Versailles train crash Following
King Louis-Philippe I's celebrations at the
Palace of Versailles, a train returning to Paris crashed in May 1842 at
Meudon after the leading locomotive broke an axle. The carriages behind piled into the wrecked engines and caught fire. At least 55 passengers were killed trapped in the locked carriages, including the explorer
Jules Dumont d'Urville. This accident is known in France as the . The accident was witnessed by the British locomotive engineer
Joseph Locke and widely reported in Britain. It was discussed extensively by engineers, who sought an explanation. The derailment had been the result of a broken
locomotive axle.
Rankine's investigation of broken axles in Britain highlighted the importance of stress concentration, and the mechanism of crack growth with repeated loading. His and other papers suggesting a crack growth mechanism through repeated stressing, however, were ignored, and fatigue failures occurred at an ever-increasing rate on the expanding railway system. Other spurious theories seemed to be more acceptable, such as the idea that the metal had somehow "crystallized". The notion was based on the crystalline appearance of the fast fracture region of the crack's surface, but ignored the fact that the metal was already highly crystalline.
de Havilland Comet Two
de Havilland Comet passenger jets broke up in mid-air and crashed within a few months of each other in 1954. As a result, systematic tests were conducted on a
fuselage immersed and pressurised in a water tank. After the equivalent of 3,000 flights, investigators at the
Royal Aircraft Establishment (RAE) were able to conclude that the crash had been due to failure of the pressure cabin at the forward
Automatic Direction Finder window in the roof. This 'window' was in fact one of two apertures for the
aerials of an electronic navigation system in which opaque
fibreglass panels took the place of the window 'glass'. The failure was a result of metal fatigue caused by the repeated pressurisation and de-pressurisation of the aircraft cabin. Also, the supports around the windows were riveted, not bonded, as the original specifications for the aircraft had called for. The problem was exacerbated by the
punch rivet construction technique employed. Unlike drill riveting, the imperfect nature of the hole created by punch riveting caused manufacturing defect cracks which may have caused the start of fatigue cracks around the rivet. The Comet's pressure cabin had been designed to a
safety factor comfortably in excess of that required by British Civil Airworthiness Requirements (2.5 times the cabin
proof test pressure as opposed to the requirement of 1.33 times and an ultimate load of 2.0 times the cabin pressure) and the accident caused a revision in the estimates of the safe loading strength requirements of airliner pressure cabins. In addition, it was discovered that the
stresses around pressure cabin apertures were considerably higher than had been anticipated, especially around sharp-cornered cut-outs, such as windows. As a result, all future
jet airliners would feature windows with rounded corners, greatly reducing the stress concentration. This was a noticeable distinguishing feature of all later models of the Comet. Investigators from the RAE told a public inquiry that the sharp corners near the Comets' window openings acted as initiation sites for cracks. The skin of the aircraft was also too thin, and cracks from manufacturing stresses were present at the corners.
Alexander L. Kielland oil platform capsizing Alexander L. Kielland was a Norwegian
semi-submersible drilling rig that
capsized whilst working in the
Ekofisk oil field in March 1980, killing 123 people. The capsizing was the worst disaster in Norwegian waters since World War II. The rig, approximately 320 km east of
Dundee, Scotland, was owned by the Stavanger Drilling Company of Norway and was on hire to the United States company
Phillips Petroleum at the time of the disaster. In driving rain and mist, early in the evening of 27 March 1980 more than 200 men were off duty in the accommodation on
Alexander L. Kielland. The wind was gusting to 40 knots with waves up to 12 m high. The rig had just been winched away from the
Edda production platform. Minutes before 18:30 those on board felt a 'sharp crack' followed by 'some kind of trembling'. Suddenly the rig heeled over 30° and then stabilised. Five of the six anchor cables had broken, with one remaining cable preventing the rig from capsizing. The
list continued to increase and at 18:53 the remaining anchor cable snapped and the rig turned upside down. In March 1981, the investigative report concluded that the rig collapsed owing to a fatigue crack in one of its six bracings (bracing D-6), which connected the collapsed D-leg to the rest of the rig. This was traced to a small 6 mm fillet weld which joined a non-load-bearing flange plate to this D-6 bracing. This flange plate held a sonar device used during drilling operations. The poor profile of the fillet weld contributed to a reduction in its fatigue strength. Further, the investigation found considerable amounts of
lamellar tearing in the flange plate and cold cracks in the butt weld. Cold cracks in the welds, increased stress concentrations due to the weakened flange plate, the poor weld profile, and cyclical stresses (which would be common in the
North Sea), seemed to collectively play a role in the rig's collapse.
Others • The 1862
Hartley Colliery Disaster was caused by the fracture of a steam engine beam and killed 204 people. • The 1919 Boston
Great Molasses Flood has been attributed to a fatigue failure. • The 1948
Northwest Airlines Flight 421 crash due to fatigue failure in a wing spar root • The
1957 "Mt. Pinatubo", presidential plane of
Philippine President Ramon Magsaysay, crashed due to engine failure caused by metal fatigue. • The 1965 capsize of the UK's first offshore oil platform, the
Sea Gem, was due to fatigue in part of the suspension system linking the hull to the legs. • The 1968
Los Angeles Airways Flight 417 lost one of its main rotor blades due to fatigue failure. • The 1968
MacRobertson Miller Airlines Flight 1750 lost a wing due to improper maintenance leading to fatigue failure. • The 1969
F-111A crash due to a fatigue failure of the wing pivot fitting from a material defect resulted in the development of the
damage-tolerant approach for fatigue design. • The
1977 Dan-Air Boeing 707 crash caused by fatigue failure resulting in the loss of the right horizontal stabilizer. • The 1979
American Airlines Flight 191 crashed after engine separation attributed to fatigue damage in the pylon structure holding the engine to the wing, caused by improper maintenance procedures. • The 1980
LOT Flight 7 crashed due to fatigue in an engine turbine shaft resulting in engine disintegration leading to loss of control. • The 1985
Japan Airlines Flight 123 crashed after the aircraft lost its vertical stabilizer due to faulty repairs on the rear bulkhead. • The 1988
Aloha Airlines Flight 243 suffered an explosive decompression at after a fatigue failure. • The 1989
United Airlines Flight 232 lost its tail engine due to fatigue failure in a fan disk hub. • The 1992
El Al Flight 1862 lost both engines on its right-wing due to fatigue failure in the pylon mounting of the #3 Engine. • The 1998
Eschede train disaster was caused by fatigue failure of a single composite wheel. • The 2000
Hatfield rail crash was likely caused by
rolling contact fatigue. • The 2000
recall of 6.5 million Firestone tires on Ford Explorers originated from fatigue crack growth leading to separation of the tread from the tire. • The 2002
China Airlines Flight 611 disintegrated in-flight due to fatigue failure. • The 2005
Chalk's Ocean Airways Flight 101 lost its right wing due to fatigue failure brought about by inadequate maintenance practices. • The 2009
Viareggio train derailment due to fatigue failure. • The
2009 Sayano–Shushenskaya power station accident due to metal fatigue of turbine mountings. • The 2017
Air France Flight 66 had in-flight engine failure due to cold dwell fatigue fracture in the fan hub. • The 2023
Titan submersible implosion is thought to have occurred due to fatigue
delamination of the carbon-fibre used for the hull. ==See also==