Houthis

According to Ahmed Addaghashi, a professor at Sanaa University, the Houthis began as a moderate theological movement that preached tolerance and held a broad-minded view of all the Yemeni peoples. Their first organization, "the Believing Youth" (BY), was founded in 1992 in Saada Governorate by either Mohammed al-Houthi, or his brother Hussein al-Houthi. The Believing Youth established school clubs and summer camps The formation of the Houthi organisations has been described by Adam Baron of the European Council on Foreign Relations as a reaction to foreign intervention. Their views include shoring up Zaydi support against the perceived threat of Saudi-influenced ideologies in Yemen and a general condemnation of the former Yemeni government's alliance with the United States, which, along with complaints regarding the government's corruption and the marginalisation of much of the Houthis' home areas in Saada, constituted the group's key grievances. Although Hussein al-Houthi, who was killed in 2004, had no official relation with Believing Youth (BY), according to Zaid, he contributed to the radicalisation of some Zaydis after the 2003 invasion of Iraq. BY-affiliated youth adopted anti-American and anti-Israel slogans, which they chanted in the Al Saleh Mosque in Sanaa after Friday prayers. According to Zaid, the followers of Houthi's insistence on chanting the slogans attracted the authorities' attention, further increasing government worries over the extent of the Houthi movement's influence. "The security authorities thought that if today the Houthis chanted 'Death to America', tomorrow they could be chanting 'Death to the president [of Yemen]. In 2004, 800 BY supporters were arrested in Sanaa. President Ali Abdullah Saleh then invited Hussein al-Houthi to a meeting in Sanaa, but Hussein declined. On 18 June, Saleh sent government forces to arrest Hussein. The Houthis participated in the 2011 Yemeni Revolution, as well as the ensuing National Dialogue Conference (NDC). However, they rejected the provisions of the November 2011 Gulf Cooperation Council deal on the ground that "it divide[d] Yemen into poor and wealthy regions" and also in response to the assassination of their representative at NDC. As the revolution went on, Houthis gained control of greater territory. By 9 November 2011, Houthis were said to be in control of two Yemeni governorates (Saada and Al Jawf) and close to taking over a third governorate (Hajjah), which would enable them to launch a direct assault on the Yemeni capital of Sanaa. In May 2012, it was reported that the Houthis controlled a majority of Saada, Al Jawf, and Hajjah governorates; they had also gained access to the Red Sea and started erecting barricades north of Sanaa in preparation for more conflict. was allied with Houthis from 2014 until his death in 2017. The Houthis assassinated him on charges of treason. By September 2014, Houthis were said to control parts of the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, including government buildings and a radio station. While Houthi control expanded to the rest of Sanaa, as well as other towns such as Rada', this control was strongly challenged by Al-Qaeda. The Gulf States believed that the Houthis had accepted aid from Iran while Saudi Arabia was aiding their Yemeni rivals. On 20 January 2015, Houthi rebels seized the presidential palace in the capital. President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi was in the presidential palace during the takeover but was not harmed. The movement officially took control of the Yemeni government on 6 February, dissolving parliament and declaring its Revolutionary Committee to be the acting authority in Yemen. On 27 March 2015, in response to perceived Houthi threats to Sunni factions in the region, Saudi Arabia along with Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, and Sudan led a gulf coalition airstrike in Yemen. The military coalition included the United States which helped in planning of airstrikes, as well as logistical and intelligence support. The US Navy has actively participated in the Saudi-led naval blockade of Houthi-controlled territory in Yemen, which humanitarian organizations argue has been the main contributing factor to the outbreak of famine in Yemen. The four-month long Battle of Aden (2015) occurred between 25 March 2015 and 22 July. According to a 2015 September report by Esquire magazine, the Houthis, once the outliers, are now one of the most stable and organised social and political movements in Yemen. The power vacuum created by Yemen's uncertain transitional period has drawn more supporters to the Houthis. Many of the formerly powerful parties, now disorganised with an unclear vision, have fallen out of favour with the public, making the Houthis—under their newly branded Ansar Allah name—all the more attractive. The alliance between Saleh and the Houthi broke down in late 2017, with armed clashes occurring in Sanaa from 28 November. Saleh declared the split in a televised statement on 2 December, calling on his supporters to take back the country and expressed openness to a dialogue with the Saudi-led coalition. Saleh was killed by the Houthis on the same day. In January 2021, the United States designated the Houthis a terrorist organization, creating fears of an aid shortage in Yemen, but this stance was reversed a month later after Joe Biden became president. On 17 January 2022, Houthi missile and drone attacks on UAE industrial targets set fuel trucks on fire and killed three foreign workers. This was the first specific attack to which the Houthi admitted, and the first to result in deaths. A response led by Saudi Arabia included a 21 January air strike on a detention centre in Yemen, resulting in at least 70 deaths. Following the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Houthis began to fire missiles at Israel and to attack ships off Yemen's coast in the Red Sea, which they say is in solidarity with the Palestinians and aiming to facilitate entry of humanitarian aid into the Gaza Strip. On 31 October Houthi forces launched ballistic missiles at Israel, which were shot down by Israel's Arrow missile defense system. Israeli officials claimed that this was the first ever combat to occur in space. In order to end the attacks in the Red Sea, the Houthis demanded a ceasefire in Gaza and an end to Israel's blockade of the Gaza Strip. In January 2024, the United States and the United Kingdom conducted airstrikes against multiple Houthi targets in Yemen, and the United States designated the Houthi as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). In February 2026, the Houthis announced that they had resumed attacks on ships in response to the recent US and Israeli airstrikes on Iran. On 28 March 2026 during the 2026 Iran war, a Houthi missile was launched from Yemen toward Beersheba in Southern Israel after its leader gave a speech. Hours later they confirmed launching a second missile. == Ideology ==

The Houthi movement follows a mixed ideology with religious, Yemeni nationalist, and big tent-populist elements, imitating Hezbollah. Outsiders have argued that the group's ideological tenets are often vague and self-contradictory and that many of its slogans do not accurately reflect its aims. According to American historian Bernard Haykel, the movement's founder, Hussein al-Houthi, was influenced by a variety of religious traditions and political ideologies, making it difficult to fit him or his followers into existing categories. The Houthis have portrayed themselves as a national resistance force, defending all Yemenis from outside aggression and influences, as champions against corruption, chaos, and extremism, and as representatives for the interests of marginalized tribal groups and the Zaydi sect. The group has also exploited the popular discontent over corruption and the reduction of government subsidies. In forming alliances, the Houthi movement has been at times opportunistic, partnering with countries it later declared as enemies, including the United States. Zaydis form about 25% of the population, with Sunnis comprising the other 75%. Zaydi-led governments ruled Yemen for a thousand years up until 1962. Although the group has framed its struggle in religious terms and put great importance on its Zaydi roots, the Houthis are not an exclusively Zaydi group. They have rejected their portrayal by others as a faction that is purportedly only interested in Zaydi-related issues. They have not publicly advocated for the restoration of the old Zaydi imamate, Many Zaydis also oppose the Houthis, regarding them as Iranian proxies and the Houthis' form of Zaydi revivalism as an attempt to "establish Shiite rule in the north of Yemen". The position of Saudi-backed Salafis and other Sunni groups in Yemen had steadily increased throughout the Republican era, as did the position of Sheikhs who sometimes cooperated with these Salafi groups for pragmatic reasons. The Salafis, who enjoyed considerable support from the Saleh regime, reportedly pursued an aggressive "policy of provocation" towards the Zaydis who inhabited the surrounding area, often accusing them of apostasy. The Yemeni government has often accused the Houthis of collaborating with al-Qaeda to undermine its control of southern Yemen. Governance shown in green In general, the Houthis' political ideology has gradually shifted from "heavily religious mobilisation and activism under Husayn to the more assertive and statesmanlike rhetoric under Abdulmalik", its current leader. After their takeover of northern Yemen in 2014, the Houthis remained committed to republicanism and continued to celebrate republican holidays. The Houthis have an ambivalent stance on the possible transformation of Yemen into a federation or the separation into two fully independent countries to solve the country's crisis. Though not opposed to these plans per se, they have declined any plans that would, in their eyes, marginalize the northern tribes politically. destabilising the government and stirring anti-American sentiment. In contrast, Hassan al-Homran, a former Houthi spokesperson, has said that "Ansar Allah supports the establishment of a civil state in Yemen. We want to build a striving modern democracy. Our goals are to fulfil our people's democratic aspirations in keeping with the Arab Spring movement." In an interview with Yemen Times, Hussein al-Bukhari, a Houthi insider, said that Houthis' preferable political system is a republic with elections where women can also hold political positions, and that they do not seek to form a cleric-led government after the model of Islamic Republic of Iran, for "we cannot apply this system in Yemen because the followers of the Shafi (Sunni) doctrine are bigger in number than the Zaydis". In 2018, the Houthi leadership proposed the establishment of a non-partisan transitional government composed of technocrats. Ali Akbar Velayati, International Affairs Advisor to Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, stated in October 2014 that "We are hopeful that Ansar-Allah has the same role in Yemen as Hezbollah has in eradicating the terrorists in Lebanon". Mohammed al-Houthi criticized the Trump-brokered Abraham Accords between Israel and the United Arab Emirates as "betrayal" against the Palestinians and the cause of pan-Arabism. Women's rights and freedom of expression The Houthis' treatment of women and their restrictions on the arts have been a subject of debate. On one side, the movement has stated that it defends women's rights to vote and take public offices, Journalist Robert F. Worth stated that "many secular-minded Yemenis seem unsure whether to view the Houthis as oppressors or potential allies." In general, the Houthis' policies are often decided on a local basis, and high-ranking Houthi officials are frequently incapable of checking regional officers' powers, making the treatment of civilians dependent on the area. Reports of abuse include Houthi supporters bullying or attacking the country's Jews. Houthi officials have denied any involvement in the harassment, asserting that under Houthi control, Jews in Yemen would be able to live and operate freely as any other Yemeni citizen. "Our problems are with Zionism and the occupation of Palestine, but Jews here have nothing to fear," said Fadl Abu Taleb, a spokesman for the Houthis. According to Israeli Druze politician Ayoob Kara, Houthi militants had given an ultimatum telling Jews to "convert to Islam or leave Yemen". In March 2016, a UAE-based newspaper reported that one of the Yemeni Jews who emigrated to Israel in 2016 was fighting with the Houthis. In the same month, a Kuwaiti newspaper, al-Watan, reported that a Yemeni Jew named Haroun al-Bouhi was killed in Najran while fighting with the Houthis against Saudi Arabia. The Kuwaiti newspaper added that the Yemeni Jews had a good relationship with Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was at that time allied with the Houthis and was fighting on different fronts with them. Al-Houthi has said through his fascicles: "Arab countries and all Islamic countries will not be safe from Jews except through their eradication and the elimination of their entity." A New York Times journalist reported being asked why they were speaking to a "dirty Jew" and that the Jews in the village were unable to communicate with their neighbors. Persecution of the Baháʼí community The Houthis have been accused of detaining, torturing, arresting, and holding incommunicado Baháʼí Faith members on charges of espionage and apostasy, which are punishable by death. Houthi leader Abdel-Malek al-Houthi has targeted Baháʼís in public speeches, and accused the followers of Baháʼí Faith of being "satanic" and agents for the western countries, citing a 2013 fatwa issued by Iran's supreme leader. == Membership and ranks ==

There is a difference between the al-Houthi family Membership of the group had between 1,000 and 3,000 fighters as of 2005 and between 2,000 and 10,000 fighters as of 2009. In 2010, the Yemen Post claimed that they had over 100,000 fighters. According to Houthi expert Ahmed Al-Bahri, by 2010, the Houthis had a total of 100,000–120,000 followers, including both armed fighters and unarmed loyalists. As of 2015, the group is reported to have attracted new supporters from outside their traditional demographics. == Activism and tactics ==

Political During their campaigns against both the Saleh and Hadi governments, Houthis used civil disobedience. Following the Yemeni government's decision on 13 July 2014 to increase fuel prices, Houthi leaders succeeded in organising massive rallies in the capital Sanaa to protest the decision and to demand resignation of the incumbent government of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi for "state-corruption". These protests developed into the 2014–2015 phase of the insurgency. Similarly, following 2015 Saudi-led airstrikes against Houthis which claimed civilians lives, Yemenis responded to the Abdul-Malik al-Houthi's call and took to streets of the capital, Sanaa, in tens of thousands to voice their anger at the Saudi invasion. The movement's expressed goals include combating economic underdevelopment and political marginalization in Yemen while seeking greater autonomy for Houthi-majority regions of the country. a genre of primarily tribal oral poetry embedded in Yemen's social fabric. The zamil, rooted in cultural tradition, has been weaponised by the Houthis as a tool of propaganda and remains one of the most popular and rapidly growing platforms of Houthi propaganda, sung by popular vocalists like Issa al-Laith and disseminated through various social media platforms including YouTube, Twitter and Telegram. The Spectator describes Houthi zawamil as its most successful part of their propaganda, stressing the movement's claimed virtues of piety, bravery and poverty in comparison with the corruption, wealth and hypocrisy of their adversaries, the Saudi-led coalition, and Arab states allied to Israel. The Houthis use radio as an effective tool for spreading influence, often seizing stations and confiscating equipment from outlets that fail to comply with their broadcast restrictions. In 2019, a Yemeni radio station aligned with the group raised 73.5 million Yemeni rials ($132,000) in a fundraising campaign for the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah. Military In 2009, U.S. Embassy sources have reported that Houthis used increasingly more sophisticated tactics and strategies in their conflict with the government as they gained more experience, and that they fought with religious fervor. == Armed strength ==

Aerial capabilities The Houthis exert partial control over the Yemeni Air Force, and possess key air bases such as Al-Dailami and Al Hudaydah. The Houthi air force consists of a single Northrop F-5 fighter jet, which was seized from the Yemeni government. The group also flew a Soviet-era Mikoyan MiG-29 during a military parade over Sanaa in 2023. They also operate Mil Mi-17 helicopters seized during the civil war. Missiles and drones Since established in 2003, Hezbollah's Unit 3800 has provided the Houthis training and strategic assistance. Iran's Quds Force has smuggled weapons to the Houthis since 2009, mainly using dhows and small fishing boats. It began smuggling missile components as well by 2015. Between 2004 and 2010, the Houthis frequently looted Yemeni government weapons caches, which included Scud and OTR-21 Tochka missiles obtained during the 1994 Yemeni civil war, due to weak government control over its arsenal. In 2017, the UN reported that about 70% of the Yemeni military's weapons were likely lost. In March 2015, the Saudi-led coalition claimed that it had destroyed most of the Houthis' missile capabilities during an air campaign, however Houthi missile attacks persisted. The Houthis, with technological help from Iran, began work on new missile variants by mid-2016, and by September they introduced the Burkan-1, a variant of the Scud with extended range. The following month, they introduced the Burkan-2H, which had a separating warhead. These weapons enabled the Houthis to strike targets deep in Saudi Arabia, including the capital Riyadh. After examining debris from the Burkan-2H, the UN concluded in December 2017 that the missile was supplied by Iran. Late in 2015, Houthis announced the local production of short-range ballistic missile Qaher-1 on Al-Masirah TV. On 19 May 2017 Saudi Arabia intercepted a Houthi-fired ballistic missile targeting a deserted area south of the Saudi capital and most populous city Riyadh. The Houthi militias have captured dozens of tanks and masses of heavy weaponry from the Yemeni Armed Forces. In February 2017, the Houthis revealed their drone program. Between mid-2018 and 2019, long-range ballistic missile attacks decreased in frequency, while the Houthis increasingly began using unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and artillery. UAVs were used for both attacks on military and civilian targets and reconnaissance. The Qasef UAV, which can carry up to of explosives, had been used in over a dozen Houthi attacks since 2016. The Sammad-2, Sammad-3, and Qasif-2K suicide drones were unveiled in 2019. Houthi drone attacks peaked in 2021, with many targeting Saudi Arabia. In June 2019, the Saudi-led coalition stated that the Houthis had launched 226 ballistic missiles during the insurgency so far. The 2019 Abqaiq–Khurais attack targeted the Saudi Aramco oil processing facilities at Abqaiq and Khurais in eastern Saudi Arabia on 14 September 2019. The Houthi movement claimed responsibility, though the United States has asserted that Iran was behind the attack. Iranian President Hassan Rouhani said that "Yemeni people are exercising their legitimate right of defence ... the attacks were a reciprocal response to aggression against Yemen for years." The Houthis unveiled the Palestine-2 missile in June 2024, which closely resembled the Iranian Fattah-1 and Kheibar Shekan missiles. According to the Houthis, the missile was locally made, a claim rejected by defense analysts. In September, the missile was fired at Israel and landed in an open area near Ben Gurion Airport, traveling a distance of in 11 minutes. The Houthis claimed that the rocket used two stage solid fuel, had a range of , and had a maximum speed of Mach 16. Israel and the US denied that the missile was hypersonic. Naval warfare capabilities In course of the Yemeni Civil War, the Houthis developed tactics to combat their opponents' navies. At first, their anti-ship operations were unsophisticated and limited to rocket-propelled grenades being shot at vessels close to the shore. In the fight to secure the port city of Aden in 2015, the Yemeni Navy was largely destroyed, including all missile-carrying vessels. A number of smaller patrol craft, landing craft, and Mi-14 and Ka-28 ASW helicopters did survive. Their existence under Houthi control would be brief, as the majority of them were destroyed in air attacks during the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen in 2015. As a result, the Houthis were left with AShMs (anti-ship missiles) stored ashore, but no launchers, and a smattering of small patrol ships. These, along with a number of locally manufactured small craft and miscellaneous vessels, were to form the foundation of the new naval warfare capabilities. The Saviz served in this capacity until it was damaged in an Israeli limpet mine attack in April 2021, when it was replaced by the . The Behshad, like the Saviz, is based on a cargo ship. Meanwhile, in Yemen, the Houthis, presumably with the assistance of Iranian engineers, converted a number of 10-meter-long patrol craft donated by the UAE to the Yemeni Coast Guard in the early 2010s into WBIEDs (water born improvised explosive devices). In 2017, one of these was used to attack the Saudi frigate Al Madinah. In the years since, three more WBIED designs have been built: the Tawfan-1, Tawfan-2, and Tawfan-3. 15 different types of naval mines were also produced. These are being increasingly deployed in the Red Sea, but have yet to be successful against naval vessels. The delivery of 120 km-ranged Noor and 200km-ranged Qader AShMs, 300km-ranged Khalij Fars ASBMs, and Fajr-4CL and "Al-Bahr Al-Ahmar" anti-ship rockets by Iran, which were unveiled during a 2022 Houthi parade, was arguably the most significant escalation in support. They combine long range, low cost, and high mobility with various types of guidance to create a weapon well-suited to the Houthi Navy. Though the Houthis' ASBM arsenal has yet to be tested, the Houthi Navy has had notable success with AShMs. On 1 October 2016, it was able to hit the UAE Navy's HSV-2 Swift hybrid catamaran with a single C-801/C-802 AShM fired from a shore battery. Although the ship managed to stay afloat, the damage was so severe that it had to be decommissioned. Though these attacks demonstrated the Houthis' limited ability to threaten vessels in Yemen's surrounding seas, the threat posed by them has since evolved significantly. Patrol boats were fitted with anti-tank guided missiles, about 30 coast-watcher stations were set up, disguised "spy dhows" were constructed, and the maritime radar of docked ships used to create targeting solutions for attacks. One of the most notable features of the Houthis' naval arsenal became its remote-controlled drone boats which carry explosives and ram enemy warships. Among these, the self-guiding Shark-33 explosive drone boats originated as patrol boats of the old Yemeni coast guard. In addition, the Houthis have begun to train combat divers on the Zuqar and Bawardi islands. == Alleged foreign support ==

Former Yemeni president Ali Abdullah Saleh had accused the Houthis of having ties to external backers, in particular the Iranian government; Saleh stated in an interview with The New York Times,The real reason they received unofficial support from Iran was because they repeat same slogan that is raised by Iran – death to America, death to Israel. We have another source for such accusations. The Iranian media repeats statements of support for these [Houthi] elements. They are all trying to take revenge against the USA on Yemeni territories. Such backing has been reported by diplomatic correspondents of major news outlets (e.g., Patrick Wintour of The Guardian), and has been the reported perspective of Yemeni governmental leaders militarily and politically opposing Houthi efforts (e.g., as of 2017, the UN-recognized, deposed Yemeni President Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who referred to the "Houthi rebels... as 'Iranian militias'". The Houthis in turn accused the Saleh government of being backed by Saudi Arabia and of using Al-Qaeda to repress them. Under the next President Hadi, Gulf Arab states accused Iran of backing the Houthis financially and militarily, though Iran denied this, and they were themselves backers of President Hadi. Despite confirming statements by Iranian and Yemeni officials in regards to Iranian support in the form of trainers, weaponry, and money, the Houthis denied reception of substantial financial or arm support from Iran. Joost Hiltermann of Foreign Policy wrote that whatever little material support the Houthis may have received from Iran, the intelligence and military support by US and UK for the Saudi Arabian-led coalition exceed that by many factors. In April 2015, the United States National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan remarked that "It remains our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen". Joost Hiltermann wrote that Iran does not control the Houthis' decision-making as evidenced by Houthis' flat rejection of Iran's demand not to take over Sanaa in 2015. Similarly, academics such as Marieke Brandt and Charles Schmitz have stated that the allegation that the Houthis are merely an Iranian proxy force has its roots in political narratives by Saleh, Saudi Arabia, the United States and other anti-Houthi forces. On the edition of 8 April 2015 of PBS Newshour, Secretary of State John Kerry stated that the US knew Iran was providing military support to the Houthi rebels in Yemen, adding that Washington "is not going to stand by while the region is destabilised". Phillip Smyth of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy told Business Insider that Iran views Shia groups in the Middle East as "integral elements to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)". Smyth claimed that there is a strong bond between Iran and the Houthi uprising working to overthrow the government in Yemen. According to Smyth, in many cases Houthi leaders go to Iran for ideological and religious education, and Iranian and Hezbollah leaders have been spotted on the ground advising the Houthi troops, and these Iranian advisers are likely responsible for training the Houthis to use the type of sophisticated guided missiles fired at the US Navy. To some commentators (e.g., Alex Lockie of Business Insider), Iran's support for the revolt in Yemen is "a good way to bleed the Saudis", a recognized regional and ideological rival of Iran. Essentially, from that perspective, Iran is backing the Houthis to fight against a Saudi-led coalition of Gulf States whose aim is to maintain control of Yemen. In early 2013, photographs released by the Yemeni government show the United States Navy and Yemen's security forces seizing a class of "either modern Chinese- or Iranian-made" shoulder-fired, heat-seeking anti-aircraft missiles "in their standard packaging", missiles "not publicly known to have been out of state control", raising concerns of Iran's arming of the rebels. In April 2016, the U.S. Navy intercepted a large Iranian arms shipment, seizing thousands of AK-47 rifles, rocket-propelled grenade launchers, and 0.50-caliber machine guns, a shipment described as likely headed to Yemen by the Pentagon. Based on 2019 reporting from The Jerusalem Post, the Houthis have also repeatedly used a drone nearly identical to Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company's Ababil-T drone in strikes against Saudi Arabia. In late October 2023, Israel stated that it had intercepted a "surface-to-surface long-range ballistic missile and two cruise missiles that were fired by the Houthi rebels in Yemen"; per reporting from Axios.com, this "was Israel's first-ever operational use of the Arrow system for intercepting ballistic missiles since the war began". The continuing interceptions and seizures of weapons at sea, attributed to Iranian origins, is a matter tracked by the United States Institute of Peace. Iranian IRGC involvement In 2013, an Iranian vessel was seized and discovered to be carrying Katyusha rockets, heat-seeking surface-to-air missiles, RPG-7s, Iranian-made night vision goggles and artillery systems that track land and navy targets 40km away. That was en route to the Houthis. In March 2017, Qasem Soleimani, head of Iran's Quds Force, met with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) regarding the "newly accelerated effort to empower the Houthis", including the provision of weapons and training. Soleimani was quoted as saying, "At this meeting, they agreed to increase the amount of help, through training, arms and financial support." Despite the Iranian government, and Houthis both officially denying Iranian support for the group. Brigadier General Ahmad Asiri, the spokesman of the Saudi-led coalition told Reuters that evidence of Iranian support was manifested in the Houthi use of Kornet anti-tank guided missiles which had never been in use with the Yemeni military or with the Houthis and that the arrival of Kornet missiles had only come at a later time. In the same month the IRGC had altered the routes used in transporting equipment to the Houthis by spreading out shipments to smaller vessels in Kuwaiti territorial waters in order to avoid naval patrols in the Gulf of Oman due to sanctions imposed, shipments reportedly included parts of missiles, launchers, and drugs. In May 2018, the United States imposed sanctions on Iran's IRGC, which was also listed as a designated terrorist organization by the US over its role in providing support for the Houthis, including help with manufacturing ballistic missiles used in attacks targeting cities and oil fields in Saudi Arabia. In August 2018, despite previous Iranian denial of military support for the Houthis, IRGC commander Nasser Shabani was quoted by the Iranian Fars News Agency as saying, "We (IRGC) told Yemenis [Houthi rebels] to strike two Saudi oil tankers, and they did it", on 7 August 2018. In response to Shabani's account, the IRGC released a statement saying that the quote was a "Western lie" and that Shabani was a retired commander, despite no actual reports of his retirement after 37 years in the IRGC, and media linked to the Iranian government confirming he was still enlisted with the IRGC. Furthermore, while the Houthis and the Iranian government have previously denied any military affiliation, In 2024, commanders from IRGC and Hezbollah were reported to be actively involved on the ground in Yemen, overseeing and directing Houthi attacks on Red Sea shipping, according to a report by Reuters. In 2024, July United States targeted new sanctions focusing on IRGC ties with the group. The Houthis dismissed the sanctions as pathetic and powerless. In 2024, Israel also placed sanctions on the Houthis. North Korean involvement In August 2018, Reuters reported that a confidential United Nations investigation had found the North Korean government had failed to discontinue its nuclear and missile delivery programs, and in conjunction, was "cooperating militarily with Syria" and was "trying to sell weapons to Yemen's Houthis". In August 2019, the South Korean National Intelligence Service had tracked the Scuds missiles (used to attack Saudi Arabia) back to North Korea. In January 2024, South Korea's Yonhap News Agency reported that North Korea had evidently shipped weapons to Houthis via Iran, based on the writings in Hangul script that were found on missiles launched towards Israel. North Korea considers the Houthis as a "resistance force". In March 2025, after the airstrikes by the US Air Force commenced, North Korean Ambassador to Egypt, Ma Dong-hee, who is also accredited to Yemen, condemned the attacks on the Houthis as a threat to regional and global order. Russian involvement It was noted by Newsweek in July 2024 that the Houthis were in possession of Russian-made P-800 Oniks missiles, and that the transfer had likely occurred via Syria and Iran. In July 2024, The Wall Street Journal reported that US officials saw increasing indications that Russia was considering arming the Houthis with advanced anti-ship missiles via Iranian smuggling routes in response to US support for Ukraine during Russia's invasion. However, it did not follow through due to pushback by the US and Saudi Arabia. In August 2024, Middle East Eye, citing a US official, reported that personnel of Russia's GRU were stationed in Houthi-controlled parts of Yemen to assist the militia's attacks on merchant ships. In October, The Wall Street Journal reported that Russia was supplying the Houthis with geospatial intelligence to target Western ships. Chinese involvement Two China based companies were sanctioned by America in 2024 for providing "dual-use materials and components needed to manufacture, maintain, and deploy an arsenal of advanced missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against U.S. and allied interests." A report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies stated that the Houthis were using weapons made in China for their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in exchange for Chinese ships having safe passage through the Sea. Another report from Israel's i24 News stated that China provided the Houthis with "advanced components and guidance equipment" for their missiles. The Institute for the Study of War reported that the Houthis supplement their weaponry through additional arms and dual use components sourced from Russia or China. For example, Yemeni border customs seized 800 Chinese-made drone propellers in a shipment bound for the Houthis, and in August 2024 had also purchased Hydrogen Fuel Cylinders from Chinese suppliers which aimed to increase the range and payloads of the Houthis' drones. According to The Wall Street Journal, the Houthis sent a group from Saada to Beijing to study Mandarin and manage the supply of drones and missile guidance systems from China and Hong Kong to Yemen. According to the United States Department of State, Chinese state-owned Chang Guang Satellite Technology Corporation has provided geospatial intelligence to the Houthis to target U.S. warships in the Red Sea. Salafi Jihadist involvement In 2024 a UN report states that Al-Shabaab and Houthis had a relationship that was "transactional or opportunistic, and not ideological", while a 2025 report states that their relationship was deepening and posed a threat to regional security. According to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, al Shabaab is provided with weapons and training while also receiving assistance in expanding the criminal enterprises that fund their operations. While the Houthis benefit by expanding their influence, strengthening Anti-American forces in the region, and weakening pro-American forces in the region. Additionally both sides assist each other in smuggling operations. Al Qaeda Arabia Province (AQAP) and Houthis had previously fought, but since 2022 they have had a ceasefire. As part of this ceasefire they have cooperated in attacks against Yemeni government, provided safe havens for each other in their territories, and cooperating in security and intelligence. == Human rights violations ==

between pro-Houthi forces, and forces loyal to ex-President Ali Abdullah Saleh. According to the Panel of Experts on Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140, the Houthis have carried out a wide range of human rights violations, including violations of international humanitarian law and abuse of women and children. Children as young as 13 have been arrested for "indecent acts" for alleged homosexual orientation or "political cases" when their families do not comply with Houthi ideology or regulations. Minors share cells with adult prisoners, and according to unspecified reports that the Panel has deemed "credible", boys held in Al-Shahid Al-Ahmar police station in Sana'a are systematically raped. Aside from the Panel of Experts, London-based Arabic newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat alleges that the Houthis have revived slavery in Yemen. Child soldiers and human shields Houthis have been accused of violations of international humanitarian law, such as using child soldiers, According to Human Rights Watch, Houthis intensified their recruitment of children in 2015. UNICEF mentioned that children with the Houthis and other armed groups in Yemen comprise up to a third of all fighters in Yemen. HRW has also accused the Houthis of interfering with the work of Yemen's human rights advocates and organizations. In 2009, HRW researcher Christoph Wilcke said that although the Republic of Yemen Government accused the Houthis of using civilians as human shields, HRW did not have enough evidence to conclude that the Houthis were intentionally doing so. Nonetheless, Wilcke stated that there may have been cases in which HRW was unable to document. and then released in April 2023 as part of a prisoner exchange deal between the former and the internationally recognized government of Yemen, said he felt like the four were human shields after the Houthis moved them to one of their military camps at Sanaa in October 2020 since it was an expected target of Saudi airstrikes. Hostage-taking According to the Human Rights Watch, the Houthis also use hostage taking as a tactic to generate profit. Human Rights Watch documented 16 cases in which Houthi authorities held people unlawfully, in large part to extort money from relatives or to exchange them for people held by opposing forces. Diversion of international aid The United Nations World Food Programme has accused the Houthis of diverting food aid and illegally removing food lorries from distribution areas, with rations sold on the open market or given to those not entitled to them. The WFP has also warned that aid could be suspended to areas of Yemen under the control of Houthi rebels due to "obstructive and uncooperative" Houthi leaders that have hampered the independent selection of beneficiaries. WFP spokesman Herve Verhoosel stated "The continued blocking by some within the Houthi leadership of the biometric registration ... is undermining an essential process that would allow us to independently verify that food is reaching ... people on the brink of famine". The WFP has warned that "unless progress is made on previous agreements we will have to implement a phased suspension of aid". The Norwegian Refugee Council has stated that they share the WPF's frustrations and reiterate to the Houthis to allow humanitarian agencies to distribute food. Abuse of women and girls The United Nations Human Rights Council published a report covering the period July 2019 to June 2020, which contained evidence of the Houthis' recruitment of boys as young as seven years old and the recruitment of 34 girls aged between 13 and 17 years of age, to act as spies, recruiters of other children, guards, medics, and members of a female fighting force. Twelve girls suffered sexual violence, arranged marriages, and child marriages as a result of their recruitment. Under Houthi-controlled areas, women have been blocked from travelling without a mahram (male guardian) even for essential healthcare. This also affected humanitarian operations by the United Nations in Yemen, forcing female staff to office jobs. The Houthis use allegations of prostitution as a tool for public defamation against Yemeni women, including those in the diaspora engaged in politics, civil society, or human rights activism, alongside threats to individuals and families. Detained women have been sexually assaulted, subjected to virginity tests, and often blocked from accessing essential goods. Torture of female detainees is also carried out by the Zaynabiyat, the Houthi female police wing. The UN Panel of Experts on Yemen discovered instances of Houthis' rape of female detainees to "purify" them, as a punishment, or to coerce confessions. The Panel documented cases where Houthis forced detained women to become sex slaves who also collect information for the Houthis. Documented instances include in 2021, where a female detainee was forced to have sexual intercourse with multiple men at Houthi detention centers as part of her preparation to be forced as a sex slave for important clients while also obtaining information. The Panel also received information about another detainee who was forced to become a prostitute to gather information for the Houthis in return for their release, and another similar instance had been documented in 2019. After being released, women may face social ostracism, including one who was killed for bringing shame upon her family. Anadolu Agency reported on Yemen-based rights groups documenting 1,181 violations against women committed by Houthis from 2017 to 2020. Yemeni activist Samira Abdullah al-Houry was held in a Houthi jail for three months and gave numerous interviews after her release on alleged torture and rape by Houthi guards. Her testimony contributed to UN Security Council sanctions being imposed on two Houthi security officials in February 2021. It was later alleged that she admitted some of her testimony was untrue, and she had embellished claims at the request of Saudi officials. Abuse of LGBTQ+ people According to Amnesty International on 9 February 2024, two Houthi-run courts in Yemen sentenced 48 individuals either to death, flogging, or prison over charges related to same-sex conduct in the past month. Abuse of migrants According to Human Rights Watch, Houthi militias have "beaten, raped, and tortured detained migrants and asylum seekers from the Horn of Africa." UN experts have warned that female migrants face sexual violence, forced labor, and forced drug trafficking by smugglers who collaborate with the Houthi-controlled Yemen Immigration, Passport and Nationality Authority (IPNA). == Governance ==

According to a 2009 leaked US Embassy cable, Houthis have reportedly established courts and prisons in areas they control. They impose their own laws on local residents, demand protection money, and dispense rough justice by ordering executions. AP's reporter, Ahmad al-Haj argued that the Houthis were winning hearts and minds by providing security in areas long neglected by the Yemeni government while limiting the arbitrary and abusive power of influential sheikhs. According to the Civic Democratic Foundation, Houthis help resolve conflicts between tribes and reduce the number of revenge killings in areas they control. The US ambassador believed that the reports that explain Houthi role as arbitrating local disputes were likely. == Public opinion ==

A survey conducted in 2024 by the Sanaa Center for Strategic Studies found that only 8% of Yemenis in Houthi-controlled areas had a positive view of the Houthi movement, compared to 3% in both government-controlled areas and contested areas. Conversely, 20%, 34%, and 39% in these areas, respectively, expressed negative views. == Sanctions ==

In January 2024, the US and UK imposed sanctions on key Houthi figures, including the defense minister, in response to the Houthi attacks on international shipping in the Red Sea that escalated in November 2023. The new sanctions were imposed in addition to the existing sanctions against 11 Houthi individuals and 2 entities, which remained in force. On 28 April 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned three shipping companies for their role in delivering oil products to the Houthis. The deliveries took place via the Houthi-controlled port of Ras Isa. On 8 April 2026, Costa Rica designated the Houthis as a terrorist organization. == United States attacks on Yemen ==

The U.S. launched a military campaign against Yemen in mid-March 2025, which it said was directed at Houthi military and strategic targets. The Houthis said women and children were killed in the attacks. The Houthis, backed by Iran, state that their operations, which have affected global trade, are in solidarity with Palestinians in Gaza. == See also ==