobility, intelligence gathering and night-time maneuvering. Sources describe Hezbollah in peacetime as "careful, patient, [and] attuned to gathering intelligence" who perform staff work and long-term planning. Hezbollah's active duty fighters are regularly described as well-trained and disciplined. Hezbollah has passed on its "knowledge of military tactics and recruitment techniques" since the 1980s to a wide range of other organizations. Hezbollah has mostly trained fellow Shiite groups, such as Shia militias in Iraq, during and after the American occupation, and has reportedly trained Houthis, Syrians, and Iraqis in Lebanon and elsewhere. Iran's IRGC-QF likes working with Hezbollah because they are Arabic-speakers and provide a degree of separation to Iran. Hezbollah's training of Iraqi militants focused particularly on small arms, reconnaissance, small unit tactics, and communications, with a focus on effecting IED attacks, EFP usage, and kidnappings. Training included intelligence and sniper skills. To a more limited degree, Hezbollah has trained a wide range of general Islamic radicals, including fundamentalists in Tunisia, Algeria, Egypt, the Palestinian Territories, and the Gulfs states. The party's training is well-regarded. In 2017, A Hezbollah commander claimed that 120,000 fighters had passed through Hezbollah's training camps. Estimates of Hezbollah's manpower vary widely. For example, in 2002 the US State Department said that Hezbollah had a few hundred operatives and a few thousand supporters. Following Israeli air raids on their training camps in the Bekaa valley in 1994, Hezbollah trained more furtively in the Bekaa Valley, with small tents and foxholes. The end of the 2006 war brought large manpower demands that required Hezbollah to expand its training facilities. Since then, Hezbollah has had fairly large and built-up training camps. The number of full-time fighters and Iranian liaison officers apparently decreased in the early 2000s as Hezbollah wound down from the peak of the insurgency. Training by the IRGC is described as serious and in-depth. In response to the high manpower demands of the Syrian Civil War, Hezbollah has reportedly shortened its background check and training governmentns for new recruits, though the quality remains high. To an unusual degree for a non-state actor, Hezbollah members are specialized in fields like IEDs, artillery, engineering, and communications. Reservists Hezbollah's manpower includes full-time fighters and loosely affiliated reservists, who may only occasionally fight for Hezbollah or be affiliated with other political parties. Hezbollah has no formal membership rolls. Assessment of the group's reservists, also known as "village guards" or part-time fighters, varies widely. These men have employment outside Hezbollah and only take up arms for major military engagements or as part of a two-week per year "duty". Israeli sources call the group's reservists "relatively unskilled," while Hezbollah describes them as just as combat effective as full-time fighters. One American think tank says they performed exceptionally in the 2006 war, while another calls them "less capable" than full-time fighters. The training of Hezbollah reservists is unclear. Andrew Exum says that they did not seem to have been trained by Iran, and some may have been former militia members. Analyst Nadav Pollak says that they were recruited from the al-Mahdi Scouts and multiple sources say that almost all were former militia members. Some people described as Hezbollah reservists apparently spontaneously took up arms or were not formally affiliated with the party. Hezbollah reservists have been rotated through Syria on short-term deployments, along with the party's regular fighters and commanders. == Supply ==

made in Iran Hezbollah is supplied mostly by the states of Iran and Syria via land, air and sea. Iran flies most materiel into Damascus area airports and has it trucked overland to Hezbollah, with some material flown directly to Lebanese airports. Hezbollah owes its unique military power to the logistical support of Iran. Logistical problems, the ongoing Iran-Iraq war, and Syrian wariness of Hezbollah limited the number of trainers and amount of supplies that could be delivered to Hezbollah at this time. Bashar al-Assad shifted Syria's relationship with Hezbollah from a vassal to a strategic partnership. Hezbollah also acquired weaponry from corrupt Syrian army officers, the Lebanese black market, the SLA, and defeated factions in the Lebanese Civil War. Arms shipments from Iran increased at this time, with the Quds Force apparently concerned that the Assad government could fall and their window to supply Hezbollah could end. Claims of specific weapons should be treated with caution, however: there are claims that nearly every weapon in Syria has been transferred to Hezbollah. Syria has blocked Iranian trucks and planes from passing through its territory. Because Syria's once-capable air defense network shielded Syria from Israeli airstrikes, Hezbollah has for decades used western Syria as a logistics and supply hub. Israel and some sources claim that Iran has established two underground weapons factories in Lebanon's mountainous Bekaa valley region, producing Fateh-110 missiles and many other weapons. Construction reportedly began after 2012. == Military ==

Hezbollah is widely described as comparable to or stronger than the Lebanese Armed Forces in military power. Reasons cited are Hezbollah's better discipline, and better weaponry, better military and combat capacity than the LAF. and more capable than UNIFIL. Hezbollah has not launched terror attacks against American interests since the mid-1990s Light infantry Hezbollah was founded as a light infantry force and it remains primarily composed of light infantry to this day. heavy machine gun In 2006, Jane's assessed Hezbollah's guerrilla forces "to be amongst the most dedicated, motivated and highly trained" in the world. Hezbollah forces in 2006 were "well trained, well led and suitably equipped" and conducted defense in depth. Hezbollah's operations were marked by tactical agility, use of cover, advanced weapons, survival, complex operations, advanced training, and effective command and control. For larger operations, Hezbollah has sometimes demonstrated "task organized" forces, including an assault team, a breach element, and support team. When the IDF massed firepower and used combined arms, it was able to comfortably defeat Hezbollah, even in their strongpoints. In 2006, Hezbollah fighters "often participated in extended direct firefights with the IDF." One of Hezbollah's strongest attributes is its skill in cover and camouflage, which is sometimes described as good as Israel. During a speech on October 18, 2021, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah publicly claimed that the military structure of Hezbollah includes 100,000 trained Lebanese fighters. Anti-armor ATGM in 2006 Hezbollah's anti-armor capabilities consist of ATGM teams with 5 or 6 fighters. Fighters are trained in anti-tank weapons, ambushes, and camouflage. Anti-tank tactics had some success and were the main source of Israeli casualties, accounting for at least 50 deaths. These forces were confirmed in a 2016 parade held in al-Qusair, Syria. Hezbollah operates T-55 tanks and artillery loaned from the Syrian Army and has an unidentified amount of BMP-1 infantry fighting vehicles. Hezbollah does not deploy armor in Lebanon against Israel, because the vehicles are dated and Hezbollah cannot counter Israel's absolute air superiority. and commanded the Battle of al-Qusayr. Hezbollah SF have been heavily involved in the Syria theater. Unit 133 - Unit 133 is a secret unit within Hezbollah with an aim to oversee the group's foreign operations and execute terror attacks in Israel, the West Bank, in Egypt and Jordan. Unit 900 - Unit 900 is a specialized division within the Lebanese Shiite political and militant organization Hezbollah. It is believed to function as part of Hezbollah's internal security and counterintelligence structure, playing a key role in maintaining the organization's operational secrecy and internal discipline. Unit 910 - Unit 910 is a clandestine unit within Hezbollah, responsible for the organization's covert operations outside of Lebanon, including intelligence gathering, logistical support, and the establishment of sleeper cells. Unit 3800 - Unit 3800 is a specialized unit within Hezbollah, established in 2003 at the request of Iran’s Quds Force, with the primary mission of supporting Iraqi Shiite militant groups, particularly during and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. The unit is in charge of training and assisting Shiite militias in Iraq and Yemen. Operating under Hezbollah's Jihad Council, Unit 3800 plays a pivotal role in expanding Iran's influence through proxy warfare across the Middle East. Unit 127 - Unit 127 is the group's specialized aerial unit, responsible for the development, production, and operational deployment of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Unit 7900 - Unit 7900 is Hezbollah's covert naval missile unit formation linked the secret "maritime file", designated to conduct sea based attacks under civilian cover against Israeli and international targets. == Command structure ==

Hezbollah is structured like a normal military organization. Hezbollah has flexible tactics and they do not have a tall hierarchical chain of command, instead delegating more authority to local commanders. In the Lebanon war, the Hezbollah high command had enough top down control to completely stop or start rocket attacks. In general, little is known about Hezbollah's decision-making process. In the 2006 war, fighters had the autonomy to operate without direct orders in case they got cut off. In 2006, Hezbollah's style of mission command and high autonomy resulted in the organization behaving on the battlefield similarly to the IDF. Hezbollah is expanding from a powerful, localized asymmetrical actor into a regional military power. Hezbollah's militant operations are compartmentalized in a separate, "black-ops" sub-group called the "Islamic Jihad Organization" or the "External Operations Organization." == Geographic commands ==

Lebanon's Shiites live in three geographically discontiguous areas: the Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon, south Lebanon, and south Beirut. Hezbollah was formed in the Bekaa Valley and began challenging Amal for control of Beirut's poor and radicalized southern suburbs in the 1980s, Most of Hezbollah's training camps, along with logistics infrastructure, are located in the rugged Bekaa Valley in eastern Lebanon near the Syrian border. From 1982 to 1992, Hezbollah was headquartered in the Shayk Abdallah Barracks in the town of Baalbek in the Bekaa Valley. == Infrastructure ==

Hezbollah has built "broad, advanced, [and] comprehensive military infrastructure within densely populated areas of Lebanon." Hezbollah is highly decentralized, with no critical infrastructure or centers of gravity. In the 2006 war, Hezbollah "intelligently prepared the battlefield" and tailored their forces to the Israeli threat. They extensively use civilian homes and buildings as fighting locations, with the reasoning that "a house can be destroyed, the village can be destroyed, but not the homeland." Because Hezbollah's fortified sites and underground facilities are resistant to airstrikes, they cannot be neutralized without a ground response. Hezbollah had about 500–600 weapons caches in 2006. Launch sites rocket launcher in southern Lebanon, camouflaged by dense brush Hezbollah has hundreds of launch sites for its rockets throughout southern Lebanon, s Hezbollah's wired communications network originally spanned from Beirut through the Beqaa Valley to the Israel-Lebanon border, but since 2006 has been expanded to cover most of Hezbollah's areas of operation, except for parts in north Lebanon. Composed mostly of fibre-optic cables run alongside existing civilian Lebanese telecommunications infrastructure, the network also contains some copper wires and standalone lines. Members store spare mines in civilian homes and warehouses. Improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, are a common element in Hezbollah's repertoire. In the past, Hezbollah members have buried hundreds of kilos of explosives in large pits to take out Israeli tanks. == Weapons ==

Hezbollah has long been considered one of the best-armed non-state actors in the region or in the world, Although well armed, Hezbollah is unable to prevent air attack, so the organization has historically refrained from acquiring large or expensive weapons systems. In general, Hezbollah has sufficient weaponry to try to fight Israel, Iranian military theorists downplay the impact of advanced weaponry for Hezbollah, suggesting that human resources are more important for determining victory. Some independent analysts concur, suggesting that the group's skills, tactics, and organization are more important than the weaponry it possesses. Since 2006, Hezbollah's military procurement has focused on air defense systems and surface-to-surface rockets with increased range and accuracy. In August 2019, Israeli drones reportedly destroyed a factory in Beirut responsible for developing long-range precision missiles for Hezbollah. Hezbollah is also attempting to develop capabilities and operational concepts to attack American forces "in areas where they have traditionally found sanctuary." Small arms Hezbollah fighters are allowed to choose between the M16 and AK-47 rifles. and FN MAG machine guns. Hezbollah owns vast quantities of firearms. In 2006, when Hezbollah had about 3,000 fighters, IDF intelligence estimated that Hezbollah had at least hundreds of thousands of rifles. or tens of thousands of M4 assault rifles. In addition, Hezbollah members have been arrested for trying to buy M200 sniper rifles and thousands of Glock handguns in the United States. In general, the group does not suffer from any significant shortages of infantry equipment. Anti-tank In general, Hezbollah has the most advanced and numerous anti-tank weaponry of any non-state actor, while having less advanced weapons than a normal nation state. Hezbollah is generally described as having relatively advanced anti-tank missiles and of using them with skill. Hezbollah's anti-tank weaponry is one of their defining attributes. and has thousands in total. According to an American think tank, Hezbollah used its ATGMs with "tactical skill" and few technical errors. Air defense Hezbollah's anti-aircraft guns are obsolete by decades and wholly ineffective against modern Israeli helicopters, so they are instead deployed as ground-attack artillery against Israel apparently with an anti-tank missile, which was considered very light losses for the IDF. Rockets There is great uncertainty regarding the many variations and names of Iran and Syria's rocket artillery systems, as well as which systems have been transferred to Hezbollah. which refers not to a specific model but is a general term for short-range unguided rockets fired in large quantities from trucks. These are particularly used in Syria. Hezbollah's rocket force is a strategic, not tactical weapon, intended not to achieve battlefield effects but to harm Israel's sense of security and quality-of-life. The main impact is not the physical destruction but the way that rocket fire affects the lives of Israel's population and causes people to flee northern Israel. In a future war with Israel, estimates for the number of rockets fired per day range from 500 Estimates of Hezbollah's overall number of rockets vary, but high end estimates are around 150,000 thousand rockets. In 2002, Hezbollah had about 8,000 to 9,000 rockets. About 100 were from the medium-range Fajr series. Similarly, despite speculation to the contrary, there is no evidence that the Fateh-313 missile has been transferred to Hezbollah. There is no evidence Hezbollah has been supplied with more Zelzal missiles since the 2006 war. Whether or not Hezbollah has acquired Scud missiles is a subject of dispute, as is the types of the Scuds supplied, the dates the missiles were purportedly delivered, and the quantity, and there is no consensus on whether missiles were delivered. The London Times reported in 2011 that Hezbollah received 10 Scud missiles from Syria in two batches. Hezbollah's fire discipline is reportedly much better than that of Palestinian groups. Iran has transferred to Hezbollah some old artillery-fire control, targeting, and damage assessment systems. Hezbollah artillery participated in the battle of Salma, the battle of Zabadani, and the Battle of al-Qusayr along with other groups' artillery. Hezbollah did not start to seriously operate armored vehicles until its involvement in the Syrian Civil War. Since Hezbollah was operating against non-state actors and had air superiority, using heavy weapons and vehicles made tactical sense. However, Hezbollah's armored vehicles are universally described as far inferior to the IDF's, and would not be useful in a war against Israel. Hezbollah fighters and operatives use civilian vehicles systemically for day-to-day transport and combat. Once arriving at a battlefield, Hezbollah fighters generally discard their vehicles and fight on foot. Iran denied involvement in the incident while others disagree. Little is known about it. Unmanned aerial vehicles Like many of its other weapons systems, Hezbollah's UAV capacity is more advanced than any other non-state actor, while being much less capable than a typical nation state. In particular, Hezbollah's UAV systems are much inferior in both quantity and capability to Israel's. Hezbollah operates both military drones, believed to be acquired from Iran, and improvised commercial off-the-shelf models. Hezbollah has no manned aircraft. Hezbollah first acquired UAVs in 2002 and their first known use of a drone came on November 7, 2004. Hezbollah has continued to use UAV technology. Hezbollah has demonstrated weaponized civilian drones, and claims to have first used them in September 2014. In 2015 Hezbollah was using COTS quadrocopter UAVs to spot artillery fire in Syria, the party's first intensive use of drones. to "dozens" to almost 200, not counting commercial civilian drones. In 2006, the group claimed to have 50 trained drone pilots. Hezbollah drones of disputed model, known as the Mirsad-1 and either an Abadil-2 or Mohajer-4 model, violated Israeli airspace in November 2004 and April 2005. Hezbollah operates Abidil-2 UAVs in several models, including communications, the Qasef-1 loitering munition, and strategic intelligence. The group does not have Abadil-2 drones for tactical surveillance. In 2014 or 2015, Hezbollah built a 2,200-foot unpaved runway in the northern Bekaa Valley, probably to use for UAVs in Syria. There is speculation that Hezbollah has acquired the Shahed 129 UAV. Hezbollah has used manned paragliders or powered parachutes. In 2008, the George Bush administration assessed that Hezbollah was possibly capable of carrying out a terror attack with chemical, biological or low-grade nuclear weapons. Fiber optic drones Hezbollah utilized fiber optic drones during the 2026 Lebanon war within the Hezbollah–Israel conflict.{{Cite web |date=30 April 2026 |title=Hezbollah adopts a new weapon: Fiber-optic drones, used widely in the war in Ukraine == Intelligence gathering==

Hezbollah maintains a capable and large intelligence apparatus responsible for intelligence, counter-intelligence, and internal supervision. Hezbollah's intelligence agency has been claimed to have penetrated or tried to penetrate Salafist and Islamist groups, Palestinian groups, the Syrian government, and Syrian and Iraqi Shiite militias. In 2006, Hezbollah SIGINT personnel reportedly managed to triangulate the positions of some cell phones used by the IDF. Hezbollah has influence within the government of Lebanon's security services. Since 2000, Hezbollah has focused on acquiring, via public reporting and spies, a database of Israeli civilian and military infrastructure to target with rocket artillery in the event of war. The professionalism of Nasrallah's bodyguards has reportedly increased in the last few years but is still unimpressive and lackluster. Counterintelligence Hezbollah has a counterintelligence apparatus composed of two organs: the "Amn al-Muddad" (encounter security) and Amn al-Hizb (party security). The counterintelligence organization contains a "combat unit" that became active around 2004. Between 2000 and 2006, Hezbollah improved particularly in counter-signals intelligence, or removing Israeli electronic spying devices, and "turning" Israeli agents. == Electronic warfare ==

Hezbollah has demonstrated a limited ability to tap fibre optic cables, intercept data and hijack Internet and communication connections. In 2006, Hezbollah "reportedly had the assets in place to jam parts of Israel's radar and communications systems." On 17 March 2026, several media networks Nida Al-Watan, MTV reported they were targeted by hacking attempts linked to Hezbollah. The networks were accused of being anti-Hezbollah, providing the Israeli army with coordinates, for bombing areas in Beirut's southern suburbs. Journalists received personal threats on their devices and they were even reports that claimed there were calls to shoot reporters affiliated to Nida Al-Watan and MTV, with a reward of up to $1000. == Media and propaganda ==

For decades, media have played a critical role in Hezbollah's military strategy. Hezbollah takes the role of media very seriously and expends great effort bringing news of its fighting activities to its constituents and to the world at large. Hezbollah's media activities mainly happen through Hezbollah's newspapers, Hezbollah's al-Manar television station, and Hezbollah's Radio Nour. == Notes ==