National bank currency was considered inelastic because it was based on the fluctuating value of U.S. Treasury bonds. If Treasury bond prices declined, a national bank had to reduce the amount of currency it had in circulation by either refusing to make new loans or by calling in loans it had made already. The related liquidity problem was largely caused by an immobile, pyramidal reserve system, in which nationally chartered rural/agriculture-based banks were required to set aside their reserves in federal reserve city banks, which were required to have reserves in central city banks. Rural banks exploited their reserves during the planting season to finance full plantings. Then, during harvest season, they used profits from loan interest payments to restore and grow their reserves. A national bank whose reserves were being drained would replace them by selling stocks and bonds, borrowing from a
clearing house, or calling in loans. With little private deposit insurance and no federal deposit insurance, if a bank was rumored to be having liquidity problems, this might cause many people to
withdraw their funds. Because of the crescendo effect (repeated situations of moral distress) of banks that lent more than their assets could cover, the United States economy experienced a series of financial panics during the last quarter of the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century.
The National Monetary Commission, 1907-1913 Prior to a particularly severe
panic in 1907, there was a motivation for renewed demands for banking and currency reform. The following year, Congress enacted the
Aldrich–Vreeland Act, which provided for an emergency currency and established the
National Monetary Commission to study banking and currency reform. The chief of the bipartisan National Monetary Commission was
Nelson Aldrich, a financial expert and Senate Republican leader. Aldrich set up two commissions – one to study the American monetary system in depth and the other, headed by Aldrich, to study and report on the European central-banking systems. There,
Paul Warburg of Kuhn, Loeb, & Co. directed the proceedings and wrote the primary features of what would be called the Aldrich Plan. Warburg would later write that "The matter of a uniform discount rate (interest rate) was discussed and settled at Jekyll Island." Vanderlip wrote in his 1935 autobiography
From Farmboy to Financier: Aldrich fought for a private monopoly with little government influence, but conceded that the government should be represented on the board of directors. Aldrich then presented what was commonly called the "Aldrich Plan" – which called for establishment of a "National Reserve Association" – to the National Monetary Commission. Because the bill was introduced by Aldrich, who was considered by southern and western states the epitome of the "Eastern establishment", the bill received little support. It was derided by southerners and westerners who believed that wealthy families and large corporations ran the country and would thus run the proposed National Reserve Association. There was also Republican opposition to the Aldrich Plan. Republican Sen.
Robert M. La Follette and Rep.
Charles Lindbergh Sr. both spoke out against the favoritism that they contended the bill granted to Wall Street. "The Aldrich Plan is the Wall Street Plan ... I have alleged that there is a 'Money Trust'", said Lindbergh. "The Aldrich plan is a scheme plainly in the interest of the Trust". In response, Rep.
Arsène Pujo, a Democrat from Louisiana, obtained congressional authorization to form and chair a subcommittee (the
Pujo Committee) within the House Committee Banking Committee, to conduct investigative hearings on the alleged "Money Trust". The hearings continued for a full year and were led by the subcommittee's counsel, Democratic lawyer
Samuel Untermyer, who later also assisted in drafting the
Federal Reserve Act. The "Pujo hearings" convinced much of the populace that America's money largely rested in the hands of a select few on Wall Street. The Subcommittee issued a report saying: If by a 'money trust' is meant an established and well-defined identity and community of interest between a few leaders of finance ... which has resulted in a vast and growing concentration of control of money and credit in the hands of a comparatively few men ... the condition thus described exists in this country today ... To us the peril is manifest ... When we find ... the same man a director in a half dozen or more banks and trust companies all located in the same section of the same city, doing the same class of business and with a like set of associates similarly situated all belonging to the same group and representing the same class of interests, all further pretense of competition is useless. ... Even Aldrich stated strong opposition to the currency plan passed by the House. However, the former point was also made by Republican Representative
Charles Lindbergh Sr. of Minnesota, one of the most vocal opponents of the bill, who on the day the House agreed to the Federal Reserve Act told his colleagues: But the Federal reserve board have no power whatever to regulate the rates of interest that bankers may charge borrowers of money. This is the Aldrich bill in disguise, the difference being that by this bill the Government issues the money, whereas by the Aldrich bill the issue was controlled by the banks ... Wall Street will control the money as easily through this bill as they have heretofore.(Congressional Record, v. 51, page 1447, Dec. 22, 1913) Republican Congressman
Victor Murdock of Kansas, who voted for the bill, told Congress on that same day: I do not blind myself to the fact that this measure will not be effectual as a remedy for a great national evil – the concentrated control of credit ... The Money Trust has not passed [died] ... You rejected the specific remedies of the Pujo committee, chief among them, the prohibition of interlocking directorates. He [your enemy] will not cease fighting ... at some half-baked enactment ... You struck a weak half-blow, and time will show that you have lost. You could have struck a full blow and you would have won. In order to get the Federal Reserve Act passed, Wilson needed the support of populist
William Jennings Bryan, who was credited with ensuring Wilson's nomination by dramatically throwing his support Wilson's way at the 1912 Democratic convention. Bryan and the agrarians wanted a government-owned central bank which could print paper money whenever Congress wanted, and thought the plan gave bankers too much power to print the government's currency. Wilson sought the advice of prominent lawyer
Louis Brandeis to make the plan more amenable to the agrarian wing of the party; Brandeis agreed with Bryan. Wilson convinced them that because Federal Reserve notes were obligations of the government and because the president would appoint the members of the Federal Reserve Board, the plan fit their demands. When Wilson signed the Federal Reserve Act on December 23, 1913, he said he felt grateful for having had a part "in completing a work ... of lasting benefit for the country," knowing that it took a great deal of compromise and expenditure of his own political capital to get it enacted. This was in keeping with the general plan of action he made in his First Inaugural Address on March 4, 1913, in which he stated: We shall deal with our economic system as it is and as it may be modified, not as it might be if we had a clean sheet of paper to write upon; and step-by-step we shall make it what it should be, in the spirit of those who question their own wisdom and seek counsel and knowledge, not shallow self-satisfaction or the excitement of excursions we can not tell. While a system of 12 regional banks was designed so as not to give eastern bankers too much influence over the new bank, in practice, the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York became "
first among equals". The New York Fed, for example, is solely responsible for conducting
open market operations, at the direction of the Federal Open Market Committee. Democratic Congressman
Carter Glass sponsored and wrote the eventual legislation, However, the 1914 report of the Reserve Bank Organization Committee (RBOC), which clearly laid out the rationale for their decisions on establishing Reserve Bank districts in 1914, showed that it was based almost entirely upon current correspondent banking relationships. To quell
Elihu Root's objections to possible inflation, the passed bill included provisions that the bank must hold at least 40% of its outstanding loans in gold. (In later years, to stimulate short-term economic activity, Congress would amend the act to allow more discretion in the amount of gold that must be redeemed by the Bank.) Critics of the time (later joined by economist
Milton Friedman) suggested that Glass's legislation was almost entirely based on the Aldrich Plan that had been derided as giving too much power to elite bankers. Glass denied copying Aldrich's plan. In 1922, he told Congress, "no greater misconception was ever projected in this Senate Chamber." ==Operations, 1915-1951==