Introduction The earliest production aircraft, registered G-ALYP ("Yoke Peter"), first flew on 9 January 1951 and was subsequently lent to BOAC for development flying by its Comet Unit. On 22 January 1952, the fifth production aircraft, registered G-ALYS, received the first Certificate of Airworthiness awarded to a Comet, six months ahead of schedule. On 2 May 1952, as part of BOAC's route-proving trials, G-ALYP took off on the world's first jetliner flight with fare-paying passengers and inaugurated scheduled service from
London to
Johannesburg. The final Comet from BOAC's initial order, registered G-ALYZ, began flying in September 1952 and carried cargo along South American routes while simulating passenger schedules. Comet 1 at
Entebbe Airport, Uganda in 1952, this aircraft later crashed as
BOAC Flight 115 in the same year.
Prince Philip returned from the Helsinki Olympic Games with G-ALYS on 4 August 1952.
Queen Elizabeth, the Queen Mother,
Elizabeth II and
Princess Margaret were guests on a special flight of the Comet on 30 June 1953 hosted by Sir Geoffrey and Lady de Havilland. Flights on the Comet were about twice as fast as advanced piston-engined aircraft such as the
Douglas DC-6 ( vs , respectively), and a faster rate of climb further cut flight times. In August 1953 BOAC scheduled the nine-stop London to
Tokyo flights by Comet for 36 hours, compared to 86 hours and 35 minutes on its
Argonaut (a DC-4 variant) piston airliner. (
Pan Am's DC-6B was scheduled for 46 hours 45 minutes.) The five-stop flight from London to Johannesburg was scheduled for 21 hr 20 min. In their first year, Comets carried 30,000 passengers. As the aircraft could be profitable with a load factor as low as 43 per cent, commercial success was expected. The Ghost engines allowed the Comet to fly above weather that competitors had to fly through. They ran smoothly and were less noisy than piston engines, had low maintenance costs and were fuel-efficient above . In summer 1953, eight BOAC Comets left London each week: three to Johannesburg, two to Tokyo, two to
Singapore and one to
Colombo. In 1953, the Comet appeared to have achieved success for de Havilland.
Popular Mechanics wrote that Britain had a lead of three to five years on the rest of the world in jetliners. A slightly longer version of the Comet 1 with more powerful engines, the Comet 2, was being developed, and orders were placed by
Air India,
British Commonwealth Pacific Airlines, Qantas was interested in the Comet 1 but concluded that a version with more range and better takeoff performance was needed for the London to Canberra route.
Early hull losses On 26 October 1952, the Comet suffered its first hull loss when
BOAC Flight 115 departing Rome's
Ciampino airport failed to become airborne and ran into rough ground at the end of the runway. Two passengers sustained minor injuries, but the aircraft, G-ALYZ, was a write-off. On 3 March 1953, a new
Canadian Pacific Airlines Comet 1A, registered CF-CUN and named
Empress of Hawaii, failed to become airborne while attempting a night takeoff from
Karachi, Pakistan, on a delivery flight to
Australia. The aircraft plunged into a dry drainage canal and collided with an embankment, killing all five crew and six passengers on board. The accident was the first fatal jetliner crash. and
wing fences were added to control spanwise flow. A fictionalised investigation into the Comet's takeoff accidents was the subject of the novel
Cone of Silence (1959) by
Arthur David Beaty, a former BOAC captain.
Cone of Silence was made into a
film in 1960, and Beaty also recounted the story of the Comet's takeoff accidents in a chapter of his non-fiction work,
Strange Encounters: Mysteries of the Air (1984). The Comet's second fatal accident occurred on 2 May 1953, when
BOAC Flight 783, a Comet 1, registered G-ALYV, crashed in a severe
thundersquall six minutes after taking off from
Calcutta-Dum Dum airport, India, killing all 43 on board. Witnesses observed the wingless Comet on fire plunging into the village of Jagalgori, leading investigators to suspect structural failure. The inquiry's recommendations revolved around the enforcement of stricter speed limits during turbulence, and two significant design changes also resulted: all Comets were equipped with
weather radar and the "Q feel" system was introduced, which ensured that control column forces (invariably called stick forces) would be proportional to control loads. This
artificial feel was the first of its kind to be introduced in any aircraft. and investigators suggested that this might have contributed to the pilot's alleged over-stressing of the aircraft; Comet chief test pilot John Cunningham contended that the jetliner flew smoothly and was highly responsive in a manner consistent with other de Havilland aircraft.
Comet disasters of 1954 Just over a year later, Rome's Ciampino airport, the site of the first Comet hull loss, was the origin of a more-disastrous Comet flight. On 10 January 1954, 20 minutes after taking off from Ciampino, the first production Comet, G-ALYP, broke up in mid-air while operating
BOAC Flight 781 and crashed into the Mediterranean off the Italian island of
Elba with the loss of all 35 on board. With no witnesses to the disaster and only partial radio transmissions as incomplete evidence, no obvious reason for the crash could be deduced. Engineers at de Havilland immediately recommended 60 modifications aimed at any possible design flaw, while the Abell Committee met to determine potential causes of the crash. BOAC also voluntarily grounded its Comet fleet pending investigation into the causes of the accident.
Abell Committee Court of Inquiry Media attention centred on potential
sabotage; During the investigation, the
Royal Navy conducted recovery operations. The first pieces of wreckage were discovered on 12 February 1954 and the search continued until September 1954, by which time 70 per cent by weight of the main structure, 80 per cent of the power section, and 50 per cent of the aircraft's systems and equipment had been recovered. The forensic reconstruction effort had just begun when the Abell Committee reported its findings. No apparent fault in the aircraft was found, and the British government decided against opening a further public inquiry into the accident. On 8 April 1954, Comet G-ALYY ("Yoke Yoke"), on charter to
South African Airways, was on a leg from Rome to
Cairo (of a longer route,
SA Flight 201 from London to Johannesburg), when it crashed in the Mediterranean near
Naples with the loss of all 21 passengers and crew on board. This time, the entire fuselage was tested in a dedicated water tank that was built specifically at Farnborough to accommodate its full length. G-ALYU burst open. Hall, Geoffrey de Havilland and Bishop were immediately called to the scene, where the water tank was drained to reveal that the fuselage had ripped open at a bolt hole, forward of the forward left escape hatch cut out. The failure then occurred longitudinally along a fuselage stringer at the widest point of the fuselage and through a cut out for an escape hatch. The skin thickness was discovered to be insufficient to distribute the load across the structure, leading to overloading of fuselage frames adjacent to fuselage cut outs. (Cohen Inquiry accident report Fig 7). The fuselage frames did not have sufficient strength to prevent the crack from propagating. Although the fuselage failed after a number of cycles that represented three times the life of G-ALYP at the time of the accident, it was still much earlier than expected. A further test reproduced the same results. Based on these findings, Comet 1 structural failures could be expected at anywhere from 1,000 to 9,000 cycles. Before the Elba accident, G-ALYP had made 1,290 pressurised flights, while G-ALYY had made 900 pressurised flights before crashing. Dr P. B. Walker, Head of the Structures Department at the RAE, said he was not surprised by this, noting that the difference was about three to one, and previous experience with metal fatigue suggested a total range of nine to one between experiment and outcome in the field could result in failure. At the opposite port forward corner of the same window, a small crack resulting from manufacturing damage - that had been repaired at the time of construction - was also located along the failure, but the investigation found no evidence of metal fatigue at this point. Once the crack initiated the skin failed from the point of the ADF cut out and propagated downward and rearward, resulting in an explosive decompression. Principal investigator Hall accepted the RAE's conclusion of design and construction flaws as the likely explanation for G-ALYU's structural failure after 3,060 pressurisation cycles. File:DH.106 Comet 1 G-ALYW BOAC LAP (2) 12.09.54 edited-3.jpg|BOAC Comet 1
cocooned and stored in the maintenance area at London Heathrow Airport in September 1954 File:Comet G-ALYU escape hatch failure.png|Image from the Cohen Inquiry Report showing fuselage failure under water pressure test of Comet 1 G-ALYU. Note intact escape hatch window frame File:Fuselage of de Havilland Comet Airliner G-ALYP.JPG|The
ADF antenna penetration that failed on G-ALYP. On display at the
Science Museum in London File:Comet G-ALYP ADF windows.png|Image (Fig 12) from the Cohen Inquiry showing the location of the ADF antenna cut out 'windows' in the roof above the cockpit of Comet 1 G-ALYP
Earlier structural indications The issue of the lightness of Comet 1 construction (in order not to tax the relatively low-thrust de Havilland Ghost engines), had been noted by de Havilland test pilot John Wilson, while flying the prototype during a Farnborough flypast in 1949. On the flight, he was accompanied by Chris Beaumont, Chief Test Pilot of the de Havilland Engine Company who stood in the entrance to the cockpit behind the Flight Engineer. He stated "Every time we pulled 2 1/2-3G to go around the corner, Chris found that the floor on which he was standing, bulging up and there was a loud bang at that speed from the nose of the aircraft where the skin 'panted' (flexed), so when we heard this bang we knew without checking the airspeed indicator, that we were doing 340 knots. In later years we realised that these were the indications of how flimsy the structure really was."
Square window myths Despite findings of the Cohen Inquiry, a number of myths have evolved around the cause of the Comet 1's accidents. Most commonly quoted are the 'square' passenger windows. While the report noted that stress around fuselage cut-outs, emergency exits and windows was found to be much higher than expected due to De Havilland's assumptions and testing methods the passenger windows' shape has been commonly misunderstood and cited as a cause of the fuselage failure. In fact the mention of 'windows' in the Cohen report's conclusion refers specifically to the origin point of failure in the ADF Antenna cut-out 'windows', located above the cockpit, not passenger windows. The shape of the passenger windows was not indicated in any failure mode detailed in the accident report and was not viewed as a contributing factor. A number of other pressurised airliners of the period including the Boeing 377 Stratocruiser, Douglas DC-7, and DC-8 had larger and more 'square' windows than the Comet 1, and experienced no such failures. In fact, the Comet 1's window general shape resembles a slightly larger Boeing 737 window mounted horizontally. They are rectangular
not square, have rounded corners and are within 5% of the radius of the Boeing 737 windows and virtually identical to modern airliners. "DeHavilland went to oval windows on the subsequent Marks because it was easier to Redux them in (use adhesive) – nothing to do with the
stress concentration and it's purely to remove rivets." (from the structure)
Response In responding to the report de Havilland stated: "Now that the danger of high level fatigue in pressure cabins has been generally appreciated, de Havillands will take adequate measures to deal with this problem. To this end we propose to use thicker gauge materials in the pressure cabin area and to strengthen and redesign windows and cut outs and so lower the general stress to a level at which local stress concentrations either at rivets and bolt holes or as such may occur by reason of cracks caused accidentally during manufacture or subsequently, will not constitute a danger." The Cohen inquiry closed on 24 November 1954, having "found that the basic design of the Comet was sound", Following the Comet enquiry, aircraft were designed to "
fail-safe" or
safe-life standards, though several subsequent catastrophic fatigue failures, such as
Aloha Airlines Flight 243 of April 28, 1988 have occurred.
Resumption of service With the discovery of the structural problems of the early series, all remaining Comets were withdrawn from service, while de Havilland launched a major effort to build a new version that would be both larger and stronger. All outstanding orders for the Comet 2 were cancelled by airline customers. All production Comet 2s were also modified with thicker gauge skin to better distribute loads and alleviate the fatigue problems (most of these served with the
RAF as the Comet C2); a programme to produce a Comet 2 with more powerful Avons was delayed. The prototype Comet 3 first flew in July 1954 and was tested in an unpressurised state pending completion of the Cohen inquiry. Development flying and route proving with the Comet 3 allowed accelerated certification of what was destined to be the most successful variant of the type, the Comet 4. All airline customers for the Comet 3 subsequently cancelled their orders and switched to the Comet 4, Capital's order included 10 Comet 4As, a variant modified for short-range operations with a stretched fuselage and short wings, lacking the pinion (outboard wing) fuel tanks of the Comet 4. The base price of a new Comet 4 was roughly £1.14 million (£ million in ). The Comet 4 enabled BOAC to inaugurate the first regular jet-powered transatlantic services on 4 October 1958 between London and New York (albeit still requiring a fuel stop at
Gander International Airport, Newfoundland, on westward North Atlantic crossings). and in 1960 began flying
Douglas DC-8's on its transatlantic routes as well. The American jets were larger, faster, longer-ranged and more cost-effective than the Comet. After analysing route structures for the Comet, BOAC reluctantly cast-about for a successor, and in 1956 entered into an agreement with Boeing to purchase the 707. The Comet 4 was ordered by two other airlines:
Aerolíneas Argentinas took delivery of six Comet 4s from 1959 to 1960, using them between Buenos Aires and Santiago, New York and Europe, and
East African Airways received three new Comet 4s from 1960 to 1962 and operated them to the United Kingdom and to Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda. The Comet 4A ordered by Capital Airlines was instead built for BEA as the Comet 4B, with a further fuselage stretch of and seating for 99 passengers. The first Comet 4B flew on 27 June 1959 and BEA began Tel Aviv to London-Heathrow services on 1 April 1960. The last Comet 4 variant, the Comet 4C, first flew on 31 October 1959 and entered service with Mexicana in 1960. The Comet 4C had the Comet 4B's longer fuselage and the longer wings and extra fuel tanks of the original Comet 4, which gave it a longer range than the 4B. Ordered by
Kuwait Airways,
Middle East Airlines,
Misrair (later Egyptair), and
Sudan Airways, it was the most popular Comet variant. File:MSA Comet Groves.jpg|
Malaysia-Singapore Airlines Comet 4 at
Kai Tak Airport in 1966 File:United Arab Airlines Comet Soderstrom.jpg|
United Arab Airlines Comet 4C at
Geneva Airport in 1968 File:DH.106 Comet 5H-AAF EAA LHR 10.05.64 edited-3.jpg|Comet 4 of East African Airways at London Heathrow in 1964
Later service in
Leicestershire, England In 1959, BOAC began shifting its Comets from transatlantic routes and released the Comet to associate companies, making the Comet 4's ascendancy as a premier airliner brief. Besides the 707 and DC-8, the introduction of the
Vickers VC10 allowed competing aircraft to assume the high-speed, long-range passenger service role pioneered by the Comet. In 1960, as part of a government-backed consolidation of the British aerospace industry, de Havilland itself was acquired by Hawker Siddeley, within which it became a wholly owned division. In the 1960s, orders declined, a total of 76 Comet 4s being delivered from 1958 to 1964. In November 1965, BOAC retired its Comet 4s from revenue service; other operators continued commercial passenger flights with the Comet until 1981.
Dan-Air played a significant role in the fleet's later history and, at one time, owned all 49 remaining airworthy civil Comets. On 14 March 1997 a Comet 4C
serial XS235 and named
Canopus, ==Legacy==